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Summary
The thesis discusses Anglo-Soviet relations - considered as a political 
inter-action - between the years 1917* when the fall of Tsardom made 
necessary the re-consideration of British relations with the Russian 
government, and 192**, when the Soviet government was recognized de 
jure by the British government* It devote* particular attention to 
the influence of radical unrest in British colonies in Asia upon 
relations between the two countries1 governments, as well as to the 
development of trade and the relations between business and 
government with regard to Russian policy, and to the labour movement* 
Chapter One considers the reaction of the British 
government and of the labour movement to the February and October 
revolutions, and the beginning of Allied intervention in Russia, 
the British role in which forms the substance of Chapter Two* Chapter 
Three surveys labour opinion and policy in regard to Soviet Russia 
until 1924, and labour’s influence upon government policy. Chapter 
Four discusses the negotiations which led to the 1921 Angle-Russian 
Trade Agreement, an agreement which was closely related to the 
Cabinet's desire to restrain radical propaganda in British possessions 
in Asia, as Chapter Five attempts to make clear* Chapter Six considers 
early Soviet foreign policy, especially on the national and colonial 
question* The conferences at Genoa and the Hague in 1922 are discussed 
in Chapter Seven* Chapter Eight considers the policy of the Conservatives 
towards the Soviet government in 1922-3, and the growing disenchantment 
of business opinion with that policy throughout the latter part of 1923 
is noted in Chapter Nine. Labour's policy towards Soviet Russia, and 
the factors contributing to the first Labour government's extension of 
diplomatic recognition to the Soviet government, are discussed in 
Chapter Ten.
The thesis is based upon unpublished Cabinet and Foreign Office 
records, private papers, national and local organizational archives, 
government publications,reports and policy publications of bodies, 
contemporary pamphlets, newspapers and journals, memoirs, and modern 
journal and monograph publications.
Introduction
It became apparent at an early stage in the preparation of the present 
study that an adequate discussion of 'Anglo-Soviet relations 1917-192**' 
would require rather more than an account of the exchange of diplomatic 
communications between the two governments. The treatment which follows 
is, accordingly, both broader and narrower than its title might suggest.
It has been my intention to provide at least an outline account 
of the development of relations between the two countries in the period 
under review against which the overall argument can be examined. At the 
same time a number of events, which appeared to be of particular 
significance, have been given detailed consideration: notably the Leeds 
Convention (1917), the Baku Congress (1920), the Council of Action (1920) 
and the Urquhart negotiations with the Soviet government (1921-2).
More generally, I have attempted to relate the course of 
British-Soviet relations to three broad themes: British imperial rule 
in Asia and the radical anti-colonial movement; foreign trade and 
business interests; and the politics of the labour movement in regard 
to Soviet Russia. To integrate these themes coherently within the overall 
argument has been a difficult taks, but a necessary one:for to discuss 
British-Soviet relations other than in this context would seriously 
misunderstand the nature of what was throughout a pre-eminently political 
confrontation* This, then, is a study not (other than formally) of the 
relationship between states, but of that between classes.
To a great extent the conceptual framework of any author must 
stand prior to any study he completes, and it is too often unacknowlegded. 
It should be made clear, therefore, that the premises of the account 
which follows are marxist. The corpus of classical marxism has - with 
the possible exception of Marx's writings on the Eastern Question - 
sufprisingly little to offer the student of international relations.
I believe the authority of Engels may, however, be invoked in defence 
of an analysis which often treats the (however limited and class-specific) 
currency of political party debate in its own terms, positing the relative 
autonomy of these 'superstructural' factoBS, without insisting upon a 
constant reference to specific economic interests. Writing in a celebrated
letter to Bloch in September 1890, Engels pointed out that neither 
he nor Marx had ever asserted that the economic element was more than 
the "ultimately determining element in history", and that to attempt 
to regard it as the "only determining factor" was to reduce the 
materialist conception of history to a "meaningless, abstract, 
senseless phrase". Judicial forms, political, juristic, philosophical 
theories, religious views, the "traditions which haunt human minds",
"also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles 
and in many cases preponderate in determining their form" (Marx and 
Engels: Selected Correspondence p**98).
It wauld be going too far, however, to accept the terms 
of those academic studies which permit statements such as (to takd a 
recent, and otherwise admirable monogrpph) "Russia asked Britain to 
probe the matter", or "Italy seemed in imminent danger of collapse" 
(Rothwell (1971) pl25»pl***0• 'Britain', of course, could make no such 
request: this could be done only by the British government, a body whose 
social composition and assumptions should be at each point identified, 
and related to British political life and to the often, or even normally 
opposed interests of other sections of the population. I have tried 
throughout to avoid a discussion in such terms, even for the sake of 
brevity.
To agtept to relate, and even expttln polities and attitudes 
by reference to their changing economic and sociological context is, I 
am aware, to offend against A.J.P. Taylor's dictum that 'things happen 
because they happen*: and I am content that this should be so. It is a 
curimus but nonetheless persistent fact that the reluctance to use such 
organising descriptions of the economic relations between countries as 
'imperialism' is more often found in those countries which have benefitted 
— often very considerably — from the operation of those relations tha n 
in those which have been less fortunate. England in this connection is 
no exception. The English, one might say, have a lot to be empirical 
about.
The present study is unfortunately, but necessarily a somewhat extended 
one. A recapitulation of the overall argument may therefore be convenient
at this point. Chapter One (Britain and the Russian Revolution) 
considers the reaction of the government and of the labour movement 
to the February Revolution which overthrew Tsardom, and traces relations 
with the Provisional Government which succeeded it. The British 
government-sponsored missions to Russia are considered, and the Leeds 
Labour and Socialist Convention, which called for the establishment 
in Britain of workmen's and soldiers' councils on (apparently) the 
Russian model, is discussed in detail. The chapter concludes with 
an account of government and labour reactions to the October Revolution, 
and of the beginnings of Allied intervention in Russia.
Chapter Two (The Rise and Fall of Intervention) deals with the 
nature and course of Allied, and especially British intervention in 
Russia in 191#-20. Divisions within the Cabinet are found ultimately 
less important than a common desire that the Bolshevik regime should 
be overthrown. The Cabinet went to considerable lengths to bring about 
this object, through the provision of material assistance and military 
supplies and advisors, and even - liberal professions of non-interference 
notwithstanding - sanctioned offensive military operations against the 
Bolsheviks. British assistance, however, proved insufficient to secure 
the success of the Whites; and the Cabinet, accordingly, abandoned the 
policy. Yet intervention had been by no means an exceptional venture, 
as becomes apparent when the policy is placed within the context of 
the revolutionary crisis which embraced Europe at this time, and related 
to the Cabinet's support of the threatened bourgeois social order 
elsewhere in Europe.
Chapter Three (Labour and Sbwiet Russia 1917-1921) considers 
labour 'solidarity' with Soviet Russia and the influence which the 
working-class movdment was able to bring to bear upon the government 
on this issue. Labour's claim to have secured the end of the policy 
of intervention is discussed, and an assessment is offered of the influence 
of the 'Hands off Russia* movement. Little evidence of pro—Soviet as 
distinct from anti-war opinion is found, and little willingness is 
evident to proceed beyond the adoption of resolutions in opposition to 
the government's policy, as the 'Hands off Russia* and other bodies 
urged. An apparent exception to this proposition, and the most notable
labour demonstration of this period, is considered in some detail.
Rather than an example of militant labour solidarity which altered
government policy towards Soviet Russia, the formation of the
National and of local Councils of Action in 1920 is found not to
have changed the government's policy — which had never envisaged
the involvement of British troops - and to have represented abeve
affean*iii?rmation of opposition to war in whatever circumstances 
&
and •£ defence of the constitution, which the government was thought
to have failed to respect.
Chapter Four (Agreement?) deals with the negotiations 
between the two governments from January 1920 until March 1921, 
when the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement was signed. The Cabinet's 
policy in the summer of 1920, when it appeared probable that Soviet 
forces would overthrow the existing Polish government and perhaps 
the Versailles settlement, is discussed. Differences of opinion 
existed within the Cabinet with regard to the conclusion of an
agreement with the Soviet Russian government; but these were
essentially differences, it is suggested, about how the Bolshevik 
regime might most effectively be undermined or at least induced to 
abandon its socialist character. The influence upon the government's 
policy of business circles and of an increasing unemployment problem 
is assessed.
Chapter Five (Imperial Crisis and Soviet Russia) deals 
with the threat which Soviet policy and Bolshevism generally were 
thought to present to the British Empire, at this time seriously 
embarrassed by a widespread, apparently inter-connected and radical 
anti—colonial movement. The Trade Agreement, considered in this 
perspective, was a settlement of a highly conditional character, the 
continued existence of which the British government made dependent 
upon the abandonment by the Soviet government of anti-imperialist 
propaganda and assistance to radical movements in the colonial world. 
A letter was hauided to the Soviet representatives by Sir Robert Horne 
on the signature of the Agreement specifying the action which the 
Soviet government would be expected to take, under its terms, to curb 
colonial agitation. The chapter conclude* with a discussion of the
note which was sent to the Soviet government later in the year which 
drew attention to apparent breaches of this understanding, and required 
a stricter observance o£ its terms.
The following Chapter Six (Soviet Russia and Revolution) 
examines the other side of this confrontation. It notes the increasing 
emphasis placed upon the colonial question by Bolshevik leaders from 
1920 onwards, when the situation in Europe appeared to have becomd 
stabilised. The proceedings of the Second Congress of the Communist 
International, and of the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East, 
are considered in some detail* The apparent failure of directly 
socialist policies in the East* prompted a reconsideration of communist 
policy, and concessions to the strength of religious and other 
traditions, even before the Trade Agreement had been signed and 
obligations contracted to restrict anti-imperialist agitation and 
propaganda. Some success was subsequently experienced in establishing 
diplomatic relations and developing trade with independent Asian 
states, but this might be at the expense, it appeared, of the communists 
and radicals of the East, who remained few in number and often subject 
to persecution at the hands of these same 'objectively progressive' 
governments. Colonial leaders generally welcomed the October Revolution 
and supported the Bolshevik government, but they rarely embraced, or 
even understood, its socialist character. India, central to the whole 
imperial edifice, was no exception. While the non-co-operation movement 
was often militant and enjoyed mass support, communism in India remained 
unequal to the attentions of British intelligence and, however serious 
a long-term threat, presented no immediate danger to imperial rule.
Chapter Seven (Conferences) returns to a European framework 
with a discussion of Lloyd George's attempt in 1922 to 'solve the 
Russian problem' through multilateral negotiations at the Genoa and 
Hague Conferences. The introduction of the New Economic Policy in 
Russia, ending state control of small-scale industry and domestic trade, 
prompted the belief abroad that the failure of communism had at last 
been admitted by the Soviet leaders (an admission which had been 
confidently, but increasingly impatiently forecast since 1917)* The 
Bolshevik leaders, it was thought, would now accept whatever terms the
Allies laid down in order to secure foreign economic assistance* Lloyd 
George's attempt to persuade their delegates to accept the Allied terms 
- which were clearly if not explicitly designed to restore capitalist 
legal and property conventions in Russia - rested, however, upon a 
misconception of the strength of the Soviet government, and of opinion 
within the Bolshevik leadership, and proved unsuccessful*
Lloyd George's policy towards Soviet Russia was regarded, 
moreover, with considerable sceptieism by many of his Cabinet colleggues, 
and his attempt to solve the Russian problem by direct negotiation was 
not repeated by Bonar Law's Conservative administration, discussed in 
Chapter Eight (The Tories and Soviet Russia)• British foreign policy 
now more directly reflected Lord Curzon's views, and his imperial 
preoccupations in particular* A number of unresolved disputes, together 
with renewed accusations of colonial propaganda and subversion, formed 
the substance of the ultimatum which Curzon addressed to the Soviet 
government in May 1923* His demands were met on many, but not all 
points; but a rupture of relations, which appeared imminent, was 
averted* After further mutual recriminations the correspondence was 
declared closed, although official relations had become no more 
cordial by the end of the year*
Business opinion, it appeared, had broadly supported 
Curzon's firm attitude towards the Soviet government in the latter 
part of 1922 and early 1923; but the views of traders and manufacturers, 
and to some extent of financiers also, changed markedly in this respect 
in the summer and autumn of 1923 (Chapter Nine: Recognition)* Trade 
between the two countries had steadily developed, and following the 
restoration of the Soviet economy and a good harvest seemed likely to 
develop further. A delegation which went to Russia in the summer of 
1923, representing major engineering interests and led by A*G. Marshall 
and by F.L. Baldwin (the Prime Minister's cousin), reported favourably 
upon the commercial potential of the Russian market. The members of the 
delegation gave numerous interviews and speeches, issued reports and 
conducted prigate lobbying after their return* Business opinion appears 
to have been impressed. Together with other developments - the Moscow 
Agricultural Exhibition, at which some British firms were represented, 
and the establishment of a Russo-British Grain Export Company in October
*practically-minded' merchants and industrialists came generally to 
the conclusion that trade with Soviet Russia should be more vigorously 
promoted. They accepted the corollary of this proposition, that 
diplomatic recognition should be extended to the Soviet government in 
order to provide a juridical foundation for trade and consular and 
other facilities for British traders in Russia. Direct representations 
to this effect were made to the government by several national business 
organizations, with the support of large sections of the press. In default 
of the normal guardians of business interests, it was the Labour Party 
which openly espoused this policy and explicitly championed the interests 
of merchants and manufacturers. The first Labour government's decision 
to extend diplomatic recognition go the Soviet government is seen, in 
this perspective, as a 'consensus' decision, which was welcomed by 
Labour and Liberal opinion, by many Conservatives, and by the great 
bulk of business institutions and the press.
Chapter Ten (Soviet Russia and Labourism) extends this 
discussion, and disputes the view that Labour's recognition of the 
Soviet government was related to the party's 'socialism*. The formation 
of the country's first 'Socialist Government' gave rise to much dark 
foreboding. An examination of the party's ideology and origins, and of 
its policy towards the Empire and towards Communism nationally and 
internationally, suggests that this anxiety was misconceived. Vhile 
some amorphous sympathy with the Soviet regime may have existed in 
working-class circles, Labour's Russian policy seems to have been more 
closely related to other factors. In particular, the Russian market was 
considered to provide at least a major part of the answer to the 
unemployment problem; and secondly, the recognition of the Soviet gov­
ernment, as a contribution to peace and stability in Europe, was 
advocated on its own merits by the former Liberals in the party, who 
were generallyjexperienced in foreign affairs and exercised a disproport­
ionate influence in the formulation of Labour foreign policy.
The conclusion deals briefly with the attempt to negotiate a 
general Anglo-Soviet settlement which followed the formal act of 
recognition, and offers some general conclusions on the complex intef- 
relation of class, party and foreign policy with which the study 
concerns itself throughout.
Many people and institutions have assisted me in the course of my 
research, and I am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness to them. In 
Glasgow Professor Alec Nove, my supervisor, has offered encouragement 
and advice at all times. Alan Ross and, in particular, Hillel Ticktin 
have read earlier parts of the manuscript and made helpful suggestions; 
and Sidney Aster gave me some initial advice on sources. The Internat­
ional Socialists' informal Wednesday meetings, the Conference of Radical 
Scholars on the Soviet Union and the Politics Department seminar were 
read parts of the manuscript in various guises, and I have benefitted 
from the discussions which followed. In Moscow, where my study was 
supported by a British Council exchange studentship, Dotsent Papin of 
the History Department was a solicitous nauchny rukovoditel* • Elsewhere, 
Walter Kendall read and discussed a number of chapters with me; Barry 
Hollingsworth ^nd Marcel Liebman corresponded with me and sent me 
useful material; and Pat Laysell-Ward gave expert bibliographic advice. 
Rajani Palme Dutt, Andrew Rothstein (in correspondence) and Morgan 
Philips Price were kind enough to discuss their recollections of the 
period with me.
The staff of a great many institutions in which I have worked 
I can thank only in general, but nonetheless sincere terms: Glasgow 
University Library and the Library of the Institute of Soviet and East 
European Studies; the Mitchell Library, Glasgow; the Scottish T.U.C., 
Glasgow; Edinburgh University Library and the National Library of 
Scotland, Edinburgh; the Lenin Library and Moscow University's Gorky 
Library, Moscow; the Brotherton Library, Leeds; Liverpool, Manchester, 
Birmingham, Leeds and Sheffield Public Libraries, especially their 
departments of local history and manuscripts; Sheffield Trades and 
Labour Council; Manchester University Library; Cambridge University 
Library; the Bodleian Libmmry and Nuffield College Library, Oxford; 
Birmingham University Library; the Library of Trinity College, Dublin; 
the British Museum Reading Room and Newspaper Library, Colindale; the 
Beaverbrook Library, London; the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce, 
London; the India Office Library, London; the T.U.C. Library, London; 
and the Conservative Party Research Department, London. The Confededr- 
ation of British Industries was kind enough to allow me to consult its
records which are otherwise closed to scholars while they are being 
arranged and catalogued, and Mr G.W. McDonald helped me to find those 
records of most direct relevance to my research. A number of other 
libraries and institutions answered questions and provided information 
in correspondence. Thanks above all are due to the East Room of the 
Public Record Office and to the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science, where so much of the research upon which this 
study is based was conducted.
The transliteration of Russian which has been used is based on the 
Transliteration of Cyrillic in Headings in the General Catalogue of 
the Department of Printed Books of the British Museum, but convenience 
has prevailed over pedantry when other versions have become accepted 
in English, e.g. Zinoviev not Zinov'ev; and spellings have not been 
modified to confwrm with present day usage when they have occurred 
in quoted passages, e.g. fizar, Nabokoff. Italics are throughout in 
the original unless otherwise stated. Dates are given throughout in 
the new style in force in the West and in Russia from 1918 onwards, 
rather than in the old style in force in Russia in 1917* which differed 
by thirteen days, and by which is explained the fact that the 'February 
revolution' occurred in March. Trotsky, who employs old style dating in 
his History of the Russian Revolution, asked the reader to be "kind 
enough to remember that before overthrowing the Byzantine calendar, 
the revolution had to overthrow the institutions that clung to it".
It should finally be pointed out that I have not strictly differentiated 
between the 'Russian', 'Soviet Russian' and 'Soviet' government, and it 
should be borne in mind that British relations were with the government 
of the R.S.F.S.R. until 1923* and with the U.S.B.R. government subsequently,
Chapter Ones Britain and the Russian Revolution
Despite the relative optimism of Milner's conclusions following his visit 
to Petrograd in February, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was 
obliged to announce to the Cabinet on 14 March 1917 that the situation 
there was deteriorating^ . Recent telegrams indicated "serious developments 
in the seditious movement in Petrograd". It was accordingly decided that 
for the moment strict censorship should be imposed on the publication of any 
details that might escape the Russian censorship. It took some time, there­
fore, for the significance of the Petrograd events to filter through to 
British public opinion. Bruce Glasier, writing in the Labour Leader, confessed 
that "what has happened and is happening in Russia we do not know"; the news
was "scanty enough, and such as it is, is contradictory and not to be relied
2
upon" • For the time being the Cabinet contented itself with the "read 
comfort" that all their information led them to believe that the movement 
was "not in any sense directed towards an effort to secure peace, but, on the 
contrary, the discontent - this is the substance of all our information - is 
not against the government for carrying on the war, but against it for not 
carrying on the war with efficiency and with that energy which the people 
expect"^ .
The following day the Cabinet learned that a series of further telegrams
from the British Ambassador at Petrograd indicated that the situation "had
by no means cleared up"; it had, indeed, advanced to such a point that
Buchanan now sought the government's authority to recognize the new de facto
Russian government. The Ambassador was accordingly given permission to
recognize the new government "if and when he considers this to be advisable
in view of the local circumstances prevailing at the moment, provided that
the French government concurred in this course"^ . A telegram conveying
5
these instructions was despatched to Petrograd •
The Russian Ambassador in Britain, Nabokov, wrote to Balfour, 
announcing that Russia would be "faithful to the pact which unites her 
indissolubly with her glorious Allies", and would "fight....against the 
common enemy to the end"^ . Recognition of the new government in itself, as 
Buchanan explained to Balfour, served the purpose of strengthening the 
moderates and influencing the government to accept the obligations of its
7predecessors, "especially as regards the war" • The Ambassador was directed >
to attempt to retain influence with "the statesmen whom we desire to keep :
8in pdwer" • The Ambassador was to be reminded that he had the authority to j
recognize the Provisional Government; but he must obtain guarantees that it ;
9
would carry out the obligations of its predecessors . "All your influence",
he was advised by Balfour, "should be thrown into the setale against any !
Administration which is not resolved to fight to a finish""^. The insistence [
that the new government maintain obligations which it was already clearly !
unable to discharge in fact contributed significantly to its eventual downfall
•f
In public, however, the government was more optimistic. The Prime 
Minister told the Cabinet that, in view of the attitude of the House of 
Commons, the government had felt obliged to announce their intention of movingj 
a resolution in Parliament, expressing hope and confidence in the Duma, 
while "pointing out that we are not free from danger"^. The terms were 
drafted in consultation with the Ambassador in Petrograd; and on 22 March
Bonar Law, on behaltf of the Prime Minister, presented it to the House of
12 ’Commons • The resolution offered Parliament’s "fraternal greetings" to
the Duma, and tendered to the Russian people its "heartiest congratulations 
upon the establishment among them of free institutions". Something of the 
government’s particular concern was evident in the expressed belief that 
recent events would "lead not only to the rapid and happy progress of the 
Russian nation but to the prosecution with renewed steadfastness and vigour 
of the wa$* against the stronghold of an autocratic militarism which threatens 
the liberty of Europe". The resolution, Bonar Law explained, was an express­
ion of "goodwill to the new government, a government which has been formedl
* twith the declared intention of carrying this war to a successful conclusion. !
It was intended to "strengthen the hands of the Russian Government in their 
difficult task"^*
Bonar Law allowed himself a "feeling of compassion for the late Czar".
The Imperial Was CabineXt, meeting the same day, went so far as to resolve 
that the Czar, the Empress and their family be invited to take up residence ^
in Britain; and Buchanan was informed on the same day that the Emperpr and \
Empress had been granted asylum in Britain1Zf. The Cabinet was subsequently |
informed, however, that there was a "strong feeling hostile to the Czar in t
certain working-class circles". The example, moreover, might prove infect- f
ious: articles tending to associate the King with the Czar had appeared in |
the press (not unreasonably, since they were cousins); and "it was felt
that, if the Czar should take up his residence here, these was a danger that
these tendencies might be stimulated and accentuated". In the event of any
difference of opinion between the British and the Russian governments,
moreover, there would be a tendency in Russia to attribute the British
attitude to the Czar's presence. It was therefore concluded that "the South
15of France, or even Spain,., might be a more suitable place of residence" .
The government's reactions were shared by the Conservative section of 
the press, which in general professed to see in the revolution the restor­
ation of order and the revival of the war effort, at the expense of a 
Germanophile court. The Morning Post announced that one result would be to 
make the Russian army more formidable to Germany than ever before; the Mail 
declared that the "German plotters in Petrograd" had "sustained the most 
signal defeat"; and the Observer heldX that an example had been given to 
the Kaiser's subjects - "political slaves now by comparison with emancipated 
Russia" - which would "shake to its foundations the German governing system 
wh±±h caused the war". Liberal newspapers displayed rather more Enthusiasm, 
but the difference in their reaction was hardly a fundamental one. The 
Manchester Guardian described the revolution as the "deadliest blow to the 
war morale of Germany", and hoped that a "new vigour " would "energize the 
war, springing from a sincere idealism", now that Liberals were in control
in Russia also. Indeed "Liberalism", declared a writer in the Nation, had
16"won its first great victory" . The Review of Reviews thought that the 
change would "magnetise and electrify the soldier in the trenches", and turn 
Russia from the weakest into the "strongest link in the European Alliance".
The Nineteenth Century and After agfeed that the revolution had been the 
"hardest blow that Germany has received in the war to date. Hitherto Russia 
has been fighting with one arm bound; now she can really prosecute the war 
wholeheartedly"^.
Wardle, speaking for the Labour Party on the government's resolution in 
the House of Commons, saw in it a "message from the democracy of Great Britain 
to the democracy of Russia ", and an extension to the latter of the "hand of 
fellowship". He found it unnecessary to express his condolences to the Czar; 
but he agreed with the government that the revolution heralded Ho weakening 
of Russia's will in regard to the war. What in particular attracted his 
attention and approval were two facts, which, he declared, "stand out with
k
T O
regard to this revolution - it is parliamentary and it is constitutional” .
The 'unofficial' Labour P^arty in the House of Commons, composed 
largely of I.L.P. and ex-Liberal members, found in the revolution a confirm­
ation of their own opposition to the conduct of the war. Philip Snowden, 
welcoming the "declaration of the new democratic government of Russia, repud­
iating all proposals for imperialialistic conquest and aggrandisement,” 
optimistically sought its endorsement by the government. No event in their 
generation, he declared, had so thrilled the world as the Russian revolution. 
"It has given us a new hope in democracy and revived our faith in Internation­
alism". It was, he thought, XK a revolt against the old order and the practice 
of international diplomacy, the "intrigues and conspiracies which hage been 
carried on in courts and in the chambers of diplomatists”: an endorsement, 
in other words, of the cXritfcism of British policy offered by the small 
'pacifist' section of the House of Commons with which Snowden himself was 
associated. It heralded equally, he thought, a "useful League of Nations 
after the war”, and a "people's peace”, to be settled by the democracies of 
the different countries, sweeping away secret diplomacy and armaments manuf­
acture. In no sense was this a defence of those who even now were calling 
for the conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war. Ramsay MacDonald, 
indeed, supporting the motion, called upon the government to "help the
Russian Revolution to maintain itself against its internal foes”, and drew
19.attention to the danger of a separate Russo-German peace •
The Labour press reflected similar preoccupations. Some writers, admitted­
ly, preferred to suspend their judgement. William Stewart, for instance, 
wrote in the Glasgow I.L.P. paper Forward that the question was "and the 
answerX will doubtless come in due course - what kind of a Revolution is 
this? Is it a Russian revolution or a European revolution?”. The paperte 
editorial, entitled "A Whig Revolution”, noted that the beginning of the end 
was not in sight^. MacDonald was less reserved. The Duma Socialists, he 
wrote, " take up the general attitude of our own I.L.P”, if they were "a 
little more extreme". The outcome of the revolution would be to bring the 
I.L.P. policy "more and more into the foreground”. Leaders of the "extreme 
pacifist Left, like Lanine (sic)”, would, he thought, tty their indiscretions
glay into the hands of Milytfkov with "disastrous results". These were the
21
"impractical groups who would make a separate peace or anything” •
5Snowden found in the revolution the ’’supreme justification of those
who have challenged Great Britain's alliance with the Russian autocracy”.
He was concerned that a permanent, ’people's peace”, through the "triumph
of international democracy”, should he achieved by the Russian people.
In the triumph of the working classes lay the hope of an early termination 
22of the war . All friends of human freedom, Bruce Glasier wrote, must
rejoice in the revolution, ’even though they may not mingle their
congratulations with the jingo jubilations that resound from Fleet Street 
23
and Whitehall" . The Socialist Review, in MacDonald's characteristic tones, 
in common with "all friends of the Russian people, and of democracy and 
freedom in all lands”, joyously welcomed the event, "not only as a wonderful 
and beneficent stroke of deliverance for the Russian people, but as a 
supremely important achievement for the cause of democracy and peace in
0 A
Europe and throughout the world" . The National Council of the I.L.P., and
the I.L.P. M.P.s, summed up the reaction of this section of the labour
movement in a message to Russia of "warm and whole-hearted congratulations
on the magnificent achievement of the Russian people", and hoped that the
revolution would hasten the coming of a peace, "based, not on the dominance
25
of militarists and diplomatists, but on democracy and justice" .
It would have been surprising had expressions of support of this kind
been uniformly welcomed by those to whom they were addressed. Something of
this is, perhaps, evident in the address which the Russian Socialist Groups
in London (whose Secretary was the future people's Commiffiar for Foreign
Affairs, George Chicherin) presented to the I.L.P. annual conference at
Leeds in April 1917. The success of the Russian revolution, it noted, was
now in the hands not only of the Russian workers, but also of the workers of
other countries. "It would be the greatest tragedy of international Socialism
if the Russian internationalists were to be defeated as a consequence of their
26brothers in other countries having failed them" • Support for the Russian 
revolution, in the event, served to unite all sections of the Labour Party, 
each section of which could find something worthy of support in the Provisional 
Government's foreign policy of 'no annexations and no indemnities', and in 
its extensive programme of civil liberties atHhome. Snowden, MacDonald and 
the 'unofficial' section found in the repudiation of annexations and indemn-
6ities a step towards its own policy of an early, negotiated and 'democratic* 
peace; while all could support the extension of civil liberties, the restrict­
ion of which in Britain under wartime regulations was often at the expense 
of the interests of Labour. The official section of the party could welconT’e 
the revolution as improving the democratic credentials of the country's 
allies, making Russia not only a more acceptable, but also, no doubt, a more 
effective ally.
Labour support was the more readily forthcoming in view of the 
opposition which Labour had always offered, before the war and on its outbreak, 
to the British alliance with Tsardom. Labour figures (especially H.N. Brails- 
ford) were involved in the work of the Society of the Friends of Russian 
Freedom, under the presidency of a respected Liberal, Dr Spence Watson, and 
an *'Anglo-Russian Committee, formed Wto watch over the development of Anglo-
Russian relations in the interests of the liberties of the fiussian people",
27included among its members Brailsford, MacDonald and J. O'Grady . The T.U.C. 
set up a fund in 1906 to assist Russian workers and peasants in their fight 
for freedom, and in 1912 the president of the T.U.C. formally moved a
resolution, which was carried unanimously, expressing the sympathy of the
28British trade unions with the struggle of the workers in Russia • O'Grady,
Keir Hardie, MacDonald and Henderson opposed the Tsar's visit to Britain in 
1909 in the House of Commons, and the T.U.C. passed a resolution deploring 
the visit2 .^
An important element in Labour’s opposition to the impending war in 
1914 was that it would range Britain beside Tsarist Russia. A manifesto 
issued by the British Section of the International Socialist Bureau on 
31 July, signed by Hardie and Henderson, declared that "the success of Russia 
at the present day would be a curse to the world"; and a resolution adopted 
at a demonstration in Trafalgar Square two days later asserted that "any 
step., taken by the government of this country to support Russia" would be 
"not only offensive to the political traditions of the country but XXXK disast­
rous in Europe"-^. As Bruce Glajier pointed out, from the death of Ivan the 
Terrible up to Z* August 191*t, Russia had been "universally regarded as the 
nether-region of autocracy, oppression, reaction, superstition and devouring 
Empire"^. Kingsley Martin recalled that Tsardom was held to be the "very 
symbol of tyranny", and that "most of the protests against the war in 1914 
were based on detestation of an alliance with Russia" ^he ^ew statesman
7
noted that the Russian alliance had since 1907 been ^steadily and vehemently 
denounced by a considerable section of Radical opinion. While attacks 
upon the alliance had ceased since the outbreak of the war, this represented 
not a reconciliation but an ’’uneasy acceptance of the practical necessity 
of the policy”^ .
The February revolution, them, removed the misgivings with which the
majority section of Labour had entered the war in alliance with Russian
Tsardom, and suggested that the war might, after all,,be one fcanuinely in
defence of democracy and the rights of small nations. Minority Labour
welcomed the revolution as the ’’dawn of a new day”, as Lansbury recalled:
a formula which implied no support of the movement towards a working-class
seizure of power, in Russia or elsewhere. Indeed they cared not whose
revolution it was, Lansbury deu/^ ared, ’’whether Menshevik or Bolshevik: for
34us it was enough that the Tsardom had fallen” •
To some extent this reflected the effect of wartime censorship. They
knew so little of internal Russian political developments, wrote the Herald.
55that speculation was idle and suggestion impertinent^ . More importantly,
it reflected the preoccupation of the 'pacifist' section of the labour
movement with the achievement of an early and negotiated peace. This concern
preceded the February revolution; and what was welcome in that revolution
was the support it soon began to provide for the renegotiation of war aims
and the achievement of a 'people's peace'. At the same time Snowden warned
that whatever might be one's views about the wa£, and however strongly one
might desire an early peace, he could ’’not but regret that there should be
strikes, the effect of which may imperii the lives of our men in the fighting
line”-^ ; and MacDonald, with more conviction, perhaps, than accuracy, at a
Leicester May Day demonstration to welcome the Russian revolution had no
hesiartfeation in condemning the ’’actions of the Lenin Party, which was
37composed of thoughtless anarchists who had no definite policy.•” • He
welcomed the apparent moderation of the new Russian government in Parliament;
38and called for a corresponding revision of British war aims • Forward found 
it necessaryjat a subsequent date to warn that thXXe Russian movement was 
"not helped by the complicated attempts to exploit the Revolution in the 
interests of Western p a c i f i s m ” ^ .
Characteristic, in fact, of the response of the main section of the 
labour movement to the revolution was a telegram which was despatched to
the Russian Duma leaders, urging continuation of the war. The telegram 
followed a request from Buchanan that British labour leaders should send 
a message to the Duma labour leaders "expressing their confidence that they 
and their colleagues will know how to strengthen the hands of free peoples 
fighting against the despotism of Germany whose victory can on}.y bring 
disaster to all classes of the Allies, and pointing out that every day’s 
work lost means disaster to their brothers in the trenches". It would, he 
added, be well also to refer to what labour classes in Britain were doing 
and to "our general unity"^. Open opposition was likely to develop very 
sho^ly between the parties of the Social Revolution and of the Duma. If the 
latter prevailed, Russia would be rendered stronger than in the past; but 
should the former prevail, whose object was "peace at any price", a "military 
disaster" was likely to ensue. The meXssage he envisaged might, however, 
contribute to strengthening the influence of the Duma leaders^I
The Cabinet decided that the message should be sent at onee. The 
text was drafted by Henderson, approved by the Cabinet, and despatched^.
The telegram declared that British labour was "watching with (the) deepest 
sympathy the efforts of the Russian people to deliver themselves from (the) 
power of reactionary elements which are impeding their advance to victory.. 
Earnestly trust (that) you will impress on your followers that any remission 
of effort means disaster to (your) comrades in (the) trenches and to our 
common hopes of social regeneration"^. Who could have gathered, GlaXier 
commented, that the Russian working class was engaged in a life-and-death 
struggle to liberate Russia from the age-long military despotism of the Czar 
and the Russian bureaucracy^. Chicherin, on behaldt of the Russian Socialist 
Groups in London, submitted their view that the Labour Party message was an 
"attempt.. to utilize the Russian revolutionary struggle in the interests of 
the war policy of the Entente imperialist coalition": the appeal was a 
hypocritical one^. Henderson, unabashed, undertook the following month to 
make the necessary arrangements for the despatch of further telegrams from 
the workers of Woolwich Arsenal and Vickers Works, as suggested by Buchanan 
from Petrograd^.
The Cabinet was informed by Henderson on 26 March that a delegation 
from the French Socialist Party was shortly to arrive in Britain en route for 
Petrograd on a war mission, "their object being to persuade (the Russian
9Socialist Party) to do all in its power to bring the war to a satisfactory
conclusion”• The Cabinet decided that Henderson should "use his influence to
secure that a suitably composed British Labour Deputation should accompany
46the French party with the same object" • Henderson reported tww days later 
that J.H. Thomas had been unable to go; but that he believed that Will Thome 
and 0*Grady would be willing to accept thfc deputation. The Cabinet favoured 
the addition af a "reliable Russian socialist .. attached to the mission as 
an interpreter", and of a "more academic Socialist of the type of Mr Hyndman" 
(whose loyalty to the war effort was not, nevertheless, in doubti!'? The delegation^ 
composed ultimately of Thorne and O’Grady with the addition of William Banders 
of the Fabian Society, was setting out to Russia with the "one object of 
encouraging, so far as they can, the present Russian Government in the 
prosecuXtion of the war"^ The government was, he stated, "satisfied that they 
will serve the purpose"^.
The mission, in the event, in spite (or perhaps, because) of the government’s
confidence in it, was less than successful, even among those ’moderate*
sections of the Russian socialists whose support they were particularly to
seek. They presented a number of addresses urging continuation of the "present
war against German militarism,• until this threat has disappeared to the free
democracies of the world’’^ . They were somewhat concerned, they told a press
conference, by what they had seen in Russia, but after a discussion of the
existing situation with the members of the Soviet, they had been assured that
although naturally an early peace was desired, there would be no separate 
50peace • Their reception was not, however, improved by the circulation of
an (evidently plausible) rumour that the deputation represented the government
and not the working-class movement. The Menshevik-controlled Executive
Committee of the Petrograd Soviet found it necessary to point out in a statement
that they had only recently discoveredjthe circumstances in which the delegation
had been despatched, and that^JjPhad not earlier been aware of the "special
51attitude of the English government to the mission" • In conversations with
the delegates, it had become clear that while formally they were ready to accept
the Soviet’s peace plan, ”in fact they did not sympathise with this view. It was 
evident that they did not sufficiently appreciate the influence of the Russian 
revolutionary democracy"^. In the course of a visit to the front, it became
10
clear that the "comrades did not entirely share the views of the revolutionary
53democracy of Russia" . Sanders, in his subsequent report, noted that while 
the delegation had been received most cordially by the provisional Government, 
it had encountered a "certain air of reserve" on the part of the Petrograd 
Soviet. At a meeting at the front a representative from the Minsk Soviet had 
spoken, and "talked crude Marxist Socialism", an attitude which the delegation 
had done its "utmost to nullify". Questions had also been brought up at the 
meetings which the delegates had attended ("almost invariably", he stated, 
by Jews) relating to English rule in Ireland, Egypt and India, and criticisms 
had been made of British imperialism, which had been represented as the counter­
part of German imperialism. The moderate leaders of the Workers* and Soldiers* 
Councils, he concluded, had great difficulty in keeping such forces under 
control; but byt the time of the delegates* departure they had at last realised, 
he thought, the "necessity of ceasing to be an opposition Government and were
endeavouring tonsciously to co-operate with the Provisional Government to bring
5kabout order and stability in Russia" • The deputation*s report concluded that
too gloomy a view of developments in Russia should not be taken: "for bad as
the situation was, it would have been much worse had the old regime been 
55existing"^ .
The experience of the delegates belied Curzon*s hope that a "well-cftosen 
deputation of Labour leaders " might do "something to keep the Russian socialist
party on the rails", and "strengthen the hands of the moderate party in
56Russia" • In fact, as Colonel Knox wrote to the Director of Military Intellig­
ence, it had become apparent that "no labour leader who is in favour of the
57war can have any influence with these people" • As Snowden had predicted, the
58reception of the delegation had been one of "Siberian chilliness"^ • Bruce 
Lockhart wrote from Moscow that the British government was being attacked not 
only in the extremist Socialist press, but also in the more moderate sections.
He concluded that "from the first the visit was a farce". The delegates "vever 
succeeded in winning the confidence even of the moderate Socialists, who from 
the first regarded them as lackeys of their respective governments"59
Henderson himself shortly afterwards arrived in Russia on a similar 
mission. Ad Buchanan was informed from London, the Cabinet had been impressed 
with the urgent necessity of creating a "more favourable attitude amongst
11
Russian socialists and workmen towards the policy of the Allies in the war, 
and more particularly of rectifying false impressions of the aims of this 
country sedulously spread in Russia by Enemy agents". It was felt that 
explanations could be given to socialists and workmen more forcibly by one 
who was a labour leader than by others • The Cabinet, in fact, had been so 
impressed with these considerations that it had empowered Henderson to 
replace Buchanan as AmXbassador at Petrograd, for an unstated period, if he 
felt this appropriate. Buchanan, despite his many services, was in existing 
circumstances "no longer the ideal British representative in Petrograd"; what 
was needed was a person "calculated to exert a powerful influence on the
democratic elements which now predominate in Russia to pursue the war with
61 fenergy" • It was most important, Lloyd George noted, to reinforce/those elements
which were favourably disposed to continuing the war, since the demand for
62peace was becoming "more and more imperative" •
Buchanan was tactfully invited to leave Petrograd in a few weeks, in
order to give the Cabinet the benefit of his personal advice %nd information
on the Russian situation^ Buchanan immediately enquired, however, whether
he was to regard his leave as a definite recall, in order that he might arrange
accordinjLy^. Knox, who learned of the possibility of the Ambassador's recall,
wrote that such a move rellected a "complete misreading of the situation here";
6 5and the Embassy staff protested along simikar lines. . Henderson himself
soon concluded that Buchanan's retention would be in the "best interests of 
66the Alliance" . Buchanan was accordingly informed that there was no question
of his recall; and he subsequently arranged with Henderson that he should leave
67for a short holiday in Fin&And, returning when he was required .
Henderson's mission was in fact, Lockhart reported, a "considerable
success"; but ^almost entirely among the so-called bourgeoisie". At the
68Committee of Workmen's Deputies he had been a "complete falure" • Henderson
himself Lockhart found as "God-fearing, as conventionally Methodist, as petit-
bourgeois and as scared of revolution as he always had been". The comrades in
the Spviets bewildered him; he did not understand their language or like their 
69manners • Henderson admitted in his report on the mission that his knowledge 
of the views and tendencies of the 'Maximalists' had been mainly deduced from
70
their published utterances and from articles in their papers • His mission 
bad an unfortunate start, when his hotel apartment was searched, and papers
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and clothes were stolen (which in the latter case he thought "excusable, is
inasmuch as the members of the Soviet themselves were suffering from a shortage
71of garments, due to the decreased output of the textile mills") • His
surroundings, moreover, failed to appeal to him. Moscow he described in a
letter as "not a bad city’,1 though it was probably the "nearest approach to
the Oriental one could possibly find outside Eastern countries", which meant,
of course, that there were "certain features in connection with the life of
the people not altogether attractive". It had also a "terribly mixed population,
72including a good many Chinese" .
Henderson had more success with Ministries, where he had interviews 
almost daily, and with a "number of persons of standing, both Russian and
7^
English, of the official, professional and employing classes" . He reported 
to the Prime Minister on an interview with members of the Provisional 
Government, at which he had expressed concern at "widespread and often
n  i
excessive demands by workpeople for improved conditions" . He reported later
on a speech he had made in Moscow, in which he had taken the opportunity to
urge the necessity of supporting the Provisional Government. He had noticed a
"distinctly more reasonable tone appearing in conversation with business men"
since his arrival; and they were, he thought, beginning to accept his argument,
of the validity of which he had, he thought, convinced the Ministry of Labour,
that the only safeguard against control of industry by the workmen was control 
75by the sfcfcfee. As he noted in his report, the capacity of Russian compared 
with British workmen was low; and the main industrial areas were pl&gued with 
labour trruble, and "demands by the workpeople, exorbitant at once in extent 
and character, presented in an atmosphere heated by every kind of political 
agitation". Industrial profits in the first two years of th^war had been 
enormous, and there was a case for a 'reasonable* increase in wages. The 
demands of the workpeople, however, were in many cases, he thought, "quite 
without economic justification, and amounted to a reckless spoliation of 
industry". The demand for the control of industry was moreover, "much more 
difficult and much more difficult to analyse"; and it was "making the life of 
the employer a burden" and "frightening the banks". Direct representations to 
the government on behall of English employers at Petrograd had, however, been 
in vain. The root ofjthe trouble was, he thought, the "revolutionary psychology"; 
and the chief hope for Russian industry was that the Government would "take 
the labour question firmly in hand"^. It was not, perhaps, surprising that
his relations with the ^
workers and Soviet deputies did not approach in cordiality those with
the Government and the employers. As the President of the Moscow Soviet
explained to him, "what in particular made (the) views of British labour
on (the) war suspicious to his friends was that they seemed to coincide with
77those held by Russians of middle class" .
The proposal to hold a Socialist Conference at Stockholm, to be attended
by representatives from the belligerent and the neutral countries, was
made originally by a Dutch-Scandinavian committee, and subsequently endorse*
by the Petrograd Soviet. The Executive Committee of the Labour Party,
Henderson told the Cabinet, had decided not to attend, but to "send a Mission
to Petrograd to impress on the Russian socialists the danger of a separate 
78peace" . A message was received from the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies asking the governments of Britain, France and Italy not to withhold
79facilities for the visit to Russia of the socialist representatives . The 
Cabinet considered the matter on 21 Hay. Thorne, O'Grady and Sanders, reported 
Lord Robert Cecil, had been asked to stay at Bergen to facilitate their 
possible attendance at Stockholm. He pointed out the danger of allowing the 
Conference at Stockholm to take place without the presence of any British 
representatives, either to watch the proceedings, or to combat the influence 
of the german socialists, and urged that a strong delegation should attfend. 
Henderson noted the difficulties of this course: in accordance with the 
views of the War Cabinet, he had used his influence with the Executive Comm­
ittee of the Labour P^rty to reject the proposal to take part in the ConferGnc 
-e, in favour of a Conference of Allied Socialists in London, on which the 
Russian Socialists' views were awaited. The Conference at Stockholm was now 
to be only a series of bilateral conversations.
It was reported, however, that MacDonald and Jowett ofithe I.L.P. 
and Albert Inkpin of the B.S.P. had applied for passports to Petrograd, 
presumably intending to stop en route at Stockholm. It was generally agreed 
that if the Conference was going to take place, British representatives 
should be present! "otherwise the Russian and German Socialists would 
fraternize without any counteracting influence, and a wholly false impression 
as to war-weariness among the Allies might be given to the enemy by the 
French Minority Socialists, and by written communications smuggled out of
14
this country". A British refusal to take part, moreover, would "have a very 
serious effect in Russia and would strengthen the German anti-British 
propaganda in that country". MacDonald, if he attended, could probably be 
"counted upon to take up a sound line in regard to annexations and 
indemnities", and he might strengthen the 'democratic movement' in enemy 
countries. Other members of the I.L.P., however, could "not be trusted to
maintain a correct attitude". It was agreed that he should not be allowed to
80go unless accompanied by a strong delegation of the British Labour Party
Henderson should arrange for a delegation of British Majority Socialists
81to proceed to Russia, via Stockholm if it seemed desirable •
The question was subsequently reconsidered, however, in view of the
expressed concern of the American and of the French governments, the latter
having refused to allow French socialists to go to Stockholm. The Conference,
it was pointed out, "might have an injurious effect on the moral of the
soldiers...and might force the Allied Governments into a premature and
unsatisfactory peace". A reversal of the decision would also be unfortunate,
however, "not perhaps so much in this country, where Mr. MacDonald (had)
comparatively small influence", but in Russia. While Russia at present was
of little value militarily, the Central Powers were nevertheless bound to
allot a considerable number of men and guns to the Eastern Front; while if
conditions there became more settled, the country might yet become a "formidable
force". A reversal of the decision, also, would exaggerate the importance of
the visit and tend to rally support behind MacDonald. On the recommendation of
Henderson - now in Petrograd - and the British Ambassador that it would be a
great mistake to refuse him permission, the decision was upheld; but MacDonald
should nevertheless be made to give an undertaking that he would not delay
in Stockholm en route, and that the two minority delegates should be
82accompanied by four from the majority section
In the event, the Seamen's and Firemen's Union, taking matters into
their own hands, refused to allow MacDonald and Jowett to sail to Stockholm.
MacDonald was not on a government mission; and the Cabinet decided, no doubt
83with relief, that there was "no reason to interfere further in the matter" .
Henderson while in Russia, however, became convinced of the desirability, 
in the interests of continuing the war, of the proposed Conference. He, Wardle 
and MacDonald, representing the Labour Party (of which Henderson had remained 
the Secretary, despite his government post) went to Paris on 27 July to confer
15
with the French Socialists on the proposed Allied Socialist Conference in 
London on 8 and 9 August, to be followed by an International Socialist
o.
Conference at Stockholm, early in September • On his return, Henderson
explained his views to the Cabinet. The Labour Party’s attitude to the
Stockhom Conference was, he said, to "postpone it as long as possible". In
Russia, the Foreign Minister had attached great importance to the Conference
as a means of "clearing away the suspicions that existed in Russia of British
Imperialistic designs". In his absence, the Labour Party had accepted an
invitation from the French Socialists to the Russian and British Socialists
to proceed to Paris to discuss the Allied Socialist and the Stockholm
Conferences. Henderson had travelled with the party as a member of the Labour
Executive; and it was, he thought, "eminently desirable", in any case, that if
the Russian Socialists attended the British should do scjalso, and that if
MacDonald (as Treasurer) did so, that those with other views should do so also.
At Paris, the convocation of the Stockholm Conference had been regarded as
settled. Henderson had "taken the line which he had decided on his return from
Russia to be best calculated to promote the national interests., (i) to postpone
the Stockholm Conference as long as possible; (ii) to do his utmost to ensure
that it should not be a conference to take decisions, but merely a consultation,
at which the British and French delegates could expound the British and French
case". He had secured agreement on this point; and he had also secured the
postponement of the Conference from 15 August until 10 September in odder to
allow the American delegates, who were strongly pro-war, to attend. The Cabinet
requested, however, that in view of the opinion^s upon the war of those who
had accompanied him to Paris, he should clarify matters by making a "strong
war speech" in the House of Commons, and pointing out the advantages which had
85accrued to the government in the past as a result or his dual position .
On 8 August the Cabinet considered the question of British attendance 
at the Conference, and deemed it less important than formerly; but decided that 
in order to avoid embarrassing the Russian government and relations with the 
Labour Party, a decision should be left to the Labour Party Conference which 
was due to meet on 10 August. Bonar Law was to announce in Parliament, however, 
that attendance at the Conference would require the government *s permission,
question, in association with
representative in London, Nabokov, was reported to the Cabinet on the same day
the other governments concerned. Acommunication from the Provisional Government*i
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as the Labour Party Conference was meeting. On behalf of the Russian Foreign
Ministry, it stated that while the Russian government did not deem it
possible to prevent Russian delegates from attending the Stockholm Conference,
they regarded the Conference "as a party confern and its decisions in no wipe
binding upon the liberty of action of the Government". A copy was transmitted 
87to Henderson .
Henderson made only indirect reference to the latter, however, in his
speech at the Party Conference. The Conference, he told the Labour meeting,
would provide an opportunity for the Party's representatives to make a
full and frank statement as to why they had supported the war, and as to the
aims and objects in the hope of achieving which they continued to support the
war. There wqs Ho question of negotiating peace terms, and there would be "no
binding decision of any kind". The Party's case, he thought, had never been
"properly stated" and was "certainly not properly understood tojthis day in
Russia". To have refused point blank to consider the question would have done
"incalculable harm". The Conference itself was more than lively to take place;
and if it did so, it would be "highly inadvisable and^Si&f dangerous for the
Russian representatives to meet representatives from enemy and neutral cou ntr
-ies alone". There was a neec. for every country to use its political weapon
to supplement all its military organization, if by doing so it eould defeat
the enemy. His decision, he emphasized, had been taken "from the standpoint
of national interests". British representation was agreed upon by 1,846,000
votes to 550,000; while it was agreed at the same time to exclude anti-war
88or pacifist groups (in effect, the I.L.P.) from the delegation •
The Cabinet,meeting the same day, considered the decision, and
oq
decided to f&rbid attendance. More important, however, was Henderson's 
failure to refer specifically to the letter from the Russian government which 
had been passed on to him, and which might have been expected to have influenc 
-ed the Conference’s decision. Agreement was reached on a letter to be address 
-ed to him by the Prime Minister; and that Henderson should not be invited to 
future Cabinet meetings or receive its documents. Henderson's resignation was 
received and accepted the following day, with an expression of his hope that 
the war would be carried to a successful conclusion and that in a non-governa- 
ental capacity he might be able to assist towards this end90^ wag decided, 
however, that the present time was not opportune for a general election, since
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"proposals of a plausible nature but tending towards an unsatisfactory 
peace were in the air".
The reconvened Special Conference of the Labour Party met on 21 
August 1917* The Executive Committee declared that the circumstances had 
been clear at thfe time of the previous decision, and proposed the reaffirm­
ation of the decision to attend, "in order that the opinions of the Party may 
not be misunderstood and misrepresented". The resolution was again carried, 
but by a narrow majority; and the decision to permit no further additions 
to the delegation "from any affiliated or unaffiliated body in thiscountry4* 
was carried by an even more decisive margin. Opinion, evidently, had changed 
as far as the Conference was concerned; and at the Infeer-Allied Conference,
held in London on 28 and 29 August, the proposal was dropped, a decision
91endorsed by the T.U.C. on 4 September •
Hendefson's departure from the government in conneetion with the
Stockholm proposal, then, had not been the result of any disagreement with
the government concerning war aims: it had been a difference concerning only
the manner in which that policy might most effectively be promoted. Lloyg
George noted moreover, in his letter to him, the help that Henderson had
rendered to the government in its relations with Labour, and in "getting the
trade unions to co-operate with us in necessary war measures", and stating
92the government point of view in labour and socialist circles • Nor did
Henderson’s resignation end the Party's connection with the government:
his place in the Cabinet was taken by G.N. Barnes, and three Labour members
93became junior members of the government .
The co-operation of the official Labour movement with the government had
hitherto beeR^a^intimate, if somewhat one-sided character. The Executive
Committee at the outbreak of the war criticized balance of power diplomacy,
and Grey's secret commitments to France; but Labour's duty was to "secure
peace at the earliest possible moment", hot to oppose the conducfc of the war,
and there was no recommendation of a general strike, as a number of Labour
94spokesmen had earlier urged . On 29 August the Executive endorsed th4 
electora 
and join
of the campaign, until "Great Britain and its Allies have obtained victory
,ruce, suspending party differences for the duration of the war;
|d the recruiting campaign, placing its head office at the disposal
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and have concluded the terms of an honourable and abiding peace" In May-
1915 Labour entered the Coalition, with Henderson entering the Cabinet; and
, 96
early in 1916, conscription was accepted . The 1916 Annual Conference
favoured repeal of the Military Service Bill, but voted lgainst agitation
97for its repeal • The formation of a government by Lloyd George in December
1916 led to increased Labour participation. Lloyd George informed them that 
he was "desirous of securing the co-operation of the Labour Party in the 
responsibilities of office"; and accordingly Henderson entered the War
Cabinet, Hodge and Barnes received ministries, and three junior ministers
98
were appointed • Wardle, who was later in the year to join the government on 
Henderson's resignation, explained in his Presidential Address that the Party 
had steadily, and in his opinion wisely, "always declined to be bound by any 
programme, to subscribe to any dogma...any mechanical formulas or to subscribe 
to any regimentation either of ideas or of policy" (by which he appeared to 
have exclusively in mind the "Marxist dogma"). The corollary of this was
what Wardle generously described as a "wide and judicious interpretation of the
99meaning of tne word 'independence'" .
As the Webbs noted, though theoretically internationalist in sympathy, 
and predominantly opposed to 'militarism' at home as well as abroad, British 
trade unionism, when war was declared, took a decided line. "From first to 
last the whole strength of the Movement...was thrown on the side of the 
nation's efforts"'*'^ . At the February 1915 Treasury Conference, the trade 
union leaders agreed to suspend for the duration of the war all their rules 
and customary practices restricting the output of anything required by the 
government for the conduct of the war: overtime regulations, health and safety 
regulations, the right to strike for better terms were abandoned. The 
government's pledges, however, the Webbs recorded, wer "not kept"; the trade 
unionists "were, on the whole, ' done' .
Labour's co-operation with the government, however, was losing its 
intimacy throughout 1917 for a number of reasons. The circumstances of the 
formation of Lloyd George's government provoked some opposition at the 1917 
Party Conference. Snowden noted that Labour's participation in the Cabinet had 
been accompanied by a rise in the cost of living, the erosion of civil liberties, 
conscription and Munitions Acts. The Executive's Report was carried by a 
large majority; but resolutions were adopted on a minimum standard of living, 
the restoration of trade union rights, and the cost of living^2.
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These factors, the existence of which there was no reason to doubt*
(the cost of living, according to the Labour Party's own figures, had MfitXXXXXXK 
almost doubled between the outbreak of the war and February 191710 )^, had, 
in combination with profiteering and the 'dilution' of labour, had a considera­
ble effect by this stage of the war. In addition,as the Socialist Review 
put it, with the German note and the American peace proposals '{^oughts of 
peace, not of war”, were now "uppermost in the minds of the nations. Nay, it 
cannot be doubted that not alone in Germany and Austria, but in all the 
Allied countries the interest and hopespf the people, and the interest and 
hopes of the soldiers in the fie^d, are no longer fixed on the struggle on the 
battle-lines, but on the political struggle for peace in the Parliaments and 
Cabinets, and in the cities and workshops at home"^^ Nor, as Lloyd George
himself recorded, could one overlook as a source of popular dissatisfaction
105the "meagre supplies of beer and the lightening of its gravity" .
These factors were responsible for an increase in industrial unrest, 
which, as Lloyd George noted, "spelt a graver menace to our endurance and ulti-
]T'06mate victory than even the milit ry strength of Germany" • Engineering
strikes in May, notably, were the most extensive since the beginning of the war.
They spread to fortjL-eight towns, and involved over two hundred thousand men
107and the loss of a million and a half working days • Not the least disturbing
aspect of the movement, from the government's point of view, was the evidence
it afforded of the declining authority of the official labour leaders. By the
end of the year Sidney Webb told Thomas Jones of the Cabinet Secretariat that
he was "very seriously alarmed .. by what IS- reported from the districts". The
rank and file were "very angry. The secretaries and shop stewards are doing
all they can to prevent an outbreak; but they all say they are in the utmost
i oft
apprehension of a spontaneous and tumultuous 'down tools'" . Jones told
Beatrice Webb in October that the Cabinet was mush perturbed by the rumours
of revolutionary feeling among the working class. The leaders of the Labour
movement themselves, she noted, were "distinctly uneasy at the spirit of revolt
109among the rank and file.." The Labour Leader was moved to observe that 
Henderson and Hodge were "so out of touch with the men in the workshops, and 
are so mistrusted by them, that any arrangement made through these advisers 
is looked upon with suspicion"'*'^
A Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Unrest was appointed in 
June 1917, with instructions to submit its report as quickly as possible. The
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sources of discontent identified by the Commission - food prices and 
profiteering - had not, perhaps, required such an elaborate proceeding.
The report declared that "feelings of a revolutionary character are not 
entertained by the bulk of the men". In South Wales, nevertheless, it found 
evidence of a "breakaway from faith in Parliamentary representation. The 
influence of the ’advanced1 men is growing very rapidly", and "attempts of 
a drastic character" to secure direct control of certain industries had been 
envi^ged . The report dealing with london and the South-East noted that 
unrest was "real, widespread and in some direction extreme", and was such as 
to "constitute a national danger unless dealt with promptly and effectively"; 
indeed a "social upheaval" was possible. In the North-East it was reported 
that existing grievances formed a "frmitfnl field for the inculcation of
112ideas that unless controlled, may lead to active and dangerous upheaval" •
Much the most disturbing finding was that of a loss of confidence in the
government, which was "unfortunately associated with a diminished reliance
on the power and prestige of the trade unions,and the impairment of the
authority and influence of these executive bodies". In the North-West theme
workmen had "come to regard the promises and pledges of Parliaments and
Government Departments with suspicion and distrust"; while in Yorkshire the
men were reported as having lost all confidence in their trade union officials,
and union executives and the government departments which acted with and throu
-gh them were apparently regarded with "universal distrust". Despite the
advantages of trade unions, as indicated by one of the area reports, in
bringing about good relations between employers and employed, the Yorkshire
report concluded regretfully that "constitutional trade unionism was no
11#longer of any avail" .
It was no doubt at least as much a consequence of this disturbing 
development as of the discourteous treatment of Henderson by the War Cabinet 
that Labour Party leaders, and particularly Henderson himself, began to attempt 
rewover its independence of the government’s policy at home and abroad. In 
August 1917 a sub-committee was formed to prepare a scheme for the reorganiz­
ation of the party, and the drafting of the party’s new programme and 
constitution were initiated. The failure of the Stockholm Conference, equally, 
and-of the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference in London, led the Executive 
Committee to draft a document on war aims. The result, the Memorandum on War 
Aims, was considered and endorsed with virtual unanimity ht a joint T.U.C.-
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Labour Party Conference in London on 28 December 1917^^» In February of the 
following year it formed the basis of the resolution adopted at an Inter- 
Allied Socialist Conference on War Aims which was held in London.
There seems, then, no need to invoke events in Russia as an explanation of
the increasing militancy and independence of the labour movement, official
and unofficial, in 1917* The Revolution in Russia nevertheless gave rise to
a series of meetings in Britain called in its support, of which the first of
any size was held in the Albert Hall on yi March under the slogan "Russia 
115Free” . A discussion of the more important of these meetings may help to
clarify the reaction to the Russian Revolution and to the developing struggle
in Russia of the ’pacifist’ and unofficial sections of the labour movement,
which was responsible for their organization; and to this we now turn.
The meeting in the Albert Hall was organized by the AnglO-Russian
Democratic Alliance, a body centred upon the editorial staff of the Herald,
including such Labour spokesmen as Robert Williams, Bob Smillie and Anderson,
as well as Lansbury himself. Nearly 20,000 tickets were sought for the
occasion, a number substantially in excess of the 12,QQ0 capacity of the
hall • Ivan Maisky, then a Russian emigre living in London, attended the
gathering and noted that the hall was packed. The Royal boxes were filled with
117workers for the occasion • The gathering was addressed by ten speakers, 
including Smillie, Williams, Anderson, H.W. Nevinson and Lansbury 
himself, who together represented, according to the official report of the 
meeting, all that was "most advanced in the Trade Union, Labour, Socialist 
and Radical movements". The meeting was declared by Lansbury the most 
representative held in Britain since the Congress of the International in 
1896. The official report conceded, however, that there was "some difference 
of opinion" among the members of the audience, and indeed among the members 
of the platform also. The resolution adopted at the meeting, referred to as 
embodying the "Russian Charter of Freedom", congratulated the Russian 
"Democrats", and called upon the governments of Britain and other countries 
to "follow the Russian example by establishing Industrial Reedom, Freedom 
of Speech and the Press, the Abolition of Social, Religious and National 
Distinctions, an immediate Amnesty for Political and Religious Offences, 
and Universal Suffrage". As Lansbury recorded, "not in any of our minds was 
there even a thought of violence and bloodshed; one and all, we hoped,
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longed and prayed for Peace..” ”We all felt that at long last a “break was
being made in the evil passions which the war had created, and that very soon
the night of doubt and disappointment would pass...Prom the first moment
110to the last the meeting was one of thankfulness and praise” • When the
organ pealed out the Internationale, the audience ”rose and sang as at a
revival meeting”; and when Madama Clara Butt (who had rendered, the Herald
remarked, a splendid service to the democratic cause on this occasion) sang
the verses of 'God the All Terrible1, "Atheists and Christians, Deists and
Jews, Moslems and Hindus all joined in the prayer 'Give us peace in our time,
1190 Lord1” • The Call’s observer reported that he had listened in vain for
the true lesson of the Revolution; international Labour solidarity and
120uncompromising hostility to capitalist imperialism and war • As an anonymous
correspondent ('a soldier and a democrat1) wrote to Lansbury, it remained
unclear, the speeches notwithstanding, how Labour was going to act. Workers
in Prance and Germany were not limiting their expressions of sympathy to
words. There was a need, he thought, for "something stronger than appeals
121to the Government"
The meeting had nevertheless, it was claimed, released the feelings
which the great masses of people were holding unexpressed. Prom that day
on, it has been suggested, there was a "great change of heart and a great
change of mind throughout Britain; what had been the unpopular propaganda of
a small minority became, in a greater or lesser degree of fervour, the
conviction of the greater portion of the thinking working class of the country,
122and of many outside the working class" • Further meetings were held, and
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Russian ships on the Clyde and the Mersey were contacted . May Day was
124celebrated with particular energy
It was the United Socialist Council, however, which now took the initiative
in summoning the Labour and Socialist Convention at Leeds on 3 June 1917 > the
declared purpose of which was to "follow Russia" and which called for the
establishment of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils throughout Britain, and
which was termed shortly afterwards the "most spectacular piece of utter
folly for which (the Socialist Left) during the whole war-period, was
125responsible - which is saying not a little" . The formation of such a
Council had been recommended by a Conference which met under the auspices
126of the International Socialist Bureau in December 1913 • The I.L.P. National
Executive decided unanimously, however, on 15 October 1914 that "the time was
inopportune to proceed with the formation of the proposed United Socialist
Council”. It was noted that the B.S.P. was not yet affiliated to the Labour
Party. At its Easter Conference in 1916, however, Hynd:nan and the pro-war
group withdrew from the B.S.P., and a resolution was adopted , which was
submitted to the I.L.P. National Executive, urging that the U.S.C. now be
established. The I.L.P. appointed its Chairman and Secretary and four executive
127members to confer with the B.S.P. . A meeting was arranged for 16 August, at 
which the I.L.P. and B.S.P. representatives agreed that the US.C. be set up. 
Since the Fabian Society could not "sec its way to join", the U.S.C. was 
composed only of I.L.P. and B.S.P. delegates. Under its constitution the U.S.C. 
was charged with the "preparation of a common policy upon all matters where 
that is possible". It should have "power to initiate demonstrations and 
other forms of propaganda, both national and local, prepare and issue manifest­
oes, leaflets and other literature, and generally endeavour to co-ordinate the 
work of affiliated organizations". What were described by the I.L.P. Executive 
as "several mutually helpful discussions" had taken place since then: in 
particular a cicculaf was issued to trades councils and affiliated organizations
on the subject of industrial conscription, and a letter was addressed to the
-| ?o
Conference of the French Socialist Party at the end of 1916 • The summoning
of the "Great Labour, Socialist and Democratic Convention" at Leeds was, 
however, the first substantial task to which the U.S.C. addressed itself.
The circular announciilg the Convention appeared on 11 M^y 1917, under 
the slogan "Follow Russia". The purpose of the meeting was stated to be to 
"congratulate and encourage our Russian comrades upon the success they have 
achieved in overthrowing the reactionary forces of that country and establishing 
real political freedom". It was the duty o# the British working class to 
repudiate the "aims and aspifations - dynastic, territorial, and capitalist - 
that were supported by the Russian Czardom, and which have substantially 
influenced the collective aims of the Allies". The fifteen signatories, on 
behalf of the U.S.C., held it to be their "urgent duty to convene a represemt- 
ativd conference of Trades Councils, local Labour Parties,^Socialist Organiz­
ations in order to ascertain and pronounce upon the opinions of the working 
class of this country regarding the developments which have taken place, and 
are taking place, in Russia.. Just as the Russian democracy have taken the most 
significant steps in favour of an international peace, so must the democratic 
forces in every country strive to emulate their magnificent example.. It is
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our duty to work for a complete and international peace based upon working-
class solidarity, and, therefore, likely to be honourable and enduring”. The
129arrangements for representation were also specified . A further circular
issued twelve days later added that the purpose of the Convention was to "hail
the Russian Revolution and to organize the British Democracy to Follow Dussia”.
The circular, which was addressed to Trades Councils, trade unions, local
Labour Parties, Socialist societies, women’s organizations and 'Democratic
bodies', declared that the Conference was already assured of a great success.
It would be historic; and would begin a new era of democratic power in Great
Britain. It would begin, the circular added, to "do for Britain what the
130Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates is doing for Russia" . Snowden,
writing the day before the Convention opened, declared that it would "be the
beginning of doing things in this country...This next weekend should see
131Great Britain painted red" .
The convening of the meeting was not without its difficulties. The
texts of the four resolutions to be discussed were distributed to those bodies
which were invited; and the fourth, which called for the formation of Workmen's
and Soldiers' Councils, in particular aroused some misgiving. In many cases
strong opposition to representation was manifested in local Trades Councils
and political society branches, and in a number of cases delegates were
132instructed to seek to amend the terms of the resolutions . When the delegates
arrived, moreover, it was found that the bookings which they had made in local
hotels had been cancelled by the proprietors. The temperance hotels, it was
reported, which "benefit so largely out of democratic assemblies of the
kind were the worst offenders". Alternative accommodation was arranged for all
but those who arrived late, who were compelled to spend the night in railway 
133carriages  ^. Following, apparently, the visit of a member of the British
Empire League to the homes of nearly all members of the local Council, the
letting of the Albert Hall, where the meeting was to have been held, was
cancelled, and delegates assembled instead in the Coliseum. The Council also
refused to permit an open-air assembly arranged to have taken place in Victoria
Square. At least one report concluded, however, that the extent of the opposition
134which had had to be overcome had "added interest and zest to the gathering" .
By noon on the day of the Conference, 1150 delegates had arrived, and 
it was reported that "many more" had arrived later. The total audience was
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135estimated to have been as large as 3,500 . The proceedings^ opened with the
reading of a telegram from Eansburjr, who was unable to be present as a result 
of ill-health'*''^ . "When they condemn you for wanting peace", he wrote, "when 
they charge you with treason for being determined to end the war, telljjthem that 
it is treason against God, treason against humanity, not to end it - and at once". 
Smillie, who acted as chairman, noted the Convention’s debt to the series of 
meetings welcoming the Russian Revolution which had already been held, and in 
particular to the "great Albert Hall meeting". If it had been a right thing for 
the Russian people to be congratulated on securing their freedom, "surely it 
cannot be a wrong thing for Britain flo desire freedom also". They had not come 
to talk treason, but reason.
The first resolution, congratulating the Russian people upon their 
Revolution, was moved by MacDonald, who noted that "for years" they had wanted 
it to happen. The Russian people shoulfl put themselves "at the head of the 
peoples of Europe". He voiced his concern, however, that they should maintain 
the Revolution, find a cause for unity, stand by their liberites and "restrain 
the anarchy in (theii) midst". Snowden proposed the second resolution, which 
hailed "with the greatest satisfaction" the declaration of the foreign policy 
and war aims of the Rus ian Provisional Government, pledged the delegates to 
work for such a peace, and called upon the government "immediately to announce 
its agreement with the declared foreign policy and war aims of the democratic 
Government of Russia". They had been appealing to the government for three ye^rs 
to be told their peace terms; the time had now come, he said, "for us to tell 
the Government what our peace terms are": which were, he specified, based upon 
"no annexation and no indemnity, and the right of every nation to dispose of its 
own destiny". The peace, he declared, would be a people's peace.
The third resolution called upon the government to "place itself in 
accord with the democracy of Russia by proclaiming its adherence to and determin­
ation to carry into immediate effect a charter of liberties establishing complete 
political rights for all mem and women, unrestricted freedom of the Press, freedom 
of speech, a general amnesty for all political and religious prisoners, full 
rights of industrial and political association, and the release of labour f#rc«w^ 
all forms of compulsion and restraint". Many of the best public-spirited men! in 
the country, the proposer pointed out, were in prison; and Labour was "enchained". 
Nearly a thousand conscientous objectors were in prison, some doing their third 
or fourth terms; and they would be "kept in prison unless we do what Russia has
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dond". Such liberty as they had had before the war, added Mrd Despard, they
were now allowing to be taken awayfcrom them*
It was the fonfcth resolution, however, which was regarded by the press,
as Anderson pointed out in moving it, asj the "ugly duckling among the
resolutions", for which reason he claimed for it the delegates1 "special
137solicitude and support" • The resolution called for the establishment in 
every town, urban and rural district of "Councils of WorkmenXX and Soldiers' 
Delegates for initiating and co-ordinating working-class activity in support 
of the policy set out in the foregoing resolution, and to work strenuously for 
a peace made by the peoples of the various countries, and for the complete 
political and economic emancipation of international labour". The convenors 
of the Conference were appointed as a Provisional Committee, whose duties were j 
to "assist the formation of the local Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils and j
generally to give effect to the policy determined by (the ) Conference". If 
there were to be justice for the soldiers, for the wives and widows of the 
soldiers, and industrial freedom for the workman, then workmen and soldiers 
must join hands. This had been termed revolution. If revolution were the conques! 
-t of political power by a hitherto disinherited class, if revolution meant 
that they would not put up in the fqture with what they had put up in the past, 
with its "shams and., poverty", then the "sooner", he declared, they had revol- ; 
ution in this country, "the better". The organization was not subversive or 
unconstitutional - "unless", he added, "the authorities care to make it so"; 
but it would be a "definite challenge to tyranny wherever tyranny (might) show 
itself". Robert Williams, who seconded the resolution, declared that "if it 
means anything at all", it meant "that which is contained in the oft-used 
phrase from Socialist platforms: the dictatorship of the proletariat". Parliament 
-t, he added, would "do nothing for you. Parliament has done nothigg for you 
for the whole period oithe warn. .We are competent to speak in the name of our 
own class, and damn the Constitution.. Have as little concern for the British 
Constitution as the Russians you are praising had for the dynasty of the 
Romanoffs". It was, declared Sylvia Pankhurst, am "attempt to mak^e a beeline 
for the Socialist Commonwealth". Despite some concern from the floor that the , 
formation of the Councils might be premature or even superfluous, the resolution 
was adopted "amid enthusiasm with only two or three dissentients".
Outside Labour journals, press comments on the Convention were disapprov- ( 
ing. The Review of Reviews assured its readers that the Socialist societies
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which had called the meeting were neither very large nor very powerful, and in 
nh way represented the great mass of British labour* The Leeds Mercury sourly 
noted that the "best way to achieve permanent peace would be to pass resolutions 
urging the troops to pursue unrelenting warfare, and the munitions workers to 
work MKcealiSffy to keep the troops supplied"'*'^. Labour comment was naturally 
more enthusiastic* The meeting had been a success, wrote Snowden, "far beyond 
the most sanguine expectations of the promoters* It was not only the largest 
Democratic Congress held in Great Britain since the days of the Chartist agit­
ation", but a "spontaneous expression of the spifcit and enthusiasm of the Labour
139and Democratic movement" . Lansbury, who was sent a telegram by the meeting 
conveying its "best wishes for (a) speedy recovery to full health", received 
letters from many delegates giving him their impressions of the meeting1^.
Leeds was splendid, write Sylvia Pankhurst. Mrs Despard wrote of the Wwonder 
of Leeds". She had noted a "strong current that is making for peace and open 
and righteous dealing now"; and at Leeds she had felt it "even more strongly 
than before". Pethick^Lawrence and his wife "enjoyed the Conference enormously.
It was splendid to see such unanimity and enthusiasm", Leeds "was great", wrote 
A.A. Watts. "There was a fine feeling about the whole show". He added " I felt 
all on the tingle all day"^if'L*
What the Convention would mean in terms of a national movement was, 
however, by no means clear. The meeting had been virtually without debate, and 
no amendments were allowed to the resolutions. The delegates, Beatrice Webb 
wrote in her diary, had been "quite incapable of coherent thinking. They vere 
swayed by emotions".Pankhurst and Snowden agreed that the meeting had 
been composed of a "mass of conglomerate elements, not yet (Bused, lacking as 
yet a common policy or plan of action"; it had represented all sections of the 
Labour and Socialist movement and all shades of democratic opinion*^.Nor had 
the meeting had time for details'*'^. Noa& Ablett, who represented the South Wales 
miners at the Convention, complained that the delegates had heard ideas which 
they had heard thousands of times before, and with which they all agreed. What he 
h: d not found was "some sort of programme, some sort of practical suggestion of 
how we are to set up the Councils". The Convention, declared the Times . had 
brought together in one hall a thousand or more individuals who were anxious 
for peace at almost any price. "Curiously diverse in their wtigin and in their 
views on fcfcher questions, they had found themselves united under the banner of 
Pacifism". The meeting had begun no new era and established no new social scheme;
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its only tangible product had been a telegram of some fifty words^^. Some 
delegates, at least, were aware of the justice of this criticism. Watts, in his 
letter to Lansbury agter the Convention, noted that ’’the great thing is for us 
to get to work.. Locally I think we must 'get on with it"1^ ^.
The Convention had, nevertheless, adopted four resolutions outlining 
a policy for the implementation of which the thirteen convenors of the meeting 
had been declared responsible, as a Provisional Committee. The first three 
resolutions had aroused practically no opposition, as Smillie told the Convent­
ion. The terms of the fourth resolution, however, had called for the formation 
of local Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, and required the Provisio­
nal Committee to assist in the formation of local Councils, which were to meet 
in district conferences to elect a further thirteen delegates to the Provisional 
Committee, and to give effect to the policy determined by the Conference. It was 
on the basis of this resolution that a contemporary journal declared that many 
of the I.L.P. men had become "avowed Syndicalists or Bolsheviks", and that the 
King had confedded himself to be "greatly disturbed" to Will Thorne1^0. Had the 
Convention, then, decided upon the formation of "extra-Parliamentary Soviets 
with sovereign powers", and upon the "extension of the Russian system of Soviets 
to Britain"1^1?
In the first place it should be noted that the functions entrusted to 
the new Councils were limited and scarcely revolutionary ones. The Councils 
were, in the terms of the fourth resolution, required to initiate and co-ord­
inate working-class activity in support of the previous resolution, to v/ork 
strenuously for a 'people's peace ', and for the "complete political and 
economic emancipation of international labour". The Councils were also required 
"watch diligently for and resist every encroachment upon industrial and civil 
liberty"; to "give special attention to the position of women employed in 
industry and generally (to) support the work of the Trade Unions"; to "take 
active steps to stop the exploitation of food and all other necessaries of 
life"; and to "concern themselves with questions affecting the pensions of 
wounded and disabled soldiers and the maintenance grants payable to the 
dependants of men serving with the Army and Navy"; and to make "adequate 
provision for the training of disabled soldiers and for suitable and remunerative 
work for the men on their return to civil life". As Mrs Pankhurst commented, this 
resolution was the "only one which meant action". It foreshadowed (she thought) 
revolution; yet it concerned itself with "matters of detail which are obviously
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part and parcel of the present system”. The resolution spoke of resisting
encroachments upon fheedom: while "every worker knows that real freedom we
have never had, nor can have under this system ”, The one specific aim of the
Councils, added the New Statesman, was the laudable but scarcely revolutionary
152one of looking after the interests of discharged soldiers •
It was, moreover, in these terms that the formation of the Councils
had been discussed in the columns of the Labour press in the period immediately
preceding the Convention, At Leeds q means must be found, Lansbury wrote, of
"setting up committees representative of the people - soldiers and civilians";
and they must also "imitate Lord Northcliffe and make our voice heard, our
wishes known to the Government", in circumstances in which Parliament had
"abdicated its functions". There ^as no question, he emphasized, of the Leeds
Conference "asking anything dishonourable §r^Snja§QLotic". Workers* and Soldiers*
"Committees" should be formed in every district, "not for the absurd, ridiculous
reasons attributed by the Press, but in order that the working class may be 
153united"  ^. Snowden envisaged the Councils undertaking the task of "combining
15Asome of the activities of the various Labour and Democratic bodies" • The 
resolution was, he later wrote, a "very harmless"^>ne, and "largely unnecessary 
since it duplicated work already being undertaken by the Labour Party and the 
trade unions'*"'^ .
The resolution was printed in the Bolsheviks' paper Pravda: but the
Soviets in Russia were not at this time yet under their control'*'^ . There is
little to indicate, in any case, that the Councils were coneeived as counterparts
of the Russian Soviets. The Councils wdre termed 'Workmen and Soldiers' Councils*,
not 'Workers' and Soldiers' Councils', which, as Sylvia Pankhurst pointed out,
would have been a more correct translation of the title of the Russian bodies;
and information other than from official and censored sources regarding develop-
157ments in Russia was in any case hard to obtain ♦ The jalea for the establishment 
of the Councils was, moreover, according to Snowden, that of W.C. Anderson; and 
it seems unlikely that he envisaged the Councils as British Soviets. It was 
certqinly his expressed opinion shortly after the Convention that the task of the 
Councils was simply to prepare machinery for the "great rebuilding" which would 
take place after the war. He disclaimed any intention of "getting the soldiers 
into trouble"; described as "nonsense" the notion that the movement was pacifist 
in character; and suggested that he and his colleagues now felt that it woulcjbe 
best to obtain the government's consent tothe formation of the Councils before
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158proceeding further  ^.
Snowden reported on recent developments to the I.L.P* National Executive 
at the end of June. There was general agreement on five points: that the 
Workmen’s and Soldiers1 Council should he constituted as a war emergency 
organization; that it shou^ not interfere with or limit the work of any 
existing organization; that it must not be allowed to dissipate the energies 
of members of the party; that it should be a co-ordinating body locally; and 
that the National Council should be "malnlyjan advisory body"1^. A week later 
the Provisional Committee, announcing the formation of the local Councils, 
stated that there must be no attempt on their part to "encroach upon or superse 
-de organizations already established. All friction must be avoided..a and 
overlapping must be eliminatdd as far as possible". A fufcther communication 
in October, representing the agreement of the National Council concerning the 
objects of the movement, declared that it must serve "primarily as a propagand­
ist body, not as a rival to, or to supplant any of, the existing working-class 
organizations, but to infuse into them a more active spifcit of liberty". (Dt
should attempt to influence public opinion by means of meetings and leaflets,
1with a view to the ultimate establishment of a Labour government . That the
Councils might provide a means of focussing working-class energies with a view
to the overthrow of the capitalist order, or that they might assume any quasi-
governmental functions, there was no suggestion.
It might perhaps be objected that while this was the role which
the I.L.P. section intended that the Councils should play, the B.S.P. section
had rather more radical aims in mind. The B.S.P. certainly claimed subsequently
that had other sections displayed the same spifcit and enthusiasm, the Workmen’s
and Soldiers' Councils "would have been well established by now"^^. Bivalry
does, indeed, appear to have existed between the two bodies, which may well
162have limited the effectiveness of the Provisional Committee ; but the
objection seemsjneve^theless a misconceived one. In the fifet place, the I.L.P.
was the dominating element in the movement, and to this extent it waw beside
the point for the B.S.P. to complain that its proposals had been overruled.
At the Convention itself the I.L.P. delegates outnumbered by more than three
to one those of the B.S.P.; and within the Provisional Committee it had a
163similar ascendancy . Quelch suggested in the B.S.P.'s journal that as the 
causes of discontent grew in intensity, and as the revolutionary urge deepened 
and gathered strength, the local Councils might become more "aggressively
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Socialist”. The following week, however, he suggested no more, if the local
Councils achieved ’’complete local solidarity”, than that the next Parliamentary
Election might witness the return to the House of Commons of a majority of
working-class representatives'^*1-* ^  seems clear, moreover, that B.S.P.
spokesmen differed little in substance from those of the I.L.P. with regard
to the issues with which the Convention^ bhould concern itself. The B.S.P.'s
Annual Conference in April adopted a resolution which pledged the party to
"act in the spirit of the Russian Revolution": which was, however, specified
as "endeavouring to arouse the British working class to a sense of the
despotism and militarism which are growing up in this country", and attempting
to bring about the end of the was on "terms involving no annexations and no
humiliation to any country": in other woris, a ’^people's peace*. The party*s
journal saw Leeds as a call to "shake off the bloody nightmare of the war and
165to stand up for the cause of Peace and Liberty among the nations" . Mrs
Montefiore, who supported the first resolution on the ELS.P.*s behalf, declared
that their duty was to ensure that the peace was not made by'materialists*.
The working-class movement, which had the power to end the war/ and establish
peace, had also the power to "bring in the Co-operative Commonwealth"; but this,
she indicated, was a task to be undertaken only after the war had ended. Neithei
she nor any other B.S.P. speaker suggested that it might, on the contrary, be
possible to end the war only by means of socialist revolution.
For common the the B.S.P. and the I.L.P. was the conviction that,
as Snowden put it, the "immediate question" was the "settlement of the war
by an honourable peace on the lines set forth by the Russian Democratic
Government". It was in this sense that the call had been issued to "follow
Russia". The resolution by "organized democratic forces" of industrial and
social problems was an important, but a "post-war" and therefore subsidiary
task. The democracy of Britain should bring influence to bear upon the
Government as the Russian people had done: this was the only way in which the
war could be brought to an end and an enduring phatfe established. To end the
the war was, moreover, the most effective way to work against conscription
166and to defeat the attacks upon industrial and civil liberties
Mrs Pankhurst wrote that the promoters of the Convention had 
decided to concentrate the opinions and will of the people upon peace; and 
"peace was of all words the most popular"1^  They wished, Smillie told the 
gathering, to concentrate the will and opinion of the people upon peace. When
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peace came, it would be a peace by negotiation; and such a peace could be 
made only by the common people (He was not however in favour of the Russians 
making a separate peace). The meeting proved, Snowden believed, that the 
movement for ending the war was becoming more powerful; and the reception of 
the speecg.es "very clearly indicated", reported the delegates from Glasgow 
Trades Council, that the delegates and the "vast majority of those they 
wepresented were tired of the war". Labour, thetj considered, had "awakened to 
the horror of it" and was now demanding a 'people’s peace1 without annexation 
or indemnity. There had never been any question of advocating or suggesting a 
physical force revolution, Lansbury emphasized. There was, he thought, a "more 
excellent method of securing Labour's aims". The Councils should for this 
purpose serve as a "unifying force throughout the land, drawing to themselves
all the men and women who wish to work for a better Britain after the war and
168an early peace.." . The Convention gave a "moral impetus" towards this end;
it reflected a "growing adherence to the view that there (could) be no military
169victory, no knock-out blow"
The Convention's decision to include soldiers as well as civilians 
within the ambit of the Councils aroused somm opposition within, as well as 
outside the labour movement. Henderson, for instance, declared that if the 
Councils were to be formed on the model of those in Russia, with the same 
possible consequences, there would be no harder fighter against it than 
himself. He had seen quite enough of the consequences of such a course of 
action in Russia. What had happened there had shown the "folly of allowing an 
army, as an army, to take part in political discussions, and this ought to be 
a warning to us". He would "fight more strongly against any course of action 
which (could) parslyse our military force as it (had) paralysed the military 
force of Russia"^^^. Yet no effort was made, or appears to have been intehdedy 
to organize actively among the armed forces, or to weaken military discipline 
in any way. The resolution, Anderson made clear in moving it, was "not intended 
to be subversive of military responsibilities". The resolution covered no more 
than the questions of the pensions of wounded and disabled soldiers and the 
allowances of the dependants of servicemen, and for the feraining of soldiers 
for civilian occupations. The linking up of the civilian element with the 
military, the Times commented, had not yet begun, and "not the slightest 
inkling" had been given of how it was to be accomplished^^.
The inclusion of soldiers within the scope of the Councils
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reflected, in fact, more than anything else the concern of the I.L.P. to
demonstrate that, while opposed to the war itself, it had done everything
possible to improve the conditions of the "soldier and the sailor, and for
those who were and are dependent upon him". The I.L.P., it was claimed, had
carried on with "tireless energy" the campaign to secure a greater measure
of justice to the dependants of soldiers in an increased scale of allowances 
172and pensions*. A joint conference of Poplar Trades Council and the League
of Rights for Soldiers and Sailors was held two months before the Leeds
173Convention in London . It showed, the Herald suggested, that the forces
at work on behalf of "our broken soldiers and sailors" were "widening,
deepening, and gathering in strength". The meeting was presided over by
Lansbury, who was elected chairman of a Provisional Committee, with Sylvia
Pankhurst as its honorary secretary. A resolution was carried unanimously
that a "Central Organization be formed for the purpose of safeguarding the
interests of soldiers and sailors and their wives and relatives and discharged
soldiers, and that a provisional committee be elected to draft a Constitution
for such a body". It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Council
of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates became precisely the ’central
organization' envisaged in the resolution: it undertook, certainly, the same
174functions, and was under the same direction .
The Council did undertake propaganda among the soldiers and sailors,
and a number of Soldiers' Councils existed for short periods. At Tunbridge
Wells an attempt was made among soldiers awaiting demobilisation to organize
175support for a local Soviet, without, it appears, much success . A unit
stationed at Sevenoaks also sought to establish a Soldiers' Council, as a
"means of representing the views of the rank and file to the commanding
officers". But the movement, it was reported, "fell very flat”: the unit
176was called overseas "where they had other things to think about" . It 
is difficult to establish to what extent these Councils were a response to 
Leeds: there was in any case considerably greater discontent among the 
armed forces (as reflected in, for instance, disciplinary offences) than 
during the first two years of the war; and it had been the purport of the 
resolution to have established Workmen's and Soldiers', and not separate 
Soldiers' Councils. Propaganda leaflets distributed among the armed forces
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declared that the V/orkraen's and Soldiers' CouncilX would "take steps to 
promote a public opinion favourable to freedom of association for soldiers',’ 
and to their right to be represented. Pending changes in the Army Regul­
ations, however, it was stated that the Councils would "confine their
177activities to men discharged from the Army"
These developments were a source of understandable concern 
to the government. On 24 May the Ministry of Labour's periodic report 
on the labour situation noted that at meetings at Glasgow and elsewhere 
the "wildest peace talk appeared to have been received with general 
acclamation". The Leeds Conference, which had been called Win favour of 
definite action to secure peace", had not, it was reported, itself adopted 
the catchword of 'peace without annexations or indemnities', but the "whole 
trend of the notice calling a conference proves the organizers to be in
ToQ
sympathy with this cry" • The Cabinet was informed the following pday 
by Lloyd George that a "large Labour, Socialistic and Democratic Conferen­
ce" was to be held at Leeds, with a view, inter alia, to "establishing 
in Great Britain a Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' DeJa&iLfees, on the 
lines of the one now in existence in Russia". The meeting was widely 
known already; and the Cabinet decided that it would therefore be 
undesirable to take any steps to suppress further advertisements, or to 
prohibit the meeting itself, "although it was of such a revolutionary
charadter". The Secretary of State for War was, however, charged to
179ensure that no soldier in uniform attended .
It was too late, Milner wrote to Lloyd George on 1 June, to 
stop the Leeds meeting; but there might still be time to "instruct the 
Press., not to 'boom' the Leeds proceedings too much". Meanwhile the 
time was "very near at hand", he considered, when they would have to 
"take some strong steps to stop the 'rot' in this country, unless we
-I Q
wish to 'follow Russia' into impotence and dissolution! • The Cabinet
decided on 5 June, largely prompted, no doubt, by the Leeds meeting,
that the "time had come to undertake an active campaign to counteract
the pacifist movement, which at present had the field to itself", and a
l8lNational War Aims Committee was established later in the month • The 
Cabinet was informed in July that efforts were being made to "induce j
soldiers to interest themselves actively in political agitation of a j
character likely to weaken the discipline of the Army. Cases had already
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occurred where meetings had been convened and addressed by soldiers".
Efforts were being made in various parts of the country to encourage serving
soldiers to form committees, which had been successful in a number of cases.
Soldiers appeared, also, to have become involved in a meeting held in
connection with the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. It was agreed that
182soldiers could not be given permission to join the Councils •
The government, then, regarded the Councils movement with greater
183concern than Lloyd George was subsequently prepared to admit . It was 
nevertheless true that, apart from a general effort to stiffen morale on the 
home front, the government need attempt to oppose the Councils movement only 
to the extent to which it appeared to be prepared to go beyond the limited 
and pacific proposals of its I.L.P. sponsors. Lansbury, at least, professed 
a concern to focus the energies of the Councils upon domestic social change.
At Leeds, he wrote, they had celebrated the triumphant Russian revolution 
and pledged themselves to work for the social salvation of the people. He 
put forward a "New Charter for the Workers" as a "translation into plain facts 
and policies of the enthusiasm of that Convention"^ ^^ . It represented a 
programme of reforms for which the new Workmen's and Soldiers' Council 
should work, as a "logical interpretation of the resolutions adopted at the 
Leeds Conference", which meant "something like this or...nothing at all".
Leeds had been a "Conference, not a Demonstration"; it had been called to 
inaugurate action, not to talk; and if it failed to inaugurate action, it
185would have failed altogether. "But", he added hopefully, "it will not fail"
The Charter was founded upon the principle of ownership by the state 
and management by the workers. It provided for increases in 
soldiers' pay, for the right of speech and the right to strike, and 
for the freedom of the press. Negotiations were to be instituted at once 
to end the war upon a basis of no annexations and no indemnities. "Better 
homes and better pubs" were demanded. The conscription of wealth was 
included, but justified with reference to the Eighth Commandment. In 
general Lansbury appeared concerned lest discontent, which was "seething 
all over the place", should break out in "undirected and sporadic forms".
The Council had a "great patriotic task" to perform in saving the nation
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from the danger of such a "disaster": for it would be able, if it acted 
effectively, to remove this unrest by insisting upon the causes of unrest 
being removed^^.
Whatever Lansbury's motives for the proposal of a Workers' Charter,
however, his initiative remained dependent upon the extent to which the
machinery set up by the Convention became effective. The extent to which it
did so has often been understated. It has been suggested, for instance, that
the Convention "had no sequel. No British Soviet or Councils of Workers'
and Soldiers' deputies were founded and even the Provisional Committee
elected by the Conference soon broke up". It has been suggested that the
Convention took place "almost in vacuo and nothing more was heard of the
Soldiers' and Workers' Councils except on the Clyde"; and that the
187Provisional Committee never in fact met . District conferences of the
Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils did in fact take place in most areas in
order to elect thirteen members to the Provisional Committee; and the
Provisional Committee did meet, and at least one meeting of the full National
Council was held. It remained true, however, that the Committee did not sit,
as Sylvia Pankhurst had urged, from day to day, as Parliament did (a
revolution, she noted, was "not...a thing which can be carried on as a spare- 
188time occupation" ); and the district meetings in many cases met with strong 
and sometimes insuperable opposition. The role of the Councils became 
increasingly marginal.
The Herald announced at the end of June that the Provisional 
Committee was about to issue a general manifesto; and when the thirteen 
district members were added to their number, thus making up the full 
National Council, they would "doubtless put forward a more definite 
programme". A "Manifesto to the District Conferences" was issued a week 
later. It professed to seek the support of "lovers of freedom" and "men 
and women of goodwill" in order to "prevent the further loss of liberty, 
to recover the ground already lost, to attack Governmental and all other 
forms of tyranny, and to quicken the responsibility and power of 
democracy. Close alliance and solidarity" was sought with the Russian 
democracy, but "not in any narrow or exclusive sense", for "every people 
must work out their own salvation in their own way". The present hour 
did "not call immediately for programme-building"; but when the full
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Council of twenty-six was assembled, a "full statement of immediate aims 
and objects” would be forthcoming. Meanwhile such a volume of "clear- 
thinking public opinion” should be created as would compel the British 
government to fall in with the Russian war aims1^. fortnight later it 
was announced that the District Conferences had all been arranged (Ireland 
was omitted for the time being, in view of the development of Sinn Fein), 
and that they were "calling forth a response from the workers without 
precedent in the history of the working-class movement"1^0. Two resoluti­
ons were submitted for adoption by each Conference, one which hailed the 
Russian revolution and called for a peace without annexations ot indemn­
ities, and another which called for the formation of local Councils,
based where possible upon local Trades Councils, to work for the implement-
191ation of the Leeds resolutions •
The district conferences at Norwich, Brifetol and Leicester passed
off smoothly enough; but the proceedings were interrupted at Newcastle,
Stockport and Swansea, and the meetings arranged for Birmingham and
192Glasgow were prohibited on the authority of the Home Office. The meeting
in London on 28 July was disrupted and the Brotherhood Church, where
193the meeting was held, was seriously damaged. ^
These metnods, Tom Quelch declared on behald of the Provisional
Committee, Represented a direct challenge to the Councils; and they would
be answered, for their cause, he wrote, throve on opposition. Lansbury
194
affirmed that the work of the Councils wogld go on y . It proved,neverthe­
less, impossible to hold the London Conference elsewhere, and as at Glasgow 
and as also at Newcastle, a postal ballot had to be held to select the
195two representatives from each area to sit on the Provisional Committee .
The central body had no greater success. Tom Quelcfe had been appointed
Secretary with offices at i+ Duke Street, Adelphi, in London. After a month,
however, Quelch received notice to quit and he joined the Army, from which
time the Council had no fixed central address. Quelch was eventually
196arrested as a deserter in 12 September •
It had still not proved possible to bring together the full
National Council. A list of delegates so far elected appeared in the Call
on 4 October, some four months after the Convention, and it was announced 
fchat a full meeting of the Council would be held in the following week at 
which the policy of the Workmen*s and Soldiers* Council would be formulated
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and a "vigorous campaign instituted". Following the election of the two 
Scottish representatives, a meeting of the full National Council was 
eventually held. It was the National Council's first, and apparently its 
last meeting. A seven-point statement of the aims and objects of the 
Council was adopted, which stated that the Council had been formed "prima­
rily as a propagandist body", not as a rival to or replacement for any
of the existing working-class organizations. A vigorous campaign was "abou
197-t to be instituted" . It was nevertheless MacDonald's conclusion, in
his report on the meeting to the I.L.P.'s National Executive, that there
did "not appear to be much prospect of activity on the part of the 
198Council" . Government intelligence agreed that workers were losing 
interest in the Councils. By the middle of ©ctober, Basil Thomson concl­
uded, "it was possible to reportlthat the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council
199movement w^s moribund" .
This was not the last which was to be heard of Soviets in
Britain. The formation of a Soviet fof the lest of Scotland was proposed
at the end of 1918; but Glasgow Trades Council decided to take no part in
the conference which was to consider its foundati£8^  and the proposal
failed to arouse the enthusiasm evident at Leeds. For the Workmen's and
Soldiers' Council movement had been the product of special circumstances.
In its essence, as has been suggested, an organization formed in order to
press for a negotiated settlement to the war rather than for revolutionary
social change or 'dual power', it could have a role to play only so long
as official Labour bodies remained HXcommitted to the Coalition government
and the f'fight to a finish*. There would have been no immediate need for
the Leeds Convention, the Socialist Review pointed out, had not the trade
union MPs and the majority of the Labour Party executive "abrogated their
functions and scrapped their Labour Party powers"^^. The Labour Party
executive announced that it had nothing to do with the Leeds Convention,
and urged that no local organization affiliated to the party should
convene conferences which were not in harmony with the general policy of
20?$he party - which was that of a gight until victory had been achieved 
This underestimated the strength of feeling which now existed, and of 
which Leeds, almost unexpectedly, gave evidence, in favour of a negotiated 
peace. Leeds represented, according to the Socialist Review, an 
"unmistakable and warning sign of the spreading feeling of Labour revolt
in the country”, a revolt which Henderson's expulsion from the Cabinet 
and his introduction of a more independent political course now allowed
centre of political debate in the Labour movement of the Stockhoihm 
proposal, slquestion which was discussed at special conferences of the 
Labour Party. Leeds, the I.L.P. Executive reported the following year, 
"undoubtedl^ave an impetus to the Movement £or summoning the 
International”. In doing so, however, it could not but contribute to
I
its own supersession . The Councils assisted the opposition section 
of the Labour movement to conquer not political power, but the official 
section of the party. For those who wielded most influence in the
SICouncils movement, this was more than sufficient return.
/ If a growing pacifism in the ranks of Labour was a major problem for the 
Cabinet, it was by no means the only one: for whatever the achievements 
of the new government in Russia in restoring liberty, it soon became 
apparent that its efforts in the military field were by no means so 
successful. As early as the end of March the Cabinet was told of ”very 
serious disorders” in the Russian Baltic fleet; the situation at Kronsta­
dt was "unsatisfactory" and "generally speaking, the discipline in the
205Baltic fleet had weakenened considerably" . The trouble was compounded
by the removal, for what appeared to be political reasons, of some of
20 f)
the most efficient Russian officers from ports on the White Sea . As
Basil Thomson observed, "the worst of revolutions is that they never know 
207where to stop" •
On 18 April the Cabinet heard a report from Colonel Knox who 
stated that he did not believe that a big Russian offensive was 
practicable in existing conditions. The Military Attache at Petrograd 
reported the view of a Russian officer that anylquestion of a Russian 
offensive was now out of the question; and it was considered doubtful 
if the troops could even hold their ground if attacked. The despatch of 
heavy artillery was suspended , owing to the "improbability of its being 
usefully employed in Russia if sent there, owing to the generally chaotic
state of the Russian army"208^ ^ay, the military situation had not
improved and it was reported that a "wave of pacifism was spreading over
205the Labour leadership to contain . The movement for a negotiated peace, 
moreover, lost most of its reason for existence with
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the Army* It seemed, however, that the officers were trying to control the 
209men" • There was a "deplorable lack of discipline in the Russian Army
210at Odessa, and very poor prospects of any offensive . The Chief of the
Imperial General Staff declared that according to his information, the
situation in Russia was very serious; and Lord Robert Cecil noted the
"lack of discipline and the spread of the extremist movement to Moscow 
211and Odessa" . The Russian forces in the Caucasus, it was reported,
would be obliged to withdraw to the east in the autumn since transport
212and supply were in a very bad state . Knox reported at the end of the
month that the military situation had not improved, that many of the drafts
refused to obey orders to proceed to the front, and that there were large
213numbers of deserters every day . The Chief of the Imperial General Staff
noted that while Knox had "never erred on the side of optimism, his
91 A
information in the long run generally proved to be accurate" . The
situation was already such as to require a secret Cabinet discussion on
the situation which would arise in the event of Russia making a separate
peace, although it was recognized that no conclusion could be reached.
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The discussion was continued at the end of July .
In June, the retirement of General Alexieff was, according to the 
Director of Military Intelligence, "entirely political". The general was 
known to be a "strong disciplinarian", of no political orientation; and 
the Provisional Government had some apprehensions that the measures which
216he might take to restore discipline might prove a source of embarrassment •
In the army the "recent impression of an improved moral was weakening".
Already, it was reported, eleven German divisions had been moved from the
217Eastern to the Western Front •
The view was already finding currency in the Cabinet that the
government was "paying too high a price and risking too much to support a
government in Russia whose prospects were at the best very uncertain
218and who were probably unlikely to exert any further influence on the war"
All, however, might not be lost. An offensive was planned and initiated by
General Brusilov. On 11 July the C.I.G.S. was able to report a breakthrough 
219to the Cabinet • A fortnight later he was forced to note that a retreat
220had begun and was continuing . Russian proposals for a Conference on War
Aims should still be postponed, the Cabinet considered, "as long
as possible," for "once it was known that we were discussing these
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questions, the effective prosecution of the war might be rendered more 
221difficult” • At the heart of the problem, it seemed, was the “considerable
and serious vacillation” of the government ”in regard to the re-enforcement
of discipline”. By now, indiscipline "prevailed almost throughout the 
222Russian Army" • The only grounds for optimism were that General Kornilov’s
army was reported to be in a better state of discipline than any other army.
The C.I.G.S. had "great hopes that his appointment as Commander in Chief of
the Russian Armies would lead to the restoration of discipline and the
223regeneration of the Russian army" . On the advice of Buchanan, a message
was composed (but not, it appears, despatched) that while Britain was "ready
to make any sacrifice to help a Russia which had a strong government, our
duty to ourselves and our other Allies might make us question the advisability
of helping a government that delayed to take the necessary steps to restore 
224discipline" . Kornilov's terms of acceptance of his appointment, including
strict discipline and the application of the death penalty, were reported to
225have led to some improvement in the morale of the Russian forces . The 
Cabinet discussed the possible exercise of its influence in favour of the 
acceptance of Kornilov's conditions, in particular the reintroduction of the 
death penalty; but it "might be said that the British government was urging 
the Russian Government to shoot soldiers". Instead a "careful message in 
support of discipline" should be sent to Buchanan, to be used at his
226discretion and after consultation with the representatives of the Allies •
In the face of a continued retreat, the destruction of ammunition
dumps, and the continued drift towards a separate peace, Kornilov
alone seemed to offer salvation. Knox described him as a "strong
character, an honest patriot, and the best man in sight". Knox had no
faith in Kerensky, who was "afraid of shedding blood and was allowing
matters to drift towards anarchy". He urged that the Allied governments
should represent to the Russian government that Kornilov should be
fully supported in the measures which he desired to make to restore
227discipline at the front, on the railway and in Petrograd • It was 
therefore a misfortune that his relations with Kerensky had deteriorated. 
Kornilov, the Cabinet felt, "represented all that was sound and hopeful 
with regard to an improvement in the situation in Russia. To talk of
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General Kornilov as a 1 traitor to his country1 was monstrous, and it should 
not be forgotten that in the past we ha3 been in generc1 sympathy with his 
endeavours to aid the cause not only of Russia but of the Allies”• It was 
difficult for the British government to interfere in the situation without 
appearing to take sides with General Kornilov, in his dispute with Kerensky; 
but it was equally ’’impossible, in the interests of the Allies and of 
democracy generally”, to make ho effort to "improve the situation", even 
though any steps in that direction would have to be taken through Kerensky, 
as the representative of the existing government. Buchanan was to be 
instructed to use his discretion in addressing an appeal to Kerens&y to 
compose his difference* with Kornilov, "not only in the interests of Russia 
herself, but in that of the Allies". All that was secured, however, was a 
promise by Kerensky to the chief Allied military representatives to endeavour 
to restore the discipline of the officers in the Russian army
A month later the Cabinet heard from the Director of Military
Operations of "more encouraging accounts of the state of the Russian Army";
but Balfour offered another report to the effect that the situation in
Russia was "worse than hitherto", and that peace would probably be made in
two months, "unless Japanese and American divisions were sent to pull the 
229nation together" . A week later it became apparent that Balfour had erred 
only in optimism2-^ .
The position for some time, however, remained unclear. "In donnect-
ion with the absence of news from Russia", the First Sea Lord was instructed
to contact Archangel and to make "every endeavour to obtain from Moscow,
231Petrograd and Hango an appreciation of the situation"  ^. His report from 
Archangel was that "anarchy prevailed in Petrograd, there being a general 
strike of all) government employees. Street fighting was taking place in 
Moscow". The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had heard that in Odessa 
"the Maximalists had the upper hand. Civil war was raging in Kiev". In 
Petrograd "the behaviour of M. Kerensky wppeared to be lamentable, and to 
give little hope of success on his part^l^Buchanan reported on 17 November 
that the Bolsheviks In Moscow had surrended to government troops2^; but by 
19 November he informed London that fighting there had ended in "complete 
victory for the new revolutionary Party"23\ The nrgt Sea Lord had had th# 
distressing news from Petrograd that "aficipline of the Baltic Fleet was very
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" 235bad, all the officers being under open arrest .
On 12 November Balfour had told the House of Commons that he 
could furnish no other information than that which had appeared in the 
public press • A week later he was obliged to admit thafe it ^appeared 
that the "extremists" were "now in complete control of Petrograd and 
Moscow"2^.
Readers of the Labour press received little forewarning of the Bolshevik
revolution. Only days beforehand the New Statesman's correspondent wrote
from Petrograd that the city was "much quieter.. Some of us still quote
Marx., but one feels the presence of a new, and probably fruitful,
238empiricism" . The revolution itself received less approval than the
March revolution had done. Information, admittedly, was lacking. It was
impossible, wrote Forward, in the absence of better information, to comment
on events in Russia; and "none of our usually recognized authorities on
239Continental Socialism" appeared to know much about Lenin ^ . Snowden wrote 
that it would be foolish, in view of their limited knowledge, to "dogmatize j
or take sides definitely in a temporary conflict"2^. Bruce Glajtier, at \
*
the I.L.P.'s conference the following Easter, declared that it would be \
wrong fo-fr* the I.L.P. to make a pronouncement which would "definitely j
proclaim their sympathy on the side of the Bolsheviks to the exclusion j
of other sections of Russian Socialists"2^; and the National Executive * s \
report made no reference to the Bolsheviks* success. The Presidential j|
Address at the Labour Party Conference suggested that the Labour movement t. 
sympathize with the Russian people in their "efforts for an ordered ij
Government", and "help them to a fuller understanding of our position , 
our aims and objects in this war"2^2.
Other Labour spokesmen were more forthcoming. Henderson, who had 
had, as he pointed out, first-hand experience, declared that he had been :j 
able to determine that Bolshevism was "nothing but oppression, violence 
and terror"2^. The situation, however, was still in solution, and there ! 
was "yet hope that the re-statement of Allied war aims might restore the i; 
moderate leaders to power"2^. Snowden wrote that for a time the "Extremists^ 
had captured the government; but the position, he thought, was "not irretr­
ievable"2^. MacDonald saw no hope of Lenin securing a firm grip on Russia. 
Lenin was, he considered, a "doctrinaire fanatic., with all the unscrupu-
kk
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lousness of his kind " • Brailsford, writing in the Herald, accused
the Bolsheviks of making a separate truce with the enemy. They were thereby 
"putting themselves outside the pale of our International Socialist 
Society"2^.
The Call declared that "genuine and not make-believe Socialists"
had seized the reins of power; and praised the Bolsheviks for their
"courageous loyalty to the principles of International Socialism as laid
down, for the time of war, by the Stuttgart and Basle Congresses", The
paper, however, called for a coalition government of the socialist parties,
and for the transfer of power to the Constituent Assembly when it met2Zf^ .
It was a singular pity, wrote a correspondent in the Herald, that no
paper in the country had so far endeavoured to have a "sympathetic
249understanding of the position of the newer Revolutionaries" . They
were, Snowden noted, "naturally prone to look on what is happening among
250the Revolutionaries from our British point of view" Litvinov, who had
been appointed to represent Bolshevik Russia in Britain, wrote in a
pamphlet issued the following Easter entitled * The Bolshevik Revolution:
its rise and meaning* , that it had beffiffi&I^Liternational character of
the Russian revolution that had "not yet been fully understood or apprecia-
251ted by the workers of other countries" ,
Whatever their attitude to the BolsheviksI seizure of power,
there were few if any misgiHings among Labour leaders about their
denunciation of secret diplomacy and their publication of the secret
treaties which had been discovered in the Foreign Ministry. Again, the
effect was to strengthen the movement in favour of a negotiated peace.
According to Snowden, publication of the documents (which began in
Izvestiya on 23 November) had not revealed much to those who had closely
followed international affairs during the previous three years. The
publication wav, nevertheless, valuable, inasmuch as it placed beyond all
doubt the truth of the rumours which had circulated, and established the
252"Imperialistic character of the war" • The I.L.P. adopted a resolution
at its conference in Easter 1918 welcoming the publication of the
documents2^. Their impact was much wider than the Labour movement;
C.P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian, republished the documents in his
paper and was moved by them to express his contempt of an "imperialist
254and reactionary government"  ^• In Parliament, Outhwaite declared that
the publication of the secret agreements revealed that the Allies were
24 5a
"committed to aims of vast territorial aggrandizement" . Lord Robert
Cecil, forthe government, refused to accept the documents as accurate,
and declined to comment on their authenticity. He did not doubt,
however, that the British Ambassador would send home copies of the
246Apublications in the ordinary course • Balfour later declared that the
documents "ought not to have been published", but made no attempt to 
247 arepudiate them '•
Shortly thereafter the Labour Memorandum on W^r Aims appeared,
and at a Special Conference of the Labour Party and the T.U.C. on 28
December 1917 it was adopted. Framed to provide a "definite statement of
War Aims and Peace Policy which shall express the general sense of the
Labour Movement as a whole", the fact of its publication and adoption
was, perhaps, of greater significance than its detailed provisions,
which reflected the sentiments of Labour and dissident Liberal spokesmen.
The Memorandum omitted to refer to the Bolsheviks1 proposals for a
general peace. It did, however, according to Lloyd George*s Secretary,
make a^ost favourable impression on many sections of opinion outside
the Labour Party". Together with Lord Lanifdowne’s letter to the Daily
Wtfcfrfcaph of 29 November, calling for an early negotiated peace, oppositi
248^-on to the government’s war policy had been notably extended •
The Cabinet was informed by Carson, who was responsible for
anti-pacifist measures, that his survey of the government’s propaganda
had led him to concluded that the pacifists were "greatly assisted by
the lack of definiteness in our territorial war aims". Barnes expressed 
24#*-his agreement . This was a serious matter. Without the goodwill and
co-operation of the trade unions, Lloyd George recalled, the^could
not have secured further recruits from among the exempted". In order to
secure their co-operation it was necessacy to place before them with
what he described as "complete frankness" the purposes for which the
2‘50<*-war was being prosecuted • There had been "mischievous statements 
circulating in the Press and at meetings, and in private that our aims 
were of an ’imperialistic* or predatory character". The Cabinet agreed 
that a public statement of war aims had become increasingly important, 
and that thelktatement should "take the form of a counter-offensive"^^ 
The idea, according to Thomas Jones, was to make the statement "ultra-
democratic, to go to the furthest points of concession, so as to,.,support 
the war spifcit at hoijie, which (had) been seriously weakened”  ^• Lloyd 
George's draft stahemfcnt was considered on k January 1918 by the Cabinet, 
the section on self-determination being modified fco as to apply "not to
all races indiscriminately, but merely to the settlement of the New
255<*> 2Europe" *, and the speech was delivered the following day . The effect
of the speech, Jones considered, was ”s|)})endid on Labour"^^, That it had
succeeded in transforming Labour opinion would, however, be too much to
say. Especially at the local level, unrest continued. Barnes reported in
dismay to the Cabinet that he had mentioned the name of Trosky at his
2 56meetings in Scotland, and ”it had been received with cheers"  ^. J.H.Thomas
told Jones that the railwaymen were "much less easy to move" than they
257had been in August 191^, and that many favoured peace terms . The strike 
movement hardly abated. It was against this background, of a steady increase 
in the strength of feeling in favour of an early peace, and of a continued 
Labour unrest no more to the taste of the official Labour leadership than 
it was within their control, that the government had to form its policy 
in regard to the new Bolshevik regime in Russia,
Whatever that policy was to be, it would certainly not be one of recognition
On 23 November, the day after a Soviet proposal for a general peace had
been received, Lord Robert Cecil gave an interview to Reuter's agency,
and made it clear that there would be no recognition, and that the new
258Russian government was "'outside the pale' of international society" y .
Balfour told the House of Commons that since the fall of the Provisional
Government, no government had been formed in Russia with which the British
259government had found itself able to enter into relations • Nor, indeed, 
did the question have the importance it was later to assume, for few among 
even its supporters believed that the new regime would have other than a 
transitory existence. The Manchester Guardian on 12 November reported 
"Kerensky returning - Extremist defeats", quoting a communique tXXXo the 
effect that the defeat of the Bolsheviks was "only a matter of days or even 
hours"^^. Buchanan told the government that the ability of the Bolsheviks 
to hold out indefinitely was "u^nlikely"; but^ jthhy might, he thought, "hold 
out for two or three months"261. Guesses were made, Nabokov recorded, as to 
the number of days that the Bolshevik regime would last, and‘'who would
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262replace it" . Only one thing seemed certain, the New Statesman
265suggested: "the Bolsheviks cannot possibly maintain themselves in power"
As late as 5 January 1918, a leader in the Daily Telegraph declared that
the Soviet government might be "swept out of existence at any hour and no
sane man would give them as much as a month to live"^^.
Similarly the question of public and private debts appeared to arise
only in the short term. Their size was estimated in the House of Commons
265at six hundred and sixty million respectively . An answer as to whether
they were adequately protected was at first refused as "not in the public 
266interest" • Subsequently, however, Bonar Law offered a review of the 
situation. He foresaw, after the collapse of the Bolshevik regime, the 
emergence of a "recognized and responsible government" in Russia, which 
would be compelled to recognize that the "development of its resources and 
its prosperity would be impossible without financial assistance from other 
countries". This would in turn be "impossible unless as a first provision 
previous debts are accepted by that Government". He did not, therefore, 
believe that the debts would "not be recovered sooner or later by this 
country"*^.
The question still remained, however, as the Cabinet was told, of 
"how far it was possible for the Allies to take any effective action 
in Russia against the Bolsheviks", who were now engaged in the
26snegotiation of an armistice with the Germans • The Allies had not 
recognized "Lenin and his associates", nor could they recognize any 
government which "officially put forward to the enemy proposals for 
peace". The trouble was - and this was at the heart of the Allies' 
predicament - that "any overt official step taken against the Bolsheviks 
might only strengthen their determination to make peace and might be 
used to inflame anti-Allied feeling in Russia, and so defeat the very 
object (the government) were aiming at". There remained, too, a lack of 
reliable information on the strength of anti-Bolshevik forces. Steps 
should be taken, it was suggested, to "build up in Russia some sort of 
unofficial organization which could counter the work of the German 
organization". The Roumanians were to be persuaded to get in touch with 
General Kaledin, which would provide some information as to his strength, 
while it would "not constitute an intervention in Russian internal affairs" 
to the same extent as action by the Allies directly* Buchanan
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was told that an "unfortunate effect would be created by anything which
269might be interpreted as official recognition" . He was later informed
that the laris Conference had decided that "Allied governments should
270have no relations at present with the Bolshevik government" .
The Cabinet approved a "formal and strongly-worded protest" signed
by the military representatives of Britain, France, Italy, Roumania and
Japan to General Dukhunin, the Bolshevik Commander in Chief, warning
against any infraction of the Russian treaty obligations towards the 
271Allies . But Knox reported that "quite apart from the action of the
government authorities, the Russian troops at the front were insisting
upon an armistice"; it was "quite clear that whatever happened politically
in Russia, the bulk of the Russian army refused to continue the war".
The Military Attache in Petrograd, surmising that the Bolsheviks would
remain in power "some weeks if not months", gave as his opinion that it
was "useless to try to hold any Russian Governments to strict fulfilment
of obligations which nine-tenths of the people repudiate, because no
government can collect the force to carry out a policy in opposition to
(the) will of the vast majority of the people". A separate peace or not,
Germany could hope for very few supplies from Russia; it would be "almost
impossible" for Russia and Germany to agree upon terms; and even if an
agreement for a separate peace were concluded, "we would lose no more than
we have lost already". The "first thing", he added, was to "prove to (the
Russian people) that they are not required as cannon fodder by Allied
Imperialists"^^.
On 29 November a further Note was received from Trotsky asking
if Allied governments would take part in discussions with a view to
concluding a "democratic peace without annexations or indemnities with
the right of every nation to decide its own destiny". The discussions
273would begin on 2 December . Balfour's reply, to what he termed the
"present Provisional Government", was to declare that the proposal was
"contrary to Russia's treaty with her Allies" and to "deeper principles
accepted to the full by the Provisional Government itself". The "very
worst way" of obtaining peace - which, "speaking broadly", was accepted
by the British government also - was the method adopted, which could result
on a
only in a "German and Imperialistic" settlement • Trotsky protested in 
vain that "all the steps we have taken go to show that we are striving
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275for a general and not a separate armistice.."
The Cabinet considered the latest communications from its representatives 
in Russia on 29 November. Cecil urged a decision at the earliest possible 
moment. If Kaledin and the Cossacks could be united against Germany, 
supplies would thereby be prevented from reaching the enemy. There was, 
he thought, "no evidence to show that the Bolsheviks have anything like 
general support throughout Russia: there was reason for thinking that the 
peasants were against the Bolsheviks". Kaledin was the one man with an 
organized force, and as the chief of the Cossacks had great prestige. Cecil 
recommended that a military envoy be attached to his staff, and that up 
to ten million pounds be placed at his disposal. "Some members" of the 
Cabinet, however, found objections to entering into active co-operation 
with Kaledin without further information. There were, moreover, "signs 
that the Cossacks were not prepared to fight". The scheme's only result 
might be to drive the Russian government definitely into the arms of Germany, 
at a time when the German peace terms, which were shortly to be announced, 
might have the opposite effect. The Cabinet was "divided in opinion", 
as the Prime minister, Balfour and Milner, then conferring in Paris, 
were informed^^.
Following the Paris Conference, recognition was definitely ruled
out, and efforts were made to discourage neutral governments (notably
the Swiss and the Swedish governments) from doing so. The supplies of food
and clothing (but not munitions), which the Cabinet had decided to continue
to send to Russia to encourage friendly feelings towards the Allies, were 
277discontinued • Their dilemma, however, remained no nearer solution.
The Bolsheviks had entered into separate peace negotiations with the enemy, 
and had begun to issue manifestoes composed, as Carson complained, "chiefly" 
of "Bolshevik propaganda". Some, he pointed out, were "appeals to the 
people as against their governments, and were in many respects of a 
violent character". At the same time the Soviet representatives might 
yet be compelled to break off their negotiations with the German 
representatives, especially if the Allies refrained from hostile action 
which might force them together. Again, as Buchanan urged, they could 
' not afford to boycott the Bolsheviks altogether if they were to attempt to 
safeguard their "many interests" in the country, and to "try to prevent them 
throwing in their lot entirely with the Germans". They were, he thought,
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likely to be the "ruling factor for some time to come"; and should their 
position, as he thought probable, be legitimized by the Constituent 
Assembly, some form of personal relations would be necessary. In general, 
however, he took a "very gloomy view of the outlook, more especially as
regards the safety of our subjects and protection of British capital
27ft
invested in banks, mines and factories" •
On 3 December the matter moved closer to a resolution, with the
decision of the Cabinet to subsidize, within reason, the Russian army in
the Caucasus, which (according to Nabokov) remained loyal to the
Provisional Government. Moreover, in view of the need of making a
"tremendous effort to maintain Southern Russia on the Allied side",
financial assistance was approved to the Cossacks and the Ukranians.
Buchanan was to be informed that the policy of the British government was
to "support any responsible body in Russia that would actively oppose the
Maximalist movement", an instruction which at least avoided equivocation,
while affirming at the same time that it was government policy to "give
money freely, within reason, to such bodies as were prepared to help the
Allied cause"^^.
Buchanan was accordingly informed of the Cabinet's decision to
"strengthen by every means in our power those elements who are generally
friendly to the Entente of whom the chief are Kaledin, Alexeiff and their
group. Any coalition of Bolsheviks with Social-Revolutionaries or even
Mensheviks would be no real improvement; it would be under Bolshevik
influence and would besides consist of talkers and theorists". A
"southern block" of the Caucasus, the Cossacks and the Ukraine might
however be set up with a reasonably stable government, and "through its
command of oil, coal and com (would) control the whole of Russia".
Buchanan was authorized directly or "through such agents as you select" to
implement this policy. "No regard should be had to expense" and he should
furnish to the Cossacks and Ukrainians "any funds necessary by any means you
280think desirable". Similar instructions were sent to Jassy and Teheran • 
Buchanan's reply noted, however, that the forces at Kaledin's and
Alexieff's disposal were "not sufficient to enable them to engage in any
^ «281 _ serious enterprise"
Plans for the commitment of British forces began to emerge at the
same time. If "some old battleships with some marines" were sent to
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Archangel, it would form a "place of refuge., for British residents in 
Russia, aa a door for communications with that country in the future, 
and., it would have a good effect from a propaganda point of view’.1 
EquaMy, following discussions at the Inter-Allied Conversations in 
Paris, proposals were examined for the occupation of Vladivostok With 
a view to the control of the Siberian Railways by American or Japanese 
forces, for police purposes, for the protection of military stores there, 
and later, if necessary, to obtain control of the Trans-Siberian Railway 
and open up communications with South Russia. The seizure of Vladivostok 
was, however, open to the familiar objection that it Might "do more 
harm than good, by strengthening Russian opposition to the Allies even 
amongst the most friendly sections of the population", and might even 
jeopardize the lives of the British Ambassador and other British subjects 
in Russia**. There was a real danger than Russia "might not only make 
peace with Germany, but al^o might be provoked by us into fighting with 
the Germans against us". At the same time an "ambiguous and uncertain 
policy towards the Bolshevik government" was "also fraught with serious 
disadvantages". Enquiries were to be made in Washington and Tokyo whfehher 
conditions were thought favourable for the despatch of a police force 
to Vladivostok^^.
The Cabinet was told on 6 December that the "many questions arising
out of the state of affairs in Russia would be easier if the policy of
the Allies was more clearly defined". For the time being, however, all
that was decided was for "suitable financial help" to be granted to the
Armenians. It was reported that British armoured cars, officers and men
28^ 5were already in Southern Russia • A fuller discussion followed some 
days later on the basis of a memorandum submitted by Balfour, with the 
Prime Minister in attendance. It was made clear that the government was 
"not primarily or specially concerned with the composition of the Russian 
government, or with the local aspirations of the Bolsheviks ", described 
by Balfour as "dangerous dreamers" with "wild theories", or other 
political parities, except insofar as they bore on their attitude to the 
conflict with the Central Powers. British aims should be to keep Russia 
in the war; or if this were not possible, to "ensure that Russia was as 
helpful to us and as harmful to the enemjifes possible". It seemed likely 
that the Bolsheviks and their * crazy system1 would be able to maintain an
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ascendancy for the few months following only; but these months were 
nevertheless crucial, and to antagonize them needlessly would "throw them 
into the arms of German)'. It was also expected that the Constituent 
Assembly would shortly endorse the new regime. There appeared to be a 
change on the part of the Bolsheviks of late, moreover; the attacks upon 
the Allies in the official press had ceased, and the Bolshevik Commander 
in Chief, Krilenko, was reputed to be insisting upon the inclusion in the 
agreement with the germans of a clause forbidding troop transfers from 
one front to another. The Cabinet "without making any change in their 
recent policy towards Russia", decided to accept Buchanan's proposal 
covering the position of British subjects in Russia and to end the 
imprisonment in Britain of two Soviet representatives, Chicherin and 
Petrov, and to allow their return to Russia, where "judged by local 
standards", thought Balfour, their opinions would "probably appear sane 
and moderate"^**.
Buchanan boldly declared in an interview published in the Soviet 
press that there was no truth in the reports that Britain was "contemplat­
ing any coercive or punitive measures in the event of the Russians making
285a separate peace" Meanwhile the H.M.S. Iphigenia was directed from
Archangel to Murmansk, a more defensible site; and Lord Robert Cecil dfttd
the Cabinet that in his opinion the "best plan was to continue the present
policy of rallying to the Allies, and assisting all those elements in
Southern Russia that wdre resisting the Bolsheviks" (while he admitted that
there was a "danger, if care were not taken, of support being given to
different separate organizations which had varying, if not actually hostile 
286views" ). The "vague nature" of British policy towards developments in
Russiadistressed him, and he called for "some definite policy" to be
1 287 I
established . The French Ambassador had suggestedlbo him a "delimitation
of Southern Russia into British and French spheres of XJCCXttKXKX activity",
which he had specified. The forces in the South, Cecil thought, had a
reasonable chance of success were the government to support them; whereas
"we could hope for nothing from Trotsky, who was a Jew of the international
type". The Cabinet still refused to come to a decision on Cecil's question.
There was, it was thought, a "danger that by backing a losing horse in
South Russia, we were destroying any hope of preventing the Germans
appearing in Petrograd as the friends and helpers of an all-powerful
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Bolshevik government”. Moreover, it was necessary to take a long view, for 
’’that Power which assisted the future Russian government in the reconstruct­
ion of the country would have the whole of Russia*s resources at her 
288command”. Cecil, Milner and Macdonough subsequently left for a
conference with Clemenceau, which took place on 23 December. The memorandum
289there agreed upon was endorsed by the Cabinet on 26 December . With its 
adoption, intervention had developed from a response into a policy.
The situation remained, of course, a complicated and changing one; and to
the extent to which the bolshevik government occupied only a part, and not
even the most important part economically, of Russia, for what was expected
to be a matter at most of a few months, it would be too much to hold that
the agreement in Paris was nothing more than an * anti-Bolshevik charter'.
Yet despite Cecil 's assertion that ”it was not a question of spheres of
influence”, it would be difficult to find a more accurate description of
290the provisions of the agreement .It did, moreover, coincide with the
actual course of events and the roles played in Russian events by both
powers;ailil it formed, evidently, a considered statement of policy to the
extent of being subsequently reviewed and its extension proposed by the 
291Cabinet . The choice of respective areas of influence was, too, rather 
more than accidental: as a recent study had pointed out, ’’British investment 
was heaviest in the Caucasian oilfields, French in the coal and iron mines 
of the Ukraine”^^.
At the meeting Milner explained the mission of the British delegates 
as one of discussion of the situation in Russia with the French government, 
with regard particularly to the question of ’’providing help for the various 
Provisional Governments that showed signs of opposing the Bolsheviki”. Cecil 
added that the situation in Russia was ’’very critical". The Allies must be 
quite clear in their own minds as to what they intended to do, lest they 
should merely ahtagonize the Bolsheviks without succeeding in establishing 
effective centres of resistance to Germany in the South. It was agreed that 
resistance in the Ukraine must be supported; while Clemenceau felt that they 
should keep contact with the Bolsheviks for as long as was possible, since 
they were in power at least "for the moment”, making "such concessions as 
were reasonable and possible". The French Ambassador had proposed a "division 
of activity, that fhance should look after lhamania and the Ukraine, and
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Great Britain after the rest of South-East Russia", which had been accepted 
by the British government. It was agreed to continue to support the 
Ukraine, even if Trotsky declared that this was civil war and sided with 
Germany.
The memorandum itself proposed that at Petrograd the powers should get 
in touch with the Bolsheviks through unofficial agents. Buchanan should go 
on leave, his long residence in Petrograd having "indelibly associated him, 
in the minds of the Bolsheviki, with the policy of the Cadets". The 
Bolsheviks were to be informed that the Allies had no desire to take part 
in any way in the internal politics of Russia, and that any idea that they 
favoured a counter-revolution was a "profound mistake". The Allies at the 
same time felt it necessary to keep in touch "as far as we can with the 
Ukraine, the Cossacks, Finland, Siberia, the Caucasus etc.". The dangers 
implicit in the German terms were to be pointed out, and those of allowing 
Russian artillery and wheat reserves to pass into German hands.
The Allies, it was noted, would thus require money to "reorganize
the Ukraine, to pay the Cossacks and Caucasian forces and to bribe the
Persians". The sums required were "not, as things go, very enormous". If
the French could undertake the finance of the Ukraine, the British government
wouAd find the money for the others. Also necessary were "agents and
officers to advise and support the provisional Governments and their armies".
It was essential that this should be done "as quietly as possible" so as
to "avoid the imputation - as far as we can - that we are preparing to
make war on the Bolsheviki". The Ukraine should again, in these matters,
be dealt with by the French, while the British would attend to the other
South-Eastern provinces. A general officer from each country should be
appointed to take charge of each country’s activities, but they "would of
course keep in the closest touch with one another...in order to ensure the
utmost unity of action..". A Convention was drawn up, additional to the
agreement, by Foch and Macdonough, concerning the spheres of French and
293British activity in South Russia* .
Measures were already in hand to secure an unofficial representative to 
be sent to Petrograd. Robert Bruce Lockhart, previously Vice-Consul at 
Moscow, was called to Downing Street on 21 December 1917 for a d i s c u s s i o n . ^94
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Lloyd George was clearly impressed with his talents; and his despatches
from Moscow throughout the year had been unusually well-informed and
prescient. In a communication of 1 fletfember (which did not, however, reach
London until 28 November, when it was initialled "out of date"), he had
reported that "considerable anxiety" was felt by the Moscow people in view
of "constant rumours of a projected Bolshevik rising to place the government
of the country in the hands of the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies.. Serious disturbances may be avoided at Moscow, but it is imposs-
295ible to say what the future holds for us" . Nor could he at this time
share the general belief, he recorded, stimulated by the opinion of "nearly
all the Russian experts in London, that the Lenin regime could not last
more than a few weeks and that then Russia would revert to Tsarism or a
military dictatorship", or the "firmly-rooted conviction that Lenin and
Trotsky were German staff officers in disguise or at least servile agents
296of German policy" •
The opportunity to send him to Russia was found in the
appointment of Litvinov as Soviet Counnul in England on Zf January 1918.
On 5 January Litvinov wrote to Balfour, informing him of his position and
297seeking a meeting with him . He received a polite note some days later 
from the Foreign Office, informing him that since the Soviet government 
was officially not recognized by Britain he could not be received by 
Balfour himself, but that he wished to maintain contact with him,and had 
nominated an agent for this purpose, Mr Rex Leeper, through whom Balfour 
could be informed of matters which required his decision. Lockhart swiftly 
got in touch with Litvinov, and a meeting was held in a London cafe, at X 
which it was agreed that although no official relationsexisted, LitvinovI pqo
in London and Lochhart in Russia would have diplomatic privileges • Lit- 
vmnov wrote a note for Lockhart to serve as an introduction to the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry. On 7 January the Cabinet was informed that Lockhart wad
proceeding to Petrograd as an unofficial means of contact with the
299 500Bolsheviks . On Ik January he left Britain on his way to Soviet Russia^ •
He was, he wrote, "head of a special mission to establish unofficial
relations with the Bolsheviks"; his instructions were "of the vaguest"-"^*
Litvinov's position in Britain presented, however, a number
of difficulties. His demand td^ be entrusted with thejfunds and records of the
Russian Embassy was refused: Cecil was "strongly opposed to the idea, as
the funds of the Embassy would probably be spent by M. Litvinov on
302spreading Bolshevik propaganda” • Litvinov, certainly, was not inactive.
He addressed an appeal "to the workers of Great Britain”, informing them
that Russian workers were "not only fighting their own battles, they are
fighting your battles too, and they will succumb unless the workers in
303other countries come speedily to their help"^ . He appointed the
304Scottish socialist John Maclean as Soviet Consul for Scotland. He
addressed the Labour Party Conference at Nottingham in January 1916, and a
305pamphlet of his was issued in April^ .
The Cabinet, seriously embarrassed already by the developing
'pacifist1 movement, considered his conduct on 15 January, and noted that
the propaganda he had conducted involved breaches of the Defence of the
Realm regulations. It was agreed that "this Bolshevik agitation would
have a bad effect on the people of Great Britain in general”. Sir George
Cave assured the Cabinet that in the past he had deported men for less
objectionable propaganda than that under consideration. As Balfour pointed
out, however, if he were deported it would be impossible to maintain the
contacts which had been established with the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, where
the situation was currently "extremely critical""^ .^ Shortly afterwards,
following his appearance at the Labour Party Conference, the Cabinet was
told that it was evident that his presence had been "exploited in the
307interests of pacifism", and his position was again discussed • It was 
agreed, however, that he must be dealt with in accordance with the 
government's general policy towards the Bolsheviks. To drive him out would 
be "tantamount to a declaration of war against the Bolsheviks", which would 
force them to side with the Germans, and prejudice the position of British 
nationals who still remained in Russia.
It was later added, in connection with Litvinov’s efforts to 
secure exemptions from military service, that he would "undoubtedly exempt
all the East End Jews if he could", who were prospering in existing
*08
conditions through supplanting English traders • It was agreed that he 
should be reprimanded, however, for an article in the "Woolwich Pioneer", 
which had been authored by him in his official capacity, and had, it was 
considered, incited the Woolwich munitions workers to revolution; and also 
for efforts which he was reported to have made to "tamper with the discipline 
of British troops". A visit which Petrov had requested to be allowed
57
to make to Britain was refused, in view of the opinion of the Counter
Espionage Department that it would be a "grave danger to allow (him) to
return to this country". A visit by Kamenev had already been approved, but
309it was agreed that he should be kept under close observation . This led
to the opening and examination of his baggage on arrival, and to the
confiscation, as MacDonald reported to the House of Commons, of such
incriminating evidence as a Bible^^.
This led to Litvinov adopting what was described as a "quieter 
311tone" ; but discussion was still required of the measures which should 
be undertaken by the government to put a stop to his activities, which 
included "attempts to undermine the discipline of Russian Jews serving in 
the British and Canadian forces, the formation of an Information Bureau 
in the East End of London for the dissemination of Bolshevik propaganda, 
the formation of Red Guards in London". A Communist Club in Soho had been 
raided the previous day, where a "meeting of Russian revolutionaries" had 
been taking place. Litvinov had not been present, but was a member of the 
Club. An Order in Council was approved, enabling the Secretary of State 
to prohibit any alien from addressing meetings or engaging in propaganda. 
Meanwhile in Russia Lockhart was making "little progress"; and indeed
7] 2
he recalled that "most of (his) telegrams to London remained unanswered"
His position was indeed a difficult ones any serious attempt to 
secure Russian re-entry into the wax would depend upon Allied 
military assistance; but the Cabinet in London at no time appeared ready 
to consider such support. Indeed,the opinion was expressed that Trotsky's 
motive in wishing to establish contact with the Allies was to find a 
means of "extricating himself from his difficulties", which were 
regarded as a necessary consequence of Bolshevik policies. Another view 
was that he was "endeavouring to get the Socialist parties of the different
countries into a conference in order to extend the scope of his fanatical
313attacks upon the existing order of civilization" . Lockhart did not 
share the optimism of the military experts about the 'loyal Russians and 
about the restoration of the Eastern Frant', which he found was not a 
major preoccupation in Russia; the aim, rather, of the 'loyal Russians''
(who were, in effect, the bourgeoisie) was to secure the restoration of 
their property through British military intervention, or if necessary
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German. He received no reply to his proposal that support be offered to
314.
the Bolshevik authorities .
At the same time, intervention plans continued to crystallize.
Intervention was declared to be a form of ’assistance1 to the Bolsheviks
which should preferably be rendered with their agreement; but, it became
increasingly apparent, it would if necessary be rendered regardless of or
even despite Bolshevik wishes. Buchanan drew the attention of the
government to the ’present anomalous situation” which could not, he was
convinced, be indefinitely prolonged; nor, indeed, was it "in keeping with
traditions of British diplomacy for (an) Ambassador to proclaim (the)
strict neutral attitude of his government when (the) latter is actively
315supporting one of the parties in it” . Balfour acknowledged that from
a purely Foreign Office point of view, there would be great advantages in
cutting off all relations with the Bolsheviks. They had broken treaty
obligations, repudiated debts and were "openly trying to raise revolutions 
316in all countries"' • On the other hand, there were "great interests in
Northern Russia" to be safeguarded, and a number of British subjects in
Russia whose position had to be considered. It was therefore necessary, he
considered, that communications of a practical kind should take place
through agents. He was, moreover, "quite clear that we could not give full
recognition to the Bolsheviks until they could show that they were
representative of the Russian people".
There remained other, and perhaps more substantial objections. The
Bolsheviks, Balfour explained, appeared to be determined to spread what he
described as ’pacifist propaganda' in Britain, and in Germany. Trotsky
was less, he thought, a German agent than a "genuine fanatic bent on
spreading the doctrines of revolution throughout the world, but particularly
in the two countries which he regarded as Imperialistic, viz England and
Germany". Such propaganda was in Britain "dangerous and attractive to those
317who had nothing to lose'*'
Besides, to establish closer relations with the Bolsheviks would 
be "clearly incompatible with the modest degree of recognition and 
support which we had been, or were giving, to the Ukraine and Don Cossacks". 
Cecil added that even to increase the powers of Lockhart to facilitate 
dealings with the Bolshevik government, as Buchanan had recommended, might 
"discourage what remained of the anti-Bolshevik elements" and might also
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"prove helpful in the spread of Bolshevik propaganda in this country, as 
also in France and Italy". In Italy, he declared, the danger of the spre­
ad of Bolshevik propaganda was "serious". Lloyd George added that the 
Bolsheviks represented a "formidable menace to Austria and Germanjp", and 
that what information thay had available regaining the internal conditions 
of Austria suggested that the authorities there were "seriously embarrass­
ed by the spread of Bolshevism". It was agreed that any recognition of 
the Bolsheviks would assist iiJjthe spread of their propaganda in BritaiS^ 
There was, Lloyd George recalled, a "genuine fear that recognition would
involve admitting into Allied countries a swarm of Bolshevik intriguers
319to foment revolution" . British relations with Soviet Russia were 
becoming, evidently, to an increasing extent the product of the Cabinet’s 
estimate of the state of labour unrest in Britain, and indeed elsewhere 
in Europe. British relations with Russia had acquired a political dimension 
which differentiated those relations from British relations with other 
countries; and had come to involve issues the gravity of which might often 
seem to exceed those involvedjln the struggle with the Central Powers.
Plans for action in Siberia were foundering, meanwhile, on American 
objections. The American Secretary of State, it was reported from 
Washington, hoped that it would not be necessary to take any action.
Japanese, and even more American intervention would, he thought, provide
32 0German anti-Ally propaganda with a "powerful weapon" . In interiiew 
with the Japanese Ambassador, on the other hand, led to the conclusion that 
the Japanese intended to land a force "if they can get a reasonable excuse 
for doing so"; and while American or British participation might be 
allowed, they intended to keep control of the operation in their own 
hands. The Ambassador had remarked cryptically that Japan had "great 
interests in that part of the world"; but no decision had, he thought, 
been takdn with regard to r“'hterventio3^. The Cabinet ordered the H.M.S. 
Suffolk to proceed to Vladivostok, with instructions to act with the 
Japanese and report on the situation. Cecil believed that the Japanese 
"ultimately intended to seize Vladivostok, but that they would not do so 
at present"-^^. The Americans remained the most appropriate Allied power 
to participate in a Siberian intervention, in order both to ensure that 
military action met Allied objectives as closely as possible, and not
simply Japanese plans of territorial aggrandizement; and to present at 
least an appearance of joint Allied action for the sake of Russian 
opinion. The Cabinet was told, however, in February that apart from 
wjealousy and suspicion of Japanese enterprises”, the Americans considered 
the Japanese the "worst possible agents of the Allies in Russia"^2 .^
The protection of the military stores at Vladivostok (635>000 
tons of railway materials, nitrates and barbed wire, and "other valuable 
supplies", the Cabinet was told)was necessary because unless safeguarded, 
they "might very probably fq.ll into the hands of the enemy". General 
Richardson felt that a force should be sent, necessarily Japanese or 
American, but preferably both; and it should "for choice., not be solely 
Japanese, as in this case the Russians as w^hole, not merely the 
Bolshevists, would be opposed to this step". It would also be desirable to 
send a few Chinese and British troops to "show the flag"^^.
It appeared, however, that the Japanese might be content with 
a limited occupation of the Eastern portions of Siberia, and might"prove 
unwilling to effect out main object, namely, the opening up of communicat­
ions with South-Eastern Russia by securing control of the whole of the 
Siberian railway from Vladivostok to the Cossack country". Curzon emphasiz­
ed thaX danger that the Japanese might be content with the "domination 
of Eastern Siberia only**, and might be "unwilling to entertain the main
proposition". A Japanese occupation would probably result also, Cecil 
irwarned, in the domination ofer the whole of Asia; and the Government of
India was not in favour of Japanese action, since it would "enormously
enhance the prestige of Asiatics as against Europeans, and would consider-
325ably react upon the attitude of Indians towards the British""^ .
The main difficulty remained the securing of American partic­
ipation. The introduction of the Japanese, Balfour noted, would "probably 
involve war with the Bolshevik government", and this they must be prepared 
to face. Lloyd George added that Bolshevism was a "growing menace to all 
the civilized countries of the world". Bolshevik doctrines were beginning 
to spread in Britain, they had undoubtedly spread in Austria, and there 
was reason to believe that they were at work in Germany. Russia, he declared 
was a "plague house". It was agreed that the Japanese should be urged to 
seize control of the Trans-Siberian railway as far as Cheliabinsk, and that 
telegrams should be sent to Washington and Paris explaining the decision
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reached, and seeking support^^.
The withdrawal of British diplomatic personnel was effected on 
32728 February 1918 • Lockhart remained: the peace terms had not yet been
signed, the peace with Germany might be of short duration, and contacts had
to be maintained. He remained convinced, as he recalled, that the Bolsheviks1
internal strength was greater than was generally realized, and that
there was no other power in Russia which was capable of replacing them.
"This, indeed, was the fundamental difference between Whitehall and 
328myself" . A landing in Vladivostok would, he wrote, destroy all
possibility of an understanding with the Bolsheviks; and common sense
would seem to indicate that as a measure for reconstructing the Eastern
329front against Germany it was ludicrous . Lloyd George later conceded
that it was "admittedly difficult to foresee any very large positive result
320that might be achieved thereby" •
In the absence of Allied assistance on acceptable terms, the Brest-
Litovsk treaty was signed on 3 March 1918, and ratified by the Fourth Special
Congress of Soviets. An Allied Conference on 16 March condemned this "final
betrayal". A declaration drafted by Clemenceau was issued two days later,
which concluded with a repudiation of the treaty: "peace treaties such as
331these we do not, and cannot acknowledge" • Events now moved swiftly
towards their conclusion. Although Lockhart was subsequently urged to "do
(his) utmost to secure Bolshevik consent to an Allied military intervention
in Russia", the possibility of the conclusion of such an agreement had 
332largely passed. The Cabinet, meanwhile,was already examining the
proposal to land a force at Murmansk in order, it was stated, to protect
333military stores there*^  ; and efforts to secure American approval for 
action at Vladivostok were not relaxed.
Lockhart informed the Cabinet on 13 April that Trotsky wished the Allied
governments to submit to him, at the earliest opportunity, a full and proper
statement of the assistance which they could furnish in order to enable
Russia to continue the war against Germany, and of guarantees which the
334Allies were prepared to give in this direction • Trotsky had added that 
if the conditions were friendly, an agreement was "both necessary and 
desirable". A further communication contained definite terms of intervention 
along the lines of Trotsky's proposal, as formulated by the Allied military 
representatives. This led only, however, to a renewed appeal to President
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Wilson, quoting this new evidence which suggested that Bolshevik approval
335might be forthcoming for Allied action . Lockhart was sent a copy of 
this appeal, and a message from Balfour to the effect that the terms 
forwarded as a basis for Allied action "may well serve as a basis for 
discussion".
On 22 April the Cabinet considered it desirable that an emissary,
perhaps General Smuts, should be sent to Russia to discuss with Trotsky
336the "organization of Russia for military purposes . Four days later,
however, it was decided that the question should "stand over" until a reply
337had been received from President Wilson on the proposals for Allied action .
The following month the question arose again. Lloyd George argued
that it was "very desirable that a nucleus of Allied troops should be sent
to Russia, so that M. Trotski might feel that he had some force behind him".
It was military advice, however, that no troops could for the present be
338diverted in this way . The opinion was subsequently expressed in the
Cabinet that an "overdue weight had been placed, in our recent correspondence,
on the desirability of an invitation for intervention from the Bolshevik 
339Government" . As Cecil expressed it in a memorandum, "we should prefer
to see the acquiescence of the Soviet government in any action we might
take, but we do not regard this as absolutely essential"^^. Lockhart, he
considered, should inform the Soviet government that "we regard ourselves
as free to take any steps that seem to us desirable to prevent the further
establishment of German influence in any part of Russia". It is difficult,
in fact, to believe that the Cabinet, with the possible exception of Lloyd
George, who insisted that there was "something to hope from Trotsky and 
341the Bolsheviks"*^  , regarded co-operation with the Bolshevik government 
as possible, even it it were desirable. Lockhart's attempts to reach an 
agreement with Trotsky simply led, for instance, Curzon to conclude that he 
was "with Trotsky", and Milner to state that he did "not keep our end up 
with Trotsky"^^.
In fact Lockhart, while originally opposed to intervention (without, at 
least, Bolshevik approval), rapidly changed his ground. He urged, certainly, 
that intervention should be carried out, if at all, with adequate forces; 
and he later wrote that "to have intervened with hopelessly inadequate 
forces was an example of spineless half-measures which in the circumstances
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amounted to a crime" . His statement that "to have intervened at all
was a mistake", however, does not accord with his communications from
Russia at the His telegrams from May onwards urged intervention as
swiftly as possible, and reported the positidm of the Bolshevik government
to be so weak and declining as to leave little room for surprise that the
forces which were despatched to Russia were found to be insufficient.
The only alternative, he argued, to an agreement with the
Bolsheviks was Allied intervention "on a large scale preferably with the
consent of the Russian government, but if not without it", which should
be prepared secret&y and launched at the "first favourable moment in
•5 k 5
the political situation here"^ • It would bd "foolish", he added, to 
"hope for too much from the Russians themselves". As for the Bolsheviks, 
the concealment of British intentions would "render any opposition thay 
might offer ineffectual". Their power was diminishing and a counter­
revolution, he felt, Might "easily be successful", although not without 
Allied intervention^ . The consent to this of the Bolsheviks was "more 
than doubtful" but this was now, he argued, a question of secondary 
importance, for the Allies would "never have (a) more favourable moment 
for intervention than the present", and their intervention, he suggested,
*71 rp
would "cause (the) downfall of (the) Bolsheviks" • These impressions 
were confirmed in a conversation with Chicherin and Karakhan. The power
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of the Bolsheviks, he told London, was "decreasing daily"^ •
In June he reported that the Bolsheviks were "almost at the end
of their power". Their attempts to create an army had failed, and they
were not even in a position to deal with the Czechs, who Vbtee then
collecting in Siberia . Two days later he added that the Bolsheviks
were in a "desperate situation.. Discontent grows daily". Radek*s wife
was reported to have fled to Switzerland; and where the Czechs were in
350force they were "completely masters of the situation"^ .
His new-found enthusiasm and urgency were not, it appeared, 
matched in London; but this was not, Balfour reassured him, because his 
work was unappreciated, or because he had "in any way lost the confidence 
of H.M.G.", who understood the "peculiar difficulties" of his position.
The changing and contradictory character of his advice found its explanat­
ion in the "constantly changing aspects of the present transitional period 
of Russian history". Balfour was doubtful, however, whether Lockhart
6f.
"equally (apprehended) the difficulties as seen from the dide of t^e
Allies". The delay was the consequence of the fact that the Allies "did
not all decide the same way.. Without the participation of America nothing
effective can be accomplished through Siberia, and the active participation
of America has so far been refused". What was lacking was "not decision 
351but agreement"-^ .
Despite such considerations as the "personal repugnance" felt by a
British representative in Russia in regard to the "occupation, even
temporary, of a Christian country by non-Christian troops", the Cabinet
had been in favour of Allied-Japanese intervention from at least the
beginning og the year (in Lloyd George*s view, the essential decision
352had been taken on 24 January X,since when the policy of the British 
government had been "steadily in favour of intervention"). The Japanese, 
however, demanded American moral and material support; and this President 
Wilson refused to sanction. (The American government had indicated on 
i March that while unwilling themselves to take part in a joint intervent­
ion, they would not object to the British and French governments doing 
so. Four days later, however, it was learned that they had decided
against intervention in any form, and were informing the Japanese govern- 
353ment accordingly^^) Following discussion at the Inter-Allied Conference 
in London on 15 March the expediency of intervention was urged upon
the President by the British Ambassador; but Wilson had decided that a
354sufficient case had not been made by the military authorities . Further
entreaties by Allied military representatives were made later in the
month; and an overture was made by the Cabinet, following Trotsky’s
request for a precise statement of the proposed nature of Allied interven- 
355tionv> . President Wilson had promised to reconsider the whole question, 
in consultation with the Japanese Foreign Minister, who was then in 
America^^. On 7 May, howdver,Lord Reading was informed that the President 
was convinced that the moment was not opportune or that a sufficient 
military advantage would be gained, and could not therefore at present 
endorse the British proposqls^^. In an interview with him later in the 
month, Reading found Wilson "quite decided in opinion that (the) moment 
was inopportune", since according to his military advisers no military 
advantage would by gained by intervention, and the proposed operations
6 g~
357would be resented by the Russians'^'.
Wilson's diffidence was decribed by a Foreign Office memorandum 
to his "sincere belief that his reputation as a prince of peace will be 
jeopardized if he mixes himself up with a policy which he believes will 
end in annexations and interference with the domestic concerns of Russia". 
It was also worthy of note that in the American elections which were due to 
be held in the following November, an alliance with Japan would be an 
EXKKXKXXX liability, especially in the important state of California, a 
circumstance which Balfour believed "exercised not a small influence on
358his judgement" • The British government had consequently "exhausted the
vocabulary in urging the U.S. Government to consent to intervention, but 
359without success" •
In fairness to Wilson, he was not alone in finding it difficult 
to associate military action in Vladivostok with military fortunes on the 
Western Front. Both Lloyd George and Lockhart, it has been noted, treated 
this thesis with some scepticism. In the House of Commons, H.B. Lees-Smith 
intorddced 2a debate on the possibility, which Lord Robert Cecil had 
welcomed in the press, of Japanese action in Siberia. As regarded the 
question of the arms at Vladivostok, Lees-Smith noted that there was no 
evidence that the Russian government had "expressed any unwillingness to 
return them",and the Japanese themselves had "refrained from asking that 
they should be Returned", and therefore, he said, he could "not see that 
those arms and ammunition by themselves constitute any ground for a 
declaration of war". There was no evidence at all of the organization of 
German prisoners of war in eastern Siberia; and there was in fact "no 
evidence at all that the German government intended to play into our hands 
and dissipate their forces by the mad enterprise of an expedition into 
Siberia". Balfour condeded that he "did not for a moment believe" that 
Germany was going to attempt to send a great organized military force from 
Riga to Vladivostok. He agreed that it would be an operation of "very great 
difficulty, and certainly, from a purely military point of view, would be 
a very great, unnecessary, and even fatal waste of power"^^^.
Even were the Japanese persuaded to act, however, their objectiv­
es were by no means bound to coincide with those that the Allies had in 
mind for her. Lord Robert Cecil stressed, in a conversation with the 
Japanese Ambassador on 22 May, that the Japanese should intervend "not for
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the purpose of obtaining any territorial advantage, but in order to
assist Russia and the Allied cause generally”, and that they should be
willing to "push their expedition as far west as Cheliabinsk, or somewhere
in that neighbourhood". The Ambassador commented that this was an "entirely
56lnew idea", and that a more limited action had been contemplated . A
decision of the Supreme War Council at Versailles on 3 June was forwarded
to the Japanese Ambassador by Balfour. Several conditions were specified
on the basis of which, it was hoped, Japan might agree to take action,
and which might then receive the "assent and co-operation" of the American
government, "without which it is evident that the whole policy must prove
abortive". The conditions, specified "in order to make Allied intervention
in Siberia acceptable to the Russian people and to public opinion in the
three Allied countries and in America", required respect for the territorial
integrity of Russia, a declaration of non-interference in Russian domestic
politics, and an advance "as far West as possible, with the avowed object
362of meeting and defeating German influences"
The Japanese government's reply expressed a willingness to co-ordinate
their policy "as far as possible" with that of the Allied governments in
Siberia. Since their attitude depended on the question of American
assistance, no decision could be taken before a "complete understanding"
was reached between the three Powers and the American government. With
regard to the conditions, the first and second were "quite acceptable",
but while in "full sympathy" with the third condition, of crucial importance
for the British government, they regretted that it would be "impossible
for them to engage to extend westward the sphere of their military
activities beyond the limits of Eastern Siberia in view of the grave
difficulties with which such operations (would) be practically confronted".
Nor was any reassurance afforded by their concern that "supreme command of
363the whole international contingents in Siberia" be placed in their hands' . 
If, then, American assistance were eventually forthcoming, Japanese action 
might be induced: but not necessarily, or even probably, on a scale and of 
a nature sufficient to secure the objectives of the British and Allied 
governments.
In the circumstances it was not surprising that the Cabinet should 
sympathize with Milner's view that the "hesitation of the U.S. ought
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not to be able to block the whole policy"^^. The discovery of a large
force - 45»000> or two good divisions - of Czech troops in Russia was
therefore most opportune. The suggestion was made that it "would be advisable
365that these troops should be used for an Allied expedition from Siberia" .
On 13 May, on the basis of a Note by General Smuts, the Cabinet discussed
"steps which could be taken to organize military resistance to the enemy
in Russia while the correspondence with America and Japan in reference to
intervention was proceeding". The Czech troops at Vladivostok or en route
"should be taken charge of there and be organized into efficient units by
the French Government", which should be asked that "pending their eventual
transport to France, they might be used to stiffen the Japanese as part of
an Allied force of intervention in Russia". The remainder of the forces
should be collected at Archangel and "used to hold those places and to take
366part in any Allied intervention in Russia"
The trouble was, however, that the French wanted the forces in France, 
while the Czechs themselves would fight Germans, but not Russian internal
367battles . They still offered the possibility of Siberian intervention
without either American or Japanese involvement; while the chances were,
as Cecil pointed out, that "the rest of the Allies would soon conform".
French approval was obtained at the beginning of June for the use of Czech
forces in Russia not in France^^.
The position of the Czech forces was enough to overcome President
Wilson’s remaining scruples. Lord Reading reported that he was likely
to declare against armed intervention, but in favour of a civilian
economic Mission to Siberia for relief and to assist Russians in organizing
369railways and food supplies . The government welcomed the proposal, but
considered that without an expeditionary force it would "lack the material
370backing without which it cannot be expected to prove really successful" .
The views of the Supreme War Council were that what was termed "Allied
armed assistance to Russia" was an "urgent and imperative necessity".
There was held to be no doubt that the Bolshevik power was "waning" (an
assurance had already begun to lose its novelty), while the "best liberal
and democratic elements in Russia" were "beginning to lift their heads" and
371 •"to get in touch with one another" !
The Caeche had apparently been welcomed by the local population, 
and had obtained control of the railway in western Siberia. It must
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remain a matter for conjecture upon which side lay the responsibility for
the outbreak of hostilities between them and the Bolsheviks. There was
nevertheless no doubt that this was a development which powerfully furthered
British policy, which had for some time previousl^envisaged the employment
of the Czech forces in such a situation. The British government, Lloyd
G^rge later wrote, felt "bound to take the necessary steps to protect
and succour them" in the predicament in which they had now, apparently
fortuitously, found themselves; while at the same time, as he noted, this
offered a means of establishing "something like an anti-German front in
372South-Eastern Russia and along the Urals" • The Allies, President Wilson
was urged, were "under (the) responsibility of taking immediate action if
these gallant allies are not to be overwhelmed". Balfour instructed Lord
Reading to point out to Wilson that the Czechoslovak successes gave them
373an "opportunity of restoring an eastern front which may never return"-^  .
The situation withioRussia reflected these developments. Attacks
were made on Britain by Uritsky, about which Lockhart promised to complain
to Chicherin^^. The Allied Embassies were withdrawn to Archangel in July,
a move which the Bolsheviks "rightly interpreted., as the prelude to 
375intervention"^ . A raid on the Allied missions followed, and Loc&hart
received a note demanding withdrawal from the positions thst British forces
376had occupied in Archangel and Murmansk •
The involfcftment of the Czechs in military engagements led
Balfour to favour the idea of sendigg troops as soon as possible. The
movement of Allied troops to Vladivostok "in order to protect supplies
and preserve order" could not, he ventured, be "considered as intervention
in Russia". It was decided to move a British battalion to Vladivostok
"for the purposes of preserving order therd and protecting supplies". There
377were already 1,200 troops at Jflurmansk^  .
7nO
Action was agreed upon to ’assist the Czechs* ; and on 
7 August it was reported that President ’Wilson had accepted the principle 
of Allied action in the Far East for this gmplared purpose (they also 
proposed to "send a detachment of the Y.M.C.A. to offer moral guidance to 
the Russian people"-^^). "With this", Balfour stated, "the co-belligerents 
had had to remain satisfied"-^^. Intervention had become a fact*
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Chapter Two: The Rise and Fall of Intervention.
British forces occupied Soviet Russia in the north, in the Fax East and
in the south; and maintained a blockade in the Baltic. It was maintained
at the time - and has been maintained since - that the aim of British
policy was not an anti-Bolshevik one: that obligations had been
contracted to groups in Russia who had opposed the Germans during the war,
and could not now, after the Armistice, be abandoned. These groups, as it
happened, were opposed to the Moscow government. Recent studies have
recorded the "absence of any overriding 'principle'" in British policy,
but rather the "habit, so ingrained in British politics and administration,
of making a virtue of the lack of a 'principle'"; and have talked of the
Cabinet's "piecemeal decisions" which formed the basis of its first post-
Armistice policy formulations^. Another study has described intervention
2
as a "striking example of British pragmatism at work" • It is worth noting
at the outset that a number of members of the government, at least in
private, were somewhat more forthcoming.
The British government, Curzon wrote to Sir J. Jordan in Peking, had
"not changed (its) policy of active opposition to Bolshevism"^. Defeat
of Bolshevism, he told Wardrop, "even if we do not take active part in
operations", was the "interest of this country"^. The supplies to the
Baltic States and to Denikin, the British Minister told the Polish Prime
Minister, were "sufficient proof of our desire to see an end put to the 
5
Bolshevik regime" .
"If", the Cabinet stoutly maintained, "we were making war on the 
Bolsheviks, our policy would be a thorough one", and the government would 
not have contented itself with the extent of material support it had 
provided for the anti-Bolshevik forces^. This was, however, to miss the 
point. What was lacking was not the Cabinet's desire to secure the 
overthrow of the Bolshevik regime, but its power to do so. The downfall 
of Bolshevism, it has been noted, was "universally desired in the
7
Cabinet" ; but there was no serious support for the view that a large 
number of British troops, or greater material support of the anti- 
Bolsheviks, should be provided, since neither could be found. Both Lord 
Robert Cecil (who had left the Foreign Office) and Lloyd George admitted 
in February 1919 that "effective war against the Bolsheviks" was
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"impractible". Apart altogether from the opposition of public opinion, 
which obstinately clung to the notion that British policy aimed at the 
overthrow of the Bolshevik government, there could be "no question”, the
Cabinet eventually concluded, ”of making active war on the Bolsheviks, for
9
the reason that we have neither the men, the money, nor the credit" .
This, indeed, left little scope for differences of opinion within the
Cabinet. If there was agreement upon ultimate objectives, there was agreement
also that their achievement did not (at least unaided) lie within British means.
This left room for disagreement only of personality and of emphasis. These,
admittedly, existed. The most notable was certainly that between Lloyd George
and Churchills and to contemporaries it might often appear that fundamentally
divergent policies were being pursued. Lloyd George himself later called
attention to the "powerful and exceeding pertinacious influences in the
Cabinet working for military intervention in Russia”. Since he himself, owing
to the business of the Peace Conference, was "not on the spot in London to
exercise direct control over the situation, for a time I was out-manoeuvred,
and Mr. Bonar Law, who presided over the Ministers in my absence, was overridden.
Mr. Winston Churchill in particular threw the whole of his dynamic energy
and genius into organizing an armed intervention against the Russian Bolshevik
power"^. Churchill wrote to Lloyd George that "since the Armistice my
policy would have been 'Peace with the German people, wax on the Bolshevik
tyranny'. Willingly or avoidably, you have followed something very near the
reverse""^. Sir Henry Wilson noted in his diary that "Winston (is) all
12against Bolshevism, and therefore in this, against Lloyd George” • A
recent study, following these views, has referred to Churchill's "unremitting
campaign for effective, decisive intervention" as one of two factors making
for the continuance of intervention after the Armistice^.
Churchill, admittedly, was the more picturesque in his denunciation
of what he called the "foul baboonery of Bolshevism"^. The Bolshevik
regime, he assured the Cabinet, was the "most horrible tyranny and
15brutality the world had ever seen" . To the House of Commons he was 
even more emphatic. Britain, he declared, could "not remain impartial as 
between the two sides in Russia". Bolshevism was "not a policy, it is a 
disease. It is not a creed; it is a pestilence. It presents all the 
characteristics of a pestilence. It breaks out with great suddenness; it is
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violently contagious; it throws people into a frenzy of excitement; it 
spreads with alarming rapidity; the mortality is terrible,. In its first 
stages, Bolshevism offers a considerable attraction to the worst elements 
in an uneducated people, like the Russian masses..”
Churchill had, however, acquired a responsibility for Russian 
policy only on his assumption of the Secretaryship of War and Air on 
10 January 1919* As he remarked, with only slight exaggeration, "up to
this moment I had taken no part of any kind in Russian affairs, nor had
17I been responsible for any commitment" . By this time the Cabinet had
endorsed a number of decisions concerning Russian policy, which, as 
Churchill pointed out, amounted to a "far-reaching J>rogramme. flit not
only comprised existing commitments, but added to them large new enterpr­
ises in the Caucasus and in South Russia” . Churchill had simply inherited
this programme, which had not been of his own making; and during his
period of office his concern was less the enlargement of this programme 
than for its more effective prosecution. While he urged that the govern­
ment should "make war upon the Bolshevists by every means in (its) power., 
with a coherent plan on all fronts at once, until such time as a definite 
victory is won,.”, he conceded that this policy must "not involve the
19employment of British troops or the expenditure of large sums of money"
Lloyd George differed from Churchill not in regarding the overthrow of
the Bolsheviks as other than desirable: but in coming more swiftly to terms 
with the truth that, in these circumstances (which were not contested
within the Cabinet), this objective lay beyond the capacity of the
British government to achieve.
Divisions within the Cabinet , while they tended naturally to
become identified with these two figures, extended beyond th^j As "zealous
and untiring advocates of the policy of intervention" Lloydbeorge included
20Lord Curzon as well as Churchill . Geddes and Long, also, as well as the
naval and military leaders Weymss, BeattyX abd Wilson, have bden added to
21those whose favour of an * anti-Bolshevik crusade1 was undoubted • Sceptics
included Fisher and Austen Chamberlain, as well as Bonar Law, who had a
22Scottish businessman*s distrust of Churchill*s extravagant schemes . Lord 
Davidson described his attitude as "always cautious, and he was inclined
to jtake no risks, especially with Russia. He didn*t think that the White 
Russians were worth backing, and he always took the line against Winston,
px
who wanted to help Kolchak and Denikin" . It would, however, be misleading
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to suggest that the sceptics remained sceptical whatever the fortunes 
of the battlefiiid : which was understandable, since their objection to 
Churchill*s urgings was not that they were wrong in principle, but that 
their optimistim was not well founded (or, as Lloyd George put it, that 
Winston was "backing thw wrong horse"^). It has justly been remarked that 
the Cabinet was divided, not into ‘interventionists* and ’non-interventio­
nists* ,but into ‘circumspect' and ' extremeK interventionists!^.
Much criticism was directed at the appearance of indecision
which resulted: as Lord H. Cecil observed in the House of Commons, the
26government had "sometimes followed one policy, and sometimes another" .
Lord Robert Cecil, a former member of the government, focussed also on the
"oscillation between^Sv;o policies". Whenever the anti-Bolsheviks were
successful, he noted, "then there was a considerable reversion to what I
may call the Churchillian policy. As soon as they were driven back there
27
was a great movement towards non-intervention" • An examination of the 
Cabinet's Russian policy tends to sustain this charge,
"In the event of an armistice", Balfour told the Cabinet on 18 October 1918, 
"we were faced with a serious state of things in Russia. The main justific­
ation of our intervention had been to prevent German aggression and absorpt­
ion of that country.. If we now withdrew our forces from European and 
Asiatic Russia we should suffer a serious loss of prestige and should be 
letting down our friends". Lord Robert Cecil "hated the idea of abandoning 
to Bolshevik fury all those who had helped us, but he quite saw that it 
might end badly if we tried to destroy Bolshevism by means of militatfy 
interference". Smuts was already looking beyond the conclusion of an 
armistice. "Before the Allies could havd an armistice with the Central 
Powers’,’ he declared, "they must be clear about political and military 
questions in Russia. Bolshevism was a danger to the whole world, and we 
were already committed at Murmansk, Archangel and in Siberia". The feroops
in northern Russia, moreover, could not be withdrawn until the following
28spring when navigation again became possible .
The Cabinet returned to the subject immediately after the armistice, 
and it became stij.1 clearer that something more than the fate of former 
allies was concerned. Balfour opened with a discwssJfiion of "our future 
policy in Russia and neighbouring countries". A "military crusade againwt
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Bolshevism was impossible”; it would "involve us in military operations
of unknown magnitude". He proposed the provision of "whatever assistance
lay in our power to those elements in Siberia and South East Russia who
had stood by us during the war"; in addition, "we could not allow" the
western border states of Russia to be "overwhelmed by central Russia^ .
The danger lay in the combination of invasion and revolution. The Bolsheviks
took the attitude that they did not mind about national boundaries, but
insisted upon revolutionary forms of government". The aristocracies and
land tenure systems of these states "constituted a class division which
was a source of great weakness". He made "great efforts to get the
Scandinavian countries to assist in providing arms and in policing these
Border States. They had, however, all refused, and if anything was to be
done, it would have to be done by the Allies". Milner agreed that "under no
circumstances could we send troops". Lord Robert Cecil added thaib it would
be "fatal to let it be thought that we were committed to an anti-Bolshevik
crusade". At the same time, however, "we ought to do what we could to
prevent the rich countries of Southern and South-Eastern Europe from drifting
into anarchy". Lloyd George indicated his "entire agreement with the
Foreign Secretary as to the line to be pursued". The Cabinet endorsed the
recommendations of a Foreign Office conference which had met the previous
day: to remain in occupation of Murmansk and Archangel; to recognize the
anti-Bolshevik government in Omsk as a de facto government; to maintain the
Siberian expedition; to occupy the Baku-Batum railway; to establish contact
with Denikin and "afford him all possible assistance in military material";
29and to supply the Baltic States with military material.
Whatever obligations the Cabinet might have assumed towards those
who had resisted German operations in Russia during the war, it was evident
that they had now come to form no more than a part of a programme of
considerably greater import. Moreover even this ground was a weak one.
The government, Churchill explained to the House of Commons, had "incurred
heavy commitments towards the people., who have espoused our cause,
and to the Russian armies, which were encouraged and called into being
largely by the Allies, and largely for our own purposes during the period
of the German War". There was, he thought, a need to "do our duty by those
30who have put their trust in us". If this obligation applied in respect
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of General Alexeiv, it was less clear that it applied to General Denikin, 
who had succeeded him at the time of the conclusion of the armistice, and 
with whom, subsequent to the armistice, the Cabinet had decided to 
"establish contact"-^. It had also been decided to recognize the Omsk 
government; but the governments support was subsequently extended also 
to General Kolchak, who overthrew it with the benevolent neutrality, if X 
not the actual assistance, of the local British representatives^* The 
government's favour was no doubt not without relation to the undertaking
made by Kolchak ten days later to recognize all Russian debts due to the
33Treasury, and promise their repayment .
The Imperial War Cabinet, meeting at the end of the year, debated 
and endorsed without substantial modification the government's policy* 
Churchill urged "joint action bv the give Great Powers", who shouldjbe 
propared to "use force to restore the situation and set up a democratic 
government* In his view, Bolshevism in Russia represented a mere fraction 
of the population, and would be exposed and swept away by a general electi­
on held under Allied auspices"-^. Lloyd George later wrote that at this
time he found himself "frequently leaning first in one direction, and 
35then in another" • He told the Cabinet, however, that he was "definitely 
opposed to military intervention in any shape". Where were the troops to 
be found, in vidw of j>b£ular resistance to serving in Russia and commit­
ments elsewhere? And there was the danger, as the French Revolution, his 
favourite parallel, demonstrated, that military intervention might simply 
strengthen the force to which it was opposed. It was agreed to support
existing allies in Russia, with supplies but not with men, and to support
36existing govXXernments in the event of Bolshevik attack •
Lloyd George extended the logic of this policy at the Paris
Peace Conference, in proposing that the contending parties meet with the
37Allies on Prinkipo island in the gea of Marmora • Bolshevism, he declared, 
was "stronger than ever". Either a million men would have to be sent 
against them - and he "doubted whether a million men would be willing to 
go" - or a "siege of Russia" would have to be instituted, leading to 
great loss of life among the "ordinary population, with whom we wished to 
be friends". The Czechoslovak troops were by report "tainted w$th Bolshev­
ism and could not be trusted. Neither were the Russian troops of Kolchak 
equal to the tafefe"; while Denikin occupied only a "little backyard near
the Black Sea". Lloyd George's original proposal was that representatives 
of the existing Russian governments should be invited to Paris; but such 
was the "univers&l fear created by the Bolshevik outbreakjjthat we experien­
ced gr^at difficulty in finding a suitable location to meet these terrors 
of the East". A^roposal inviting the parties to Prinkipo was finally agreed 
upon; but while the Bolsheviks were willing to attend, the conditions made 
by their opponents were unacceptable, and the meetin^jdid not take place. ^  
Simply the rumour that it might do so, however, aroused vociferous 
opposition in the House of Commons, and Lloyd George hastened to make it
clear thfctf there had been no proposal to recognize the Bolsheviks, a
39government of "assassins" .
The proposal to reach an agreement with the Bolsheviks had been 
made, admittedly, at a time when little seemed to be possible to hope of 
their opponents. At a Cabinet meeting on the same day as Lloyd George's 
statement in Parliament, Churchill complained that the Bolsheviks were 
"getting stronger every day. In the south, General Denikin's army had 
greatly deteriorated.. The situation in Siberia was exactly the same. There 
was complete disheartenment everywhere". Chamberlain agreed that "the 
chances of any good results had greatly diminished in the last few weeks"; 
and Curzon conceded that the Bolsheviks "were in the ascendant militarily". 
Curzon wished the Cabinet to be "perfectly clear that they were doing all 
they could in what he would call the bolstering policy"; but admitted that 
a "determined and thorough-going intervention" was "impossible". Churchill 
agreed with him that "intervention on a large scale was not possible"^.
It was decided at the beginning of the following month to "press for the 
early withdrawal of Murmansk and Archangel"^. "Everything", Churchill 
lamented, "was going wrong"^.
Things continued to 'go wrong' until almost the end of April. By
early May, however, Churchill was able to report to the Cabinet that Kolchak
"was moving rapidly"; his army was "really rolling forward". He felt that
it was "quite possible that the Bolshevik regime would crumple up, and we
should get a civilized Russia friendly to us above allJother Powers if events
43continue to proceed on satisfactory lines" . In the circumstances the 
Cabinet felt justified in moving into a position even more to
reconcile with what Lloyd George had called the "fundamental principle of 
al\ foreign policy in this country., that you should never interfere in the
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internal affairs of another country, however badly governed" ( a principle
from which he regarded it as "not in the least., a departure", however,
to "support General Denikin, Admiral Kolchak and General Kharkoff"^)
The Foreign Office, Curzon told the Cabinet, had "come to the
conclusion that the time had now arrived for recognizing (Kolchak*s)
Government, and were in favour of according it recognition as the Provis-
h5ional Government of Siberia"^- . On 26 May an Allied note was despatched
UGto Kolchak in this sense • His reply was received on g  June, and wa® 
welcomed by the Allies an 12 June as "in substantial agreement with the
w k i c l  j,n
propositions^ hey had made" .
At the same time a more material contribution to his success 
swiftly acquired form. A telegram had been received stating that Kolchak 
expected to be in Kotlas by the end of May or the beginning of June. "If 
this was the case", Churchill considered, "it would greatly facilitate
i o
future military operations" • What operations these might be became clear
at a meeting of the Cabinet on 11 June, summoned on Churchill's request
so that he might outline a plan of action in Borth Russia which, he said,
had been submitted to the Prime Minister in Paris and approved, and
^approved also by the General Staff and the Admiralty . "For the first
time", he said, "we proposed to depart from our present defensive policy
and embark upon definite aggressive action against the Bolsheviks". It
was proposed that General Ironside should advance with two brigades
against Kotlas, which it was expected would be taken within fifteen days.
A junction was here to be effected with anti-Bolshevik forces, following
which General Ironside was to retire back tc|krchangel. Field-Marshal
Wilson declared that the aim of the operation was to "hit the enemy hard"
and to "join up with friendly forces in the south". Curzon noted that
"this was the first time that we were taking the offensive against the
Bolsheviks". The action, as a Foreign Office official pointed out, was
"directed to achieve the overthrow of the Russian Soviet Government at the 
50earliest moment" . Churchill, nevertheless, said that he "saw no difficu­
lty in justifying to Parliament the present plans", which, he stoutly 
maintained, were "simply designed to secure our withdrawal from North 
Russia". The Cabinet's approval was obtained for the operation^.
Only a week later there was disquieting news. "Almost immediately", 
Curzon told the Cabinet, after the plans had been approved, telegrams had
loi
been received "recording the serious setback which had been suffered by
Admiral Kolchak"; and subsequent telegrams had been "far from reassuring".
Curzon was understandably "much disturbed at the possibility of our
undertaking a venture which :rould prove unsuccessful". He was "in favour
of a forward policy, but he was not prepared to give his asppntX to a
proposition that might launch our men on an expedition into Central Russia
which was doomed to failure". Churchill argued that the military experts
believed that that the "real trouble on the Kolchak fron'^ t was now coming
to an end", although he admitted that the position was still "not quite a
happy one". He remained in favour of the advance even if a union with
Kolcftak's forces was no longer feasible. Bonar Law, however, stated that
he and Lloyd George had been under the impression when approving the attack
that it "would not be undertaken unless there was a possibility of joining
up with Admiral Kolchak". The situation "caused him great concern". It was
52agreed that the matter should be considered again on 27 June .
By this date the Chief of Staff had to admit that,while with the 
"Russian temperament., anything was possible", the chances of a junction 
with Kolcjak1s forces were "very remote"^. Reports from the governments 
representatives in Russia, moreover, gave little ground for optimism. The 
military situation, it was reported from Omsk, was "admitted by all to be 
extremely bad”. This was the result of "bad-management"; the men had "little
confidence or enthusiasm" and the peasantry were "Hot really well/disposed
5k Ito (the) government"^ . From Vladivostok it was rpeported that the situation
was "serious": the recent retirement of Kolchak*s forces had, indeed, been 
a "rout", and it was "not easy to see how (the} panic can be stopped". Attem­
pts to turn the struggle into a holy war had not been successful: "I am told
55that (the) religious feelings of (the} peasantyy are not strong at present” •
A mutiny, meanwhile, had taken place among the Russian troops at
Archangel. Curxon told the Cabinet that he was "rather perturbed regarding
the situation at Archangel"^. The advance on Kotlas had now been abandoned.
General Ironside stated that he had come independently to the conclusion that
the suggested attack would be "unwise, at any rate during the present month";
57and his decision was confirmed. Evacuation would continue as plknned •
A week later Churchill admitted that "there was no doubt that the 
58situation was critical"^ • Chamberlain pointed out XXat a subsequent meeting 
of the Cabinet that it appeared that the situation i~n Siberia was "just as
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serious as, or even more serious than, that in Archangel”. Churchill
admitted that it was quite probable that in the course of the following
two months the "whole Kolchak movement woulS riSSieto pieces"^. It was
still, however, possible, he argued on 2$ July, that Admiral Kolchak might
"retrieve his position"; while withdrawal would only "give the greatest
60satisfaction to., the Bolshevik sympathisers throughout the world" • The 
government could not, however, Lloyd George replied, "bind ourselves to 
help Russia indefinitely, and must not give any pledges as to the future". 
Balfour added that Kolchak's army had sustained "not only a serious but 
a calamitous reverse, ftom which it was almost inconceivable that it could 
recover". It was accordingly decided that all British troops,at Archangel 
and Murmansk, should be evacuated; that no British mission should be left 
at Archangel; that British forces should be withdrawn from Siberia as soon 
as transport allowed; and that evacuation of British forces from the 
Caucasus should begin the following month. Archangel had been evacuated 
by 27 September, Murmansk by 12 October; while the Siberian army "continued 
to retreat, broke up and ceased to be a factor in the military situations^ 
The situation prompted same disillusioned reflection within the 
Foreign Office. A memorandum circulated at the end of July argued that 
Kolchak's forces had suffered such reverses as would require many months 
to recover from; and that while Denikin was making considerable progress, 
Kolchak's prospects had before been "no less promising", W&le anything in 
the nature of temporary setbacks should be the "last reason for altering 
our policy in Russia", the "sudden reversal of the very favourable 
conditions of two months ago" was nevertheless felt to justify a "close 
revision of that policy in the light of our recent military and political 
experiences". There could be no question of increasing British support 
either in men or materials: "no government in Europe or America is strong 
enough to undertake an extensive military expedition in Russia". It was 
considered "very improbably" that Kolchak would overthrow the Bolsheviks, 
and "extremely doubtful" whether Denikin would do so. The present Russian 
government was "accfepted by the bulk of the Russian people". Its conditions 
were reasonable, and negotiations among the parties concerned should be 
initiated^2.
Curzon agreed, in a memorandum of 17 July, that the Bolsheviks were 
"now embarking upon a course more in accortnw£th the adopted principles of
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international comity and intercourse”• Their peace proposals were indeed 
"attractive at first sight". Allied support had however been given to 
Admiral Kolchak, and it was "impossible for the Allies to abandon his 
cause, lien if they felt any inclination to do so^? In a memorandum 
prepared for the Cabinet the following month, he admitted that the general 
impression was one of "disappointment, in some cases of admitted failure". 
The results produced by Allied intervention had so far been "incommensur­
ate either with the objects for which they were undertaken or with the 
enormous expenditure involved". The anti-Bolshevik government in northern 
Russia was unlikely to survive the Allies1departure; while in Siberia the 
situation had "undergone a decided change for the worst", and Kolchak’s 
forces were reported in "full retreat". The Russian forces which the
British government had supported had been generallylunsuccessful; and the
64 ISoviet government had become stronger .
All, however, was not lost. For in South Russia the situation
was much more favourable. Indddd if he wefe supported * Denikin might "yet
attain a success which has been denied to his chief"^. On 4 July
Churchill told the Cabinet that the growth of the Volunteer Army had been 
66"remarkable" • Increasingly British assistance was directed to aiding
67his "far more serious and sustained" movement . On 1 August Churchill
informed the Cabinet that "up to date, no men had been sent to General
Denikin except what was called a British Mission. This was not to exceed
the number of two thousand, and they were not supposed to be fighting meq”
although, he added disingenuously, "of course, if in the front line they
6 R
might have to take part in the fighting" • He later told the House of
Commons that " a few airmen and tank corps personnel" had been involved in
69the fighting under Denikin (v/ho had himself been awarded the K.C.B. ).
Even Curzon, however, had come to the conclusion that it was 
"impossible for us to continue our support both in Siberia and in South 
Russia". His proposal was for an Inter-Allied Council with a fund jointly 
subscribed: "it would then be for the powers to agree thXM assign to 
themselves spheres in which they were respectively politically interested, 
or which were suitable on account of geographical propinquity". The Rrime 
Minister and Bonar Law both believed, however, that the Powers would 
refuse the suggestion of a pofcl; and Lloyd George fbhought, indeed, that 
Clemeneeau had "practically written Russia off his books". Churchill
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urged that the "one bright spot in Russia was the present position of
General Denikin, who was now halfway to Saratov" and "seemed to be welcomed
everywhere"; and who was reported to be intending to proceed as far as
Moscow. Balfour remained sceptiaal: "if we reallyjthought that Ddnikin
could reach Moscow, we might entertain hopes of his crushing Bolshevism";
but this, he thought, was unlikely. Curzon offered a "word of warning.. :he
doubted whether Denikin would achieve any great success, and it was always
possible that he might fail like Kolchak". Barnes added that "we were always
baeking the wrong horse". Lloyd George observed that while support of
Kolchak in May had been a "legitimate risk", this was not now the case. An
estimate should be prepared of a Wfinal contribution" to DenikiZ?
days later the Cabinet decided that assistance to Russia should be confined
to Denikin; and "all operations in other parts of the former Russian empire
71should be brought to an end as soon as possible" .
Churchill, however, continued to press for assistance. On 25
September he called for "war upon the Bolshevists by every means in our
powerX..with a coherent plan on all fronts at once, until such time as
either a definite victory is won, or it is decided to make a general peace
in which all parties would be included". He conceded, crucially, that such
a proposal should "not involve the employment olf British troops or the
72expenditure of large sums of money"' . By mid-October, nevertheless, Denikin
had reached Tula, 220 miles from Moscow; and Churtfhill wrote in a public
letter that there were "good reasons^ for believing that the tyranny of
73Bolshevism will soon be overthrown by the Russian nation.." . He wrote to 
Curzon on 5 October that the Bolsheviks were "failing and perhaps the end 
is not distant. Not only their system bjtt their regime is doomed. Their 
military effort is collapsing at almost every point on the whole immense 
circle of their front", a situation parallelling that of the final debacle 
of the German forces in October 1918. "Everything in our power" should be 
done to help Denikin, at the expense if necessary of what he termed "very
n  i
small passing interests of a subsidiary character" •
Denikin’s fortunes appeared to have improved to such an extent 
that a Foreign Office memorandum was issued, which proposed the recognition^ 
even fct this late stage, of a Denikin-Kolchak government. Leeper wrote to 
J.D. Gregory that the remaining military difficulties before Denikin were 
"comparatively slight"; he should, he considered, "be in Moscow by December".
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Gregory agreed, in a minute written on 17 October: "as far as we can see
now", he wrote, "Ben|^ |in is about to come out on top”. As Curzon noted,
"we seem to be swinging round rather rapidly”. There was "clearly nothing", 
he remarked, "that succeeds like success". The government, however, should 
"not take a false step now". An Allied decision would be necessary; and 
did Deri$f^in*s success, he wrote in a further minute on 22 October, justify 
the recognition of Kolchak also? He would "rather wait a bit before 
proposing recognition". A telegram to Eyre Crowe in Paris, which noted 
that the situation in Russia had "undergone such a drastic change that we
are bound now to reckon with the possibility of the collapse of the i
!
Bolshevist power at no distant date", and asked whether he agreed that !
I
it might now be "politically expedient" to regognize a Denikin-Kolchak !
75 *government, was accordingly suspended . i
The Cabinet had approved a final contribution to Denikin on
7 October of three million pounds and nonmarketable supplies, howev^ S?; and
Denikin was forced to begin a protracted retreat later in the month.LCurz-
on, in a memorandum written at the beginning of December, professed to see
"no reason to conclude that the wheel of fortune" had "finally turned in *
favour of the Bolshevik armies and against their opponents", he admitted
77that the fortunes of the latter were then "not the most favourable" . A
Foreign Office memorandum of 22 December went so far as to state that #
despite some expressed opinions that the Whites might yet overcome the
Bolsheviks, it was in fact "utterly impossible to hope fto:$ anything of the 
78sort" . To subsidise the White armies further would amount, it appeared, 
to throwing good money after bad: a line of conducfe which failed to find 
an advocate within the Cabinet.
The Cabinet*s contribution to the anti-Bolshevik cause had already become
a very substantial one. These forces had suffered, as Lloyd George told
79the House of Commons, "no failure., from any lack of equipment" . Britain 
was giving these forces, Churchill clHi|ttaimed, "all the help we can without 
violating our fundamental principle, that Russia must be saved by Russians". 
This help comprised "arms, munitions and., a certain number of volunifcfe^ B, 
especially in the technical services" • Denlklin was supported by J^ every 
means in our power, short of the despatch of large fighting units from 
this country" • This amounted to "ample supplies of munitions of war of
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all kinds1': the troops had "not lacked anything we were responsible for
providing them with"; as well as "instructors and technical advisers in
regard to the supply of complicated war material" • The government,
declared Churchill, had also "not failed in our task of supnlying Admiral
82Kolchak's troops with arms" • Lloyd George remarked that "far more than 
moral support" had been given to the anti-Bolshevik governments in Siberia 
and the south. They had received "substantial" support, both financial 
and in terms of ammunition and gund: the government had "not denied them 
anything in that respect". Indeed "pretty much the whole of their equipment 
- at least a good deal of it - (had) been supplied by the Allies"^. (Part 
of the trouble, indeed, had been that the abundance of British supplies 
hdd led Denikin's forces, in an appreciable number of cases, to interest 
themselves more in its sale than its use: a "roaring trade" was done by 
some of Denikin's supporters, it was stated, selling British munitions
o 1
to the Bolsheviks ; and in the battle in which the Red Army captured 
Kharkhov in November 1919> British anti-freeze was being sold across the 
bar of the Hotel Mtefcrppole while lorries and tanks froze for lack of it^)« 
The government remained somewhat coy regarding the precise 
numbers and costs involved. Churchill declared that it would be "very 
undesirable" to disclose the number of British troops in Russia; and the 
cost of the British missions in Russia could not be stated without a "very 
great deal of elaborate work, such as I am not prepared to undertake at 
the present moment" . Three weeks later, however, what was described as
Q r p
a "rough estimate" was published . It covered military and naval operati­
ons from the Armistice only until the end of July 1919» Already by that 
date, however, military and naval operations (including the cost of issue 
of 'non-marketable stores and munitions') had amounted to nearly £26 mill­
ion, largely as a result of operations at Archangel and Murmansk. Assista­
nce to the Russian armies contributed a further £if3 million, making a
88total of almost £70 million pounds • By the end of October, when further
figures were published, these totals had swelled to nearly £33 million and
nearly £if7 million respectively. In addition a 'final contribution' of
stores and assistance of about £13 million had been made to General Denikin
89raising the total sum to nearly £95 million .
These, however 'unmarketable* the stores, were substantial sums; 
and the Cabinet was understandbbly concerned that the caase on wh$ch they
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were lavished should not be thought an unworthy one. It was "important", 
Lloyd George thought, that the public in England should realise more 
fully what Bolshevism meant in practice. France was more secure against 
Bolshevism, owing to the existence of a large population of peasant propr­
ietors. Here we had. a great, inflammable industrial population". It was 
"very desirable" that they should know of the sufferings of industrial 
workers in Russia at the hands of the Bolsheviks. Chamberlain considered 
it "most important" that they should get the press to take up the question 
of Bolshevik excesses more fully. Lord Robert Cecil revealed that the 
Foreign Office had a "good deal of information on the subject which could 
be made available". It was decided that the Foreign Office should "collect
as much material as possible in regard to the behaviour of the Bolshevik
90Government., with a view to its full and speedy publication".
The results of the Foreign Office's investigations appeared in April,
with a foreword expressing understandable confidence that the accounts it
embodied would "speak for themselves in the picture which they present of
the principles and methods of Bolshevik rule, the appalling incidents by
which it has been accompanied, the economic consequences which have flowed
91from it, and the almost incalculable misery which it has produced". In a
number of respects, admittedly, the Bolsheviks might in retrospect appear
to have been guilty of no more than pioneering. Religious education,
for instance, had been ended; and boys and girls were being educated
together in schools run by committees of pupils, in which marks,
homework and punishment had been abolished. Teachers were appointed by a
92
vote in which students and non-teaching staff took part. The "idea of a 
six to eight hours' working day with higher wages" was shamelessly espoused. 
An especial source of indignation was the treatment meted out to the 
'educated classes'. General Know reported to the War Office that officers 
had been "put on to the most menial forms of work, such as street cleaning,
93loading bricks at railway stations, and a colonel is now a night watchman". 
There was moreover evidence to show that commissariats of free love had 
been established in revolutionary towns,,"and respectable women flogged 
for refusing to yield". A decree for the 'nationalisation of women* had 
been put into force, and efforts made to 'nationalize children'. Loss of 
life had been very considerable: although its extent in the prisons was 
not fully appreciated because "during the executions a regimental band plays
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lively tunes". The Bolsheviks, General Poole reported, were now "employi­
ng gangs of Chinese for the purpose of killing officers and deserters".
"Many thousands" were reported to have been shot by "Mongolian soldiers"; 
and in one case a number of captured Russian officers were reported to 
have been "given over to the Mongolian soldiers, who sawed them in pieces". 
In such circumstances it was not, perhaps, to be wondered at that there
were^’signs that the Terrorist Oligarchy is tottering", and that the
9hAllies "would be welcomed with open arms everywhere" .
In Parliament the report provoked concern that no dealings
whatever should be had with "these anarchist assassins"; their recognition,
thought Clement Edwards, would bring "anarchy, revolution and red ruin on
95the whole of the civilized communities of the world" . Brigadier General
Croft daw the extension of Bolshevism as the "end of civilization, the
end of Christianity - absolutely the end of Christianity". In churches
under Bolshevik control "they are dancing day and night"; they had"become
96the homes of the harlots of Russia" • The government was urged to "do
something definite and effective .. to stamp it out"; without, however,
97the sacrifice of British lives • This was a fatal reservation: for if 
(as became evident) not by Kolchak and Denikin, the overthrow of the Bol­
shevik regime could be brought abo#t only by the despatch of a military 
force the size of which not even the most determined anti-Bolshevik was 
prepared to contemplate. As Sir J.D. Rees later remarked, "whether we 
like it or not we must be content with the moderate measure of support 
which we are now giving to the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia, and it is 
hopeless for us to attempt, much as one would like to do, any larger and
more heroic form of intervention". There was "really no alternative but
98to support the policy announced by the Secretary of State for War"^ .
Beyond the measures which have been noted above, the
government also took "steps., to prevent trade with that part of Russia
which is at present under Bolshevik rule" (although it was nevertheless
maintained that this did "not, in fact, constitute a blockade in the legal
99sense of the term" )• They would "continue until a democratic government 
which can be recognized by the Allies has been established in the part of i
Russia in question"'*"^, Prisoners, also, although there was no war, would
be "treated in the same way as prisoners of war would be treated"^^. The j
Cabinet had in fact ruled on k July that "in fact, a state of war did exist ;
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as between Great Britain and the Bolshevist government of Russia": or as
Lloyd George put it, "actually we were at war with the Bolsheviks, but we
102had decided not to make war".
The government also made payments for the upkeep of the
Russian diplomatic, consular and other services, amounting in the year
1919 to nearly £10,000, It was stated that these payments should be
regarded as "in the nature of a debt to be repaid by a future government 
103of Russia", The payments had been discontinued as of $1 March 1919* The
total amount paid in support of - in effect - Nabokov, the Russian charge
d’affaires before the Bolshevik revolution, was later announced to have
been over £184,000.'^’ Nabokov was later succeded by Sabline, representing
Kolchak's administration, at the Russian Embassy; end the treasury was
reported to be paying a proportion of the rates for the building. As late
as August 1920 the Foreign Office exerted its influence upon the Treasury
in order to secure that the "representatives in London of the late Provisional
Government", while "strictly speaking" not entitled to this or other
diplomatic privileges, he exempted from local rates in respect of Embassy
105and Legation houses in accordance with a reciprocity agreement of 1892.
Even at the time it was suggested that economic motives
might form a central preoccupation of the government's Russian policy.
Neal Maclean remarked, with some justice, that it had not been government
policy before to intervene in a foreign country or send troops or munitions
there "merely because atrocities were being committed there". The real
cause, he charged, was because there was so much British capital invested
in Russia, and "because we want to be sure that there is a government in
Russia which will safeguard the capital invested". He estimated that there
was £1600 million of European capital invested in Russia, most of it
British; and three members of the government were among the investors.^*
Walton Newbold, in a pamphlet which claimed to contain "startling facts
about the financial powers in Great Britain interested in the overthrow of
the Russian Revolution", noted that Eric Geddes, Walter Long and Austen
Chamberlain all held shares in companies which had been nationalized in
107whole or in part by the Bolshevik government. Further details were 
supplied in the House of Commons (somewhat to its consemation) by Colonel 
- Mialone, who concluded; "when you have £1,600 million invested in Russia it 
is not likely that (the) honourable Members opposite, who largely control
110
• I T *  •4.f»108it, are going to risk losing it" •
Business opinion, certainly, offered much support for thjs view.
One journal concerned with Anglo-Russian trade declared in mid-1918 that
Mwhat we are witnessingX now in Russia is the opening stages of a great
struggle for her immeasnurable war materials”. The Federation of British
Industries added: "Siberial The richest prize ever offered to the
109civilized world since the discovery of the Americas" . Archangel,
Lindley wrote to Curzon from Vienna, had a "great commercial future": it j
was the "largest timber reserve in Europe" , There was a liv^ier interest,j
perhaps, in the south of Russia, where oil and minerals were available, I
Mr Stinton Jones, a member of the British-Russia Club, an association of
business people with an interest in Russian trade, went on a tour which
included "such parts of Russia as (had) been freed from the domination of
the Bolsheviksff on behalf of a number of British engineering firms; and j
despite a breakdown in transport and currency difficulties, it was apparent
that significant trading opportunities existed, for the purchase of coals j
111oil and corn, for instance, and the sale of automobiles • The Cabinet •
authorized the Shell company to proceed with the export of oil from the [
area; and H.J. Mackinder, a geographer and M,P. with Business connections, s
was despatched there on a government mission, with instructions which j
112included the development of British trade and industry •
This may be part, at least, of the explanation of government policy: 
but there is no need to regard the members of the Cabinet as other than 
mortal to suggest that it is not the whole of that explanation. For what !
was common to then^ and, indeed, to business opinion, was an assurance that 
what Lloyd George termed the "fantastic and hysterical experiments" charact­
eristic of Bolshevism could not long continue^^. Lord Robert Cecil told 
C.0. Scott that "Bolshevism in his view was impossible as a basis of 
society and nothing could be bmilt on it"^^. Lloyd George had no doubt
that you could P.not carry on a great country upon rude and wild principles
115such as those which are inculcated by the Bolsheviks" . There were even 
those who were prepared already to state that Lenin was "moving directly 
towards the right. The fact is that like all of us he realises that extreme 
socialism is a farce". Internal conditions in Russia were changing from 
Socialism into "Radicalism or even Liberalism"^^. A stable Russia, such 
as would ultimately emerge, could not, moreover, and no doubt would not even
Ill
wish, to suspend what were considered to be natural and immutable laws of
commerce within and among nations. Whatever the size of the Russian debt
117(reckoned by Bonar Law to be £568 million }>, there could be no doubt, said 
Churchill, that when Russia "becomes again a great civilized Sfcfcte she will 
pay-118.
Another part the explanation, undoubtedly, is in what Lord Curzon
delicately termed the "wider aspect" which the question had a^umed since
119intervention had fifst been undertaken. In a paper submitted to a meeting
of the Cabinet on 12 August he noted that the government’s policy had been
inspired "partly by obligations and responsibilities towatfd those Russians
who have trusted the Allies and thrown in their lot with them"; but it had
also been "partly in the nature of defensive measures designed to preserve
the fruits of victory by preventing, or at least restricting, the spread of
a political conflagration which is capable, if unarrested, of nullifying
its result not only over Russia alone, but over vast contiguous areas of
120the European continent" • Writing in July 1919, Mr O’Malley of the Foreign
Office pointed out that it was not because the de facto Soyiet Government
was a tyranny that recognition had been refused to it, but accorded to the
other de facto Russian governments. It was, he considered, "rather because
we hope by this means to fend off a threat to the 'social order', which
121means our class distinctions and private incomes" . J.D. Gregory agreed
that the government's policy towards Russia, and towards the spread of
122Bolshevism , were "closely bound up" • The nature and extent of this 
connection - in other words, thd international and political dimensions of 
intervention - will now be examined; and it will be suggested that the policy 
of intervention can only adequately be understood within a context of social 
upheaval on the European continent, and an Allied policy designed here as 
in Russia to preserve an embattled status quo.
A revolutionary upheaval appeared, indeed, &o await their principal 
adversary. The alacrity with which an armistice was concluded in the last 
month of the war stemmed partly, it has been noted, from a natural desire 
to place the outcome of the war beyond doubt, but also from a "wish to 
minimise social upheavals summed up in the word 'Bolshevism". Smuts called 
for.the immediate conclusion of a full peace treatjjin late October, for the 
reason at least in part that "today the grim spectre of Bolshevik anarchy
112
is stalking to the front", leading him to the conclusion that it would be 
"wrong” (or more precisely, perhaps, imprudent) "merely for the sake of
still further and more adequately punishing Germany for her misdeeds to
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continue the war". On 7 November the Cabinet heard the news of the
124Kiel naval mutiny. Three days later Lloyd George read the Cabinet a
telegram from Clemenceau who was "afraid that Germany will break up and
Bolshevism will become rampant". Lloyd George asked Henry Wilson if he
wanted this, or would rather have an armistice. Wilson "unhesitatingly
said 'armistice1. All the Cabinet agreed. Our real danger now is not the
125Boches but Bolshevism". A Polish Jew sent to Basil Thomson, the head
of the Special Branch, by the Foreign Office, told him that "unless we
negotiate quickly with the existing German government we shall have
nothing left to negotiate with. The process of Bolshevik desintegration
126has already begun..". It was reported to the American Secretary of State
from Europe that "there was running through the minds of all the high
political men the fear of revolution and Bolshevism in Germany and their
belief that the only barrier against the spread of it would be to leave
127the German army sufficiently armed to put down such revolution1.1
The continuance of the blockade of Germany in the following
year led to extreme food shortages; and the Allies to the fear that "under
the twin pressures of defeat and famine the Teutonic peoples - already in
revolution - might slide into the grisly gulf that had already embraced 
128Russia". Wilson was becoming "very anxious" about the interior
condition of Germany, owing to the want of food that was reported, and
about the spread of Bolshevism that was taking place in consequence. On
3 March 1919 he confided to the King that he was "getting very frightened
of Germany going smash altogether", leading to the "most awful chaos the
world has ever seen". The peace terms to be forced upon Germany were, he
129thought, "fantastically severe and illogical". Hankey posed the question
to Jones: "can we get through the preliminaries of peace in sufficient time,
and in such form, as to save Germany?.. It is outrageous and intolerable
that Germany should not pay, and yet, if she is made to pay, we may raise
130a danger as may overshelm civilisation itself". The Spartacists, he
added, were a "very horrible and dangerous spectre to raise and I doubt if
JSchiedemann and his lot will ever be able to lay it".
Not all were impressed. Bolshevism in Germany, the National
113
Review declared, "leaves us stone-cold, Germans could hardly be better
employed than in cutting each others* throats"; and some suspicion Remained
that the * Bolshevik danger* was being used by the German negotiators to
outflank their Allied counterparts^^. The danger,nevertheless, was real
enough, A report from agent *V,77* on conditions in Germany in February,
circulated to the Cabinet on 7 March n w ,  concluded that itf the Spartae-
ists were allowed a few weeks more for the development of their propaganda
under the increasing stress of famine and unemployment, there was "no
question but that the whole country will be consumed by the flame of
Bolshevism which will spread with such rapidity that the waters of the
152Rhine will be incapable of checking its advance" .A report on 'Bolshevism 
in Germany', circulated a month later by Churchill, stated that the danger 
was "both real and imminent"'*'-^ . A note by the General Staff on the 
'Relaxation of the blockade of Germany', circulated by Churchill on 25 
April, noted that the maintenance of the German government was a "primary 
interewt to the Allies"; but its position was weak, and unless it could 
alleviate the terrible conditions existing in a large part of Germany, its 
fall was "probably certain. This would be disastrous from every point of 
view": and it would "throw Germany into the arms of the Bolsheviks", leading 
to a "general conflagration in Europe". The blockade shou'gflj be relaxed, it 
was urged, to "enable the more stable elements to make head fagainst 
Bolshevism"'*’
Lloyd George brought the views of British officers who had been in 
Germany to the attention of the Allies at the Peace Conference. They 
believed, he said, that Bolshevism was being created: "as long as the 
people were starving they would listen to the arguments of the Spartecists, 
and the Allies by their action were simply encouraging elements of disrupt­
ion and anarchy". Nor was the problem in any sense a local one: "if 
Germany went, and perhaps Spain, who would feel safe? As long as order 
was maintained in Germany, a breakwater would exist between the countries 
of the Allies and the waters of revolution beyond. But once that breakwater 
was swept away, he could not speak for France, and he trembled for his 
own country. The situation was particularly serious in Munich. Bavaria, X 
which on-Ce had been thought to represent the most solid and conservative 
pa*t of Germany, had already gone Bolshevik". If Germany starved and ran 
riot, "a state of revolution among the working classes of all countries
135would ensue with which it would be impossible to cope" ^ .
He returned to the question in the *Foni?ainebleu memorandum* 
of 25 March 1919* The whole of Europe, he wrote, was "filled with the 
spirit of revolution. There is a deep sense not only of discontent but of 
anger and revolt amongst the workmen against pre-war conditions. The 
whole social order in its political, ssocial and economic aspects is 
questioned by the masses of the population from one end of Europe to the 
other". There was a serious danger that the lilies might through their 
actions^throw the masses of the population throughout Europe into the 
arms of the extremists, whose only idea for regenerating mankind is to 
destroy utterly the whole existing fabric of society". The "greatest 
danger" was that Germany might unite with Russia, and it was "no mere 
bhimera". Germany must be offered a peace which, "while just ,will be 
preferable to all sensible men to the alternative of Bolshevism". A Leafeue 
of Nations must also be constructed, which should act as a "safeguard to 
to those nations whXXKo are prepared for fair dealing with their neighbours 
and a menace to those who would trespass on the rights of their neighbours, 
whether they are imperialist empires of imperialist Bolsheviks". Bolshevik 
expansion, he concluded, "does not merely menace the states on Russia*s 
borders, It threatens the whole of Asia and is as near to America as it 
is to France"^^.
To an extent the memorandum formed a part of Lrhojtd George's effort 
to secure a moderation of the peace terms with Germany: an effort which 
required him to exaggerate the danger to the other Allied governments of 
harsh terms. Yet the news which had come from Hungary (where a Soviet 
government, headed by Bela Kun, had come to power on 21 March) demonstrated 
that the danger was "no ifiXXX fantasy". This "offshoot 6<ff the Moscow fungus 
sprouting independently at Budapest", as Churchill termed it, emphasized 
the Bserious that the whole continent might lapse into anarchy"^"^.
Less than a week affeer the accession of the new government a "plan for 
dealing with this new situation by military force" was under discussion at 
the French Foreign Office^^.
The implications of the estab^ishmmnt of another Boviet regime 
in Europe were not lost on the Foreign Office. Sir Samuel Hoare wrote to 
Churchill, in a letter which was forwarded to Lloyd George, that the 
Czechoslovak Republic was "in real danger of destruction". Bela Kun was
"Lenin's lieutenant"; his objective was to establish through Galicia
!
a junction with Soviet Russia; end his administration was "to be recokoned |
with". His government, however, Hoare urged, could "easily be destroyed
now"; while if no action were taken, in two months' time, trading on
Magyar and German nationalism, it would have "smashed Czechoslovakia and
established itself firmly in Buda (Pest) and in Vienna as well". He was
159convinced of the "necessity of destroying Bela Kun and his Government" ^ .
Lt. Commander Graham was interviewed in the Foreign Office following his
escape from Hungary in Ju}.y. "Some definite action should be taken without
any delay to overthrow the existing Communist Government at Budapest", he
had argued; it could be done without the loss of a single life, since
the population was largely hostile but "unfortunately., not organized".
The Foreign Office sent the record of the interview to Balfour in Paris,
with a covering note suggesting that Graham's agfcuments merited the "most
careful attention", and trusted that the Allies cou^d be persuaded to
"take common action to put a final end to a state of affairs which is
prejudicial to the interests of all parties, and can only be relieved by
a strong and concerted policy on the part of the Allied Governments"^^.
In discussion of the problem at Paris, whence decisive Allied
action must come, Foch, who strongly favoured military intervention,
stated that "to liberate Hungary from Communism in one week" eight
infantr^fdivisions, a cavalry division, 'a hundred airoplanes and "as many
armoured cars as possible" would be necessary. The arguments on both
sides strikingly recapitulated those which had been advanced concerning
intervention in Russia. Balfour insisted that in considering the question
141
he was "not animated by any consideration of Hungarian internal politics".
For there were, he noted, in all countries sections of opinion which had
a "certain sympathy for Bolshevik programmes", and were "mostX strongly
opposed to military action against the Bolsheviks". Within Hungary, however.
General Boehm had sought support in opposition to Bela Kun; and "all these
disadvantages be avoided by proceeding through General Bo
Concern was general that "the evil might spread all over the world"; but
ana French governments in particular were not prfSfied to provide
military forces, and intervention was eventually rejected in favour of
economic sanctions1^. On 12 March the Supreme Economic Council had approve< 
the lifting of the bloackade against Austria and Hungary; but on 28 March
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the Council of Foreign Ministers decided "in view of the events that had 
lately taken place in Hungary" to maintain the bloackade, pending further 
study. The Council of Foreign Ministers on 9 May, and the Council of Four 
on 22 May approved plans to exert pressure upon Bela Kun, by announcing 
that the blockade would be lifted as soon as a government was formed in 
Hungary "which gives some assurance of settled conditions". A military 
investigating mission was despatched to Hung?ry on 17 June, leaving open 
the possibility of military action. More effective, however, was a statem­
ent on 26 July promising the Hungarian people food and an end to foreign 
occupation as soon as a responsible government was formed. The implication, 
it has been noted, was clear; the Allies had surmised correctly that such 
measures would "accomplish the Allied objective of deposing Bela Kun '
without the need for open military intervention". Food was shipped in o<
2 August, the day after the fall of Kun*s government"^**. Allied actions 
were not, admittedly, alone responsible for the downfall of the Soviet regime 
in Hungary; yet the Allied response to the establishment of a revolutionary 
government, in a country where no obligations could have been professed to 
earlier allies in the war against the Central Powers, appears to have 
differed little, if at all,fS°?he Allied response to the establishment of 
the Moscow Soviet government. The Allies did not intervene militarily in 
Hungary; but it was clear that they would have done so, had it not proved 
possible (as was not the case in Russia) to bring down a revolutionary 
government by indirect means.
Nor could governments nearer home feel secure. On Armistice Day,
Basil Thomson recorded, therewere "simultaneous attempts at revolution
in Switzerland and Holland.. Italy and Spain were unstable, and in the U.S..
1A5
and Canada the spread of Bolshevik ideas had begun to cayse serious alarm" .
As early as March 1918, the Dutch, he wrote, were "in a ticklish state,
~LL.fiBolshevism having made great headway" . In November he heard from the 
British Consul General in Holland that "revolution is very near., unless 
the people are supplied with food and coal". lit Italy, he wrote, both the 
government and the Vatican were "growing very nervous about Bolshevism".
Sir Samuel Hoare, who came to see him after a visit there, was "sure that 
Italy is on the eve of a serious social upheaval". Hoare, he noted, had 
be£h in Petrograd right up to revolution, and had professed to notice 
the same signs^ "**^ .
Lord Robert Cecil raised the matter of^the growth of Bolshevism
118
in Holland " in the Cabinet, He thought the idea of sending squadrons of
ships or arming prisoners of war was "most inadvisable, at any rate, unless
the Dutch government appealed to us to do so. However, we ought to say to
the Dutch, and to everybody, that, in the event of Bolshevik disturbances,
we should give them no food.. We should use our cXontrol over the food
1 uc*-
supplies of the world to assist the forces of order rgainst disorder’1 .
More direct measures were nevertheless undertaken by the EXKXKSX 
British government to control the spread of Bolshevism, in particular to 
prevent the movement of Bolshevik agents and funds through the neutral 
countries. Following a Foreign Office circular telegram at the end of 
1918, addressed to the British representatives in eight neutral countries, 
agreement was eventually reached with the governments concerned that an 
'anti-Bolshevik control officer* should be attached to the British mission 
to work closely in co-operation with the local police and customs staff.
The arrangement, conceived at a period when Bolshevism appeared to offer 
its maximum threat to the established order, hardly lasted beyong the end 
of 1919; but it does appear to havd played some part in co-ordinating
1
anti-Bolshevik activArJr between the British government and those (at least)
147*of Scandinavia, Holland, and Spain and Portugal •
Of most immediate concern, however, was the situation in the
countries on the western borders of Russia. Russia, said Lloyd George,
was "just like a volcano; it is still in fierce ermption, and the best
you can do is to provide security for those who are dwelling hn its remotest
and most accessible slopes, and arrest the devastating flow of lava, so
that it shall not scorch other lands". Their objective must^be, in other
words, to "prevent the forcible eruption of Bolshevism into Allied lands^.
The Cabinet on 14 November 1918 endorsed the decisions of the Foreign
Office oonferencd held the previous day, which held that "support should
be affSi^S to the border States of Western Russia from the Baltic to the
149Black Sea", which should be recognized and supported . The Cabinet, Bonar
Law observed, had in effect "undertaken to support the Baltic States against
150the menace of Bolshevism" •
A request from the French government to join its effort to "ensure 
order" in Austria and Czechoslovakia had to be declined, in viww of the 
"appilling dimensions" which British military liabilities had assumed-®-^.
It was agreed, however, to assist the Roumanian government to "defend her
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frontiers and to resist internal Bolshevism". Churchill argued that
"unless sp-edy steps were taken to go to the relief of Roumania, our ally
would become a prey to Bolshevism and would be lost to us.. The Bolshevist
menade was growing daily more formidable". Clothing and equipment for
152150,000 men were provided .In January the Cabinet considered a message
from Marshal Foch, impressing upon them the "enormous importance of
assisting Poland against the Bolsheviks", and urging that it was "to the
interest of the Associated Governments to stop the advance of Bolshevism
before it penetrated Austria and Germany", The Allied governments, "not
being able tomintervene themselves with sufficient force, ought to organize
as quickly as possiblea Polish army". Lord Robert Cecilq? who forwarded the
proposal, described himself as "personally^ warmly in favour^ 'of it, Curzon
noted that the "situation in Poland was rapidly becoming dangerous. The
military position, both to the east and to the west, was precarious".
Churcnill agreed that it was "quite impossible for us to stand aside and
let Poland go to pieces". Indeed it wasa "matter for serious consideration
whether we Sft^l^not now decide to bolster up the Central Powers, if
155necessary, in order to stem the tide of Bolshevism" .
It is, in fact, precisely because the Cabinet so clearly 
regarded Bolshevism, wherever it emerged, as a unitary and total challenge 
that its response, whether in Russia or elsewhere in Europe, must be 
considered as an inter-related whole. It was, as Churchill wrote, a 
"delusion to suppose that all this year we have been fighting the battles 
ofjthe anti-Bolshevik Russians. On the contrary, they have been fighting 
purs"^\
The point was not lost on the Bolshevik government, which had a
similar awareness that the issues at stake went far beyond the territorial
boundaries of the former Russian Empire. The war between us and Denikin,
T§udenmch and Kolchak", wrote Chicherin, "is just part of an international
155civil war, taking all the time more obvious forms" . The policy of the
capitalists to crush Russia, Lenin noted, was becasue they knew that /in
their own countries they have the same enemy - the bolshevist movement".
World imperialism had resolved to crush world bolshevism in the form of its
156main cell, Soviet Russia . The "so-called ‘Russian* question", Zinoviev
wrote, "is in fact a world question: the question whether capitalism will
157continue to exist" • The imperialist war, Lenin declared, had inevitabTly
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into a civil war of the exploited labouring classes with the proletariat 
it its head, against the exploiters, against the bourgeoisie. The 
resistance of the exploiters and the international solidarity and 
organization of the bourgeoisie were leading to the unification of civil 
war inside individual countries tomth revolutionary wars between proletari­
an countries and those remaining bourgeois, a process which had been
158"especially swift since the end of 1918", Imperialists and capitalists
now understood that "in Russia is being decided the fate, not only of the
159Russian, but also of international capital" .
An especially unwelcome innovation, to orthodox diplomatists,
was the Bolsheviks' early revolutionary diplomacy. The government,
Chicherin noted, had occupied itself less in "writing notes to governments,
but more (in) writing appeals to the working masses.. The foreign policy
of the Soviet republic is more and more becoming identified with the world
160
struggle between revolution and the old world" . The first act of the
Soviet government in the foreign policy field, the Decree on Peace, was
addressed to "all belligerent peoples and to their governments"'*'^, and
appealed in particular to the former to follow the precedents of Chartism
and other acts of "proletarian heroism and historic creativity" in the
course of their struggle to establish peace and free mankind from "all
slavery and exploitation". The failure of the Allied governments to
respond to the call for a general armistice and peace negotiations led the
Bolsheviks increasingly to address themselves to 'peoples' rather than
their 'governments': indeed, Trotsky's appeal of 19 December 1917, after
a preliminary armistice with the Germans had been concluded, addressed
itself specifically to workers as against their governments, stating that
"only the revolutionary struggle of the working classes against existing
162governments" could bring about a democratic ppeace . Allied intervention 
led to a series of appeals to workers and labour organizations in the All­
ied countries'*-^ .
Such appeals were the more disconcerting in that it was consider­
ed that they might meet with a ready response in Britain. During the first 
three months of 1919, wrote the head of the Special Branch, "unrest 
touched its highwater mark. I do not think that at any time in history 
since the Brifetol Riots (of 1831) havd be been so near mwvolution"'*’^ .There 
was agreement from contemporaries. "The only time in my life",xilS^led’
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Kingsley Martin, "when revolution in Britain seemed likely was in 1919".1^
C.P. Scott, writing in his diary somewhat earlier, was concerned to find
the "crude extravagances and injustices of the Bolshevik economic
doctrine., penetrating to some extent our own Labour extremists".
British workers, wrote an alarmed contemporary, "have turned to Bolshevism
with an avidity and enthusiasm that Englishmen have never before displayed
for any alien political philosophy". The home, he thought, was "in grave
danger", while the socialists were making efforts "openly to discredit
the family and virtually to abolish marriage". The Bolshevik danger he
167thought "not only serious, but acute". 1 The Nineteenth Century and After
found a "notable feature" of the new situation to be the "marked and
ominous decline of faith in Parliaments* a change it thought "menacing".
Labour supporters, in particular, often "would not vote. They no longer
168believe in Parliaments". Even people who usually kept their heads,
the National Review noted, were "talking of impending devolution,N. Labour
leaders saw themselves in Buckingham Palace and the King "working in a
mine or driving a lorry". Lloyd George was considered by the journal "in
169some ways worse and more dangerous than Kerensky..".
There were revolutionaries to be found in the most
unlikely places. They were present, Thomson noted, "even among the
undergraduates at Oxford and Cambridge, and in one or two of the public
schools",The Cabinet, however, found more to concern itself with
on the industrial scene. The later stages of the war had brought a threatened
rail strike and a shipwright^ strike, both, alarmingly, against union
171advice, as well as a threatened coal strike. The new year brought
the threat of action on London transport, and among engineers and electric­
ians Undoubtedly more serious, however, was the situation in Glasgow,
where a strike for a forty-hour week had gripped Clydebank. Bonar Law 
told the Cabinet that it was "vital., to be satisfied that there was a 
sufficient force in Glasgow to prevent disorder". If the movement 
there grew, he thought, it would spread all over the country. Two brigades 
of troops and six tanks were despatched to Glasgow, ■'■heir reliability was 
not, however, above question. General Childs explained to the Cabinet that
previously there had been a "well-disciplined and ignorant army, whereas
173now we had an army educated and ill-disciplined". The following day^
subsequently known as "Bloojty Friday", the demonstrators were charged by
122
mounted police in the centre of the city, and some casualties resulted* !
It was, the Secretary for Scotland asserted, a "misnomer to call the j
situation in Glasgow a strike - it was a Bolshevist rising"^\
The miners* strike in July was, iJoyd George told the Cabinet, 
"practical and not theoretical Bolshevism, and must be dealt with with 
a firm hand.. If the government were beaten and the miners won, it would 
result in Soviet government. A similar situation mightX result to that of
the first days of the Revolution in Russia.." The people should be appealed;
17 5 ito to "defend themselves against Bolshevism"  ^(The word * Bolshie* or j
'Bolshy*, which came into popular usage at about this time, was, it has
176been noted, one "loosely used by opponents" ) The Home Secretary 
explained later that the Triple Alliance's "present agitation was not real­
ly for nationalization only but for something much bigger". Churchill
reassured the meeting somewhat: "militarily, we were in a good position to
177fight the Triple Alliance" . j
It was, indeed, a novdl and significant eleient in the situation; 
that neither the armed forces nor the police had remained unaffected by | 
the prevailing unrest. A police stride had occurred in the later stages j
i
of the war over the issues of wages and union recognition. It was described |
by the Assistant Commissioner as "very serious., every district was affect-|
178 *ed" . In January 1919 the Cabinet was warned of the "strong probability j
of another police strike, which would be a serious matter". The Secretary
of State for Scotland added that there was "very considerable unrest among
179the Scottish Police" . The position was undoubtedly serious, the Home 
Secretary subsequently reported. There wilfx *a number of firebrands in the 
Force who were working with confessed Bolsheviks.."; but a "troublesome 
feature in dealing with the simtuation was the fact that., they had a
■j Q
number of genuine grievances" • When the strike did take place, it wasIgi
reported to the Cabinet that 2.LfO men were absent . The movement in fact 
attained considerably greater dimensions: over a thousand men were involved 
in London, and in Liverpool! Birkenhead, Bootle and Birmingham the strike 
was officially reported to have had a "regrettable amount of success". Many 
of the warders at Wormwood Scrubs Prison had also joined the strike. All,
] Op
however, were dismissed • The dispute had been concerned with the 
recognition of a policemen's union; but it had nevertheless, declared a 
contemporary journal, been "staged., according to revolutionary ideas",
123
and a minority of the strikers had "accepted the doctrine of class 
warfare"^^.
In the army, a "wave of intense impatience nand resentment accompanied 
by serious breaches of discipline", wrote Churchill, who had come to the 
War Office at the beginning of 1919, spread across the ranks. Mutinies and
disorders had already taken place on both sides of the Channel. In a single
week more than thirty cases of insubordination among the troops were
reported. "In several cases considerably bodies of men were for some
days f&&Ji$i£Xely out of control.. Some units informed their officers that 
they had constituted themselves a Soldiers' Council, and intended to 
march to the nearest township and fraternize with the workmen"; and the 
situation was "very threatening i^n many places". Luton Town Hall was 
seized and burned. In Calais at the end of January there was a "regular M 
mutiny", with three or four thousand troops in charge of the town for some
-I O i
days. A mutiny occurred at Folkestone on 3 February . On 7 January some
1300 soldiers demonstrated first at Whitehall and then at Downing Street,
demanding to see the Prime Minister, despite efforts to dissuade them.
The men, Henry Wilson noted in his diary, were "respectful and quiet, but
185not much saluting" ♦ The delegation, he told the Cabinet, "bore a danger-
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oue resemblance to a Soviet" • The First Sea Lord had "no doubt that
we were up agrinst a Bolshevist movement in London, Glasgow and elsewhere.
He had just returned from one of the naval ports where there had been a
little trouble, which was purely of a Bolshevist nature.. He had no doubt
1 87
that a skilful organization was behind the revolt" .
"Everywhere", noted Churchill, "the subversive elements were active 
and everywhere they found a response..A tremor, and indeed a spasm, shook
the foundations of every State". It was a "testing time, if ever there was
188one, for., the British Democracy" • It was not the case, of course, that
Bolshevism was alone responsible, as members of the Cabinet hastened to
make clear. The working man, Long reported io his colleagues, "regarded
the indifferent quality of bder as a typical case of class legislation,
and complained thaty whereas the labouring classes could only get a very
poor quality of beer, the upper classes could still get wiaes of pre-war
strength". Roberts suggested that an increase in barrelage and in gravity
would "have a good effect on public ibpiniibn, and do much to allay the
189prevailing industrial unrest" . A decision was also taken to dispose of
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the "expensive type of car" favoured by ministers and to substitute a
"single inexpensive type". Bonar Law told the Cabinet that he had been
informed that "few abuses are causing greater discontent than the fact
that junior officials are seen passing through London in powerful cars,
190the upkeep of which is maintained out of the public purse".
In January Curzon expressed his alarm at the fact that no
concerted action was being taken by the various departments with regard
to combating the spread of Bolshevik propaganda. A Minister without
191portfolio should, he thought, be appointed. A Committee on Industrial
192Unrest was appointed shortly afterwards. Bolshevik activity in Britain,
the House of Commons was told, "is widespread and is going on all the time".
A great deal of literature of a "most pernicious kind", added Bonar Law, 
was being circulated. The government promised that "firm action" would be 
taken.
The question of the prosecution of seditious speakers was examined
by the Cabinet in February. In ordinary times, Bonar Law considered,
prosecutions "did more harm thajv good, but the present circumstances were
exceptional". Proposals were to be drawn up to deal with the problem of
"aliens coming to this country and indulging in propaganda". A "legal
difficulty" nevertheless remained, as the Home Secretary observed, that
"so many who were aliens by parentage and upbringing had been bom on
194British soil and were British subjects".
A number of public bodies came into existence to supplement the 
government's efforts to control Bolshevism. A number of bodies which had 
already been founded, such as the Liberty and Prosperity Defence League and 
the Anti-Socialist Union, acquired new functions at this time; but a 
considerable number of new organizations was formed, from the names of most of 
which - Liberty League, League against Bolshevism, Middle Class Union, Christian 
Counter-Bolshevik Crusade - their object was clearly evident. Many of them 
emphasized the need for 'sound economic education', a need which was felt 
to be the more pressing in view of the manifest inability of the union 
leaders to control their men, among whom 'extreme' and 'doctrinaire' views 
were widespread. The National Review regretted that patriotic sentiment 
and energy appeared to be dissipated over about twenty of such "small and 
'Obscure bodies, each with its representative bureaucracy, all ostensibly 
"fighting Bolshevism", but which, in view of their separation one from
125
another, were in sum "comparatively futile, except for the purpose of
195spending their subscribers' money”. ^  Their importance was greater than
this judgement might suggest, however: their directors and sponsors were
in many cases men who either controlled or administered considerable 
I96
wealth; while the main recipients of industrial generosity were the
distinct, but nonetheless related bodies which concerned themselves with
more strictly industrial functions, such as propagating the principles of
the Whitley Councils and prompting 'sound' working-class education,
and which received from business and business associations a measure of
financial support and advice without which it is unlikely that they could
197have continued to exist.
Lloyd George, C.P. Scott was told, was not mainly concerned about
the situation in Ireland in the summer of 1919 > he was "far more concerned
198about the Bolsheviks at home". "Will Capitalism survive the Winter?"
199asked Forward. The same question, evidently, disturbed Lloyd George.
In a remarkable Cabinet meeting on 5 August, he reported that "responsible 
Labour leaders" had told him that there was in existence a "formidable 
body of young men whose aim was to destroy the present industrial and 
Parliamentary systems and who would then take the reins of government.
i
These young men had a definite philosophy. They accepted the doctrine of 
class government". The workers' instrument, they believed, was "Soviet 
government.. The futility of talk was contrasted with the value of action. 
It was the duty of the government to demonstrate to the working classes 
the folly of such doctrines. No-one was doing this now". The only people 
who were using the press were the Bolsheviks, and they held meetings on 
Sundays which were attended by thousands, at which they spread their views. 
They had also "captured the trade-union organization". Legitimate demands, 
he thought, must be met, such as on the question of profiteering ("he had 
heard Army officers talk wild Bolshevism of the subject of profiteering", 
a reaction which was, he thought, a "great danger to the State"). Housing 
was another problem which was "federating the lower-middle class with the 
working classes in the general discontent". The people had seen nothing 
done: what they (not unreasonably) "wanted to see was the houses actually 
being built". Unlike France and Germany, Britain lacked the balancing 
- element of an agricultural society: for in those countries the agricultural
population was a "solid foundation for the State, an& in the event of
126
trouble, could always be relied upon". In Britain, on the other hand, 
they ’’could not take risks with Labour.. We hcd in this country millions 
of men who had been trained to arms, ana there were plenty of guns and 
ammunition available”. Despite a reluctance to interfere with the 
workings of what Balfour delicately termed ’’the moral machinery interested 
in increasing production”, a Committee on Profiteering was established^?
In October a National Emergency Committee of the Cabinet 
was set up, taking over the functions of the Strike Committee and the
201Industrial Unrest Committee ”to meet industrial crises in the future” •
An "elaborate supply and transport system was worked out", recalled
Amery. The organization was decentralized under regional commissions who
were to assume all necessary powers of government if communications with
London were severed, for • hich purpose junior ministers were sjLectefP^*
Military officers were sent to assist local authorities in the
203organization of a Citizens' Guard . It was later decided to encourage 
the formation of Special Constables rather than the Citizens' G u a rd^\
In January 1920 the Cabinet was gloomily contemplating the "probability 
of a large combined strike during the next month or two, the mere extreme 
leaders of which were believed to contemplate a movement not far short of 
revolution.. The greatest stress was laid on the inadequacy of the military 
forces available..” Measures originally devised for the provision of 
special forces had broken down, and the number of Special Constables was 
"totally inadequate”, the trade unions having refused to allow their 
members to join. Might ex-officers be mobilized? It was agreed that 
"discreet enquiries should be made on a large scale to obtain the names of 
persons of undoubted loyalty who would agree to join a Spc.eial Constabul­
ary in an emergency”. Sir Robert Horne reported that what he would term 
the "Bolshevist forces in Brest Britain were very active.. They were
conducting a very large number of meetings, and being provided, apparently,
205with guns and hand grenades .
Ministers were informed of the number of troops which would be
available for use in the event of revolutionary disturbances; and a
committee was appointed to go into the question of the safekeeping of
weapons and especially to "ascertain the distribution of lethal weapons
throughout the country", and the "best method *Wr making them available
206to loyalists in the event of any emergency" • There were, Roberts
127 ;
i
rwpcr'ed, "Isrge groups preparing for Soviet government". long complained ! 
th?t tie ’'pea ceslle manpower of the c our try Iz wit bout arms. I nave not J
a piseol less tn?r 200 years old’*. Bonar Lew coorioered tnae "all weapons 
ought tc be sv' liable for distribution to the friends of the Government"# 
The universities, Auckland leddes observed, were "full of trained men 
who could co-operate with clerks and stockbrokers”# Bonar Law indeed,
"so often referred to the stockbrokers as s loyal and fighting clans*
that Thomas Jones gained the impression that "potential battalions of I
2C7 'stockbrokers were to be found in every town" •
There was, then, evidently good reason to wish to secure the overthrow
of a government in Russia which both incarcerated and vigorously
encouraged a movement which represented a grave threat to British
(and Allied) interests, both in Europe and in Britain. The shrewd mind
of Lloyd George, however, had by early 1920 ceased to "believe in the
20 ft
imminence of the revolution" ; and the situation in Europe became
rather more stable during the latter part of 1919» with the fall^f the
Bavarian Soviet Republic in May and, in particular, of Bela Kun’s
government in August. Basil Thomson felt able to conclude, in his
’Monthly Review of the Progress of Revolutionary Movements Abroad* in
October, thah "on ihe whole, Bolshevism appeared to be less menacing to
209the civilisation of Europe than it was" In these circumstances the
objections to the intervention policy began to claim rather more of
ministers* attentions.
A decisive factor, certainly, was the failure of those whom
the Cabinet had elected to support. It was "no good", thought Chamberlain*
to assist the anti-Bolsheviks unless the War Office "thought that there
was a reasonable change of success". The Cabinet, Curzon declared, was j
"relying on General Denikin to fight and beat the Bolsheviks".^By
210 1
November 1919 this prospect seemdd most unlikely to be realised •
The anti-Bolshevik leaders, moreover, had signally failed 
either to agree among themselves or to provide assurances for the Allies 
which might allow them to reassure their own people that they were "not", 
in Churchill’s words, "endeavouring to reinstate a Czarist regime"2H #
Jfas thought "advisable", before Admiral Kolchak was recognized, to 
"obtain XXMMXXZ1 a declaration from him regarding his democratic policy
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on land questions etc." Churchill urged Kolchak to accept the "broad
principles of a Const,uent Assembly and a democratic franchise whose decrees
212shall settle the future government of Russia" . Kolchak wax reported,
however, to have found a number of conditions made by the Allies in their
note of recognition difficult to accept, in particular the proposal to
summon the Constituent Assembly of 1917, of which Lenin, Trotsky and other
Bolsheviks had been members, Curzon noted that "so far from exhibiting
any satisfaction,, he seemed inclined to cavil at the conditions, and to
213claim,, the right of modification or revision" . Moreover, many of the 
states ahich had formerly been part of the Russian Empire and were now 
claiming independence viewed "with misgiving the intentions of Admiral 
Kolchak and his adherents in regard to the liberties to which they have 
so long aspired", A compromise would present "undeniable advantages" for 
the Allies, especially in view of the "widespread suspicion" that Kolchak
j :
and his associates sought with the Allies* assistance to reconstitute f
214 ithe former Russian Empire, and lacked popular support within Russia •  j.
No solution appears, h\/djever, to have been found. Indeed Fisher
later drew the Cabinet*s attention to the "atrocities committed by Admiral i
i.
r
Kolchak*s force" which had "alienXhted the whole of the Siberian peasantry".!
He was informed that "Admiral Kolchak himself was an estimable officer,
215 ibut he was surrounded by a bad entourage11 . This, however, was not j
sufficient to recommend his government as a whole either in England, or X I
in Siberia. Lenin, in fact, observed that the government had "given us j
millions of supporters of Soviet power in the districts farthest away
from industrial centres, where it would have been difficult for us to 
P Igain them" • This, needless to say, was not the object of British policy.
The situation in the south of Russia was if anything more unsatis­
factory. Denikin, it appeared, was also "surrounded by persons of reaction­
ary tendencies"; and it was "quite possible", added Lloyd George, that he 
migkt be beaten "not by the Bolshevik array in front of him, but by the 
forces behing him". It was "very desirable to have effective gwuarantees 
that General Defcikin and the officers with him were going to play the gli^y 
Three months later it remained necessary for Curzon to ask Mackinder in the 
course of his mission to urge Denikin to "adopt a policy consonant with 
the trend of Wextern democratic opinion". Pogroms, in particular, were to 
be avoided: they "create the worst possible impression in Western countr?i§"
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Denikin, moreover, continually appeared to threaten the independence
not simply of those states in the north of Russia which were seeking
independence, but also and indeed, particularly, of those states in the
south of the country in which the government took an independent interest.
His attitude to the Baltic states had been '’uncompromising", althou^i
it was in his own interest not to alienate those forces if he were to
219"gain their assistance in his struggle against Bolshevism". y Denikin
had nonetheless protested to the Allies about their recognition of the
independence of Finland (on 6 May 1919)* it was, he declared, a question
220for the Russian people to decide. More importantly, perhaps, as
Chamberlain observed, "there was a great deal to be said for our supporting
Denikin, providing he undertook merely to fight Bolshevism, but he
221was also attacking Georgia". Curzon recalled that "one of the conditions
which we had made with Denikin was that he was to fight against
Bolshevism but he was also attacking Georgia and Armenia". Churchill
suggested that the supply of arms might serve as a "lever, on the one
hand, to enable him to fight the Bolsheviks, and, on the other, to
222prevent him maltreating the Southern States", where British troops
were committed. During Denikin's advance in August, Curzon declared that
the "most serious difficulty" was that his ambitions lay "not in the
direction of Moscow, but towards the Caucasus". He believed that he might
indeed "turn his back on Moscow and overrun Georgia and Azerbaidjan, which
seemed an easy prey". There was a "certain safeguard" in the fact that
the arms supplied to him were conditional on his respecting a line north
of the Caucasus. But Chamberlain doubted if any of the Russians helped
by Britain "would ever listen to our advice or give us the guarantees we
223wanted, and accept our direction of their policy".
In the circumstances it was difficult to secure popular
approval for the government's policy. It remained a "difficulty", as
Curzon pointed out, that a "great many people in England objected to
any British soldier still remaining in Russia, as they could not get
it out of their heads that we were there solely for the purpose of
fighting Bolshevism"The Minister for Health believed that people
did not understand the reasons for British operations in Russia, and
were "verflf antagonistic towards them". He laid "great stress on the
22cpopular feeling. • against operations in Russid1. Long concurred ' •
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The extent to which this feeling was shared by the armed forces more
directly limited the government's freedom of manoeuvre: a decision might be
taken to commit a large number of British forces, but the men might refuse to
go. There was in any case considerable unrest in the army; but Wilson noted
that it was "notorious that the prospect of being sent to Russia was immensely
unpopular". The result, he concluded, was that it was "impossible for us to
226reinforce our troops in North Russia and in Siberia". Churchill, on his
arrival at the War Office, sent a circular to all commanders, marked "secret and
urgent", enquiring among other things whether their men would "parade for draft
to overseas, especially to Russia". He was informed that they would do so, with
227the exception of Russia. Lloyd George told the Allies in January of his
certainty that "if the British tried to send any more troops (to Russia) there 
228would be mutiny". The following month he reported that he "understood the
military view to be that, if we were going to do any good, we should need a million
men at least, and these should be despatched in the spring;/(of 1919)* * Such a
polich could not seriously be advocated; and not even Churchill attempted to do so.
Moreover the armed forces were rapidly being demobilized during 1919
(the disorders at the beginning of the year had sprung in large part from delay
in demobilization, and led to an acceleration in the rate of doing so) while
commitments in Ireland, Egypt and elsewhere demanded increasing numbers of
troops to sustain them. A call was received from Egypt for reinforcements in
April; but, noted Henry Wilson, the War Office "were in difficulties as to how
to meet the call as the regular army was very short of establishment". "I really
have not enough troops to cope with our present difficulties", Wilson wrote in 
229his diary. Wilson increasingly favoured the limitation of the British
commitment in Russia, and the distribution of such forces as were available
within the Empire. In Transcaucasia, he wrote, "it is impossible for us to
remain on". The cost was a major consideration; "nor could we find the men,
230as we have not enough to garrison our own Empire".
Related, and decisive objections were that the cost of intervention, 
even at existing levels, was excessive, and could certainly not be increased; 
while the conviction became increasingly strong that the effect of the 
policy was in fact precisely to strengthen the position of
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those against whom it was directed. Support for Denikin, noted J.D. Grego­
ry, was "unquestionably limited by reasons of economy. If we could afford
to put down millions for helping the armies now engaged in crushing
2 3 iBolshevism, I suppose we should do so1 • The disasters to the anti-
Bolshevik forces, Beatrice Webb wrote ih her diary, were "doubtless the
immediate cause of the Cabinetfs somewhat ignominious confession of the
failure of its policy of subsidising civil war in Russia. Even the middle
class would not stand further expenditure in Russia, with prices steadily
rising and the National Debt increasing - a debt which sooner or later
2 3 2must be paid by the property owners" • The cost, Lloyd George told the
2 3 3Cabinet, was a "determining factor" • In March he reported that he had 
just been put in possession of figures showing the cost of*all *these 
various Russian commitments". Taking the military forces alone, it appear­
ed that £73 million was required for a period of six months; while if 
naval requirements were added, the total cost would be ®150 million per 
annum, "for wh$t were after all very ingignificant operations". Chamberla 
-in objected to "pouting money in this way into the Russian sieve"^^.
There was "hot the slightest chance", moreover, Chamberlain 
pointed out, of securing financial help from Frqance or Italy for under­
takings XgX in Russia. "If therefore X M  it meant that the whole burden 
of resisting Russian Bolshevism was to be thrown on this country, we 
should break down under the strain. That was a very real danger". It had 
become clear, he added later, that the whole burden of fighting the
Bolsheviks in Russia was now being borne by Britain alone: the situation
2 3 5"was becoming intolerable"  ^. The French, Lloyd George noted, "had always
wished to carry out the campaign against the Bolsheviks at our expense".
Facts had to be faced. "We were shouldering the burden alone, and we were
spending £100 million a year on operations in Russia, which was half our
expenditure before the war". The question of cost was "most important in
defining our policy"^^. Writing to Churchill, he pointed out that
Denikin had been supplied with all the munitions and equipment he needed;
and between £100 and £150 million had been spent in various ways on the
Russian enterprises. But "not a member of the Cabinet is propared to go
further.. Neither this fOvernment nor any other Government that this
237country is lively to see will do more. We dannot afford it" ^ •
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Defining the policy he would pursue at the peace negotiations, Lloyd
George declared that the troops for an intervention policy could not be
found without conscription; and if Parliament endorsed conscription for that
purpose, "he doubted whether the troops would go". Beyond this, however,
was the danger that military intervention would'"only strengthen the very
set out to destroy.. The one thing to spread Bolshevism was to
attempt to suppress it. To send out soldiers to shoot down the Bolsheviks
would be to create Bolsheviks here". The one sure way of establishing the
power of the Bolsheviks was to attempt to suppress it with foreign troops.
An:.expensive war of aggression against theip would strengthen Bolshevims
Kin Russia and create it in Britain. "We cannot afford the burden. Chamber-
1 in tells me", he added, *that "we can hardly make both ends meet on a
peace basis even at the present crushing rate of taxation and if we are
committed to a war against a continent like Russia it is the royal road to
2^8Bankruptcy and Bolshevism in these islands" •
He elaborated the argument to the House of Commons in April. The 
government could not, he said, "in a quarter of a centAry spend as much 
money on railways and canals in Britain as a single year of military enter­
prise in Russia would cost". He shared the House's horror of all the Bolsh­
evik teaching^, but "I would rather leave Russia Bolshevik until she sees 
her way out of it than see Britain bankrupt, and that It the surest road
to Bolshevism in Britain". To attempt intervention in force would be the
239"greatest act of stupidity that qny government could possibly commit" ^ . 
Opposition to intervention, moreover, on the grounds that tended to 
strengthen! the position of the Bolsheviks, was an argument which had found 
converts among the anti-Bolshevik forces themselves. ^Nothing could come 
of any plan, declared Kerensky, who had originally urged intervention on
^1 A
the government, which did "not leave Russia alone" • With the failure of 
the anti-Bolshevik armies in the field, these objections could no longer 
be dismissed.
On 29 October Churchill assured the House of Commons that there 
had been a "very great improvement in Russia from every point of view" since 
his last speech. A "great improvement in the position of the anti-Bolshevik 
forced'had taken place; Denikin was in control of an "enormous feerritory"; 
and there was "no reason" why he should not be able to be self-supporting 
after the end of the fl&a&cial year. British involvement was being brought
to an end while securing the "main objects and interests of those with j,
whom we had entered into a joint responsibility"^^. During November,
however, Denikin* s army "melted away, and his whole front disappeared
^ I o
with the swiftness of pantomime" ; while it was reported from 
Vladivostok that "militant anti-Bolshevism in Siberia" was "at an end, 
and (the) Omsk Government, at all events in its present form" was 
"moribund"^^. Lloyd George, speaking at the Buifcdhall on 8 November, ;
accordingly delivered what has been termed the * epitaph’ to the policy
‘p  II i
of intervention . On 20 November the Cabinet agreed that "unless there j
should be some change in the present situation, the bloakade should
245not be re-instituted" .
A meeting of Allied representatives in London on 12 December
confirmed the abandonment of direct intervention in Russia. Clenceau
(influenced, in Uoyd George*s view, by recent elections in France which
had convinced him that there was no immediate danger of the extension of ]
246Bolshevism to France ), observed that "intervention had been tried by j 
every means - men, supplies anc money - with the object of setting up a |! 
stable Government., (but) it was certain that up to now the Allied policy 
had not succeeded.. It therefore seemed useless to continue on these 
lines". He was prepared to give up all idea of further direct intervent­
ion in Russia. Lloyd George aggued: Britain had spent £100 million and 
"had not got much in fceturn for it". Clemenceau felt that there should 
be erected "as it were, a barbed wire entanglement roung Russia in 
order to prevent her from creating trouble outside, and in order to 
stop Germany from entering into relations with Russia, whether of a 
political or a military character". ItMwwuld also be a "great mistake if 
we did not maintain Poland in order to dam up the Russian flood..*'. The 
resolution agreed upon the following day provided for the ending of 
com itments to anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia; for leaving EStXXKSt 
Bolshevik Russia "as it were, within a ring fence"; for a strong Poland, 
with guarantees to be decided later; and support as appropriate for the 
"border communities" opposing the Soviet government^**7 • Churchill 
objected in the Cabinet to the decisions which, he said, "involved the 
abandonment of the anti-Bolshevist forces in Russia which we had 
supported up till now". The Cabinet reached the perhaps more prudent 
conclusion that on^&Sesian policy "the less said the better"^^.
The definite abandonment of direct intervention allowed the J.
negotiations for the exchange of prisoners, which had been discussed since
January 1919 and actively since June, to take place?^ The difficulty of
deciding in which country the negotiations should take place, and the
conditions there to be afforded to the Soviet representatives, delayed
their initiation; and "only on the 7th November was a final invitation j
received from Lord Curzon to send Cde. Litvinov to Denmark"2^. Discissions '
between Litvinov and the British delegate, Mr 01 Grady ( a Labour MP who had
been a member of the government’s ill-fated mission in 1917), began on
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25 November in Copenhagen • 01Grady had been instructed to be "particul­
arly careful in no way to countenance any attempt on their part to negot­
iate on any other subjects than that of the exchange of prisoners and the
252arrangements connected therewith" y . Litvinov later recalled that the 
number of English prisoners of war in Soviet hands "was very small,. But 
among them were members of English aristocratic families" whose relatives 
had exerted considerable pressure Apon Curzon to secure their return2^. j 
Litvinov declared that he had full authoritXy to enter into peace negotiat- j 
ions, if the British representative were rdady to do so; but O'Grady was 
instructed to "decline to receive any peace proposals from Litvinof 
whatever may be the method which he attempts to deliver theM"2^.
O'Grady pointed out that the JfHBXX question of exchanging prisoners of 
war and 6f providing for the repatriation of civilians had become "merged
in (the) whole issue of a resumption of relationships between Western
255 :Europe and Soviet Russia" . O’Grady finally revised a draft which had
been broadly approved by the government, and the agreement was signed on
12 February 1920. It provided for an "exchange of combatant and civilian
prisoners and,, the return of,, nationals", under the joint supervision
256of both governments •
Lloyd George’s exposition of government policy in the House of 
Commons on 17 November was greeted with dismay by those who had been the 
most vehement in their denunciation of the Bolsheviks. The speech had been 
"extremely disappointing", said Lt Col Guinness, although he conceded that 
no-one wjrygjted armed intervention in Russia,- and that they could "not involve 
ourselves in heavy financial obligations”. The Bolsheviks, claimed Colonel 
Malone, "have won"2^.
It was a conclusion which underestimated Lloyd George’s considerable
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resource as a politician. In the first place, he had, he told the House
of Commons, en "overwhelming sense of the importance of bringing peace
to Russia”; for "nor only is Russia a source of unrest and disturbance
to all its neighbours, with all the infinite possibilities for mischief
which lurk in such a condition over so vast an area, but a settlement of
the Russian problem is essential to the reconstruction of thd world".
Russia was one of the great sources of food and raw materials. The
prevailing condition of Russia was one of the contributing causes to
the prevailing high prices, and high prices were "undoubtedly in all il
258 ‘lands the most dangerous form of Bolshevik propaganda" • !
It was not possible, he declared at the beginning of the 1920 
Parliamentary session, to "restore Europe without putting into circulation 
the resources of Russia, the strength of Russia, the wealth of Russia".
It was clear that the withdrawal of Russia from the supplying markets j !
was contributing to high prices, a high cost of living, and to scarcity j j  
and hunger. Russia before the war had provided wheat,flax,buXtter and
other products in quantities which were "prodigous in every direction.
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The world needs this supply" . It was not simply a question of ensuring |
thaifc British merchants were no worse off th^fli Germans in which was termed
2 gn
"that most lucrative market" • Conditions in Europe, Lloyd George 
warned, were "serious". High prices were being used to "stir up strife, 
suspicion and jealousy of existing institutions throughout the land. The j 
dangers are not in Russia, they are here at home". He spoke "with j
knowledge, with apprehension, and with responsibility.. We must fight j
261 1anarchy with abundance" . More, evidently, might be lost by refusing j
to trade with Russia than by doing so. i
Secondly, and not less importantly, the resumption of trading j  
relations might not be without effect in Russia. The establishment of j
business relations with Russia, suggested a Foreign Office memorandum of 
22 December, might assist the Allies in gaining the favour of the Russian 
population, and would serve to convince the British population that Bol­
shevism had been "given a chance". More than this, Bolshevism itself might
262"vanish away", once the pretext for violence had been removed . The 
notion that attempts to alter fundamentally the existing order of society 
were futile, and could exist only in abnormal conditions, was congenial 
to Lloyd George. He developed it in the House of Commons. No detestation
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of Bolshevism, he declared, could be deeper than his wwn; but intervention
was "not the way to gight it”, ;;nd it had become "perfectly clear to every
2 c-z.
unprejudiced observer that you cannot crush Bolshevism by force of arms" ?
The anti-Bolsh.vik armies had clearly "failed in their great attempt to 
recover Russia". The government and the Allies had "failed to restore 
Russia to sanity by force. I believe we can save her by trade. Commerce 
has a sobering effect in its operations. The simple sums of addition and 
subtraction which it incmlcated soon dispose of wild theories.. Trade, in 
my opinion, will bring an end to the ferocity, the rapine and the crudities 
of Bolshevism surer than any other method" • It was this belief which 
informed the negotiations which were now entered upon fot? the conclusion 
of a trade agreement.
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personal car had been built for the Tsar of Russia, and its speedometer 
was marked in versts not miles, a fact which may have helped him to 
bear in mind the^l^^the0 monarchical cause (Lord Riddell: Intimate 
Diary of the Peace Conference and After (London 1933) P372) # Ullman 
(op.cit.p297) includes Milner among early advocates of intervention.
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It is clear, at any rate, that in his support of the principle of 
intervention Churchill was not "almost unsupported" or a "lone figure" 
in the Cabinet (Lowe and Dockrill op.cit.p505). Churchill’s visit to 
Paris on 14 February 1919 led to his advocacy at a meeting of the Council 
of Ten the following day of a proposal for a united anti-Bolshevik 
offensive under the direction of an Allied Council for Russian Affairs.
Lloyd George responded with a telegram which endorsed the telegram which 
Churchill had proposed to send to the Bolsheviks, containing a ten-day
ultimatum (Churchill’s message to Lloyd George informed him also of "joint ,
measures" which had been planned, and of the proposal of an Allied Council
for Russian Affairs; tdlegrams Churchill to Lloyd George No 310, Lloyd 
George to Churchill No 177, 15 and 16 February 1919, in F.O. 371*3936. 
26048). He was alarmed by a further telegram from Churchill, and sent a
i
further message to him expressing his alarm that war appeared to be under 1
consideration against the Bolsheviks,and pointing out that the Cabinet 
had never authorized such a proposal (Lloyd George to Churchill, telegram 
No 178, 16 February 1919; also in Lloyd George Papers F8/3/120). Lloyd 
George subsequently wrote that Churchill had "adroitly seized the opportun­
ity presented by the absence of President lilson and myself to go over to 
Paris and urge his plans with regard to Russia" (The Truth about the Peace 
Treaties (London 1938) i p368). Churchill had, nevertheless, made his 
position clear at a meeting of the Cabinet at noon on 13 Fmbruary, at 
which he had expressed his belief that the Allies should have a "decided 
plin" which should be carried out "energeXtically", and had mentioned the 
possibility of an Allied declaration of war with a united declaration at 
Paris (Cabinet Minutes 13 February, W.C. 532A, Cab 23/ )• It had,moreover,
been Lloyd George’s own suggestion that it should be Churchill who should 
"go to Paris immediately and try and obtain a decision" (on Russian policy) 
(Notes of a Conversation in Bonar Law’s room, 13 February 1919, Lloyd 
George Papers F202/1/1). Despite the assertion that Lloyd George was 
"flatly opposed to any sort of intervention in Russia" (Lowe and Dockrill 
op. cit.p503). Lloyd George Mfull^shared the responsibility for both initi­
ating XX and keeping it going". There was, in fact, "really no conflict 
between Churchill and Lloyd George on Russian policy" (Silverlight,J: The 
Victors’ Dilemma (London 1970) p285, Ullman op.cit.p302). As the New 
Statesman commented, "Mr Churchill’s faculty of securing blame is almost
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days preceding the operation" (Lindley to Balfour, 24 January 1919, Balfour 
Papers F.O. 800.205 p460f).
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Capitalism and landlordism in Russia. Go hofie and establish Industrial 
Republics in your own country, and together ww shall form a world-wide 
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the progress of the class struggle at home and abroad" (The Call, No 1,
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1918). Despite misprints ('glass struggle in the Ukraine') the paper 
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contained letters from four British spldiers (Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs to the Director of Military Intelligence, 13 Februfary 1919,
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ion based upon the effect of Bolshevik propaganda. Maynard at Murmansk,
for instance, saw his problem in terms of securing greater financial
support from the Treasury than the "insignificant sum" he had been granted. 
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Chapter Three: Labour and Soviet Russia 1917-1921
In addressing the House of Commons in November 1919 Churchill was asked
by the Cabinet to "make it clear that the British Government were not
out to destroy a revolutionary Government in Russia"^, The statement
was intended to answer the char*e'Snsanly, although by no means exclusively,
by Labour and working-class opinion to the contrary. There was indeed
Mno doubt", Barnes told the Cabinet, "that the feeling among Socialists
and Labour men was that the Government were pursuing a capitalist 
2
policy" ; and opposition from this and other sources played a part in 
first limiting, and then bringing to an end the government's direct 
involvement in Russian affairs. It has sometimes been maintained that, 
as the New Leader claimed, Lsbour had "compelled the abandonment of 
Mr Churchill's campaign of intervention,.brought the blockade to an end" 
and "stopped the plans for interference in the Polish war" in 1920^, It 
has already been suggested that there were other, and perhaps more 
compelling reasons which persuaded the Cabinet to reverse its policy in 
riXSXeg ard to intervention and the bloakade; and it will be suggested 
below that while suspicion existed in regard to the government's policy 
during the Russo-Polish war of 1920, there was in fact little substantial 
difference between its policy and that of the Labour movement. It has, 
also, been stated that the position of the Labour movement at this time 
was one, not simply of opposition to the continuation, by direct or 
indirect means, of war, but one of active solidarity with the Soviet
republic. Its opposition to war has been termed a "fight to save the
k 5Workers' Republic" , and "solidarity with the Russian Revolution" • This
proposition will be examined below. It should first be ndted, however,
that Labour's opposition, whatever its nature, had hardly begun to
develop before the signature of the Armistice and the Labour Party's
withdrawal from the Coalition in November 1918, although intervention on
6a major scale had taken place in the summer of that year.
The rumour of an imminent Japanese incursion into Siberia with 
the blessing of the Allies led H.B. Lees-Smith to raise the question in 
the House of Commons. The venture, if it were launched, would he thought
JO
demonstrate the "moral bankruptcy of the Alliance*• Writing in thd 
Labour Leadar. Snowden charged that Ministers ddspite their "hypocritical
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platitudes about this being a war for democracy" were secretly encouragi 
-ng the "most militarist and imperialist country in the world to attack,
o
and to endeavour to overthrow, the newly established democracy of Russia":
Colonel Wedgwood later K5HEXK suggested the establishment of a committee
to consider "how best relations between this country and Russia can be
improved". Intervention in Russia, against the will of the Russians, he
thought "absolutely futile and damaging to the whole of the Allied
cause". The Bolsheviks, King added, "may not have been our choice, bpt
they are at the present time undoubtedly the choice of the people of 
a
Russia" •
At the Labour Party annual conference, however, which opened
two days later, there was little discussion of Russian affairs. Indeed
the only direct reference to intervention was that of Sylvia PankhSst
who commented briefly on "the Japanese business""^. Attention caBtred
rather upon thejsufcrise appearance of a "strange man with a yellow face"^,
Kerensky, who wa^jlntroduced to the conference by Henderson, who "took
the fullest responsibility" for his presence. He had "learned to admire"
Kerensky in the course of his visit to Russia, and had a "very high
appreciation of the work he was endeavouring to do on behalf of that
great people he represented". He introduced Kerensky as "one whose name
had been closely associated with their work during the past year", and
12secured the conference*s agreement that he should be heard. Delegates, 
Snowden wrote, were "naturally suspicious that there was some deliberate 
intention to use M. Herensky*s presence at the Conference for the purpose 
of assisting the designs to use Allied intervention in Russia for the 
purpose of overthrowing the Bolshevik government""^* The Bolsheviks* 
envoy, Litvinov, was present but was not allowed to address the delegates* 
Whatever the reason for Kerensky*s appearance, however, his address, in 
which he declared that the "Russian people and the Russian democracy** 
were "fighting against tyranny" and were "going to fight to the end", 
appears to have been less than completely successful^. His appearance 
was reported to have been greeted with cries of "whom does he represent" 
and "down with Kerensky", which, since he did not know English, he took 
to be friendly greetings, and smiled and bowed until Henderson sat him do- 
wn#He made a short speech in Russian, which was then translated, and 
appeared equally gratified by the mixed applause and abuse which it
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orovoked^. The Allied Socialist and Labour Parties, wrote Brailsford at 
the end of July, had chosen to keep silent about intervention, although 
to oppose it did not necessarily mean to support the Bolsheviks. "But 
even an honest Liberal would have said *Let Russians settle their own 
affairs*. An honest Socialist would have withstood with double stubbornne­
ss a patently capitalist intervention". The "damning record" would relate 
that British Labour "looked on as dumb spectators" at the destruction of 
the Soviet Republic^.
The landing of troops in Russia in August was a "challenge to 
democracy and Socialism", the I.L.P. National Council considered in a 
Manifesto issued at this time. It represented an attempt to over—throw 
the social revolution and to re-establish the rule and power of capitalism*^ 
Socialists in Britain and in other Allied countries could "not remain 
silent and indifferent under the challenge and menace of this act of 
imperialist aggression. . We appeal therefore to British organized Labour 
to express the strongest condemnation of the participation ofjthe British 
government in an act which constitutes a crime against national independ­
ence and against the Russian Revolution., a crime which if persisted in
will prove not only disastrous to Russia but to the cause of freedom and
17democracy throughout the world" • Snowden talked of a "departure of
12
momentous significance", a "second Belgium" . Sylvia Pankhusst, Walton
19Newbold and others urged "Save the Revolution" •
An Inter-Allied Conference of Labour and Socialist Parties,
however, meeting in London on 17-20 September 1918, as a result of ;
"discussion., supplemented by a speech by M. Kerensky, who attended the
Conference as a visitofc", confined itself to an "expression of deepest ;
sympathy to the Labour and Socialist organizations of Russia" which I
had continued the struggle against German imperialism, and condemned the I
20treaty of Brest-Litovsk • The resolution as finally adopted not merely
failed to point out, as a minority draft had done, that intervention
"under the preHtext of fighting Bolshevism, sh&uld serve the reaction
against Socialism and Democracy": it omitted X§Sli£i*reference to
intervention altogether. Henderson, whose influence was in favour of
the final amended version , had been instructed by the Labour Party
neither to "approve or condemn Allied intervention, but (to) accept
21intervention as an accomplished fact" • The workers, complained the Call.
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"should intervene. Why do they accept the word of Kerensky in preference
22to that of the representatives of organized Russiah labour?1
Brailsford, writing in November, talked of Labour*s "failure to
stand by the Russian Revolution". Call asked why official Labour was dumb
JSgjegard intervention. M °^ not le  ^it said", it wrote, "that it was
the apathy if not the hostility of the workers of Britain that delayed the
23complete triumph of the workers of the workd" . The Labour Party manifesto 
issued in connection with the 1918 general election did include a call j
p  1 j
for the "immediate withdrawal of the Allied forces from Russia" # The j
time had come, as the New Statesman remarked, to break the "self-imposed j
silence which we have observed With regard to the British government*s 
attitude towards Russia", on which they had previously "shrunk from the 
responsibility of taking a strong line1*. So long as the need existed of j
repelling German advances in Russia, "we were naturally willing to support 
precautionary measures"^.
Following the election, the Party and the T.U.C. "concerned at the 
reports respecting the Government's policy with regard to Russia", addressed 
a letter to the Prime Minister, seeking an assurance that there was "no 
intention on the part of the British government to interfere with the 
right of the Russian people to decide for themselves their own form of
£government", and that the armed forces would be withdrawn at the "earlist 
possible moment". An acknowledgement was received two days later, but 
no more. A further letter on 3 January 1919 > asking that a deputation be 
received, was not even acknowledged. "Up to May 1919"» the Executive 
reported, "it had not been possible., to secure any official indication 
of the objects sought to be achieved by the Allies in their Russian policy^'
The industrial side of the movement did not require suctJjLengthy
consideration of the matter. Shortly after the general election the j
Birmingham Trades Council adopted a resolution calling for a Conference I
to consider action to "compel the Government to withdraw all troops from
Russia, in order that the Russian Democracy be allowed to establish whate- *
27 iver form of internal government they require* . By the following spring ;
Basil Thomson reportedjto the Cabinet that "every section of the workers"
appeared to be against conscription and intervention in Russia.HEven mild !
trade unionists are said to be strongly moved over these two matters.."2^
On 26 March the National Conference of the Miners* Federation
16if
unanimously serried an executive resolution calling on the government
immediately to "withdraw all British troops from Russia, and to take the
29necessary steps to induce the Allied Powers to do likewise" . A week later 
a special conference was convened by the executive committee of the Labour 
Party and by the Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C. to define their 
attitude to the proposed Covenant of the League of nations. An emergency 
resolution was submitted by the Miners which called <bn the government to 
cease its intervention in Russian affairs, lift the blockade against 
Germany, bring conscription to an immediate end, and release all the 
conscibnfcous objectors. Speaking for the resolution, Smillie urged that a 
special conference be held with the object of determining what form of 
industrial action should be taken to achieve these objects. The chairman 
of the Parliamentary Committee, Stuart-Bunning, who presided, however, 
refuded to accept the second part of the Miners1 resolution, since it 
implied industrial action, a course to which, he said , the political sect­
ion of the movement could not be committed. The ruling was accepted, and
30the first part of the resolution was adopted •
The Labour Party executive issued a manifesto to the press after 
the meeting, expressing "grave concern regarding the long drawn-out 
delay of the Paris Conference to agree upon the terms of peace, thus 
entailing a continuation of the bloakade and a paralysis in industrial 
and political order which have led inevitably to the spread of anarchy 
in certain European states, so that democratic government there and elsewh­
ere is now seriously threatened..", and urging that the policy of 
military interference in Russia be "stopped forthwith". British:-soldiers, 
it was noted with particular indignation, had been "left practically 
isolated in Murmansk and Archangel, and exposed to attack". It was agreed 
to send a delegation to the Prime Minister to present the terms of the 
resolution which the Miners had proposed; but an attempt to defeat the 
governments policy by industrial action would be a "new precedent in 
our industrial history"-^ . As Smillie observed later, "nothing effective 
was done"-^.
The Council of the Triple Alliance, meefcmng at Southpoat on 16 
April, supported the Miners* initiative, with a rider that the Parliament­
ary Committedbe called upon to summon a special national conference to 
-L -1-z
decide what action should be taken-' . A deputation from the Council of
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the Triple Alliance met the Parliamentary Committee on 15 Kay "in order 
to urge upon them the absolute necessity of calling a Conference immediat­
ely". The Committee decided in the first place to seek a meeting fcith the 
Prime Minister, and a meeting with Bonar Law took place on 22 May for the 
purpose of a discussion of the Triple Alliance’s resolution. Following 
the interview the Parliamentary Committee decided (on 28 May) not to call 
a conference, as the Triple Alliance had urged. The Herfrld found the 
decision "amazing”; and it was, admittedly, taken by a small majority vote. 
It was not intervention in Russia, however, which appeared to account for 
the reservations of the minority, but the questions of conscription and 
Churchill’s secret military circular which had been published in the 
Herald^. No answer had yet been found to the Herald* s question: "Resolu­
tions and pious protests are not enough. The war must be stopped. What
35will Labour do, not say, to stop it?"
In his Presidential Address to the Labour Party Annual
Conference, which met in Southport on 25-27 June, McGurk declared that
there could be "np peace so long as we continue to indulge in military
advantures in Russia. Russia must be left free to work out its own
political salvation". He warned, however, that a movement was "already
afoot to employ the strike weapon for political purposes. This would be
an innovation in this country which few responsible leaders would welcome.
But the danger is there, :=nd the proposal is being canvassed with much
energy". It was, AAdeed, advocated at the conference itself by Hodges,
Williams, Bromley and other major union leader®. Smillie considered that
the action of the government in sending troopsjto Russia might not be
constitutional; and thought it "rather strange that the Executive Committee
of the Labour Party should have taken up exactly the position of every
exploiter and capitalist and politician in this country at the present
time". Such were the feelings of the delegates that despite the appeals
of J.R. Clynes a motion was carried by a 2-1 majority demanding the
"immediate cessation" of intervention and instructing the executive to
consult with the Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C. with a "view to
effective action being taken to enforce these demands by the unreseceved
36use of their political and industrial power" • The Fortnightly Review
thought the proposal that of "firebrands who are bent on destroying the
37Constitution*.' The Labour movement had been "captured by extremists" • Yet
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Hodges himself hod pointed out that the resolution was ni more than an 
"expression of opinion". The Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C. would 
be invited to call a conference and to put a resolution on the aganda on 
the lines of that adopted at the Labour Party conference. It was "not 
suggested that the T.U.C. could make a declaration as to an immediate 
strike". The Times noted that the resolution "committed nobody to
70 — — — — —
anything"^ .
Discussions also took place at the Labour conference on a proposal 
which had been made more than a month earlier that a general strike be 
called in Ita&y, Fr-'ance and Britain in order to end intervention. The 
Labour representatives secured the adoption of a statement that demonstr­
ations of protest (rather than industrial action) should be made on 20 and 
21 July by the workers in each country, "in the form best XHXXM adapted 
to their circumstances and to their method of operation". It was agreed 
that the British labour movement would stage demonstrations throughout 
Britain on 20 July, a Sunday; while French and Italian workers were prepared 
to stage a twenty-four hour general strike on 21 July, a working day. The 
British labour leaders made little effort to implement the decision; and 
the resulting national series of demonstrations was widely regarded as a 
fiasco . The appeal, commented Industrial Peace, was "ignored". The workers 
apparently did "not mind what happens to Comrades Lenin, Trotsky and Bela 
Kun,,Zf^ . The movement "collapsed ignominiously", it has been noted, Turati 
accusing the British working class of forming the "bourgeoisie of the 
international proletariat"^. The London dockers, the Norwich boot and shoe , 
operatives, and the Merthyr miners were the only strikes of importance; and j 
the demonstrations were reported to have been poorly attended, both of those 
held in London coming into Opposition from counter-demonstrators, and those
i p
in other towns simply endorsing the official resolution • A number of 
resolutions reached the Foreign Office; but as a minute drily observed:
"No action seems necessary. We frequently receive such protests"^.
The Parliamentary Committee refused to act on the Labour Party 
conference resolution, and a conference of the Triple Alliance on 23 July 
decided that action should be taken on its own initiative. A ballot paper 
should be circulated to elicit members* opinions on the question of the 
withdrawal their labour to secure, among other objects, the end of the 
intervention in Russia* The decision was publicly opposed by J.H. ThiMiaa
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and the Call thought it an opportunity for British labour to clear itself
of "all suspicion of having betrayed the cause of the Russian Revolution"^.
In the event, however, Churchill’s announcement on the same day in the
House of Commons that Murmansk and Archangel were to be evacuated before
the winter led to a decision to postpone the ballot until after the T.U.C.
46 Thdd met . ThaT.I.C. in its turn decided on 12 September that the Parliam­
entary Committee should again present the movement’s demands to the govern­
ment, and if not satisfied should call a special meeting. Bob Williams 
commented in Forward; "With millions of organized workers", British 
labour was "helpless and impotent" on Russian policy, as a result of the 
"inaction of many of the leaders of the trade union movement, Marx had 
once called the British workers the advance guard of the international 
proletariat, but now they had become the Chinese of Europe"^. Thomson
reported to the Cabinet that by August feeling with regard to intervention
48m  Russia had "practically died out" .
On 13 October the Secretary of the Labour Party wrote th
Balfour on behalf of the Pa frty executive, who had instructed him at a
meeting the previous week to put before the government six queries, "with
a view to eliciting information as to the present position of affairs". The
questions dealt with restrictions still obtaining on trade via the Baltic,
and asked when it was proposed that military action in Russia should cease.
49The Party was told that it was /impossible to fix such a date"^ . A further
resolution reached the Foreign Office from Herbert Morrison, on behalf of
the London Labour Party, who was content to X"ask that the points dealt
50with will receive your careful consideration’’^  . As the Call pointed out,
people grumbled, they were discontented, they adopted resolutions protesting
against intervention, sometimes they even threatened, "but %hey do nothing
which could really frighten the bandits in office". People would "have to
51do something more than pass resolutions of protest’’^  .
Following an interview with Lloyd George, the proposed special
conference of the T.U.C. met on 9 and 10 December 1919* A resolution was
adopted which exprisixi^progound dissatisfaction" of the deputation which
had met the Prime Minister. No more was resolved, however, than to send a
delegation to Russia to make an "independent and impartial inquiry into
the industrial, political and economic conditions in Russia", and to conside
52-r a further reXMIfXXJOlport on the question at the next T.U.C. meeting^ •
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The resolution adopted at the special T.U.C. conference, in particular,
fell short of the policy urged upon the labour movement by the National
'Hands off Russia' Committee, which in a circular of 18 September had
called not only for the withdrawal of troops, but for the stoppage of
supplies to Denikin and Kolchak, the raising of the bloekade, and the
establishment of diplomatic relations . The Committee was probably the
most prominent body at this time urging opposition to the government's
policy in Russia within the labour movement, and succeeded to the tasks
which had earlier been performed by such bodies as the "People's Russian
Information Bureau"^. The Committee orig^ated in a meeting held in
London on 18 January 1919 at which 350 delegates were reported to have
been in attendance, representing I.W.W., S.L.P. and B.S.P. branches, trade
union branches, British and Irish socialist societies and a number of
other bodies ranging as far as the West London League for the Blind*^. A
fifteen-man committee was elected, and a resolution was adopted which
called for an "active agitation upon eve^y field of activity to solidify
the Labour Movement in Gfeat Britain for the purpose of declaring at a
further conference, to be convened for that purpose, a general strike,
unless before thXXe date of that conference the unconditional cessation
of Allied intervention in Russia., shall have been announced". Some
difference of opinion was recorded: some delegates believed that the
workers would "only strike on economic questions MXXXXXX immediately
affecting them"; but it was agreed that 'Hands off Russia', or even the
British Revolution, could subsequently be added to such demands. The
bodies represented should form 'Hands off Russia committees' in their 
56own localities .
In view of the very limited extent to which the labour movement 
in fact eggaged in active opposition to intervention, in circumstances of 
«8i£fSi&8iidiabour unrest., it is difficult to sustain the claim that 
the Committee was a "powerful force" in the agitatioS? and still less that 
that agitation had a considerable influence upon the government's Russian 
policy. The meeting in London established only a body responsible for the 
capital-^. A further meeting was held on 8 February in the Albert*Hall, 
presided over by E.C. Fairchild, and addressed by Lansbury, John Maclean, 
Jtfallhead and Athers. The Times reporter considered that "young aliens of 
JewAAh extraction., fornrfed a large part of the audience"; and Professor
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Simpson of Edinburgh, who attended the meeting and sent a report of its 
proceedings to the government, agreed that "half of the audience was of
5  Q
alien origin and that three-quarters of that alien half were Jews" . 
Simpson also professed to notice a "distinct advance in audacity of state­
ment and general bearing", and an increase in the waving of red flags.
Yet less than one-third of the proceedings of the meeting had, he thought,
60been devoted to Russian affairs • The Call's report termed the meeting
"memorable", but conceded that the difficulties of transport had been
"without a parallel in recent years", limiting, presumably, the attendance.
The ground# upon which it chose to criticize the government's policy was
that it constituted a "flat denial of their own announcements in support
of the principle of self-determination". On this score, it noted, the
organizers of the demonstration had received the "active assistance and
support of a legion of people in the country who do not ordinarily, as
yet, find themselves in alliance with the B.S.P." Messages of support for
the demonstration were, indeed, recorded from Morel, BedMbrand Russell,
6lPonsonby, and Bernard Shaw • Such was the basis of the Committee's
opposition to intervention in Russia that while composed mai&ly of Labour
and trade union politicians, it attracted also, as Kenworthy recalled,
a "sprinkling of Liberals, Quakers, Pacifists, and even some Conservativ§§"
A manifesto issued by the Woolwich 'Hands off Russia' Committee pointed
out that what the Committee stood for was simply 'hands off Russia': while
the Woolwich committee^considered that workers were in control in Russia,
the 'Hands off Russia' Committee had avoided "expressing any definite
opinion o£ this point"^.
A further meeting took place in Manchester on 21 June 1919»
which condemned intervention in Russia, and also military and industrial
conscription. Smillie had warned the delegates of the "perpetuation of
6hmilitarism and conscription for all time" . Following the Conference it
was agreed to establish a National Hands off Russia movement "which
accepted the broad principle of non-interference in Russia". The Conference
appointed a Committee, the chairman of which was A.A. Purcell and vice-
Presidents of which were Cramp, Shaw, Peet, and Brassington. W.P. Coates,
the BS.P. National Organizer, was loaned to the body as Secretary, and
offices were taken in M a n c h e s t e r 6^  Coates told an interviewer in Tiflis
66in I923 that the Coamitt## had been "inaugurated in August 19{9" • A
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67National Organizer was eventually appointed in September . Already by 
this time the evacuation of Northern Russia had been decided upon by the 
Cabinet, as well as the re-direction of support to Denikin rather than 
Kolchak, and the decision on 12 August that a * final1 contribution 
should now be made to Denikin. The Cabinet had revdersed its SSiii&sx before 
a national 1 Hands off Russia* organization had been formed. Pollitt 
conceded, moreover, that while "every effort was made to intensify all 
the work connected with the Hands off Russia Movement", they were "not able 
to develop the mass movement to the point where the trade unions were 
prepared to take strike action” • It had no greater success, as we have 
seen, in persuading the T.U.C. to endorse its four-point programme. Indeed 
somewhat later the attempt to organize among unionists led to the publicat­
ion of an acrimonious correspondence in which the National Transport
Workers' Federation accused the Committee of "attempting to induce its
69members to strijsji without the authority of their Unions” .
The Labour Party in Parliament offered, certainly, no greater 
resistance to intervention than the party outside it. Labour MPs seemed, 
indeed, hardly less concerned to denounce the principles of Bolshevism 
and of extra-constitutional action in the labour movement, than to attack 
government policy in Russia. Bolshevism, Graham told the House of Commons, 
was a "mixture of tyranny, autocracy, plunder and social and political
70ideals.. There could hardly be a more dangerous mixture in any country” .
Bad as the old regime was, J.H. Thomas held, "it is infinitely worse
today"; and that bad as the German Government had been, it "certainly was
preferable to the atrocities that are committed in the name of the Soviet 
71Government" . It was, Clynes declared, the "very negation of Socialism",
72especially in its rejection of Parliament' . Intervention, however, was 
believed not to be justified, since it constituted a violation of the 
principle of self-determination; and in any case, as Clynes put it,
"military interference with what is going on in Russia on a large scale 
is beyond our power, and must be ruled out as totally impossible", while 
military intervention on a small scale was futile. He suggested that it 
would be "better to try and kill Bolshevism by feeding it rather than by 
fighting itM^« The New Statesman agreed that force had failed against the 
Bplsheviks: "it is time for other measures". In particular it believed that 
the bloakada of Russia had probably done more than anything else to maintain
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the Bolsheviks in power; and^in the power of an economically re-established
Russia to ’’make short work of Bolshevism". Tb raise the blockade would
probably constitute, it considered, the "severest blow that Great Britain
is capable of dealing to the Bolshevik regime"^. The raising of the
blockade and the establishment of a complete peace with Russia, declared
'Labour's Russian Policy', a statement of party policy, Rwould no more
imply moral approval of (the Bolshevik government) than did our formal
75recognition of the ffsar's Government" • Clynes claimed with some justif­
ication that there was a "definite Labour policy on the question of inter­
vention in Russia, and, if the words of the Prime Minister mean what they
say, that Labour policy is not different from the policy of the 
76Government" •
Labour MPs were particularly impressed with the danger that
government policy might lead to serious outbursts of social unrest.
The House of Commons was assured that "in the event of any attempts
being made to Engineer anything in the form pf a revolution" Labour
parliamentarians would be "standing up against any such movement" and
would "not give encouragement either to revolution or to unofficial
77action in the Labour movement" . The Party stood for the "policy of
no
law, order and constitutional government" . In Clynes' view, the movement
should "think, in the main, in the terms of their country, and be moved,
in the main, by inspirations of real patriotism", not "those narrower
79class struggles" which some groups were currently "pressing too far" •
It was precisely because the Labour representatives did "not want to see 
the spread of disorder and anarchy" that they declared themselves "in favour
Qq
of immediate peace, democratically considered" . Hartshorn referred to 
the "intense feeling that exists in thwjcountry at the present time in 
relation to this particular question". He was as "whole-heartedly opposed 
to the spread of Bolshevism in this country as any man in the House, but 
( he saw) a real danger of it taking root .. and of its pretty rapid devel­
opment", and feared that the attitude of Churchill would "help very
0-1
considerably in that dXXKKXIStHevelo pment" . H.H. Thomas thought that the 
people of the country, especially those who had sons in the Army, were 
"alarmed and amazed" that they should be sent to Russia. He believed that 
Nothing would be more fatal in the present industrial situation than for 
it to go forth that, because we happen to disagree, and we do disagree,
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with the Russian Constitution, we are prepared to send or even keep troops
there for the purpose of interfering with what after all are the internal
82affairs of that particular country" • There was an "intense dislike to 
any of our soldiers remaining in Russia", Adamson added, and the government 
would be "well-advised to take steps for bringing back our men.. at the ;
earliest possible moment". The situation represented "one of the dangers <
8 3 f'of serious trouble in this country" . 1
The government's eventual abandonment of intervention, and its j
efforts to restore normal trading relations with the European continent, J
were welcomed for the same reason, Adamson held that "unless you can get I
the world back quickly to work there is a great danger of universal
Q  I J
disaster" . The blockade of Russia, Graham declared, apart from thd
human suffering to which it led, would "impose a burden upon us, because
we shall be committed ultimately to some policy of reconstruction for Russia, J
I
as for the rest of the world". Britain needed Russian food imports, and j
Russia could take British experts, which because of government policy might !
85be placed elsewhere . Russia should be given not only supplies, machinery
and credit, Hdnderson believed, but what he coyly described as "advice., in 3
86 'the restoration of her economic life" • i
Revolutionary Russia, it has been suggested, was "central in
i
Labour thought on foreign affairs" and the "chief issue in foreign affairs" j
dividing the Labour Party and the Conservatives^. Thi^ jwas hardly apparent, j
at least, in the House of Commons, where Balfour, indeed, drew attention
  00
to the "extraordinary measure of agreement" whictjexisted . The intervention
issue had been raised in the War Office debate on 29 May, the Labour executive
reported, following an "unsatisfactory sppech" from Churchill^9, It wXas
pointed out at the conference, however, that it had been raised not by the
90Labour Par&y as such, but by a private member of the Labour Party7 . An 
amendment was proposed by Colonel Wedgwood to the Army Vote to reduce it by 
the amount of the subsidy to Deiiikin; but only 37 Labour MPs voted in favour 
of it91.
The action of the British trade union movement towards the Allied 
war upon the Russian revolution, Snowden wrote on 13 November, was the "'acid 
test* of its belief in democracy and internationalism. The full story of the 
apathy and weakness of British Labour towards the policy of the Allied 
governments in their determined efforts to overthrow the Socialist Revolution
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and to re-establish the monarchical and capitalist regime is one which
should make every democrat feel hot with shame and humiliation”• The efforts
of the official Labour movement from March until November 1917 had been
’’directed to trying to induce a wartorn and exhausted people to continue
to give military support to the capitalist and imperialist war aims of the
92Allies”; and there had been no response to the call for a general peace,
Ddspite Henderson’s statement to the press that Labour had ’’never failed"
to protfcst against|interventiQn, commented the Workers’ Dreadnought. the
policy had in fact been inaugurated with Labour members in the governments
The Party "made no protest in those days"; and the Inter-Allied Conference
had, indeed, "set the seal of its approval on the Russian Intervention",
The Party had now come to find intervention a "good stick with which to
93beat the Government"' . Only rank-and-file pressure, Snowden noted, had 
secured the adoption of the resolution on Russia at the Labour Party Conf­
erence in June 1919; and it had been the non-Coalition Liberals, not the 
Labour members, who had been most active in the House of Commons. The 
indifference and complacency of official Labour amounted, he considered, to 
"practical support of the government’s policy’’., "If the Allied adventure 
fails, as it seems likely to do, it will not be due to the opposition of 
the British Labour Movement.. A determined attitude againstjthis policy 
by British Labour would have brought intervention to an end long a^&". The 
charge was a harsh, but not unmerited one. Nor, indeed, is it sufficient 
to attribute responsibility for Labour’s attitude to the Labour executive. 
The executive members, certainly, had no love of Ipilitant or extra-constit- 
ttional action: yet where rank-and-file pressure was strong and determined, 
it could makeeitself effective. This, evidently, was not the case. Basil 
Thomson, whose reports on "Revolutionary Organizations in the United King­
dom" generally exaggerated the revolutionary threat and the influence of 
Bolshevism, supported this view. The objection of trade unionists to 
intervention, he reported, was that "they do not see any necessity for it. 
They say that Russia has never been any good to us as an Ally, and should 
be left to settle her own affairs. No British lives ought to be lost for 
ber sake". At the same time, it was "not at all likely that anything drastic 
will be done to stop conscription and intervention, for drastic action 
ttesae the loss of wages for themsilves"^. Despite the "sound and fury" of 
resolutions on Russian policy, the rank and file refust to be interested in
96anything Russian” • While the outcry against intervention was loud, the
motive was "apparently not sympathy with the Bolshevik regime, but the fear
of individual soldiers and sailors of beingjsent abroad again". Even the
extremists, he told the Cabinet, had "realised that it would be useless to
97call a national strike on such a question"7 . Pollitt, certainly, who was
probably one of those whom Thomson had in mind, admitted the truth of the 
98charge7 . Murphy, who was another, conde4ed that the British labour movement 
"rejected the principles of the Soviet Revolution so far as its own develop­
ment wiv c o n c e r n e d " ^ ,  jt is indeed difficult to find (at least until the 
end of 1919» by which time intervention had effectively ended) a. case in 
which a significant section of the labour movement called for an end to the 
governmentls policy in Russia in terms which clearly extended beyond a 
desire to avoid the loss of working-class lives and unnecessary expenditure 
to a defence of the principles of the Bolshevik regime itself. There was 
no ’fight to save the Soviet Republic*.
Labour's opposition to Allied intervention in Russia, again, derived from 
a variety of motives, among which the classic liberal principle of non-inter- 
ferencein the internal affairs of other countries (especially where this 
was likely to prove an expensive operation) was only one. Labour shught to 
bring to an end wartime restrictions on civil and trade-union liberties-j- 
which the continuation of the war in the form of intervention in Russia 
appeared likely to prolong. This contributed to the fact that opposition to 
intervention begcn to develop on a significant scale only affeer the Xrmistice 
and throughout the following year the demand for withdrawal of troops from 
Russia was combined with a number of issues of a more straightforward 
character. So long as intervention continued, McGurk told the 1919 Labour 
Party conference in his Presidential Address, there could be "no question 
of disarmament and the alleged need for retaining conscription in this 
country will remain.. The workers of Great Britain will have no conscription, 
and we shall resort to every legitimate means to bring about its withdrawal?^ 
Smillie remarked "was it not the duty of the trade unionists who were still 
free from the curse of militarism to safeguard the interests of their men 
*ho were away?". The Special Conference on the League of Nations on 3 April, 
at-'thich the emergency motion calling for the withdrawal of troops from 
Russia had been adopted, carried as parts of the same resolution the demands
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"to raise the bloekade; to withdraw the Bill now befor£ Parliament for the 
conscription of men for further military service; and to release forthwith 
all conscientious objectors"'*'^.
The Triple Alliance included the same demands in the resolution 
adopted at its meeting on 16 April; and in the following month added the 
demand that the controversial circular seeking information on the 
reliability of troops in civil aiid industrial disputes, which the Herald 
had published, should be withdrawn. The ballot paper which it was decided 
to circulate on the question of the withdrawal of labour to end intervent­
ion in Russia referred also to the abolition of conscription and military 
intervention in trade-union disputes. • Smillie pointed out, at the 
Triple Alliance conference at which the decision to circilate the ballot 
papers was taken, that with regard to Russia, it was impossible to know 
the real truth. Britain had, however, "quite sufficient trouble of its 
own", and had "come through quite sufficient" without "unnecessary interv­
ention in the affairs of another nation outside of ourselves1^ ? The Prime 
Minister, another delegate argued, had expressed the sentiments of the 
Labour Party on the question: non-interference. Neither the country*s 
wealth nor XXX the lives of its citizens should Jje "wasted in Russia".
Other matters, thought Tillett, were "much more important" than the 
Russian questio8!f Smillie agreed that the apparent desire of the government 
to crush trade union action by the use of troops, revealed by the Herald
wircular, would "of itself have been sufficient justification for calling
105a General Conference" . The movement against the Russian people, he told 
the Miners* Annual Conference, while a very important matter to them, 
was a "XMXy small matter to us". It affected the delegates "to this 
extent", that if the movement in Russia were al&owed to be crushed, "our 
turn may come next"^^^.
These related considerations emerged at the Labour Party Conference, 
which in addition to the endorsement of the resolution on intervention 
adopted resolutions calling for the repeal of the Defence of the Realm 
Act, under which civil liberties had been effectively suspendedy during 
the war, and for the release of political prisoners and conscientious 
objectors. The general election Appeal had pledged^he Party to seek the 
^^destruction of all war-time measures in restraint of civil or industrial 
liberty**^0'7; and it was feared that the continuation of the war in Russia
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‘might be used as a prtetext for their maintenance. As Wellhead told the
Conference, "if the reactionary government could force 180 millions of
people under the heels of autocracy, did they not see that, even from the
trade union point of view, it was going to react upon them. It was up to
the Labour Party to stop the damnable brigand war in Russia, in the inter-
1 no
ests, not only of Russia, but of the British people..” .
It was a danger to which socialist bodies were equally alive.
It was ”up to us to save the Russian Socialists”m declared Silvia
Pankhurst, ”and thereby to save ourselves.. A state of war with the
Bolsheviks will enable the capitalists of all countries to attack, intern
and harry all whom Northcliffe and his coterie care to consider as Bolshev- i
iks. That means all sections of the Socialist movement not in alliance with 
109the authorities” • If reaction triumphed in Russia as a result of the 
efforts of Allied militarism, Labour Leader pointed out, socialists wfauld 
"fasten upon ourselves the chains we forge for Russia”"^? There wefe, in 
fact, compelling reasons for Labour opposition to intervention, apart 
altogether from a hypothetical desire to assist the Soviet revolution.
The continuation of the war in Russia appeared to involve expenditure and ; 
the loss of life on a major scale, and to threaten the continuation of the j  
war-time restrictions upon political expression and trade-union activity. j 
This could not $>ut provoke the opposition of all sections of the labour j 
movement, whatever their attitude to Bolshevism, inwards the governments 
policy in Russia. The explanation of Solidarity' is a superfluous one.
The readiness at least to consider industrial action for political 
ends m|.Bst, moreover, be placed in context. The immediate post-war period 
was one of great labour unrest: over six times as many working days were 
lost in industrial stoppages, for instance^as^lid been the case in the 
previous year; and seven disputes occurred in which more than half a
112million working days were lost, compared v/ith two each in 1918 and 1920 •
The Labour Party had, also, been placed in a very weak Parliamentary 
position following the 1918 general election. The election resulted not 
simply in a severe defeat for the Party's candidates as a whole, with the 
return of only 57 of 36SnanSsS^of 31 unendorsed candidates. It resulted, 
more specifically, in the near-elimination of the I.L.P. and radical section 
wrly three of the former being returned, a state of affairs variously 
described as the "temporary defeat of those who have stood for a sane
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national and international policy”, or as the "engulfing of Pacifism and
Bolshevism"^-'*. Those who had been elected, declared the Review of Reviews.
represented the "sanest and best elements of Labour in the nation"; the
"Pacifist and Bolshevik irreconcilables" had been "swept into limbo"’*'^*
Those closer to the Party had a shrewder idea of what this might mean in
terms of the movement as a whole. To protect themselves from Bolshevism,
the New Statesman noted, they must "at all costs, maintain the popular
faith and confidence in the House of Commons.. Especially must we see
that the Labour Party, the orderly constitutionalism of which is anathema
to the Bolsheviks, is strongly and effectively represented in the new
Parliament". Clynes agreed that the "best guarantee against violent forms
of unrest was a large and independent Labour representation in the House
of Commons". The result, Snowden forecast, would give an "irresistible
impetus to the most extreme forms of industrial action", a prdbsject he
115evidently regarded with distaste . Hdnderson wrote in April 1919 that
the unrest which existed was "more widespread and deepseated than ever
before in the history of industrial England". Itss"chief danger" he found
not in unrest which was "definitely organized and controlled and wisely
guided and directed by recognized leaders", but in "sporadic local efforts'.'
The chief political factor contributing to the industrial trouble he
considered to be the under-representation of Labour in Parliament^
The leadership of the Party in Parliament was entrusted to
Adamson and Clynes: "both", wrote Snowden, "admirable respfi&wnetatfves of
Labour in their way, but neither of them has distinguishedlhimself as a
117formidable champion of the political principles of the Party" . Beatrice 
Webb was characteristically uncharitable regarding the "respectable but j 
dull-witted Adamson, elected Chairman because he is a miner". He had 
"neither wit, fervour nor intellect; he is most decidedly not a leader, !
11Q :
not even, like Henderson, a manager of men" . The lack of a more vigorous •
i
opposition to the government in the House of Commons , Snowden noted, cause |
-d a good deal of dissatisfaction and criticism of the Party in the country;’
and in his Chairman*s Address to the 1919 I.L.P. Conference, he pronounced j
the Labour Parliamentarians "very disappointing in regard to such fundament-
119al questions as civil liberty and economic and international policy" .
I*art of the trouble was that "on most of the leading questions of the day 
there was no difference" between the parties^? At the 1919
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Labour Party Conference, the Parliamentary Party was described as a
"failure", and its report was referred back^? Shinwell believed that
there was a "tendency on the part of the rank and file to swing away
from Parliamentary activity to industrial action. He thought that was
123!very largely due to the inactivity of the Party in the House" .
Within Parliament, the Review of Reviews commented, the
Labour representatives were "not likely to have much influence over a
Government which still controls a majoritjrjof over three hundred votes".
It was "not surprising therefore that Labour places its faith in its
123industrial power" • Even constitutionalisms within the labour movement,
such as MacDonald, were prepared to accept extra-constitutional action
in such circumstances. Where action, he wrote, was "defensive against
injustice, where Parliamentary forms are abused by a Party in power, where
governments seek to deprive Labour of its due rights., then industrial
action is justified"'*'^ The decision to hold the general election so soon
after the end of the war, in an atmosphere of public hysteria, was widely
regarded as one which had frustrated the expression of the popular will;
and the government’s Russian policy was held to be one conducted in
secrecy and despite the opposition of the public and Parliament, and
therefore to be unconstitutional. In such a situation the "justification
for direct action", it was declared, was that it could "compel the
government to be constitutional": that it represented, in fact, a
"constitutional check upon tyranny". The workers, Boi Williams wrote,
were "really being compelled to a,dopt the same extra-constitutional
125methods for the restitution of the British Constitution" .
Labour was prepared in these circumstances to act outside 
the constitution in order to attempt to secure the withdrawal of military 
forces from Russia. Had this been a movement of principled solidarity 
with Soviet Russia, it might have been reasonable to expect its extension 
in support of movements with which it had something in common, in Ireland ; 
and Hungary, where popular and national forces were opposed by Allied troo­
ps, at the expense of the principles of non-interference and national self- 
determination. This was not the case. The Socialist International formally
i
condemned "any intervention in (the) internal affairs" of Hungary in ,
April; but when the "Hungarian working classes cried out for help to their - 
comrades", it was subsequently stated, "their answer was the shameful
~LPfifiasdo of the general strike of protestation of July 21" (1919) • Allied
action, wrote Mrs Snowden, was an "outrageous violation of all the profes­
sions about radical unity and national rights and self-determination..
127Cannot International Socialism do something to prevent this iniquity?" .
The Labour Party conference the following year was informed that the
Hungarian labour movement, "thrown from power by the intrigue and the
military forces of the Allies", had been "almost exterminated". A Labour
delegation which visited Hungary in May 1920, at the invitation of the
128Hungarian government, confirmed this impression • This was, however,
some months after the overthrow of Bela Kun(s government. Not without
reason the Hungarian Communists and Social Democrats charged the workers
129of the Allied countries with "heartless indifference" .
On the Irish question it was "time", Stewart wrote in Forward.
"that the British Labour Party spoke out strongly, decisively and fearless­
ly". Two years later Morel declared that the party was doing "precious 
little" about the war in Ireland, which had by this time attained major 
dimensions'^^. Labour, the Socialist International was told at Berne in 
January 1919> bad "always supported Home Rule for Ireland", and was 
"recognized by the Irish people as a steady and reliable ally in their 
agitation for National Self-Government"'*’"^ The Party Conference held the 
previous summer had, however,contemplated only "self-dfetermination in all 
purely Irish affairs*^. The Labour Executive in a statement of March 1920 
accepted that there should be a vote on the issue of union or separation; 
but not, however, at that time, since the atmosphere was held to be "neith­
er healthy nor normal", and might result in what was described as the 
"sacrificing of Ireland’s ultimate interests to the immediate satisfaction
that might be gained by a total repudiation of any form of connection with
133their old-time political oppressors" . The Review of Reviews noted an 
"apparent reluctance ot British labour to side definitely with Sinn 
The subsequent efforts made by Labour to prevent the outbreak of war with 
Russia during the Polish crisis were regarded by Irish v/orkers, it was 
reported, "with a mixture of amusement and contempt", since they could 
not "forgive or forget the fact that British Labour (had) not yet succeeded 
in stopping the war on Ifceland". Labour's belief in freedom was "restricted 
■to the other side of Europe"1-^ .
It ‘trae indeed "unfortunate", wrote MacDonald, that the Labour 
Party was "becdwing suspect in Ireland"’*’*'^ . The despatch of a Commission
of Inquiry to Ireland XMfeJSXX&lxXfcXXXRXX was unable to reverse this 
development. It ndid not get to the hearts of the people whom it saw”, 
and in general ”did not make a very good impression". However, while a 
"majority of the wild men", thought MacDonald, might be "in favour of a 
Republic", this was "no reason why the Labour Party should declare for 
iP?. The Labour Commission proposed that a constituent assembly should 
be elected, after peace had been restorddj to establish an Irish constitu­
tion; but it should be required to "prevent Ireland froip becoming a
17 0
military or naval menace to Great Britain" ^ .C.R. Buxton noted the 
"strange indifference of the British Labour Movement to the tragedy of 
Ireland""^?
It was an indifference which must tend to reinforce the impression 
that Labour supported a popular political movement, as in the case of 
Soviet Russia, when an attempt to crush it appeared to involve a threat to 
its interests, and in particular to political and trade union liberties, 
and when it appeared likely to prove sn expensive failure. Wartime 
military controls had come to an end, however, by the spring of 1920; 
and proposals to re-constitute the Council of Action to force an end to X 
the war in Ireland (as appeared to have been achieved when a folish war 
was threatened in the summer of 1920), or to attempt to bring about a 
settlement consistent with the wishes of the political movement (Sinn 
Fein) which evidently commanded overwhelming electoral support on the 
part of the Irish population were not adopted, or even seriously 
advocated. Labour had no greater sympathy for the Bolsheviks than for 
Sinn Fein: it believed, simply, that an armed attempt on the part of the 
Allies to overthrow their regime would lead to conscription and censorship 
and would fail notwithstanding. It might, wt^se, even strengthen the 
position of the Bolsheviks, as the Mensheviks were believed to have 
concluded^? These considerations did not operate in favour of the 
independence movement in Ireland. A socialist journal commented: "to our 
everlasting shame we have stood by in cowardly silence while Ireland has
Ikl
been ravaged by fire and sword" •
On 2^ April Polish forces began an offensive against Soviet Russia. There 
^Seemed no doubt that Poland, a "bankrupt State., could not put a regiment 
on the field without the connivance of the Allies"^^* The marionettes,
181
wrote the Herald, "are in Warsaw, but the strings are being pulled from 
London and Paris”, The country was "again at war with Russia". On 8 May 
Kiev was captured by the Polish forces. Despite government assurances, it 
was not a Polish war but an "Allied of fensive""*"^ .
A ship called the "Jolly George" was at this time awaiting cargo 
in the East India Dock. Some of the cargo which arrived for it was packed 
in crates labelled "OHMS Munitions for Poland". The dockers sent a deputat­
ion to Bevin and Thompson of the Dockers1 Union, and received assurances 
that the Union would support them if they refused to load or coal the 
ship. The crates had to be disembarked"*"^.
It is difficult to agree, however, that the dockers* action was
"indicative of the intense feeling aroused among Trade Unionists" or that
the British workers were now "ready for any action to defend workers*
145Russia’1 • The extremists were "much elated " by the incident, Basil 
Thomson reported, but he considered that "most of the agitation will end 
in talk for there is no real support for the cause of the Russian Soviets 
among the working classes""*"^. Pollitt^ i who was actively involved in the | 
dockside agitation, confessed himself "greatly disappointed" byjan earlier i 
failure to secure a stoppage of work on two Belgian barges which were being | 
converted for the transport of munitions to Poland. On 1 May the Danish 
steamer Neptune left the East India Dicks: "we had", said Poliitt, "failed 
to stop her"'*'^ "? Following the *Jolly George* incident, the Hands off Russia 
Committee urged that a national conference be called to declare a strike 
JNXXXXHttigX to force the government to attempt to bring about peace between 
Poland and Russia. "Mere pious resolutions won*t force the hands of the 
Government", stated the appeal, "but resolutions backed by industrial action 
will""*"**? A week later an appeal, signed by a number of prominent trade 
unionists, called for a conference "in order to declare a National *down- 
tools* policy of 24 Hours to make peace with Russia". Peace, they believed, 
was "to the interest of the organized workers of Great Britain": the 
European economic situation, indeed, necessitated it. Moreover "King George 
V created a precedent of a down-tools policy by advocating a general cess­
ation of work on November 11th as a reminder of Armistice Day". The Parlia­
mentary Committee of the T.U.C. and the Labour Party were urged to follow 
this worthy initiative^^.
The president of the Labour Party Conference the following 
aonth, however, noted that while they had "protested" they had nevertheless
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stood "almost idly by while the reactionary forces of the world - capital- gi 
ists, governments, and Press - have been putting fofcth every endeavour E 
to strangle the Socialist experiment which has been going on, in face of j 
truly colossal difficulties, in Ryssia". There was no need to be in full 
sympathy with the policy and outlook of Russian Bolshevism to oppose 1
their action. The conference adopted a resolution which declared that the 
economic restoration of Europe was the "onljr secure foundation for the 
peace and prosperity of the world", and called upon the Allied governments • 
to recognize the Russian government and to end all direct or indirect I;
attacks upon it. Proposing the motion, Tom Shaw called for the extension. |
of the hand of friendship"not merely to Lenin and Trotsky, but to the |i
160 millions of peaceloving people in Russia", who might otherwise acquire 1
'T' I'a "hatred of this country that could only end in anotherwwar”. All Central |!
end Eastern Europe was in a ferment because, he believed, "of our mad |
ji
policy". No more was proposed, however, to implement the policy than to g!
send another deputation to the Prime Minister to urge the "Necessity of $
peace with Russia and the lifting of the blockade with a view to the J-
150 Mrenewal of trade activities" . ■
An addendum to the resolution was proposed by Hodgson, a B.S.P. 
representative, calling for the summoning of a national conference to n
organize a general strike to end the governments direct and indirect sup­
port of attacks on Soviet Russia. In the twelve months since the last 
resolution on Russia had been adopted there had been, he told the j
conference, "no earnest attempt to act upon it". It was urged that I
151 !"something more than a deputation to Mr Lloyd George was necessary"*; and I
smmething more than a deputation would havd been undertaken, had it indeed ; 
been the case that a "powerful movement to halt intervention stirred the ||
British working class, •• under the leadership of the militants and j
152revolutionaries. " • The proposal was, however, "heavily defeated"  ^. r.
It was, in fact, not XXKJSXJEXXHX a concern for the fate of the 
Soviet Republic, hut a threat that the war which had developed between ||
Poland and Soviet Russia might come to involve British forces which led 
to the most striking demonstration of Labour opposition to government policj 
towards Soviet Russia, the establishment of the Council of Action in August. 
-The Polish offensive had been stopped, and then reversed by the Red Army, 
which had instituted a sdccesdful counter-attack. Armistice negotiations,
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negotiations, however, broke down at the beginning of August; and it
appeared possible that the British Government would be required to fulfil
a promise to maintain Polish independence. The Times and the Herald agreed
(for once) that - as the Herald put it - "exactly six years after Britain’s
declaration of "The War to end Wars" - the country is again in urgent danger 
153of a great war". The Review of Reviews considered that Europe was "faced
with a situation that not only threatened to undo the whole work of the Peace
Treaty, but even to plunge the continent once again into the ghastly nightmare 
154of War". It was difficult to know how seriously to take the threat; but
recent experience of the Government’s relations with Russia, and of Churchill's
conduct in particular, suggested that the nation might have a military engagement
sprung upon it, as was thought to have been the case in 1914> were the government
to be left the slightest opportunity of doing so. Henderson, accordingly, as
Secretary of the Labour Party sent a telegram to every local branch of the Party
describing as "extremely menacing" the possibility of an extension of the
Russo-Polish war, and urging local parties to organize demonstrations against
155intervention and the supply of men and munitions to Poland. The Party issued
a statement that in view of the "grave situation" which had arisen in relation to
the Russo-Polish war and the possibility that the government might involve the
people in its extension, a meeting would be held on Monday 9 August with the
156Parliamentary Labour Party and the Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C. The
issue was not in doubt. As an "Appeal to the British Nation" stated it, over the
signatures of Purcell, O'Grady, Clynes, Lansbury and Williams, it represented a
protest against an attempt to involve the country in a war, which would "drive
us over the precipice of bankruptcy, on the edge of which we now stand". British
workers wanted "peace - a real peace, a lasting peace - rather than endless wars
157and threats of war". Unless working people wanted militarism and
conscription back, and "your sons dragged away and butchered, desmembered,
158disembowelled, as your brothers have been - act now". The Labour Party appeal
"met with an unparalleled response", it was later reported, "and it was evident
159that Labour had mobilized public opiniaa rapidly and successfully".
Demonstrations, in many cases on a massive scale (10,000 turned out in Glasgow) 
took place; and in a special Sunday edition the Herald urged "Not a Man, Not a Gun, 
Not a Sou".^^
The following day, Monday 9 August, the meeting took place as arranged
18k
in the House of Commons of the T.U.C. Parliamentary Committee, the Labour ' j  
executive and the Parliamentary Labour Party. A resolution was adopted 
with what was described as "surprising unanimity", expressing the convict­
ion that war was "being engineered between the Allied Powers and Soviet 
Russia on the issue of Poland", a plan which if successful would constitute 
an "intolerable crime against humanity". It warned that the "whole 
industrial power of the organized workers" would be used to defeat the 
war; and that affiliated bodies would be instructed to prepare their 
members for a "down tools" call from a national conference, which would 
shortly be convened. A Council of Action was "immediately constituted to f
take such stops as may be necessary to carry the above decisions into I
161 1 effect" . The Council was composed of five members each from the three \
162 !bodies in attendance, with powers to co-opt further membefs . The Council * 
met immediately, and decided to convene a Special Conference to wrhich j,
trade unions affiliated to the T.U.C. and to the Labour Party should be j 
invited to send representatives of their executives, and all societies *
igT !
affiliated to the Labour party should send delegates ? *j
j
The Council sought and obtained an interview with the Prime j
Minister the following day, Tuesday 10 August, and presented him with the 
resolution. Bevin, who presented the Council's case, declared that it was 
"not merely one in opposition to direct military action, but it is a decl- | 
arction in opposition to what I would describe as an indirect war, either I 
by blockade or by the supply of munitions or by assisting the forces that j 
are now at war with Russia". They were ready and determined to resist the ] 
triumph of reaction and war. It was "not merely a political action", he f 
declared, "but an action representing the full force of labour and we j
believe it represents the desire of the great majority of the British j
people"^^. Labour supported the principle of Polish independence, but j 
believed that it was not in fact threatened: a conviction strengthened by j
the publication later that day, in a special edition of the Herald, of the j
165 — —— —  |
Russian peacd terms . The Council wrote to the Prime Minister urging that J
166 !the government clarify its attitude to peace terms with Russia . On 12 j 
August, Bevin was summoned to 10 Downing Street, accompanied by some of 
his colleagues, and told of the Prime Minister's belief that the Soviet 
authorities were frustrating a meeting of the respective peace negotiators j 
bn the Polish frontier. Following an interview with Kamenev, Krasin and |
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Klishko of the Russian Trade Delegation, the Prime Minister was informed
th at after some difficulty in establishing contact' the Polish negotiators
were now at Minsk. The point, it appeared, would "not be pursued". The
Prime Minister urged the delegation on its departure to "use its influence
with the Russian government to keep to the published Peace Terms rather
than stiffen them, in view of the military successes then being achieved
by the Red Armj^? The Council made representations to the Trade Delegation
to this effect, which were transmitted to Moscow; and the Council was
subsequently informed that the original terms would be mainta inel6?
It must be borne in mind, accordinsjLy, that by the time the
National Conference assembg^jd on 13 August^, peace appeared in all essentials
to have been secured, subject to the Soviet authorities making no major
169change in the peace terms offered to the Polish negotiators • What was 
needed was a demonstration of determination and unity in order that this 
achievement should not be challenged. The conference was accordingly "one 
of the most striking examples of Labour unanimity, determination and 
enthusiasm in the history of the Movement^? The resolutions were carried 
without dissent, and no amendments were allowed: the avoidance of war was 
an "issue on which all the warring sections were absolutely united and 
determined’^!' The was, Snowden recalled, a manifest determination not to 
permit any difference* of opinion to obtrude into the discussions and there­
by weaken the demonstration of unity on the one essential thing, that the 
"whole force of Labour should be employed to prevent Great Britain giving 
support in any form to a war against Russia". It was, he found, a "strange 
spectacle to see and hear the men - most of Whhm had been enthusiastic
supporters of the Great War - displaying an almost religious fanaticism in
172opposition to war" •
In his opening address to the Conference, Adamson, who presided, 
declared that atthe beginning of the week the "situation in Europe appeared 
to be then so grave, and the black shadow of war so near", that the Labour 
Party and the T.U.C. had felt obliged to meet and to set up the Council.
The Council, he said, had "focussed the practically unanimous opinion of 
this country against any more wa^r armed intervention in the affairs of 
other countries", and had done so "so effectively that up to the present 
t£e government have been kept back from the slippery slope that would lead 
another European conflagration". The Conference was intended to "demonst-
186
l
rate the deep and united feeling existing against any action on the part of 
our Government which would drag our people into war and abolish the prosp­
ect of peace in Europe". They were "not concerned about the merits XHM or 
demerits of the present rulers of Russia; the issue i£ far greater than 
that". Ke hoped for a demonstration of a "deep resolve to have nothing to 
do with assisting in the nefarious designs of those who care more for XKK 
conquest and the maintenance of force than they do for the welfare of the i
common people and the rights of nations to work out their own destinifes^ *'7^
Bevin, presenting the report of the Council of Action to the 
conference, noted the general feeling that "last week, under what was 
almost fatalism, we were* drifting again to war". On the question of war, 
whatever their views on ordinary industrial matters, "wefelt convinced that 
we were justified in taking any and every means. Hence the absolutely unan- j 
imous resolution that was carried". The Council "began work immediately",
as his report made clear. "We must", he stated, "have peace. Progress depends!
upon it. The economic salvation of the working classes depends upon it"* !
The consciousness of the value of peace was "now being realised", he thought,:
i
"as it was never realised before’.* The Council was united in a "willingness |
to take any action to win world peace". No other measures, Clynes added,
than those recommended could "save the country from being committed to
1 7 kwar against its will" 7
A resolution, proposed by Thomas, which endorsed the decision 
to establish the Council was carried unanimously. Another instructed the 
Council of Action to remain in being until satisfied that British military 
and naval forces would not be used in defence of Poland and against Russia, ! 
nor any blockade maintained, and "unrestricted trading and commercial 
relationships" established between Britain and Russia. The Council was 
authorised to call for "any and every form of withdrawal of labour which 
circumstances may require to give effect to the foregoing policy", and to 
endeavour to "sweep away secret bargaining and diplomacy and to ensure that 
the foreign policy of Great Britain may be in accordance with the well-known 
desires of the people for an end to war and the interminable threats of 
war"1'7^  The resolution would be used, said its proposer, Hutchinson, "intell­
igently but nevertheless determinedly, if it is required". The Council was 
empowered to take "ahy steps that may be necessary" to carry out the 
decisions of the Conference or the policy of the trade-union movement and
187
the Labour Party; and. the Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C* was authorised
to charge a levy of a halfpenny per member to be paid by each of its affiliated
176organizations "as and when required".
"One cannot say", wrote Snowden, "what would have happened if the Council
of Action had been called upon to put the resolution into effect. Fortunately,
the necessity never arose and shortly afterwards the Council of Action was 
177dissolved". A certain amount of activity was in fact undertaken subsequent 
to the Conference. The Council, which delcared its intention of meeting daily 
"until further notice", assembled on 14> 15 and 16 August, and reached a 
decision that Labour bodies and trade-union branches should be asked to
178summon local conferences at which local Councils of Action should be formed.
It was decided to call not national "Peace with Russia" demonstrations the 
following Sunday, 22 August. "Make Sunday a day of national protest against 
war and in favour of an immediate peace between Britain and Russia. .Demand 
peace, demonstrate for peace, organize for peace", it urged. A ‘Manifesto to 
the Workers of r^eat Britain1 called upon the workers "not to relas their
179efforts", to be "prepared to make every sacrifice in the cause of PEACE".
The resolutions which had been adopted at the Conference were
forwarded to the Prime Minister. On 24 August the Council met the Russian
Trade Delegation to urge the withdrawal of the proposal for a civic militia
in Poland under the peace terms, and this was agreed by the Soviet Government.
he Council sought a meeting with Balfour but he was prepared to meet only
Adamson and his Parliamentary colleagues and "no further action was ?
180therefore taken in that direction". On 5 September the Council agreed
that it would be desirable to be represented at the Polish-Russian peace 
talks, and two delegates were appointed. The Council wrote to Lloyd George 
explaining the purpose of the deputation, and naming its members. They
181were refused passports, however, and were accordingly unable to travel.
The local Councils were circularized from time to time on various aspects 
of the National Council's work, and asked to supply information concerning 
the manufacture and transport of war munitions. They were responsible for 
the organization of demonstrations for peace with Russia on 27 August and 
17 October. The Council devoted considerable attention to the economic 
possibilities of trade with Russia, and a "special series of four leaflets 
dealing particularly with the relation of Russian peace to unemployment"
188
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was issued in connection with the October demonstration •
The studied moderation of the Council did not dispose of the
fe-rs of those who saw in its establishment an "attempt to impose Soviet 
183rule" . The presence of Kamenev and Krassm, the Review of Reviews charged, 
was "undoubtedly, . largely responsible for the extraordinary speed -nd 
efficiency with which the Council of Action was brought to life,. Its 
constitution was so closely modelled upon the Russian system of Soviets 
that there could be no doubt as to its origin.. Bolshevik propaganda was 
poured forth from thousands of platforms". The Polish situation had been 
used as a "pretext for creating a complete organization of Workers* Councils 
on the Russian model with a view to subsequent action in the event of a 
general strike***^ The victory of the Poles, wrote the Fortnightly Review, 
"miraculously saved this country from an attempt to introduce the 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat in accordance with the Russian precedent". 
The Labour Party seemed to mean in regard to foreign affairs, observed 
another journal which compared Lloyd George with Kerensky, "not England, 
bu East End Jew". With regard to the flocal Soviets* it consoled itself
with the thought that there were, mercifully, "hardly sufficient Jews £o 
go round*^?
Even Lenin was convinced that "Bolshevism (was) growing among the 
English workers". The establishment of the Council of Action had "the same 
significance as the February revooution of 1917 had for us". The English
-i or
press had - rightly - described the situation as one of * dual power*
Britain had reached the stage of political relations which had existed in 
Russia after the February revolution. The Mensheviks in the Councils of 
Jction - which, he declared, were Soviets, although not sailed such - would 
be obliged to assist the path of the British workers to Bolshevik revolutl§2 
Only exceptional circumstances, however, had allowed the Council 
to be formed, and its powers remained strictly confined to the issue which 
had* united Labour and popular opinion in support of its establishment, the 
threat of British military involvement in the Russo-Polish conflict. Only 
extraordinary unanimity had created the Council, wrote J.C. Wedgwood, aXX 
member of the Council, and only extraordinary unanimity had allowed the 
delegates to hand over their powers to such a Council."War and the fear of 
war made this a special case": the "Christian Nonconformists" who supported 
the Council believed la the principle of non-interference and held that 
war was "morally wrong". This required the Council to "use the machinery
189
l88of general consent", which was "only rarely available" . The function and 
aims of the Council, wrote Snowden, were to be confined to the specific and 
definite purpose of preventing war, and it was "neverXXintended that the 
Council of Action should be used to aid general revolutionary propaganda"*
As Hodges noted, the motives which brought the Councils into being were 
"transient. Their main object is peace. There is no desire to destroy 
Parliamentary government, and there is no question of Soviet government*^? 
Writing in the Labour Leader, Snowden opposed a possible attempt by the 
"extremeX section to widen the functions and aims of the Council* *M The 
great majority of the British Labour movement, while willing to employ,if i 
necessary, Direct Action for the specific and definite purpose of prevent- j  
ing war*', were "in no sense committed-g-to an aporoval or suoport of Bolshev- 1 ' 
ism"1?0.
It was made clear to the local Councils that they were "not to super- ! j 
sede the powers of fche) trade-union executives", but were to act as /centres 
of information" and in accordance with any instructions issued by the
I
National Council. The instructions went later expanded: local Councils were
to exercise "care" as to their functions, and in particular were "not in j
any way to usurp the powers of trade union executives, especially so far
191as the withdrawal of labour is concerned*." . A circular from the ’Hands 
off Russia* Committee to local Councils, urging them to demand that the j| 
National Council call upon them to prevent the export of coal to France, ; 
and thereby to compel that country’s abandonment of support for the anti- 
Soviet forces, provoked considerable trade-union indignation. C.T. Cramp,
a Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen and a member of the Council,’.
i i
addressed a protest to the Committee in reply. He favoured, as they would 
be aware, anything which could be done to cripple the attacks upon Russia, 
but this must not lead to an "undue interference with the executive rightg" 
of trade unions, and had been adversely commented upon at a meeting of the 
Council?2
Such X236XX a conception of the role of the Councils was not to the 
taste of all of those who were involved in the movement; but fcuch evidence 
as exists suggests that they were overwhelmingly those of not simply the 
leadership, but of the rank and file also* A letter from a branch of the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union pointed out that the majority of people were 
"absolutely siek of war and the after-effects of war", and wanted only peace
190
and reconstruction. This was the "sole reason", the member thought, for
the acceptance of the policy of 1 direct action1, -nd the only cause for
193which the members would consent to act . Basil Thomson reported that 
any attempt by the local Councils to involve themselves in questions 
outside the Polish conflict v/ould be resisted by "bona fide trade-union 
branches.The Councils owed their existence to the "general fear of conscr- 
iXpXtion that exists in the lower middle and working classes and not to 
any tenderness for Russia, for if there were no question of war there 
would be a very feeble response to a strike-call to enforce recognition 
of the Soviet government". The local reports which had reached him suggest­
ed that "although the men would refuse response to calling up notices,
19kthey would support the Government in countering Bolshevik action" . In
the manifesto which appeared on 7 August under the signature of a number of
195prominent labour leaders, including three Communists (as Klugmann notes )
it was pointed out th'-t the country could "ill afford to spare even a
few thousand men or a few million pounds from our depleted financial
resources" for the purposes of the Polish "enterprise". Bousing was
"lament&bly short", the prime necessities of life "becoming increasingly
difficult to obtain.. The people in every country want only to devote the-
196mselves more and more to rational and peaceful reconstruction" • The 
issue,aJ?2iiie$alme Dutt in the Communist, was "not essentially a revolut­
ionary class-issue, but simply a popular expression of war-weariness and !
horror at the prospect of being dragged into another war". The final
outcome might, he thought, be disappointing to those who had biilt high
197 Jhopes upon it •
Basil Thomson nevertheless expressed considerabl§°?fia?nthe response j
i  ]
to the call for local CouncilsSf had been "considerable", and hundreds of
198them had been formad, he estimated, by the end of August. The movement
called for "very serious consideration". Local Councils were permeating
that "great mass of the workers which is usually apathetic". Bolshevism
was "openly advocated", and enormous quantities of Extremist* literature
was distributed. There had been adverse fomment from the middle classes I
199at the licence allowed to arlators . A week later he found the tendencies 
which he had noted "becoming more pronounced". The local Councils were 
tfadopting revolutionary resolutions"; they appeared to have the intention*
, if not the .power, of broadening their scope, Lambeth Central Labour Party
i*;,.
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was reported to be advocating the establishment of a Civil .Guard; and
moves were being made in Wales to federate the local Councils^? At
Brighton a Cycle Corps was reported to be under formation; and the Councils
were evolving in a radical direction also at Coventyy, while at Mettjjiyr
and Cardiff the local Councils were, he thought, "almost frankly Soviets*
201and ready for revolutionary action of "even the most sanguinary kind" .
It was upon the potential of the local Councils, indeed, that
most of the revolutionary groups had built their hopes. It was up to the
rank and file, the Workers1 Dreadnought declared, to infude them with
life and energy, so that they became "really Revolutionary Councils, which
will work for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the
Communist Republic", Set up in a society in which the class struggle was
intensifying, the Worker noted, the Councils would be "forced bjr the logic
of events to engage in activities which their promoters never contemplated".
It was "essential", however, that the revolutionaries should play their
202part m  the creation of the new weapon , Lansbury agreed that the local
Councils should be Sis inclusive as possible, including trades councils,
local Labour Party branches, the I.L.P. "and", he specified, "the new
M3
Communist Party" which had been formed shortly beforehand. In setting up
the Councils "let us not1,’ he urged, "be afraid of words and bogies", such
as '.Soviet1, •’Bolshevism'f^They nevertheless turned out to be, as Thomson
205noted, "shy of Communists" •
The Communist Party had been formed at the Unity Convention on
1 August, but it was not represented at the meeting which had established
the Council of Action on 9 August, and its attempts to secure representation
at the National Conference on 13 August, and on the Council itself, were
met with a firm refusal. Further attempts were unavailing, despite the
20party's intention to "insist upon such representation" • Two members of 
the Council were at that time also members of the Communist Party; but this 
was a tiny minority in a body of twenty-seven, including co-opted membe?§^, 
In the meantime, McManus urged members to "get on to the local 
councils". Their work was not for the fceturn of a Labour government, but for 
a "social revolution with administration by Soviets or Workers' Councils", 
The local Councils had "potentialities which^ehould be nourished and devel­
oped". Even at the local level, Communists,fhowever, so far did "not play
p/>Q
the principal |>art in organising" the local Councils. • Indeed a letter
192
to party branches a week later reported that a "large number of letters" 
had reached the central office from local branches nomplaining that there 
had been "considerable difficulty" even in securing representation upon 
them.209
A circular from the London and Home Countifes Council of the party in
mid-October expressed dissatisfaction that Curzon was permitted to send
his despatches with impunity, and to suspend peace and trading negotiations
at his pleasure. "Nothing" had been done. The Communists had been barred
from the National Council of Action, and from the London Council, "despite
repeated protests". In the absence of such representation, the formation
was urged of several local Councils (Communists were occasionaly able to
secure representation as the delegates of trade union branches) into a
Federation of London Councils of Action. "We know that the rank and file
is with us", it was optimistically claimed; "the revolt against this
210apathy is everywhere". No more, however, was heard of the proposal •
Attempts by Stafford Trades Council to .convene a Conference of Local
Councils, and by the Party to "Fix a Date" for industrial action in the
absence of a more satisfactory response from the government had no greater 
211success • The Communist Party*s role during the Council of Action period
may have been (as has been claimed) a "most honourable" one; bit it remains
212difficult to dispute that its role was at the same time a marginal one •
Granted the relatively weak position of the more radical sections
within the Council, however, as compared with more aldermanic figures, it
remains necessary to account for the adoption by a body composed in this
way of a policy which, declared Thomas, were it implemented, would constit-
213ute a "challenge to the whole Constitution of the country*1 . It .should 
accordingly be noted, in the first place, that it was unlikely that the 
Council would be compelled to exercise the powers with which it had been 
entrusted. They would not take action, Cameron promised the National 
Conference on 13 August, "unless they were absolutely compelled" to do 
so. The Labour Leader had, moreover, already termed the government's plans 
"defeated"2^  Lloyd George told the House of Commons that there had never, 
in fact, been the least justification for extra-constitutional means: Labo­
ur had acted, he declared, "merely in order to impress the public with 
the idea that they did it,, and that had it not been for this dire threat 
this country-would hare been plunged into war". The government's policy,
193
as announced to the House of Commons, appeared to him to differ in no way
from that enunciated at the Labour Conference: "the wvdnging of a sledge-
215hammer against an open door is merely made for the purposes of display" .
There was an element of exaggeration in this: there was widespread suspicion
that Britain might become involved through her alliance with France, which
Thomas warned would not be countenanced, or through the secret machinations
of Churchill, who more than any other individual, stated Clynes, had been
216responsible for the establishment of the Council • The Economist, however,
considered that anything like a revival of war on its recent scale was
"impossible": there had, indeed, been a "good deal of make-believe about
the whole business". Labour was accused by another of having employed an
"unscrupulous electioneering device"; and the New Statesman conceded that
2377Labour1s action had probably "had no influence on the course of events" . 
Conceived as a means of demonstrating the widespread popular opposition to 
the prospect of the government, or of sections within it, wishing to consid­
er intervening in the Polish conflict, the Council of Action found that 
the hypothetical need to carry out its threat had begun to recede even 
before the National Conference had met.
In the second place, as Thomas, who had "always opposed direct 
action when (he felt) that the same result could be obtained through the 
ballot box", explained to the Conference, no Parliamentary means could 
do what the delegates were being asked to do; and "desperate as are our 
means, dangerous as they are, we believe that the disease is so desperate 
and dangerous that it is only desperate and dangerous methods that can pr­
ovide a remedy". The action, added Shaw, was not opposed to the Constitution 
which "if (it) means anything at all., means that the men and women of this 
country have the right to determine its policy, and the policy on which 
this government was elected was to end war". The Parliamentary Party had 
endorsed this view without hesitation: "no question of differencej^csx of
method ever arose, for this was a mttter in which there was no alternative.
No Parliamentary or political measures .. could be effective in themselves 
to save the country from being committed to war against its will"2^? It 
was $ot simply that the 1918 election had been, as MacDonald put it, a 
"conspiracy to cheat the cpuntry and take it by assault unawares, under 
circumstances wfcich "depastffafcfce Parliament of moral authority"21 .^ Within
19 k
the existing Parliament, in addition, Labour had been "taught to place
no reliance whatever on the word or pledges of Ministers, and Russian policy
in particular " had from the beginning been "conducted with conspicuous
bad faith"?^8lynes told the Commons that he doubted whether the country
had ever lived through a period of greater secrecy in matters of the
highest importance than in the previous twelve or fifteen months, "We
cannot call that democratic government. It is not even representative 
221government’1 • In foreign affairs in particular, noted Wedgwood, Parliament
had now "no voice and no ears and no control": the constitution had
222"broken down so far as foreign affairs are concerned" •
"We Parliamentarians", MacDonald wrote earlier in the year, had 
before them a "fight against revolution and direct action". It was however 
"sound democratic dottrine" to take extra-Parliamentary action when a 
Parliamentary majority set aside the national will. Accordingly when what 
he termed the "lying and unscrupulous gang which now controls international 
policjf"threatened to involve the country in a demonstrably unpopular war,
such action was not an attack upon, but on the contrary an affirmation of
223the Constitution . There was "as much Communism about the Council of
Action and the policy that created it, as in taking a breakfast"^^ It
had been an emergency measnre to meet an emergency situation, wrote
Forward, as a result of the "abuse by the Government of Parliamentary 
225power" . Labour’s action, indeed, had "restored constitutional government 
in Great Britain", and "reasserted the authority of Parliament over matters
ppf.
of war and pe^ce". It had been a "great victory for constitutionalism" .
A considered statement of the whole problem of ’direct action
and the constitution* was published by the I.L.P. The necessity of their
day, the author, C.J. Burdock, found, was "drastic action in defence of
the constitution, with which Mr Lloyd George in his period of office has
so seriously tampered". He had done his best to convert the government of
the- country into a dictatorship, v;hile maintaining an outward show of
democratic form. The Russian intervention had in particular been a "story
of unconstitutionalism": it had all been done in secret, and each stage
had been "engineered behind the backs of ’the representativesof the people”,'
a "gross betrayal of the electors". Labour, he concluded, "so far from
attacking the British constitution", was precisely "defending the constit-
227ution against those who would wreck it" ;
While this was naturally the charge of their opponents, it is
tss I
;i
difficult to see the Councils movement as one in support of Soviet j;
Russia or Bolshevik principles as such. Such a purpose was, certainly, \
explicitly disclaimed by its leaders. Addressing the National Conference, ij
!:
Adamson told the delegates that they were "not concerned about the merits ■'
or demerits of the present ruleraDf Russia", and they were not concerned ;
?28with thd "virtues or vices of the Bolshevik form of government"” . Thomas
told the House of Commons that So far as Soviet methods were concerned,
he did not agree with them, nor with Lenin or Trotsky. If the Russian
229people did, however, this was their own business • Part, indeed, of the 
burden of Labour1s criticism of the government was that its activities 
were in fact "calculated, not to weaken the Bolshevik government, but to
strengthen it". The party believed, said Mills, that only when peace came {
>.
would Bolshevik theories of administration be successfully challenged, l:
230 \:a constituent assembly set up there and reforms introduced . They did (j
not want Bolshevik principles to spread, added Spencer; but this was \\
h
precisely what the government's policy was likely to promote. Those who ;|
desired to confine the system of Soviet government to its narrowest limits , 
"would do well", he advised, "to allow Russia to work out her own salvation : 
along those lines^^. Neither the French Soyethment nor Churchill had been
j
able to succeed in crushing Bolshevism by military force, said Clynes; :l
perhaps it "would be better after their experiences to try some other meth- 
od"2^2. j
IVhat the country was concerned about, said Sexton, was that "under j
tno circumstances shall this or any other Government compel them to go j
to war with any country". Men who were opposed to Bolshevism and "would !
tomorrow protest against being allied with Bolshevism" were nevertheless
"so^id" on this question. They were "not concerned about Russia or Poland"^
and the Conference vote had not been upon the question of whether they
should go to war with Russia, or what their attitude should be to Polish
independence. *It was theHopinion of men who differ on these questions"
233expressed "against war at any time and under any circumstances" • To 
"meddle in affairs that do not concern us, to pledge our nation into a war 
that can be avoided, is a crime against humanity and against God", felt 
Wignall?^ This note recurred at the National Conference. It""b resolutions 
constituted "Labour's Charter of Peace", suggested Bowen, a member of the 
Council. Labour would fight jEor peace, he declared, "for that peace which
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the peoples of Europe have striven to attain for so X&Hg many years., so
that we can live the life that God Himself intended we should live with 
235one another” . The failure to do so, Thomas warned, might have serious
consequences within Britain, and would seriously exacerbate labour
unrest. More alarming still was the view of the Labour Leader that unless
Allied policy were reversed, a chapter in human history would be initiated
which might "lead to world-wide war, to world-wide starvation and to world- 
236wide revolution" .
Against this prospect not simply labour but large sections of
middle-class opinion were united. The Polish offensive had been widely
regarded as a purely aggressive venture, and had given Soviet Russia the
sympathy of liberal opinion. Popular opinion of Polish actions was no
doubt not improved by charge (denied indignantly by Harmsv/orth) that the
237Poles were using coloured troops . Indeed there was every indication,
Shaw told the National Conference, that "the whole of the people, whoever 
they are, with very few exceptions, are opposed to war with Russia. Clynes 
believed that the Party was "acting and speaking not merely for the 
Labour Movement, but that we were moulding and interpreting what we felt 
to be national opinion"^? Labour's action was declared to be the "echo 
of a huge consensus of opinion". Indeed it was reported that "some of the 
most enthusiastic people" at meetings in support of the Labour policy 
were "people who are generally understood to be called the middle classes". 
The government's policy had alienated not only the country's trade union­
ists, but a "good section of the middle classes and the business people", 
239thought Mills. Concerning Russia and Poland, at least, the New Statesman 
reported, the views of Labour were shared by the City. "Everyone in
p  I  A
England wants a settlement and peace" . Labour knew that for once, the 
House of Commons was told, "they had the country not behind them, but in 
front of them"^^.
Without a doubt, Beatrice Webb considered, many non-Labour 
elements - "all the middle-class pacifists and many middle-class taxpayers" 
- had been grateful for the Labour Party's intervention. She was however 
inclined to doubt whether 'direct action', "unless it proved to be a 
symptom of public opinion among all classes, would havd been sufficiently . 
universal to be ef fective"^^* Yet -if it was widespread public concern 
which allowed the LaboimP;initiative to* be made, this had at the same time
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the corollary that Labour*s threatened sanction was virtually a superfluous 
one: for widespread public concern , equally, formed an effective constraint 
upon government action.
Public Apierest began to ebb:,, however, once the immediate crisis 
had passed. Without the widespread popular support which had earlier 
existed, the Council was compelled in effect to relinquish the sanction 
of general industrial action with whichit had been entrusted. In a 
manifesto issued on 28 August, ’’possibly to rehabilitate itself”, thought 
Thomson, the National Council warned that it might still be necessary to 
prevent a continuation of open or disguised warfare against Soviet Russia, 
and to resort for this purpose to a partial or complete stoppage of work. 
They had utilized argument and persuasion, only to toe met by evasion and 
subterfuge on the part of the government. The workers were accordingly 
called upon to ’’hold themselves in readiness for any call to action which 
may be made.. Be warned,- be ready and prepare for any contingency that may 
arise”^ ^  One such contingency, evidently, was the possible continued supply 
of munitions to Poland, a supply which the Council declared ’’must be stopp­
ed”. The Council was most carefully watching for such supplies, the Herald 
told its readers, and would certainly stop them when it was aware of them. 
Munitions for Poland, however, need not be addressed to Poland. They were, 
in short, ’’very much where XXX£ we have always been. The waijgainst Soviet 
Russia goes on.. British Labour has not yet stopped it”, because it had
O] i
been ’’tricked and fooled by the Government as usual” . It appeared also t
that army boots were being made for Poland in NorthXamptonshire, and the
local officials of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives had
2.U 5asked their union and the Council to take appropriate action. The 
Secretaries of the Council did, in fact, report that a number of indications 
had reached them which suggested the manufacture and transport of munitions 
of war and other supplies for use by the Polish forces or in connection 
with'General Wrangel’s offensive in the latter part of 1920.In considering 
the reports, however, the Council ’’met with the difficulty that were Direct 
Action to be recommended, it could only be used effectively by the Trade 
Unions, and taking into consideration all the circumstances the Council felt 
it would be unfair to put the whole onus upon single sections of the Moveme­
nt**. A ’’general movement of a wider kind”, it wa^onsidered, ’’would not have 
Bet with the successful response that it was evident such an appeal would
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commanded had open war been declared by the Government early in August”,
puC
Since then "public interest” had "waned considerably” . So also, it
appeared, had that of the labour movement as a whole. The response to the
special levy for the Council of Action was not found satisfactory, and in 
October it was decided to send a second circular to those affiliated bodies 
which had not yet paid it. A total of 112 societies eventually contributed 
a sum of £9300# This represented less than half, however, of the number of
o / 17
bodies affiliated to the T.U.C. at the time .
A good many people, the Manchest Guardian observed in November, 
had "probably almost forgotten by this time the existence of the Council of 
Action"; and the Council, indeed, had "not met regularly of late”. It was
still meeting from time to time, however, and it was nov; preparing to take
a hand shouM any complication arise in the negotiations for the reopening
pi Q
of trade with Russia • The Council met on 23 December, and a statement on
the Russian trade and unemployment was issued for the consideration of the
special Party Conference on Ireland six days later^? Covenfy Council was
reported to have prevailed upon the Maxtor of the town to hold an open-air
250meeting upon the subject of trade relations with Russia • Little more was
heard of the Councils?1!!! MXXXX X£XX
As eqrly as 23 August Colonel Malone, in a letter to a friend,
had observed that from what he had seen of them, the Councils of Action, both
local and national, should rather be termed *Councils of Inaction*. They
were "mostly in the hands of reactionary labour parliamentarian place seekers.
252The most they want is a General Election.." . "Frankly”, declared a writer
in the Communist, "the National Council of Action has failed". It had been
formed to prevent supplies and munitions being sent in support of the attack
on Soviet Russia, which it was "quite obviously not doing". Somehow, from
somewhere in the country, "those supplies are being sent". The war, Malone
told the * Hands off Russia* Committee, "was still going on", and munitions
253were "still being despatched from this country" . British workers, commented 
the Worker, had formed a Council of Action, "and then, as if that were enough 
work for a year, we have gone to sleep again". The movement had not gone » 
beyond the bounds of a purely pacifist, anti-war action. The process of 
communist education of the British working class, Philips Price tactfully 
concluded, would "take some tiae*^^*
post-war booa came to an abrupt end in October 1920. Unemployment more
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than doubled in the last quafcter of the year; and the figures for those 
unemployed of the membership of certain trade unions almost trebled. IA 
Sheffield the number of those unemployed doubled in only one week after 
16 October; and it was unemployment "of a kind an9^e^?ent unknown XXHXX
2 55before 191V*» which formed a "new expedience for the local working class" •
Foreign trade was especially in decline. In such circumstances the concern
which the Council of Action had come to manifest for the development of
trade relations with Soviet Russia XXcame increasingly feSdiJSx shared within
the labour movement as a whole.Already in March Maclean had pointed out to
the House of Commons that Russia was willing to take locomotives, railway
rolling-stmck, and engineering products from Britain, and willing to send
in return oil, grain, timber and the goods which were needed to restore
pre-war lelrwls of production in Britain. The prospect was one which "must
appeal to the commercial instincts of business men, to say nothing of the
256practical needs of the very people themselves" • Labour and Independent
Liberals had urged the opening up of trade with Russia "time and time
again". If they were to "save this country, if we are to effect the security
and happiness of the people, to remwe unrest and discontent and pregent
the social revolution", Swan urged, then that trade must be restored, allow-
257m g  prices to be reduced .
The opening of negotiations with the Russian Trade Delegation, 
and the threat that the talks might be broken off at the time of the Polish 
crisis, brought this theme to the fore. Krasin1s arrival was welcomed. The 
Cabinet had been beatein, Forward considered, partly by public opinion, but 
"mainly by sheer necessity. V/e must enter into trading relations with Russia 
• or we shall be left out^^^. The seriousness of the economic situation in 
Europe, noted the Labour Leader, which was beginning to be felt in Britain,
and coild be alleviated by the opening up of Russia to trade, should influen
259ce the government to carry the negotiations to a successful conclusion .
The possible breakdown of the negotiations was viewed with alarm by the 
Party Conference: no private financial interests, it resolXved, should be 
allowed to stand in the way of an immediate resumption of trade with Russ?^ 
Nor was this enough: the government must "face the inevitable", thought 
MacDonald (perhaps aware that this was, of any government, an optimistic 
assumption) and recognize the Soviet government, and make peace. One of the 
greatest gains which he foi^ esaw was the "cessation of Bolshevik mischief-
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making”. The Russo-Polisii conflict had a "very serious bearing" upon the
internal state of the country, Clynes told the House if Commons; and on
261this basis he felt entitled to condemn government policy . The war could
•T
not be continued, Thomas argued, withoutjthe effects being felt in Britain.
The "one solution for the world trouble" was not its continuation, but the 
establishment of £eace which would set industry going again. Summing up the 
change, the Labour Leader noted that Ifcfeo&r had been "compelled., to take 
the international view", and forced to recognize that "international policy
P P
largely determined industrial conditions at home"
Industrial conditions excited concern not only in Labour circles j
by the latter part of the year. By the end of the year the figure had j
i
more than doubled (as we havd seen) to almost 8% of the insured workforce; 
and by March, when the Russian Trading Agreement was signed., it had reached 
15%. Over a million applications for employment were received in January 1921, 
and the number increased rapidly, reaching nearly two million in April. The 
overall figures concealed the fact that those sectors which depended more 
than others upon foreign trade were especially seriously affected. The 
percentage of the insured population registered as unemployed in iron and 
steel manufacture, tinplate, engineering goods, ironfounding and ship- ,
building reached a third, a half, or even more of the total in March and 
June 192126^
In October Henderson announced his conversion to the view that 
"one immediate and practical way of dealing with the growing menace of j
unemployment" was to develop trade with Soviet Russia. It would mean ’'employ- j 
ment &o the workers in the engineering, textile, clothing and boot and shoe I 
industries" • British imports from and exports to Russia in 1913 amounted ! 
respectively to fiearly £ 1 0 0  million and £ 5 0  million, at current prices, j
Adamson reminded the House. The imports could make a considerable contribtt- J 
ion to the reduction of prices in Britain; taken together, they demonstrated 
the "importance of renewing trade relations with the Russian people at the 
earliest possible mement, from the point of view of the cost of living, and 
as a means of finding a market for our goods". He thought that there was- a j 
prospect of an even greater export business than in 1913» since the Russians 
were in great need of many commodities •
The prospects of Russian trade received a more detailed examinat­
ion in the press. In 1913. Itorward reported, nearly half of Britain*s imports
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of coniferous timber and pitwood had come from Russia; as well as huge 
quantities of wheat, eggs and butter, the prices of which were going up ;
"because the British profiteers wonft make peace with Russia”. Exports to 
Russia had been of major significance for the engineering, boot and shoe, 
textile and other industries. The passage of time had if anything increased 
the possibilities of exports to Russia; indeed here was a "colossal mafcket, 
able to find employment for the whole of the West", as Processor Goode 
had concluded after a recent visit. Government policy, concluded the paper, 
was "not only strangling and starving Russia; it is strangling and starving 
us"266. j
The notion that trade with Russia would relieve unemployment, Adamsonj 
told the House of Commons, had "taken hold of the imagination of a great 
section of our people". He himself, and the Labour Party and the trade 
unionists, were in "complete agreement" with the proposition . Many Labour 
representatives had been directly influenced by the situation in their 
own constituencies, and the views which the unemployed there ha.d pressed 
upon them. In Leeds, said O’Grady, he had been "flooded" with resolutions 
on the subject sent to him by local trade unionists. About 60,000 workers 
in or near Leeds would be directly affected were a trade agreement concluded. 
Even manufacturers had approached him in connection with the Russian fra§§^. j 
Other speakers drew attention to the effect the decline of the Russian j
trade was having upon the dockyards, the Scottish herring industry and j
the tea industry. Orders that might have been placed in Britain were now j
269 !being placed in Germany, or held up indefinitely A party statement,
’Unemployment: A Labour Policy*, was issued in January 1921, containing
the report of a Joint Committee with the T.U.C. on the subject, and the
resolutions of a Special Conference which had been held on the subject on
27 January 1921. There must be an "immediate resumption of trade with Russia*,
it concluded. The trade agreement should be agreed upon and put into
operation. "Almost immediately employment would be provided in some of j
our staple industries and the process of slowing down production would be |
270 !retarded and perhaps reversed** •
More was involved in the question of unemployment than 
trade figures alone. Many Labour representatives drew attention to the 
-’•serious results** which might attend the failure to relieve the situation 
'sf the unemployed. The createdt .assistance and encouragement that could be
>r; : i* ; .
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given to Bolshevik propaganda in the country, Sexton warned, was the
fear of unemployment: since no revolutionnary propaganda could take place
in a country that was progXperous. The government's efforts were not
271sufficient to meet the problem . Bolshevism had no hold in Britain,
Thomas told the House, but it would "thrive on hungry and starving people.
Because we want to save our country from that, we plead with the Government
to do their duty.. the only thing that matters to us is the unemployment 
272problem" • The fact that the leadership of the organized unemployed had 
passed largely into the hands of radicals undoubtedly increased the unease 
of Labour spokesmen. Wignall stated that "unemployment produced poverty, 
poverty produced discontent, discontent produced revolution". From circumst­
ances of destitution, he noted, "foolish acts sometimes arise". The Labour 
Party- was "sitting on the safety valvd". It realized the "growing force and
power that (was) outside", and aksed the government to "meet this question
273m  the most genefous way" .
The signature of the Trade Agreement on 16 March 1921 was welcomed
by Labour. Maclean thought it would givd a "very great impetus., to work,
274and to the lessening of our unemployment" . It was conceded that the
Agreement in itsekf could not solve the unemployment crisis, which was the
result of the governments policy in regard to countries besides Russia, but
there was "no doubt" that it would make a "great difference in the immediate
275situation" and might "mark the turning of the tide" 1 .The Agreement was
276welcomed by the Party Conference later in the year .
The opening of trade, moreover, and the restoration of normal 
economic relations, was expected to "remove one of the strongest props that 
supported the present system in Russia", of wrhich Labour representatives 
yielded to none in their abhorrence. Government policy had hitherto succeeded 
only in uniting the Russian people behing the Soviet government. In a trade 
agreement lay the best means of securing a "stable §overnment"in Russia.
Myers agreed with the President of the Board of Trade: the opening up if 
trade with Russia would "prove one of the shortest cuts towards breaking
277down the impossible theories" which the Bolsheviks were believed to hold .
Trade with Russia, then, might reduce the level of unemployment, and thus
reduce labour unrest and inhibit the^rowth of groups which souhg^t more far-
reaching social change; while the development of trade appeared more likely
tp prove effective igMMMiwrmining Bolshevism in Russia than attempts to over- 
thfo* Jtttfc.by military force, which had clearly failed. Such was ’Labour’s
kjBpsiaA policy*.
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in fact, Basil Thomson had feported that as the danger of conscription 
faded, the "uselessness of the National Council of Action seems to be 
affecting the workers generally; they are losing interest in the local 
Councils" (Report on Revolutionary Organizations in the U.K. No 74, 30 
September 1920, Cabinet Paper C.P. 1908, Cab 24/112). A week later he 
reported that the Councils were "practically dead", although an attempt 
to "whip up the laggards" was being made by holding a demonstration on 
17 October. The move, he reported, was less than successful: the crowds 
were much smaller than at the August meetins, and the speakers "dealt 
with unemployment and the miners* strike rather than with Russia". He 
noted a "waning interest in Russian affairs" (Report.. Nos 75,77, Cabinet 
Papers C.P. 1937, 1997, 7 and 21 October 1920, Cab 24/112). On 23 
November 1920 he reported a "very general apathy", now that the bogey 
of conscription had been removed. The movement was "in the national 
sense, moribund. There is little^MSSii°¥hat if a general strike were 
called to enforce peace with Russia, its outcome would be a fiasco" 
(Report.. 82, 25 November 1920, Cabinet Paper C.P. 2169, Cab 24/115)
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Chapter Four: Agreement ?
In January 1920 Lod Riddell noted in his diary: "The Allies now understand
the impossibility of fighting the Bolsheviks in Russia, No nation is
prepared tojsupply troops or money"\ On 16 January the Supreme Council,
meeting at Paris, recognized the logic of this argument by declaring fehe
blockade at an end. The resolution adopted provided for an "exchange of '
goods on ^ cbasis of reciprocity between the Russian people and frfr* Allied I
and neutral countries". While affirming stoutly that this "did not mean a I
"change in the policy of the Allied governments towards the Soviet government",
there could be little doubt that the decision was other than a voluntary 
2one . Discussing the trade scheme that had been proposed at a meeting of the 
British, French and Italian heads of delegations two days previously, Lloyd 
George found it "worth taking up": prices were rising in Western Europe and 
"this very fact tended to create Bolshevism.. From the point of view of !
exchanges and prices, the Russian supplies were vital **^. A memorandum from f
Mr Wise, British member of the SupremeX Economic Council, on Economic
Aspects o<f British policy concerning Russia* , was circulated to the Cabinet 
by Lord Curzon on 7 January 1920. Wise pointed out that Russian resources' i:
before the war, though "crudely developed", were a factor of "enormous l
importance in the economic stability and organization of the world". The I
linen industry in Belfast and Dundee depended upon Russian supplies for three- | 
quarters of the total raw materials; and in its absence^^Se°focal workforce (7 /> j,
was out of work. A third of imported butter came from Russia, and there was •
no hope of supplying an adequate ration until these sources were fcgain 
available. Russia was believed to have a "vast exportable surplus of grain"; 
while the demand of the Russian market for goods, as soon as trade was 
possible, would undoubtedly be on a "colossal scale". The renewal of trade 
with Russia would "go further than any other factor to reduce £he cost of 
living", a critical matter especially in Central Europe. Wise did not recomme-. 
aid the recognition of the Soviet government, but he did favour the restoration 
of commercial relations and the ending of the blookade"^. |
The point was reiterated in a memorandum from Roberts, the Minister 
of Food, to the Prime Minister on January . He noted the "profound importance 
of the pacification of Russia from the point of view of the world*s economic
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outlook". For the United Kingdom, the lack of Russian supplies was a matter
of "considerable moment". The figures for imports from Russia in 1909-1913
were reviewed. There was a "close inter-dependence", he considered, between
"civil war in Russia and famine in Europe". A covering letter to Curzon
stressed the "disastrous consequences, as regards Europe's economic life,
5
of a continuance of civil war in Russia". Wise's memorandum appears to have
formed the basis of the proposals which Lloyd George placed before the
meeting of the heads of the British, French and Italian governments on 14 January
dealing with the restoration of commerce with Russia; and Wise's scheme formed
the basis of the report of a 'Committee to consider the Reopening of certain
Trading Relations with (the) Russian People' on 15 January, a document which
contained proposals for "reconstructing trading operations with the whole of
Russia without officially recognizing the Bolshevik Government".^
The proposal to suspend hostilities and to enter into (at least)
commercial relations with Soviet Russia was, on the face of it, a significant
change. Yet other th«n formally, there was little change in British or Allied
policy. The new scheme offered, rather, what a Foreign Office official
termed an "opportunity of testing the theory frequently advanced of late
that the lifting of the blockade would do more to oust or modify Bolshevism
7
than armed intervention ever accomplished". Recommending the trade scheme to
the heads of delegations, Lloyd George declared confidently that it would
"destroy Bolshevism". The "moment trade was established with Russia, Communism 
8would go". The Daily Chronicle, a journal normally close to his views,
regarded the agreement as a means of exerting influence above all upon
the Russian peasantry, a group felt to be infifferently disposed to the
Soviet regime, which would be drawn into economic relations with the West
through the Co-operatives, with which relations were to be established, in
9
which some 25 million of them were enrolled. The Supreme Council specified 
in its’resolution that the development of trade should take the form of the 
offering to the Russian co-operative organizations of the possibility of 
organizing the "import into Russia of clothing, medicines, agricultural 
machinery" and other objects of prime importance"., in exchange for grain, flax 
etc.^ The foreign section of Centrosoyuz, the Russian co-operative 
organization, had in fact undertaken the provision of supplies to Denikin,
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Kolchak and to the White govefn^ent at Archangel^BKXKKHKBX As Lord
Hardinge noted in a telegram to Paris on 20 January, the Soviet government
appeared to have abandoned its repeated plans to absorb the Co-operatives,
and was "now looking to them to assist in the distribution of commodities
especially in recently conquered Siberia and South Russia. If this is so
it constitutes a notable victory for individualism as opposed to Communism'.1
It would lead, he thought, either to formal relations with the Soviet
government or to an "attempt to use the Co-operatives as a substitute for
12Kolchak and Ddnikin in the struggle with the Soviet Government" •
The possibility of utilizing Centrosoyuz in this way, however, 
clearly required at least the acquiescence of the Soviet government. The 
Paris department of Centrosoyuz sent a telegram on 2o January to the 
chairman of the organization in Moscow, outlining the decision reached by 
the Supreme Council, and enquiring whether an exchange was possible, and 
whether import and export operations would be permitted, in which connection 
the despatch of representatives to Moscow was envisaged. In reply the 
Chairman of Centrosoyuz announced that the organization had received permissic 
-n from the Soviet authorities to enter into direct trade relations with the 
Co-operatives, and also with private firms in Western Europe, America and 
other countries. It was ready immediately to enter into such relations, and 
the visit of a delegation to Moscow was approved, and a guarantee of safe 
conduct promised. The delegation was named by the foreign section on 27 
January. Centrosoyuz, however, on 2 February declared that it would act in 
the name of all the Russian co-operative organizations; and, deprecating 
the visit of "three co-operators with little authority", proposed to send its 
own representatives abroad, "in possession of all the necessary information 
and with the necessary broad powers". Litvinov, in Copehhagen, was named as 
the mission's chairman, and the names of the other members were announced on 
25 February. The delegates would leave as soon as a route and visas were 
arranged, and would be "provided with the authority to conduct negotiations 
and to conclude contracts on thejspot"^
The connection with the work of the Co-operatives of the mission's 
chairman and of another of its members, Krasin, *'fta^iitherto at best peripher­
al, The membership of the delegation, and the change in the Centrosoyuz 
policy, reflected the nationalization of the organization on 27 January^.
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The Bolsheviks, Krasin wrote, accepted tha Supreme Council*s suggestion and 
’’responded to it in a somwwhat unusual way, sending ostensibly as a 
Cenrtosoyuz delegation prominent Soviet workers and communists headed by 
the People's Commissar., The governments of Western Europe., right from 
the beginning regarded it not as a representative body of co-operators, but 
as a representativaX body with full powers on behalf of the Russian Soviet 
Government"^. Lord Riddell enquired of Lloyd George on 6 March whether the 
Russian delegation represented the Co-operatives or the Bolshevik government. 
"The Soviet”, he replied, "undoubtedly*^•
A number of obstacles remained, however, before negotiations 
could be initiated. In particular, a guarantee to "refrain from interfering 
in the policies or internal affairs of Great Bfitain or other countries" 
was required from Krasin, Nogin, Rozovskii and Khinchuk; but in view of his 
"interference in internal affairs when he was living earlier in London", 
Litvinov was refused permission to proceed there to take part in negotiation?, 
where the "difficult practical details" were to be resolved. He might, 
however, take part in that further stage of the negotiations which it "would 
be convenient to conduct through Copehhagen". Centrosoyuz protested that 
enquiries of the Soviet government had revealed that the grounds professed 
did "not correspond with the facts". Neither the British, nor the French, 
Italian or Belgian governments, however, was prepared to grant him permission
in "existing circumstances". For the other delegates, agreement was reached
H 18onjtransit rights and a communications link with Moscow • Centrosoyuz agreed
to despatch its delegation "as soon as it is known whether it will be able to
stay in Copenhagen for a sufficient length of time to discuss affairs with
Litvinov, a member of the delegation"^. The mission left at the end of
ftarch for Copenhagen, travelling through Finland and Sweden.
In April the delegation began negotiations in Copenhagen with the 
members of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Economic Council, which 
had been mandated by the Supreme Council to "solve all questions of an 
international character which might arise in the course of the negotiations; 
to make with the Russian delegation agreements essential for the swift renewal 
of trade with Russia; to discuss with the Russian delegation and to present 
for the consideration of the Allied governments general questions connected 
with the renewal of trade and gBBBrally to specify measures which might make 
Russian raw materials available for the rest of Europe, and European products
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20and goods for Russia"• In the course of the negotiations, however, it became
apparent that a number of political considerations existed which must be settled
before effective trading could be resumed between Russia and Western Europe.
The Supreme Council delegates went to San Remo to report on the results of the
conference; and Krasin at the same time (21 April) sent a telegram to the
Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, urging that it was "necessary in the
first place to agree in broad outlines on general conditions for re-establishing
economic and commercial arrangements between countries, which required
21formal negotiations and definite agreement". On 26 April the Italian Minister
Ritti replied on behalf of the Supreme Council to Krasin, announcing that the
Supreme Council had authorised representatives of the Allied governments
to meet Krasin and the Russian Trading Delegation currently at Copenhagen
"with a view to the immediate re-starting of trade relations between Russia
and other countries through the intermediary of co-operative organizations
and otherwise". The inclusion of Litvinov would not be permitted; otherwise
the Allied representatives would be "prepared to meet the Russian delegation
22in London at the earliest date convenient to them". The Supreme Council
concluded its business with the adoption of a resolution empowering its
Permanent Committee to make such arrangements as were necessary to enable
trade with Russia to be resumed "as rapidly as possible"; to discuss with the
Russian delegation, and submit to the Allied governments, general questions
arising out of the resumption of such trade; "generally to devise measures
which shall render surplus Russian foodstuffs and raw materials available as
soon as possible for the rest of the world"; and to consult as appropriate
with the American and neutral governments, and with the Secretariat of the 
23
League of Rations.
Krasin in reply to the communication from Ritti protested at the 
exclusion of Litvinov, "against whom no accusations of abuse of his diplom­
atic privileges while in London had been advanced"; and declared his intention 
of regarding him, notwithstanding, as a member of the Delegation and of
Q  J
discussing with him and involving him in all the delegation’s decisions.
Peters, on behalf of the British government, informed him on 19 May that
Lloyd George would be "glad to see him in London and that H.M.G. would be
ready to discuss with him the general question of the removal of obstacles
to the renewal of trade with Soviet Russia". Litvinov might remain in Copenhagen,
provided the Danish government had no objection. Krasin accordingly set
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out to join the other members of the delegation in London; and the negotiations
25began at the end of May, 1920 .
The Russian Trading Delegation had already begin negotiations in
Sweden in the course of its journey to Copenhagen.The Swedish government
was reluctant to negotiate directly with the Delegation; but overtures to
the biggest and oldest Swedish locomotive factory, Niudkvist and Holm, led
to the formation of a joint concern comprising this and (Courteen other
major Swedish firms, which, with the approval of the Swedish government,
26concluded an agreement with Centrosoyuz on 15 May 1920 . It was agreed that
Russia n finds and goods imported in connection with the agreement would
not be liable to confiscation; and that payment might be made in gold, this
making the first serious inroads for the Soviet regime into the *gold
blockade*. Estonian and Scandinavian bakks were influenced to follow suit;
and English and French, as well as Swedish, banks began to accept Russian
27gold in payment at Reval, although at first at a significant discount .
Negotiations with Britain remained, however, of "decisive 
importance" for the Bolsheviks. Britain was the most powerful country in 
Europe, and her decision on this matter might be expected to influence 
other governments. An agreement might be expanded and augmented; while 
failure might lead to failure elsewhere also. Thus "from the end of May
1920 all the effofts of the Soviet foreign delegation were concentrated
28on tk£ realisation of an agreement with England"
British policy remained equivocal. Lloyd George had pioneered the
Allied change of front, to the detriment, it appeared, of relations with
the French government (which protested to the Swedish government following t
the conclusion of the agreement with the Russian delegation, and refused
29to participate in the London talks ). Curzon, however, at first refused 
to conduct negotiations with Krasin, and at the opening of the talks had 
(as Lloyd George told Maisky somwwhat later) refused to shake hands with 
Krasin until Lloyd George demanded that he 'be a gentleman*^? He had not 
teen present for the decision in Paris to end the blockade. The decision 
had been taken, he wrote to Hardinge, "in the absence of any Foreign Office
representative"^1. Churchill showed no more enthusiasm. In a memorandum to 
the Supreme Council meeting at San Remo, he declared that they must "decide 
which of two factoBs is most (sic) dangerous to the existing order of
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society in Europe and to the security of the United Kingdom, namely,
.. recognition of the Soviet Government or starvation and disease in
32Europe on an unprecedented scale’1 • He was not present at the meeting
with Krasin; and was reported afterwards to have asked: ’’Did you shake
33hands with the hairy baboon?" . Differences within the Cabinet were
among the factors responsiblejfor the fact that the negotiations lasted
almost ten months.
The fifst meeting was devoted to a preliminary exchange of views
on measures essential for the renewal of trade relations. Krasin emphasized
the importance of securing a stable peace, allowing the Soviet government
to concentrate on peaceful reconstruction; while the Allied", he believed,
were surely behind the Bolish offensive. Stocks of raw material existed;
but there was a need for assistance in the development of the export trade.
The removal of the blockade should be made evident to neutrals; the
minefields should be cleared; commercial representation, with powers of
communication, should be established, and a proper legal and currency
basis for trade developed. Lloyd George disclaimed any assistance to the
Polish offensive, and raised the question of British prisoners of war
remaining in in Russia, two of whom had allegedly been killed, and of the
Bolsheviks supplying Armies and states which were ’’hostile to British
interests”. In Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan and North West India
Soviet emissaries were ’’stirring up trouble.. Such action must necessarily
stop, if trade was to be reopened on friendly terms”. The 2oviets^wej|^.
’encouraging Turkish Nationalists to make trouble” which must be XXMXXX
IKffl&MBritain could ’’not resume trade unless the Soviets brought to an
34end all propaganda directed against the Allied governments” .
At their following meeting Krasin gave a ’’provisional” reply. He 
Believed that the provisions regarding prisoners had been carried out, 
while there were some counter-complaints. Propaganda was a reaction to 
an aggressive British policy towards 'Soviet Russia; to remedy which he 
proposed reciprocal guarantees. Lloyd George replied that once trading 
relations were established, the blockade would be raised fully. Minefijj^ iis 
and commercial representation could be agreed upon in principle, provided 
that there were provisions for "abstention from propaganda or interference 
in politics”. The ’’recognition” of Russian obligations, if not their 
immediate payment, was not, in the British government’s opinion, a matter
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which could he left over until a later stage,
Krasin declared that all British subjects had been released
with the exception of ’’those who were in prison for grave offences”. Curzon
retorted that it was ’’precisely the case of those against whom gravd
offences were alleged that we wished to raise as one of the conditions of
entering upon commercial relations”. He was ’’desirouSjthat the whole of the
prisoners in Russia should be released without any distinction as to grave
offences”. Krasin suggested a reciprocal amnesty following the conclusion
of the agreement. As regarded the East, Krasin affirmed that Soviet actions
were in response to British anti-Soviet policies , and wguld cease when
British policy changed and guarantees were provided.Curzon noted that Soviet
action in Persia, at Resht and Enzeli , was an ’’act of direct aggression
against Persia, and one of the kind of things that we were asking should be
stopped”. Krasin was prepared to offer an undertaking that no anti-British
35propaganda would be conducted were an agreement concluded .
that the Soviet government was prepared to give an understanding not to 
carry on ’’communistic propaganda and interference” in the internal political 
life of Britain, openly or secretly, if an agreement were made, and a 
gritish guarantee offered in return. An agreement to refrain from hostile 
action could be made, if reciprocal, at a bilateral conference. To consider 
private claims only against either government would be unfair to Soviet 
Russia. British businessmen, often those who held claims against the Soviet 
authorities, in fact generally favoured the establishment of trading 
relations without necessarily requiring a prior recognition of claims, in 
order that Russia might be enabled to establish her ability to pay. Claims 
should be reciprocally investigated; foreign policy and economic disputes 
should be separately examined, while trade in the meantime was allowed to 
develop.
British government in entering MftHM into ostensibly ’trading * negotiations, i 
The development of trade between the two countries was (at least for many 
members of the Cabinet) not an objective, but a harmless concession in return 
Tor which it was hoped to secure worthwhile changes of policy on the part of
-one. Lloyd George replied that this amounted to a ’’practical refusal to
At the resumed negotiations on 29 June 1920, Krasin announced
This (perhaps disingenously) misunderstood the objects of the
the Soviet government on precisely the matters which Krasiif^proposed to postp* 
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accept the only conditions which made possible the resumption of trade
relations11. It was impossible for Britain to admit Soviet agents so long
as Sovidt Russia was "endeavouring to stir up trouble for the British
Empire in the East.. The British Government., regarded the complete mutual
cessation of hostile action, whether military or by propaganda^? as absolutely
essential to the resumption of trade", Krasin was proposing to postpone
36"fundamental questions" • Krasin was to leave to discuss these matters in 
Moscow and then return.
A British memorandum was handed to the Soviet representative on 
30 June. It stated that it would be "useless" to enter further into 
dispute and mutual accusation. The negotiations had reached "such a 
stage, that it is essential to bring them to a definite result". It 
sought a "categorical answer: yes,or no, was Russia ready to enter a trade 
agreement with the British Empire and the other powers " upon certain 
conditions. These were: that each side should "refrain from hostile actions 
or measures directed against the other side, and from the conducting of 
any kind of official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions 
of the other side: in particular the Soviet Government will refrain from 
any kind of attempt by means of military actions or propaganda to urge the 
peoples of Asia to any kind of attempt by means of military action, directed 
against British interests or ggainst the British Empire". This in the British 
governments opinion was the "basic condition of any kind of a trade agree­
ment between Russia and any of the western powers". Secondly, British and 
Russian citizens detained by the authorities of either side should be free 
to return to their homeland. Thirdly, the Soviet government, with a 
corresjMmging obligation on the part of thd British government, should .
agree in principle to pay compensation to private citizens who had rendered 
goods or services to Russia for which they had not been paid. Such a 
declaration was felt to be necessary for the "real renewal of trade between 
the two countries", although it was not demanded that such debts should be 
settled immediately. Fourthly, the British government agreed with the measures 
suggested by the Soviet government to facilitate trade relations and 
communications, retaining the right to refuse entry to someone judged 
persona non grata, which should be the right of the Sovietjgovernment also.
Th© memorandum sought to know definitely whether the Soviet government "agreed 
or not to accept these principles as the basis of an agreement on the
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renewal of trade relations between Russia and the British Empire..’1. If the
reply was a favourable one, the British government was ready to discuss
the details with any experts or representatives named by the Soviet
government (with the exception of those whfc had already been rejected); and
if no positive reply followed within a week, then the negotiations would be
37considered to have concluded, and measures would be taken accordingly^ .
On 7 July Chicherin despatched a reply to Curzon, which ”in the
interests of a swift concision of peace between Russia and Great Britain”,
accepted the principles stet out in the British government’s memorandum as
the ’’basis for an agreement between Russia and Great Britain". The agreement
itself should be the object of negotiations between the two governments,
which should begin without delay. The opportunity was not lost to protest
against the "accusations, contrary to the real state of affniBB, that Soviet
Russia (was) carrying out attacks on the British Empire.. In its relations
38with the British Empire Soviet Russia desires only p e a c e . . • Bonar Law
announced in the House of Commons fehat an "understanding had, ther“fofce, been
30
reached as to the principles on which a trade agreement will be negotiated" . 
The development of the Russo-Polish conflict, however, halted further moves. 
The connection with the development of Rjisso-British trade was not an obvious 
one: but the negotiations had bden pre-emin^tly political throughout.
The initial stage of the war, characterised, by the rapid advance of Polish 
forces in an operation variously termed "aggressive" or "pre-emptive", was 
regarded by the British government with an attitude of studied neutrality. 
Churchill informed the House of Commons that "any operations which Poland may 
engage in are settled by the head of the Polish state|md by the Polish 
government"; and Lloyd George added that Poland was not being supplied by 
Britain in any way, either with men, money or munitions. On 2.1f April 
Marshal Pilsudski invaded Russia; on 8 May Kiev was captured. Bonar Law 
denied that the British government had been consulted by the Polish government 
Before its offensive, or that the government was giving moral or material 
support to Poland^. King George V sent a telegram to the Polish government, 
however, on 3 May, congratukating them on the first anniversary of the 
Polish state, a gesture which im view of the time chosen to make it was 
taken to imply rather more than it expressly conveyed. On 11 May Churchill
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told the House of Commons that the British and French governments had, in
fact, "helped to strengthen and equip the Polish Army"* Bonar Law explained
that the government was allowing the Poles to ship out of the country
munitions and other surplus stores which had been promised to them as a
L.2gift in 1919. He "thought that thd material had gone long ago" • A British 
military mission which had been despatched to Poland was "acting in an 
advisory capacity on naval and mercantile marine matters to the Polish 
Government"^. A Conference of Ministers considered fehe conflict on 11 June 
1920, and decided not to suggest peace X8XMX negotiations to the Polish 
government, as this would imply responsibility in the event of failure.
Perhaps more importantly, the Poles were in any case winning: the military 
situation, it was noted, was "distinctly favourable at the moment to the 
Poles"^.
The reversal in the fortunes of the Polish army, however, brought
about a sharp change in the government's attitude. Lloyd George pointed out
to Marshal Flch that thd Allies had undertaken by the peace treaty to
defendj^ he independence of Poland, and "if we allowed the Bolsheviks to
trample the national independence of Poland out of existence under the hoofs
h 5of Buddennie's cavalry, we would be eternally dishonoured". Not only 
honour was qt stake. The British government had been warned by its 
representative in Warsaw that the situation was "undoubtedly serious from 
every point of view.. Economic conditions generally are favourable for the 
spread of Bolshevism". In Rumbold's view "if the Polish barrier against 
Bolshevism goes, the barrier will be shifted much further west and an 
opportunity will be given to latent Bolshevism in Czechoslovakia to join 
hands with Rhssian Bolshevism thereby creating a very serious state of things • 
for Central Europe and the Western Powers"^. Count Sforza, speaking at the 
meeting of Allied representatives at Spa on 10 July 1920, declared that 
•’within two weeks of the occupation of Poland by the Bolsheviks, Hungary will 
become BolsheviXk". Lloyd George added that the Allies would be confronted 
by an Independent Socialist government in Germany. Supposing they refused 
to carry out the treaty, "where would the Allies be? The Allies must 
secure an independent Poland.• otherwise all their work would be undone".
It was agreed that $ document should be sent to the Soviet government, propo- 1 
sing a Russo-Polish armistice, failing which war supplies would be sent to
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to Poland; and the Polish representative present was given a guaatotee 
k7accordirajLy^' .
The Allied note, as sent to the Soviet government by Curzon, 
confirmed Soviet acceptance of the principles contained in the British 
memorandum of 1st July (30 June) as the "basis of an agreement for the 
renewal of trade relations and the cessation of mutual hostile actions”, 
and declared British readiness to "continue the negotiations for the 
conclusion of a trade agreement as soon as the Russian delegates return”.
The note, however, suggested in addition, in the interests of the 
"re-establishment of peace throughout Europe", the conclusion of an 
armistice between Soviet Russia and Poland on the basis of the border 
establishecjjin the previous year by the Peace Conference. A conference in 
London under the auspices of the Paris Peace Conference should follow as 
quickly as possible, to establish peace between Russia and not only 
Poland, but Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland also. Any representatives might 
be sent who "accepted an obligation not to interfere in affairs
of the British Empire and not to conduct propaganda". An armisticd was 
likewise proposed with Wrangel*s forces in the South, and it was proposed 
that he be invited to London for discussion, although not that he should 
be a member of the conference. While the British government could not assist 
Poland in any actions hostile to Russia, it was obliged by the League of 
Nation^s agreement to "defend the inviolability and independence of Poland 
within its legal ethnographic frontiers", which the Allies would do if
i Q
necessary by all means in their power •
The Soviet government replied on 17 July, welcoming the British 
desire to "facilitate the establishment of a general peace in Eastern Europe", 
while noting that such a desire had "unfortunately not been apparent at 
the time of the development of those complications between Russia and Poland 
which (had) concluded in the Polish offensive on Russia and the Ukraine".
It remained, however, to be demonstrated that the Polish government was 
interested in the conclusion of an armistice; while previous British action 
hardly suggested that its governmenljmight be a suitable arbiter. Tne Soviet 
government "considered direct negotiations with Poland, without any external 
interference., to be essdntial". If in the negotiations the interests of 
both sides wese "exclusively taken into consideration", a complete armistice 
would be "easily attainable", as had been concluded already with Estonia,
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Georgia and Lithuania (of the existence of the last of which the British 
government appeared to be unaware)* Nor could the agency of the League of 
Nations, of which Soviet Russia was not a member, be accepted as a kind 
of “court of xSifilix instance over all the states of the world'1. Any 
appeal bythe Polish government to begin peace negotiations would, however, 
not be rejected, and a more favourable X8KXM frontier than that outlined 
by the Supreme Council would be granted to her. XX XXX
As for Wrangel, the Soviet government could not be unaware that a 
link between Wrangel*s offensive and the Polish attack existed, in the form 
of a military agreement. Wrangel*s army and administration, in the absence 
of a source of income of his own, "existed entirely on money rendered to him 
by several Allied powers"; his military equipment was entirely of Allied 
origin and had been brought to him on English-owned ships or from ports 
which were under English control. The Soviet government was ready to offer 
the General and his staff a safe conduct, provided th^t they surrendered 
and handed over their territory and^ irms, as the northern anti-Soviet 
government had done. A protest was made that the Allies were attempting 
by means of Wrangel "in practise to annex the Crimean peninsula". It was 
hoped that the delegation which was being sent to London to negotiate a 
final agreement on the basis of the notes of 1 July (50 June) and 7 July, 
would be able to achieve its purpose without extraneous issues becoming 
involved^.
The Cabinet ,meeting on 20 July, was informed that it was the view 
of the British diplomatic and military representatives in Poland that the 
Polish army was "overweighted, to a considerable extent demoralised, and, 
in spite of a rally in patriotic enthusiasm for the defence of the country, 
the only real propsect of saving Poland lay in the acceptance of an armistice 
by Poland". While Poland, it was felt, had probably brought her present 
"desperate? situation upon herself by "ill-advised attacks", this did not 
alter the fact that "if nothing were done, Polish independence was threatened 
with extinction. If she disappeared and were absorbed in Soviet Russia this 
might be a prelude to the union of the latter with the Bolshevist elements 
in Germany and the postponement of European peace'*. The Cabinet approved 
the Prime Minister's telegram to the Polish government urging them to implem- 
©nt their understanding and to apply directly to the Russian Soviet government 
for an armistice; to approve the draft of a reply to the Soviet proposal to
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conclude an armistice; to approve the Prime Minister's action in requesting 
the Admiralty to delay the return to Britain of M. Krasin and M.Kamenev, 
and requesting him to inform the delegation that their return was not 
desirable until the government learned the terms of the reply of the Soviet 
government to the Polish request for an armistice.
proposing the immediate despatch of a joint French and Biitish mission to 
Warsaw to consult with the Polish and other governments on an armistice, 
and to co-operate with them in the event of the negotiations for an armistice 
breaking down, and to report. The British envoy was to be Lord d'Abernon, 
British Ambassador in Berlin, accompanied by a military officer. If the 
Bolsheviks refused to accept an armistice, the German government was to be 
pressed to divert to the Polish government war material due to be handed 
over for destruction under the Trdaty^f Versailles'^.
"large number of disputable points" in the Soviet reply (of 17 June), and 
differences both of fact and principle, but limited itself to the "pressing 
problem of the conclusion of military actions between Poland and Soviet 
Russia". The British government did not intend to insist upon the presence of
negotiations for an armistice and a peace settlement; but despite its
request, Soviet forces had continued their offensive, forcing the British
government to ghe "conclusion that the Soviet government intended to carry on
war against the Polish people", If this were the case the British government
and the Allies would "render the help and support to Poland which they
promised". Nor could negotiations for the renewal of trade with Britain begin
again if Russia was invading Roland; Kamenev and Krasin had accordingly been
51instructed to remain in Reval until an armistice had been concluded^ .
The Soviet replj (23 July) accepted the proposal of a conference 
in London between Ssviet Russia and states in direct or indirect hostilities 
with her; while informing the British government that the military command 
bad been instructed already to meet Polish representatives andjto befcin with 
them negotiations for an armistice and a peace settlement. "Surprise" was 
expressed at the British refusal to continue the trade negotiations, despite , 
the Soviet acceptance of all the conditions which had been stipulated for their
continuance. Such conduct wogjd make the reaching of an Agreement much more
difficult
The Prime Minister was empowered to send a telegram to Millerand
The telegram despatched to the Soviet government noted the
third parties. The Polish government
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The British government, "in view of the acceptance by the 
Soviet government of the Polish proposal for an armistice and peace negotdS^ 
iati ons" declared its readiness to receive the Russian trade delegation.
A conference should take place in London, at which the Soviet government 
should be represented, provided that the aims of such a conference were 
clear: the participation of the Allies and of the other border states in 
the negotiations having apparently been rejected. It was felt that jpf) the 
Allied governments were to meet the Soviet delegates with any chance of 
success, Polish delegates and delegates from the other border states 
should also be in attendance. The main aim of the conference should be 
the restoration of peace in Europe, and above all between Poland and 
Russia, on conditions guaranteeing the independence of Poland and the 
legitimate interests of both sides. The Unsolved problems of relations 
between Russia and the border states should also be considered. "After the 
solution of these questions the conference can go on to discuss the points 
at issue between Soviet Russia and the Allies and the restoration of normal 
relations between them" .
The Allied reply was drafted at the Second Conference of Boul 
-ogne, on 27 and 28 July 1920. Lloyd George pointed out that "it was 
impossible to fight, as neither France nor England would stand any more 
fighting". His statement to the House of Commons that if Poland were invaded 
Britain would be prepared to fight had "excited very great uneaiiness in 
the House even among the Conservative elements, and it had aroused the 
apprehensions of the public. Nobody wanted war, and nobody was disposed to 
send troops. The feeling in England was that the Poles had made a mess of 
it, and had only themselves to thank for what had happened". The conference 
in London was proposed. Lloyd George declared that what was necessary was 
that France and Great Britain should "establish a common front to combat 
Bolshevism". It was "essential that France and England should bow come in 
to save Poland". A telegram was drafted and despatched by Curzon to 
Moscow on 2.9 July^\
In the absence of a reply, a further telegram was sent on 3 
August. Russian-Polfsh negotiations had meanwhile broken down. It had been 
learned that the Polisjj delegates had been required to consider the conclusio 
-n of peace; and in the absence of other Powers, "the projected summoning
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of a conference would losg its meaning". The Soviet army had continued to
invade Poland. If this continued it would be concluded that the Soviet
government did "not intend to respect the freedom and independence of
Poland" and the position earlier envisaged, in which appropriate action
53would be taken by the Allies, would arise .
On k August, Kamenev and Krasin from the Trading Delegation , which
was now in London, were summoned to meet Lloyd George and Bonar Law. They
were informed that there was no armistice, that Russian forces were invadi-
-ng ethnographic Poland , that Chicherin had not answered the note of 29
July, and that accordingly no agreement existed between England and Russia.
"The moment has come, when Sngland should meet her obligations to Poland".
The fleet had been ordered out, the blockade renewed and the unloading of
ammunition had begun in Banzig. The Polish government had been advised to
be moderate and to accept legitimate Soviet conditions and guarantees; but
the "reality", which Lloyd George was exclusively prepared to consider,
was that negotiations for an armistice had "not yet begun and the army is
56moving on Warsaw" •
A fubther meeting took place on 6 August. Unless there was a stoppa­
ge within the next forty-eight hours, Lloyd George warned, "the conference, 
trade and everything else went". A truce was proposed, which the British 
government was prepared to accept even if the French government would nojt 
flo so. It was not, however, a guarantee of a conference, which the
French government refused to attend unless the Polish peace were on the 
57agenda . The British proposals embraced the cessation of military activities 
, the prohibition of re-arming or reinforcement of existing forces, and
the agreement of both sides upon a demarcation line, prior to the opening
58of peace negotiations •
Lloyd George was informed two days later by Kamenev that the 
Soviet governments proposals had been accepted by the Polish government, 
and that delegates were to be sent to Minsk to conclude an armistice and 
a peace agreement. The negotiations were due to open on 11 August. It was 
hoped that this would meet the desire of the British government that 
military activity cease and that peaceful relations be established between 
Russia and Poland in the quickest and simplest manned? Kamenwv further 
informed Lloyd George that immediately the Polish government accepted the 
conditions of an armistice, which would concern mainly the reduction of her
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military forces, Soviet forces woqld be withdrawn to the line which had
been indicated by the Supreme Council and by Lord Curzon, and their number
would be reduced, provided that the Allies, especially the French government,
accepted an obligation not to attack and not to support any attack upon 
60Soviet Russia •
Lloyd George replied that if Kamenev*s note were the final reply 
of the Soviet government,the British government could^consider it only as 
a refusal of the conditions for an armistice outlined at the meeting on 
Friday 6 August11. The meeting in Hythe, then taking place, would proceed 
upon this assumption^.
The Third Conference of Hythe on $ and 3 August opened with 
the receipt of what Lloyd George termed **most depressing” news from 
Poland. The Poles were ”quite demoralised and., incapable of either civil 
or military direction”. There was ’’little prospect of saving the situation.
It was impossible to defend Warsaw, and there was the danger thaijthe 
Bolsheviks might reach the German frontier”. That being the case, the 
situation was the ”most dangerous one that had ariseii since 191*f”. If the 
British armistice proposals were not accepted by the Soviet government, 
the idea of a conference in London would be at an end, and thereE) could be 
no question of resuming trade relations with Russia. ”What would practically 
be a state of war would supervene”. They were confronted with the "definite 
fact that Poland had collapsed; that neither France, as he understood, nor 
Britain could send troops”; ships and a blockade forming the only possible 
means of exerting pressure upon the Soviet leaders. The "trouble was that 
fche Poles could not be trus4fcd, and that f^lsudski was so powerful that he 
could not be removed”. The opinion in Britain was that he had gone too far, 
and "English public opinion was absolutely opposed to war”. The cost of 
sending the fleet to the Baltic would be a high one. He did not trust the 
Bolsheviks, he said, "any more than one trusted highwaymen”, but he thought 
that the Allies, by "threatening them with certain consequences, might lw 
possibly induce them to give fairfry good terms to Poland”. Every endeavour 
must be made to save Poland, because the "salvation of Europe lay in the 
salvation of Poland”. Millerand, who likewise was not in a position %to 
provide troops, urged the consideration of "measures., to ward off what was 
an international peril..Every day the Soviet peril grew more formidableW.
It was agreed that the Soviet government*s recent communication should be
21*0
regarded, in Lloyd Georgefs words, as a "definite refusal to accept the
62terms which had been proposed to them” •
A further session took place at Lyrnpne that afternoon. Lloyd 
George stated that the meeting was "trying to review the situation created 
by the attempts of the Bolsheviks to Bolshevize or destroy Poland, and to 
see what the Allies could do": or, as Marshal Foch put it, "supposing the 
Poles were smashed, what the position would be and what action the Allies 
would take, supposing, fob instance, (that) the Bolsheviks pushed right up 
to the German frontier". If Germany were to ally with Soviet Russia, this 
would be a "most formidable alliance", a development "essentially to the 
detriment of the Allies". They must !»endeavour to reinforce (Poland) from 
outside to the utmost extent of their power, bjit at the same time, they 
must endeavour to lend her assistance from inside". Blockade of the Russian 
ports was considered, among other possible Measures; and the provision of 
assistance to Wrangel whose record was "superior to the rest". It was 
"essential to construct a buffer state in order to combat Bolshevism and 
to prevent a union of Germany and Russia ". Lloyd George noted that it was 
an "unfortunate fact that everybody hated (the Poles) except the French, who 
were in the happy position of not being their neighbours.. That was a source 
of considerable trouble to us". Moreover, Allied assistance must necessarily 
"fall short of what was really necessary to support Poland against Bolshev­
ism". The Allies could not continue to pppose the Bolsheviks if the Poles 
accepted the Bolshevik terms; and it was "conceivahle|that within a week the 
Allies might be deprived of any excuse they now ^ adse£ded for opposing the 
Bolsheviks". Henry Wilson reported that thd "only supplies that the British 
could give $he Poles would be a certain amount of pack saddlery, sets of 
equipment, boots, clothing and so on". If Wrangel ware supported, the Allies 
would have to continue to do so until he could make terms of peace. That wo­
uld involve them in "very considerable commitments". All that Britain could 
do would be to provide a "certain amount of supplies and to give support 
from the sea, bjit that was all".^
Curzon noted that the Daghestanis had offered to raise the whole 
Caucasu* against the Bolsheviks for the "very moderate sum of £1*0,000".
^loyd George suggested the consideration of the pressure which it might be 
possible to bring to bear upon the Bolsheviks in order to "save the real 
independence" of Poland: (i) internally by helping with officers, technical
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advisors, munitions and material; (ii) by a reimposition of the blockade;
on the assumption (i) that a state of war did not exist with the Soviet
government; (ii) that neither England not France could send troops; (iii)
that the amount of money that each of the Allied countries would be able to
64contribute must be strictly limited .
Measures were considered in more detail on 9 August. Papetfs
were presented on naval and military means of "exercising pressure on the
Soviet government", and on "political measures whereby pressure could be 
6 5put on Russia" . Troops, Millerand confessed, were "impossible", but the 
Allies must nevertheless "provide a maximum of war material, munitions, 
officers etc.,", and take military and naval measures as appropriate. The 
border states could not be asked "actually to attack Russia, but they could 
be asked to get up a defensive barrier against Bolshevism". Lloyd George 
noted that when it came to taking hostile action, the "difficulties of the 
British government were greater than those of the French, as British public 
opinion wad the more uncertain. The British government had their difficulties 
in going to war with the Bolsheviks". Not only the labour elements was 
opposed to war with Soviet Russia, but also moderate opinion, and "even 
certain Conservatives were wither definitely against war or most reluctant to 
enter upon it". The must make it clear that their action was "not merely 
anti-Bolshevik", otherwise there would be "very grave trouble". The danger 
of this was less in France , as France "had had her revolution in comparat- 
ivelyjrecent times. Great Britain, however, had not been so recently inocul­
ated". There could be no war for the sake £ forty-eight hour difference 
in the cessation of hostilities; or because British terms were not accepted 
by the Bolsheviks; nor should Poland choose to accept the Bolshevik terms.
The responsibility for her situation ^remained largely that of Poland; the 
Bolshevik forces were "hot well eqip^ed or well organized.. It should have 
been easy to stibp them but for the incredible incompetence of the poles"?1^ 
Millerand considered that the Allies were "fighting anarchy and 
were struggligg to prevent anarchy preying upon the whole world". The defence 
of Poland was ^essential to preteat the loss of the friits of victory". The 
Soviet delegates in London should be expelled, ^loyd George objected that 
it would be "quite impossible for them to go on if Poland accepted the terms 
of peace offered", despite the Allied offer of assihtgnce. In such circumsta­
nces the British government could "not possibly ask the House of Commons to
2**2
sanction heavy expenditure and the blockade of Poland as well as of Russia"•
As for the Sovidt delegates, he believed that the Cabinet would be in favour 
of trading with Russia because there was "somuch raw material in that country 
which was sorely needed by the whole world", and becjpra)se the British govern­
ment "believed that the resumption of trading would have the effect of 
disintegrating Bolshevism". The thought that the ris& that the Soviet 
government would be running by the resumption of those relations would be 
greater than the risks that the Allies would run. If Poland justifiably 
refused terms, Kamenev and Krasin must leave England; but if terms were 
accepted, the British government could not terminate the agreement that they 
had reached with the Soviet delegates. Thejdelegates had come to re-start 
trading relations upon certain conditions; and if the Poles accepted terms, 
and the condition^weme observed, "those delegates could not be asked to
leave", Moreover if they were expelled, "wibuld that affect the question in
67the slightest degree"? .
Admiral Beatty pointed out that the form of naval action required
might prompt reproaches of seamen "such as that the navy was the weapon of
the capitalist against the labouring classes. This, as stated by the Prime
Minister, had had a certain effect on British sailors, and might be expected
to have more". Lloyd George did not wish the working classes to be able to
say that he had missed any chance of making peace. "If they could say so
with truth, it would rot the navy, and it would rot the working classes
68and lead to the triumph of Bolshevism in England" .
The draft resolution, adopted at the meeting, agreed that the "only 
ground upon which (theX Allies) can undertake hostile action against Russia 
is to assist the Polish people to maintain their independence within her 
ethnographic frontier". If the Polish government, after hearing the policy 
of the Allies, as defined in the resolutions, came to terms with Russia, fehe 
ground for Allied action against Russia lapsed; but if Russia imposed terms 
upon Poland which infringed her independence, common action would bejtaken: 
naval action, the blocking of communications, the provision of war material 
and adviee to Poland, the supportjof Wrangel and of the border states, counter­
propaganda, and the expulsion of Kamenev and Krasin. Foch was given charge 
of thd initiation of military action, and BeAtty of naval action; and a 
draft declaration to Poland was adopted. Crucially, however, no Allied forces 
were to be provided^.
2*f3
A meeting of the Cabinet took place later that day* In the discussion
of Lloyd Sdorge’s report,, ’’great stress was laid upon the very strong
public opinion against intervention in the Russo-Polish war”; and it was
considered possible that a general strike might be undertaken by labour in
order to prevent British intervention into the conflict. The Prime Minister
was urged to exercise the "greatest caution” in anjt references to the
circumstances in which Kamenev and Krasin would have to leave the country
in the event contemplated in the Hythe resolutions in the speech which he
70was to make in the House of Commons the following day .
The Prime Minister’s statement drew attention first of all to 
the "grafe condition of affairs in Central Europe". While still "hopeful 
of peace”, he hinted nevertheless that "certain steps" might have to be 
taken. The Polish attack upon Russia had not been justified; buljnothing could 
justify retaXliation which went to the extent of wiping out national 
independence. Polish independence was an "essential part of the structure 
of European peace"; and the repartition of the country would be , in his 
opinion, "not merely., a crime, it would be a peril". There had been a "very 
sjispicious delay" in arranging an armistice. The Poles might chbose to 
accept the terms offered to them, in which case the Allies would not 
intervene; but should the Minsk conference fail as theresult of an insistence 
by the Bolsheviks upon terms inconsistent with Polish independence, and 
which were rejected by the Poles themselves, this would give rise to 
what he termed a "very serious situation". There was the question of the 
’’moril right of the nation"; and alsp, not less importantly, the "danger 
which is involved to the peace of Europe if you have a great aggres ive 
Soviet Empire coterminous with Germany". If Poland were overrun, the Soviet 
republic would become an "aggressive Imperialist State which is menace to 
the freedom and independence of the whole world" (not to mention, presumably, 
the capitalist order). In this case, Poland would receive military stores 
and training, economic pressure would be put upon Russia, Wrangel would be 
equipped, and the trade negotiations would be discontinued. If men with 
•’wild, extravagant, irrational views" were "out to challenge the institutions 
upon which the.i liberties of Europe and civilisation depend, we shall meet 
them in the gate"*^.
The situation altereld materially upon the receipt from Kamenev of 
the terms of armistice and peace preliminaries which the Russian delegates
2ZfZf
would submit to their Polish counterparts at Minsk. The terms proposed by
the Bolsheviks appeared unexceptionable: indeed, territorially they condeded
more to Poland than had Lord Curzon's scheme of 20 July. The terms, it
72was noted, "might be supplemented by details of secondary importance” •
Lloyd George observed that the terms were ”not nearly so severe as had been 
imposed by the Allies upon Germany and Austria, and he did not think that 
Great Britain could make war in order to secure better conditions than 
these”. It was generally agreed thfct the terms were ”as reasonable as could 
be expected”. In particular it was a "great cause of satisfaction" that they 
"secured the independence of Poland". The Polish government was to be informe 
-d that Britain could not assume the reponsibility of taking hostile action 
against Russia if the conditions now offered in their general substance 
were refused: although the Poles were, of course, at liberty to attempt to 
secure better terms by negotiation if they could. The French government was 
to be informed that the Cabinet was "unanimous in thinking that public 
opinion in Parliament and in the country would not justify the British 
government in undertaking hostilities against Russia in order to secure 
better terms". It was hoped that the French representatives in Warsaw would
nt.
be instructed along these lines •
Lloyd George returned to the House of Commons later in the day 
to announce that he had received a communication from Kamenev, which he 
proceeded to read out. While not prepared to offer his opinion with regard 
to the contents of the document - the discussions might be prejudiced, and 
some amplification of particular points was required - it appeared, neverthe­
less, that the crisis had passed'7*1'. It was announced in the House of 
Commons that if an agreement were made, or Polish independence, at least, 
accepted in principle, the Russian Delegation would be allowed to remain 
in Britain to conduct further negotiations towards the conclusion of the 
trade agreement under the terms of the understanding arrived at with the 
exchange of notes at the beginning of July, and provided that its terms were 
respected. As regarded Poland, the House was assured that if the terms 
proposed by Russia did "not go beyond, and are sincerely those given to us, 
then the Government will not interfere”® Moreover the government would "take
ho action until the House of Commons had been called together”, and its
75approval obtained for any proposed course of action' .
It subseq^f^ly became known, however, that the Soviet terms
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to Poland included at least one provision not to the taste of the C*abinet, 
a requirement that a w^ <5|dLng-class civic militia be formed in Poland. Lloyd 
George and Giolitti, the Italian Prime Minister, meeting at Lucerne on 
22 August, agreed that it was desirable that a state of peace with the 
Bolsheviks be secured. "Otherwise the latter would become even more 
dangerous and would increase their hold on Europe”. Lloyd George pointed out 
that the Germans "were an orderly people whose natural tendency was anti- 
Bolshevik. But if they were driven too hard they might bd forced into 
Bolshevism^ What, for instance, if the Bolsheviks reached the German border? 
"Undoubtedly there were revolutionary elements in Germany, and if the guns 
and rifles were still there the position would be dangerous”. It was agreed 
to "impress upon the Russian Soviet government, in the interests of peace, 
not to insist on conditions inconsistent with Polish independence", by 
which were meant "some special form of government", such as Soviets, or that 
the army or militia be "drawn from or placed under the control of any 
particular c4iss of people"*^.
Meeting the following day, Lloyd George observed that the terms 
offered to the Poles were "not terms that Poland could possibly accept". 
Despite Kamenev&s assurance that nothing significant would be added to 
the termm whkch had been forwarded to Lloyd George, the Bolsheviks had 
now "included terms which it was absolutely impossible for the Poles to 
accept". As published in the Times and the Herald, they included a provis­
ion (Article 4) for the reduction of Polish armed forces and for the 
constitution of a "civic militia composed of workers"; and required also 
that Poland should demobilize within one month of the signature of the 
treaty. The conditions were "very dangerous, since they meant the 
establishment of a Red force in Poland"; but a protest from Britain and 
Italy might secure their withdrawal. A communique was published to this
effect in the Times on 24 August 1920, having been delivered in advance to
77Kamenev, and Curzon sent a telegram to Chicherin to this effect .
The communique, as delivered to Kamenev, was accompanied by a letter 
from Balfour, which drew "especial attention" to the fact that thd condition 
with which, the latest information suggested, the Soviet government proposed 
to bind Poland were in "basic contradiction" with the terms which Kamenev 
bad presented previously to the British government. The Cabinet took an
2k 6
,!extremely serious view of these new conditions..11 It was enquired whether 
the Soviet government intended to insist upon them. The future policy of 
the British government, it was indicated, would depend upon the terms of the 
reply which was received. The matter was of extreme importance and should 
he eonsidered as one of urgency. The communique itself noted with "deep 
regretW that the Soviet Russian government, despite official assurances 
to the contrary, was "attempting to impose upon Poland conditions inconsiste 
-nt with her national independence". The requirement concerning the civic 
militia was declared to he an "indirect method of organizing military 
forces for the forcible liquidation of the democratic constitution and its 
replacement by a despotic regime of a few priviliged people, who had 
absorbed the Bolshevik doctrine" (an inversion of the more familiar marxist 
charge). This constituted an "unacceptable attack upon the freedom, independ 
-ence and self-respect" of Poland. Kamenev’s failure to mention this provisi 
-on was a "crude infringement of*trust", which made further negotiations
1 n Q
with the government he represented "more difficult, if not impossible"' .
Chicherin replied on 25 August, expressing surptise that the
question of the interpretation of a principle in the proposed agreement
could become the prexbxt for a pronouncement of such a kind. It commented
upon the "distrust" which the British government appeared to have of the
workers, appearing to assum*'that workers "by their nature should be
imbued with the Bolshevik doctrine, a point of view which could only be
welcomed by those who ex£ecfeed the extension of Bolshevl^s^ to England".
This individual point, however, the Soviet government was ready to remove
7 9in order to reach agreement with the British and Italian governments .
This was greeted with "satisfaction" by Balfour, who disagreed,
nevertheless, with Chicherin’s supporting arguments. Kamenev’s communication
(the Soviet government affirmed) had been "limited to a few lines, whifcjn
the final peace conditions were the subjectjof an extensive document,
containing an abundance of material which must inevitably be included in
the latter but not in the former". Kamenev ventured the remark that the
British government might not have objected so vehemently to the establishment
of a civic militia "if it was to be composed of representatives of the
80propertied classes’* •
Kamanev’s imminent departure for Moscow allowed the Cabinet to 
define its attitude to recent developments more precisely. A Conference of
Ministers which met on 10 SeJ>fcember considered a letter which he had sent 
to Lloyd George, which stated his inkfcntiion of returning to Moscow for 
not more than ten days, and asked for proposals which he might wish to be 
placed before the Soviet government. It was agreed that a refusal to let 
him return would probably end the trade negotiations , "which at present held 
out some prospecfe of useful results". The Prime Minister was to see Kamenew
Oi
and warn him of his conduct
The meeting took placd later that day. Lloyd George began by 
defiiaring his intention of speaking "quite frankly". The undertaking which Kx 
Kamenwv had given to refrain from political propaganda had been broken: he 
had taken Jfsteps of an active character to subsidise a newspaper not merely 
hostile to the Government., a newspaper whose object is to attack the 
institutions of this country, which every day is trying to sow strife 
between classes, to create unrest, to spread discord". The £75*000 which, 
he affirmed, had been communicated to the directors of the Herald constitute 
-d a "gross breach of faith". If Kamenev had not in any case been leaving 
fot Moscow the following day, "it would have been our business to ask 
him to leave". "We cannotjhave peace emissaries here who are merely conspir­
ators against the institutions of our country". Additionally, Kamenev had 
communicated Soviet terms with Poland to Lloyd George, omitting provisions 
"quite incompatible withithe independence of Poland". Kamenevfs trustworth­
iness as a representative had been seriously impugned.
Kamenev declared that he "did not give, had no powers to give*' 
and jhad at that time) lho powers to give any subsidy or support to any 
newspaper whatever". Thejtransmission in question ,moreover, appeared to 
have taken place some months earlier when he had not in fact been in the 
country, and had apparently emanated from the Executive Committee of the 
Council of Action, of which he was not a member. That he had had "political 
contacts" could refer only to the provision of information to some MPs who 
had visited him on behald of the CounclljDf Action. With regard to the terms 
of peace with Poland, there had been a dispute in Russia about them; bgt 
the provision which was objected to had in any case been dropped three weeks 
previously. Had "political eircumstances.. supervened", he asked, which 
had made the levelling of accusations against one of the Soviet representat­
ives a "political necessity"?
Lloyd George declared that Kamenev's denWijls made it more
2/f8
difficult than ever for negotiations to be conducted through him. The
Soviet government would be informed of conditions of peace. It should
"give up the idea that (it) can use peace missions to attacks British
institutions”, and should ’’abandon their policy of propaganda in this
country. Upon that will depend the question of whether we will discuss
with them the question of peace". British prisoners, also, had not yet
been released, *nor "adequately fedW; a memorandum wqa promised on this 
8 2question.
ChinhEwin regretted, in a Note to Curzon, that was "nothigg other than 
an attempt to interfere by any means with the conclusion of an agreement 
between the two states and to put off for an indefinlfe^pe?iod the re­
establishment of peaceful relations between Russia and England". The 
acceptance by the Spviet government of the four conditions advanced by the 
British government had not led, as was supposed to have been the case, to 
the conclusion of a ddffnite agreement. Indeed, the acceptance of the 
British conditions had had no practical consequence. The withdrawal of 
a provision of the peace terms with Poland had led, not to the renewal of 
negotiations but to their suspension, on grounds which he asserted were of
o-z
"obvious insuibstantiality" .
A number of obstacles, however, remained to be removed bifore 
negotiations could begin^again. In the first place, the position of British 
prisoners detainedjkt Baku gave rise to anxiety. Despite earlier reports 
that they had been seen ’playing football’, a Conference of Ministers on 
15 September 1920 was informed of the "unsatisfactory position" of the 
British prisoners at Baku and elsewhere in Russia. There about 150 of them;
q i
and there was "evidence that they were very indifferently fed" . It was
agreed at a later meeting of the Cabinet that no further negotiations
85would be possible until the prisoners were released . Curzon sent a note 
to Chicherin on 1 October, asserting that the conditions which had been 
made by the British government for thfe renewal of trade relations, on the t 
basis of which Kamenev and Krasin had been admitted to Britain, "have been 
broken and are being continually broken". Kamenev had engaged in "practically 
open propaganda"; the recent Third Congress of the Communist International, 
presided over by Lenin, had "openly announced that the Communist Party, and 
thus also the Soviet government, intended to use all means to overthrow
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existing institutions throughout the world11. Radio and press, and the
86recently convened "revolutionary Conference of Asiatic peoples in Baku" ,
were "clearly directed against British interests", as were Soviet actions
in the Caucasus, Persia, Central Asia and Afghanistan. Moreover, British
subjects were "still continuing to languish in Russian prisons or were
not receiving permission to return home". The trade agneement could not
be concluded the "three conditions, which were included in the Note
87of 1st July, remain unfulfilled" . When Kamenev left London on 11 Septem­
ber, there remained, apart from the Military mission in Siberia, a 
"significant number" of British subjects, the names of 8l of which had 
been furnished to Kamenev. A further 72 remained in prison in Baku, includ­
ing a Consular representative. Action was sought before the 10th ®f October,
otherwise "we shall take all the measures for their releame which we
88consider necessary"
It was objected in reply that the British government was equally 
guilty, in its relations with the Polish government and with Wrangel, of 
infractions of the agreement; nop had many Russian citizens under British 
control in Egypt, Persia and elsewhere been allowed to return. The Soviet 
government was nevertheless ready to return all British subjects remaining 
in Soviet Russia, including those convicted of crimes, provided that the 
British government allowed thd return to Soviet Russia of all Russian 
citizens in Britain or under de facto British control who wished to do so. 
Special negotiations in Tiflis concerning thd Baku prisoners were proposed; 
and some indication was requested as to when the trade negotiations might 
be resumed^.
Curzon took issue on 9 October with many points, and reverted to 
the questions of the prisoners of war and of Asian intrigue. Soviet Russia 
had sent fotfces into Persia; had entered into a "military conspiracy" with 
Turkish nationalist forces - a movement "obviously aimed against British 
interests"; had threatened to attack Khoresan; had organized a body in 
Tashkent whose object was the organization of the forces of Central Asia 
with a view to an attack upo&®Br?^?s8 Snterests; had organized a revolution 
fal Bukhara with this end in view; had kept a group of emissaries in 
Afghanistan for some months, attemXpting to conclude an agreement with the
Emir, in order to provoke an uprising on the Indian border. At congresses 
in Moscow, in Bakji and elsewhere, a "real hurricane of propaganda, intrigue
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and conspiracy against British interests and British power in Asia" had been
initiated. Large sums were being spent on anti-British propaganda, and
operations were being carried out both openly and secretly. "Such a situation
must be ended if the trade negotiations, to which both sides attach so much
importance, are to be concluded". Appropriate measures v/ere suggested, upon
90the taking of which the renewal of trade relations would depend.
The question of prisoners of war offered few intrinsic difficulties;
91and the Soviet government in turn suggested a means of making the exchanges.
92Further correspondence followed; and & protocol was signed on 1 November 1920
92which provided for the release of all British subjects detained in Baku.
Bonar Law, speaking in the House of Commons, explained that the delay in
arranging the resumption of trading relations with Soviet Russia was "not
difficult to explain. The agreement was contingent upon some agreements by
the Soviet government, among which was the return of prisoners. When that is
93done, the negotiations will be resumed". An agreement on this point had now 
been rea.ched, and this objection, presumably, no longer applied. There were 
other factors which also operated towards a resumption of the negotiations; 
and these will now be discussed.
The near-intervention in August of the British and French governments into
the Russo-Polish conflict had been conceived at a time when it appeared that
the fall of Warsaw, and, indeed, the collapse of the Polish state were
iminent. It was precisely such an outcome, indeed, that their proposed
intervention had been designed to frustrate. It was avoided, in fact,
not as a result of Allied moves but following a reversal in military fortunes,
in which the Polish forces had managed to defeat the Red Army in front of
Warsair on 15 and 16 August. Polish forces had then recorded a steady advance;
and the peace, negotiations, which had not been suspended, finally resulted
in the signature of an armistice on 12 October 1920. The Allies need now concern
themselves no longer for the fate of this ’bulwark against Bolshevism1; and
equally, must for the immediate future role out the prospect of a successful
Polish onslaught on Soviet Russia. Nothing, either, could now be hoped from
Wrangel’s forces in the South. His declining fortunes were reported to the
Cabinet on 11 November; and agreement was reached that British policy (which
had throughout been more circumspect towards his forces than the French had been] 
"should be that of strict neutrality which on no account should be compromised".His
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final defeat came in the same mibnth, when the Bolsheviks invaded his
94last stronghold and, on 14 November, took Sebastopol • No alternative to 
the Soviet regime could now reasonably be foreseen by even its bitterest 
opponents in the government,
S It was also the case that sufficient contact had by-now been 
established by individual journalists and groups with Soviet Russia to 
allow the formation of another opinion, one often better-informed, about 
that country’s stability and form of government. Not att approached their 
experience in the same spirit, Lansbury, for instance, who visited Soviet 
Russia in February and March 1920, wrote in his record of his visit that 
he had not gone to Russia as a "Cold-blooded investigator.. I went as a
95socialist, to see what a socialist revolution looks like at close quarters" .
He concluded characteristically that the revolutionary leaders ”of all men,
in their work for Russia, are doing what Christians call the Lord’s work".
He found LeninSs "wholehearted enthusiasm and devotion to the cause ofKttMJUCXXy
humanity" made his "whole life (seem) to be that of one of the saittsX of 
96oibd" . He declared that no set of men and women responsible for a revolut* 
ion of the magnitude of the Russian revolution "ever made fewer mistakes 
or carried their revolution throughtwith less interference with the rights 
of individuals, or with less terrorism and destruction, than the men in 
control in Russia*’^ . He sent a telegramjto Lloyd George from Moscow, which 
suggested that the Prime Minister was making the "mistake of (his) life" 
with regard to the Bolshevik leaders • LeiAA and his colleagues, he told 
Lihoyd George, were "first-rate clear-headed honest humane men*’. Somewhlat 
optimistically, he concluded: "beg you come here (and) join in (a) conference 
with Lenin. (I) am certain (that) your eyes would be opened (as) soon as
you cross (the) frontier”. He was invited to "crown (his) career by coming
. 98out and making a peace honourable to both democracies’* • He made less
impression upon the Prime Minister, however, than upon liberal and labour
opinion. Lansbury, the Eveninfa Standard commented, had seen "Russia with the
wide-eyed wonder of the child he will never cease to be". His reports were
nevertheless widely read, and a crowd of over a thousand greeted him at fche
station upon his return, some having waited for over four hours. He addressed
a meeting at the Albert Hall two days later, on 21 March. The hall, built to
accommodate 10,000, was "packed", according to the Times report, as Lansbury :*
gave an account of his visit and denounced the "stupendous crime of the All?§#:
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H.G. Wells differed in regarding Marx as a "Bore of the 
extremest sort", and developed in the course of hisjvisit to Russia in 
1920 a "very activte hostility" towards him. He gained the impression of 
a "vast irreparable breakdown" mn the country. But he concluded that the 
Communist Party was and "is the only sort of administrative solidarity 
possible in Russia"; and the Bolshevik governmentjin Moscow was, he thought, 
"as securely established as any government in Europe""*"^.
Those who had visited the country from Britain in 1919 had 
much in common in their views with Wells and Lansbury. Irthur Ransome, 
whose account was intended to provide simply a "bald record of conversat­
ions and thiggs seen " in the course of his visit, nevertheless convyydd 
his impression of the "creative effort of the revolution., the living, 
vivifying expFBisien of something hitherto hidden in the consciousness 
of himanity"^^. Professor Goode, whose reports had appeared in the 
Manchester Guardian, produced an account of his visit in July and August 
1919 entitled 'Bolshevism at Work'. He was granted interviews with Lenin 
and with Chicherin , and recorded that the leaders weee "profoundly simple 
in their dress, food, life", despite the "slanderous descriptions of them 
circulated in the West of Europe". He had "not found the milennium - far 
from it - but the reality is far otherwise than the stories circulated at 
home would make one believe". The Bolshevik government he found to be 
supported by a "mass of the workers solidly", and by as many as two-thirds
of the peasantry actively or passively. He attacked the blockade, and
102called for greater contacts • Mrs Pankhurst, who visited the country 
in 1920, added that Russia had become a 'prohibition' country, in which 
all alcoholic drink was banned. "To-day", she wrote, in a remark which 
may appear ironic in retrospect, it was believed that the Russian people 
had "mostly forgotten the very existence of alcohol
A greater impression than any of these individual travellers 
was made, perhaps, by the visit of the Trades Unidn Congress and Labour 
Party delegation to Russia in the summer of 1920. The delegation, composed 
of Mrs Snowden, Tom Shaw and Robert Williams from the Labour Party,
Margatet Bondf«fcld, A.A. Purcelljand H.Skinner from the T.U.C. with C.
Roden Buxton and L. Haden Guest as joint secretaries, found British press 
reports to be "perversions of the facts". The revolution, in their view, 
had "not had a fair chance". They decided to recommend that the entire
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British labour movement should "demand the removal of the last vestige
of blockade and intervention, and the complete destruction of the barrier
which Imperialist statesmen have erected between our own people and our
brothers and sisters of Russia". The present Russian government, they
lOhconsidered, should be "unconditionally recognized" .Many notions which
had enjoyed wide currency in the press were refuted: noborfjJ had been seen
to fall dead of starvation in the street; no evidence had been found of
interference with religious observance; no Chinese soldiers had been
found, nor particular luxury on the part of the leading Commissars; nor
105did either women or children appear to have been nationalized . The 
report as published concluded with a number of documents, including pleas 
from Prince Kropotkin and from the Socialist Revolutionary Party that 
the intervention be enddd, on the ground (among others) that its effect 
was to strengthen the Bolsheviks, and weaken the position of their opponen?^ 
Not all the delegates reacted favourably to what they had seen.
Mrs Snowden’s views, for instance, were strongly hostile, and were 
subsequently deployed bj Lioyd George in his speeches. The result of her 
visit she summed up briefly in the book which she wrote after her rfefcurn: 
it had been to confirm her approval for the Russian revolution which had 
overthrown Czarism; but she was "utterly opposed to the coup d’etat of 
the Bolsheviki, as I should be to the seizing of power byaf^ ny small minority 
of the people; for out of this action has spring a large part of the
1 AH
misery the unhappy people of RussiaX endure" . ^ertrand Russell, who
had travelled with the delegation and also wrote a book on his return,
although he regarded the revolution as "one of the great heroic events
of the world’s history" was also critical • Leslie Haden Guest (whose
conduct in Russia was regarded by some as suspicious, even to be that of
a secret agent of the British government, and who was accordingly closely
watched by the Cheka^^, wrote a series of articles in the Times and
made contributions to other journals. His views, also, were hostile; the
Soviets, for instance, had in his view "degenerated into rule by unrepres-
110entative executive committees" •
Most of the delegates, however, would have agreed with Ben Turner, 
the delegationls chairman, who told the labour press on his return that 
the stories pf attempts to hoodwink the delegates were"nonsense",and 
those which reported Russia in a condition of anarchy to be "totally unt^ii’.1
25k
There was evidence of hunger, but for this intervention an^the hlockaie
were "chiefly responsible". The public health arrangements of the Soviet
112government were "marvellous" Turner; xkia had brought back to Britain
Lenin's ‘Letter to British W o r k e r s I t  was certainly rather more
'advanced' than the thinking, at least, of the Labour delegates themselve*;
and Shaw explained in an interview that Lenin's knowledge of England was
"very poor"11**. There was no doubt, however, to Turner that the Bolshevik
government had the acceptance of the bulk of the people; and the delegates
115agreed upon the "urgent necessity of an immediate peace" . Five members
of the delegation appealed to trade unionist* to take direct action in an
ll6attempt to exert an influence upon British-Soviet relations •
Not all reports written by those who had recently been in
Russia were of the nature of those by the labour delegates. A book by
H.V, Keeling appeared, entitled 'Bolshevism', and devoted to the author's
five years in that country. Keeling addressed meetings in Britain in which
he dealt with his experiences there; and he favoured intervention. The impact
of the book may, perhaps, have been reduced by the clarification which
Keeling found necessary to include in his preface: he had not, he wished
117to make clear, received government money . Keeling's was one of a series 
of works which the Timesjincluded in its ifcfeue of 21 August 1919 as being of 
probable value as anti-revolutionary propaganda. The other tracts referred 
to 'Bolshevism: curse and danger', the *tragedy of Russia', among others,
118and to the unimaginable fate of 'London under the Bolshevists' • The
concern manifested by the government, however, to propagajte a view of
developments in Russia more in accord with its own policy than those of
the labour delegates and the liberal journalists suggested that the anti-
Bolshevik argument^reqiirei^more effective advocacy. The government's own
119efforts in this direction were not inconsiderable •
A Committee to Collect Information on Russia was set up in May 
1920 under the chairmanship of Lord Emmott. An Interim Report was issued 
the following Borember, which dealt with the treatment of British prisoners 
in Russia. It reported that although their suffering had not been , it 
appeared, "nearly so severe as those of the Russians themselves", the Soviet 
authorities had nevertheless proved themselves "incapable of discharging 
(their) responsibilities towards British subjects detained in Russia"120.
One man's soup, the Committee discovered, had had a horse's eye floating
in it; another man had been given a space in an overcrowed cell only by
the somewhat primitive means of removing the most accessible inmate and
shooting him (The report concdddel that the probability of execution in the
121case of Russians was "far greater" ).
The Final Report which was presented on 25 February 1921 expressed
the opinion that for the economic equilibrium of the world Russian exports
were an important factor, whose increase on the European market
It did not, however, offer any confidence in the repudiation by the Soviet
government of any connection with the Communist International; and it found
the "complete renunciation" of propaganda "directed towards the destruction
of the political and economic order existing in other countries" to be a
"fundamental premise" for capital aid and credits for Russia, which were
122considered to be vital needs of the Bolshevik regime •
The importance of developing trade was fco§t lost on "the British
government, especially towards the latter part of 1920 following the
collapse of the post-war boom. From the middle of October, special weekly
125reports on unemployment were circulated to the Cabinet . It appeared, 
moreover, that the development ofjtrade with Russia might significantly 
alleviate the problem. The Observer on 5 November predicted orders of up 
to £100 million in the first year after trade with Russia had been
-i ^ i
resumed . Addressing the House of Commons on 15 November, Bonar Law 
(himself a businessman), dealing with the future of the negotiations with 
Russia, declared that trade was "still more desirable now, when there is 
a state of unemployment in this country. We shall certainly do nothing to 
prevent these relations being resumed as far as we can.. Trade relations 
have been renewed by other governments, and this government must do its 
bext to get its share of the trade"^^^.
Trade contacts between the two countries had, in fact, been 
well developed in-1913, the last complete normal year of trading, and the 
year upon which comparison and forecasts were based (although somewhat 
misleadingly, since the area, and even more so the economic resources of 
Soviet Russia were smaller than those of the former Russian Empire). In 
this last pre-war year, Russian exports to Britain totalled 933>313>000 
roubles, a figure exceeded only by that of exports to Germany. Imports 
(602,9*+6,000 roubles) were considerably less in value than those from 
Germany, but again placed Britain in second place^^.
The war, followed by intervention, blockade and civil war,
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drastically reduced Russia*s economic exchanges with Britain, as with other
countries. In 1913 Russia*s total trade turnover with other countries
reached 2,895 million roubles; but in 1918 it was only 113 million roubles,
127in 1919 3 million roubles, and in 1920 30 million roubles . Exports to
Britain dropped to 6,970,000 roubles in 1918; and for 1919 and 1920 none
*1 p Q
at all are recorded • Imports dropped correspondingly to 41,877,000
roubles in 1918, to 94,000 roubles in 1919, increasing to 20,973 
129roubles in 1920 . It was not an exaggeration to state that trade relations
with capitalist countries were **in practice broken off after the October
revolution**. Until the beginning of 1920, only a few semi-contraband
operations operations could take place'*'^ .^
The end of the blockade and the establishment of peace with
Estonia (2 February 1920) provided the first practical possibility of
foreign trade for Soviet Russia. Import plans, in view of the state of the
economy, envisaged "almost exclusively the import of the means of
production: equipment, machinery, seed, metals^^. These, however, were
precisely the goods which Britain was best equipped to provide (and had in
132the past provided ^ ) ; while ram materials from Russia had had an important 
place in pre-war British imports from Russi^ t, and in the case of many branch­
es of industry had been Britain’s major source of supply.
The President of the Board of Trade, speaking in the House of 
Commons, discussed the possibility of the renewed import of timber from 
Russia. While this was of course "dependent upon the general question of 
the re-opening of trade with Russia", timber, which was "one of fiussia’s 
chief exports’1, would "naturally be one of thd main factors to be conside?4^ 1.' 
The continued progress of the negotiations attracted further enquiries.
Nearly two million pounds* worth of wheat, and four and three-quarters of 
a million pounds* worth of eggs, had been imported from Russia in 1913, 
the President of the Board of Trade reported, although he was at pains to
point out that it would be some time before trade could be re-established
i-z/, accountedfw-
on a large scale ^ . Taken as a whole, the Russian trade had not XJCWX a
major part of British foreign trade before the war. In some cases, however, 
it predominated. Almost 70% of Britihh flax imports had come from Russia; 
as well as 52% of hewn and sawn fir, and 45% of pit props^^. The absence of 
these imports was in many casew believed to be holding back the development
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of important industries, and to be the source of redundancies and short-
"1 7time; the absence of food imports (butter, eggs and beans in particular J ) 
was held to have contributed to the high cost of living; while the export 
potential of the Russian market was believed to be considerable. Unemploy­
ment in Britain, the Minister of Labour told a Conference of Ministers on
2.1+ January 1921, "was becoming increasingly serious". A Cabinet Committee
137on unemployment had been set up the previous month . To many members of
the Cabinet there were now important economic arguments for the continuation
138and successful conclusion of the fcrade negotiations. ^
The decision 4>o retain the Trading Delegation in London 
after the departure of Kamenev and the effective suspension of the negotiat­
ions might, Lenin considered, serve to strengthen the parties and groups in
139Britain that were working for the conclusion of a trade agreement ^ . The 
Soviet delegation accordingly, and not without success, attempted to 
influence British public opinion, and to grant orders to and have dealings 
with trading and business circles in order to stimulate interest in trading 
relations with Russia^^.
An important part was pkityed by the All-Russian Co-operative 
Society, or *Arcos*, which was founded in London:: on 9 June 1920^^. On 
Krawin*s proposal, the decision was made to register a private company in 
Britain, yet detaining control in Soviet hands, as a means of avoiding 
the possibility of actions for the seizure of goods by holders of Russian 
bonds or owners of property in Russia which had been nationalized, pending 
the settlement of these questions and the recognition of the Soviet governm­
ent. The company was registered on 11 June 1920 with a capital of £15,000. 
Two of its directors, Krysin and Polovtseva, had been domiciled in Britain 
for some time, and Rozovskii, the third, had come with the Trade Delegatlcfti. 
All were members of the co-operative societies. In 1921, however, the 
capital was increased to £100,000, and officials from the Commissariat of 
Foreign Trade took over the positions of chairman and managing director"^^.
The company, reported the Secretary of the Defrtjjment of0* mm 
Trade, had entered into negotiations with various firms and some contracts 
bad been signed for the eventual supply of goods'*’^ .  Krasin had published 
a detailed list of export goods which the Soviet authorities proposed to 
offer in trade relations; but banks remained reluctant to offer credit, and
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the import of gold into Britain remained subject to the risk of confiscation.
•Deals in Britain, Krasin wrote on 17 August, were possible "only to the
extent to which firms can be found which are prepared to receive gold in
1A5Reval for their goods” .
A great impression was created by the placing of an order with 
five Yorkshire firtns for broadcloth to a total value of i^ af^ Ly a million 
pounds sterling, payable in cabb, which was concluded in the middle of 
September on receipt of an urgent order from Moscow. The news, Krasin recall­
ed, had a ”most striking effect" on the London stock exchange; and it 
"caused a sensation in the City.. We were inundated with inquiries”. There 
followed a "whole series of newspaper articles in influential papers and 
interest in trade deals with Soviet Russia increased markedly"'*'^. The 
Times, on the basis of enquiries made among business circles, admitted that 
"the urge to establish trade relations with Russia grows daily”. Interviews 
appeared in the press in October with the managing director of *Becos*, 
a federated organization of engineering firms, Mr A.G. Marshall, and with 
the chairman of the professional association of the rubber industry, both of 
whom urged the establishment - in Britain*s interests - of the closest 
possible trading relations with Russia. The Daily News the following month 
printed a series of leading articles by Arthur Cummings whose conclusion 
was a similar one. The opinion of businessmen was quoted, and the conclusion 
as swiftly as possible of an agreement was urged^^.
The Cabinet reviewed the order for broadcloth on 21 September. The 
cloth was required, it was noted, for the manufacture of military uniforms 
for the Bolshe vih army, who "might evdn be employed against British troops
-j I o
in Persia or elsewhere". It was decided to investigate the matter.
Writing to Lloyd George on k October, Krasin dwelt upon the trade 
relations which were already developing, the further development of which 
would be facilitated by the conclusion of a trade agreement. There was a 
series of "definite deals and trade contracts" which "could be made forthwith 
following the conclusion of a trade agreement". Preliminary negotiations had 
established the possibility of exporting railway locomotives to Russit^of 
arranging for the repa±± in Britain of Soviet locomotives, in which "several 
railway and machine-engineering firms in Britain were interested". The annual 
value of orders from Soviet Russia for railway equipment would be in excess 
°f £10 million, and thiy could be placed largely in English factories, which
259
were short of orders and far from fully employed, There might he further
orders for machine tools, electrical equipment and lorries, in the case
of which negotiations were already in progress, and for which orders could
be made "extremely quickly". Orders had been placed for the supply of
medicines and other goods, and the list could be greatly extended. Despite
her limited financial resources, instructions had been received to place
orders for textiles to the value of several million pounds. Orders for
colonial raw materials "could be swiftly made after the conclusion of a
trade agreement". Negotiations had been conducted and agreement effectively
reached with a series of English firms for the export from Russia of wood
and railway sleepers; and other substaXntial orders were being held up
only in consequence of a lack of available shipping and the "impossibility
of establishing normal trading relations until an agreement was concluded
lZ.g
between the two states on these questions" .
Negotiations, Krasin recalled, were entered into with a""whole
range of major firms"; with a Slough firm, for instance, for the delivery
of five hundred automobiles, with Marcnni, on the formation of a British-
150Russian society for trade with Britain, and with Armstrongs • It was
reported in the Glasgow Herald that several contractsjwith large firms had
been signed, and orders had been placed to the value of sever&l hundred
151thousand pounds, mainly in the fields of textiles and engineering • Inquir 
-es were received, Krasin noted, and proposals began to be received from 
major British firms with regard to concessions. Whi'ffe no binding promises 
were given by the delegation, "all the same several industrial groups 
began to exert ptfessure upon the Foreign Office and on Lloyd George". By 
the time the question of the prisoners of war had been settled and the 
negotiations renewed, the trade delegation "had a fairly powerful group 
in the City behind it"^^^.
It was stated in the House of Commons that the "commercial men 
of this country" had "quite made up their minds that, whatever may have 
happened in the past with regard to Russia, the question of commercial 
relationships being resumed with Russia should be undertaken now openly 
and freely": a view expressed to 0*Grady by "gentlemen who are great men in 
the business life of this country". He declared that if the government
would "take the commercial men of this country into their confidence, we 
should see a resumption of commercailG. relations with Russia". Russians
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financial obligations could be met in five years by the development of
155
her resources . "The commercial men of this country", Tillett added, "will
154have no quarrel with Russia when they can make a profit out of them" •
This current of opinion did not pass unnoticed in the Foreign
Office, On 20 December an article from the Sunday Times of the previous
day was placed on file. The article's headline read: "Why we must trade
with Russia: Orders British firms require: An end to depression". It went
on to state that if Britain did not enter into trading relations with
Russia "other countries will capture the market". British manufacturers
were reported to be "unanimous" in the belief that there would be no settled
trade conditions in the country until trade relations with Russiq had been
resumed. The representatives of a Midland engineering firm, it was added,
155had recently made contact with Krasin . On 6 December a letter arrived
at the Foreign Office from the Indian Tea Association. It urged that "every
156effort" should be made to bring about trading relations with Russia .
Later that month the infoteation was circulated that two mills in 
Yorkshire, Fenton Textiles Ltd. and C. andJ. Hirst Ltd., had signed contracte 
with the Russian Trading Delegation. According to a letter to the Prime 
Minister fS£fiKBi8j£Turner which the Yorkshire Pa£t had published on 11 
December, these were the only two mills in Yorkshire which were working on 
a full-time basis. The "leading commercial associations and business men", 
noted a Foreign Office minute, now favoured the "resumption of trade" with 
Russia. A further minute was added by Mr Clark, who noted that disappointment 
if the negotiations broke down "would not be limited to labour only". There 
had been a "good many indications lately of a change of mind in commercial 
and industrial circles"^^.
There were, then, some grounds for thinking that the negotiations might 
proceed further when Krasin again communicated to Curzon a note from the 
Soviet government on 9 November 1920. The conditions specified in the British 
note of 30 June, it was pointed out, which the Soviet government had been 
required to observe, had been described by the British government itself as
obligations dependent upon the conclusion of a trade agreement, and not,
therefore, binding in the absence if such an agreement. The British
government gad, however, made the renewal of negotiations dependent upon the
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prior fulfilment of these obligations, as they had been interpreted in
Curzon's note of 9 October. The removal of misunderstandings and those
disagreements which still remained should form the subject, it was proposed,
of further and direct official negotiations.
A further note drew attention to the ’’most unsatisfactory position”
in which the negotiations had been left, although ten months had now passed
since the Supreme Council had proposed their initiation, and four since the
basis of an agreement had been reached. A ’’direct and swift answer” was
sought to the question of whether the British government was ready to enter
159into negotiations in order to establish normal relations.
Lloyd George's speech at the Guildhall, and a speech by Sir Robert
Home at Oxford in which he had argued the necessity - in Europe's interests
- of the resumption of trade between the Vest and Russia, gave some indication
of the trend of Cabinet thinking.But in Krasin's view, the Cabinet
remained divided, sometimes bitterly, on the matter. Curzon, Churchill, and
that section of business whose interests had suffered as a result of the
nationalization in Russia declared against any kind of agreement, or even
negotiations with Soviet Russia.Some evidence of the concessions which
it might be necessary to make to this group was apparent in the unofficial
text of a trade agreement which appeared in the Times on 5 October. The text
contained a number of alterations in the British interest as compared with the
basis of agreement reached in the June-July exchange of notes; in particular
it required the recognition by Soviet Russia of the whole of the governmental
debt. The Delegation's protest, however, led the Department of Overseas Trade
162to announce that the text as printed had had no official endorsement.
The negotiation of the agreement remained within the Board of Trade, assisted 
as appropriate by Lloyd George,* and the foreign Office, as Gregory noted in a
165minute, would take "no responsibility for the drafting of the Trade Agreement". 
Curzon later noted that he desired to "have nothing to do with the agreement 
myself”.^
The Cabinet considered the resumption of the negotiations at its 
meeting on 17 November. The debate extended into the following day, and 
ultimately approved the Lloyd George-Home proposal to do so. The Russians,
Home argued, were prepared to place large orders in the country and many of
■the contracts were at an "advanced stage". They were "of the greatest importance..
from the commercial point of view and because of the menace of unemploy-
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ment, of the likelihood that during this winter the slump will last for 
a considerable time”. Trade, if not engaged upon, would be lost to other 
countries. Moreover he ’'felt strongly(that) the only way we shall fight 
Bolshevism is by trade. It thrives best in uncivilized conditions”. If 
trade were not initiated the debts would never be paid. Moreover ”our 
trading community as a whole want to resume trade although no doubt there 
will be protests from concessionaries”.
Curzon objected. He did not dispute the economic arguments; he 
was concerned with the conditions of the agreement. The Bolsheviks were 
bound by conditions which had been laid down repeatedly ad fundamental: 
the complete repatriation of nationals and the cessation by Russia of hostile 
propaganda and the movements against Great Britain in the East. The Russian 
menace in the East, he declared, was ’’incomparably greater than anything 
else that has happened in my time to the British Empire”. With regard to 
prisoners, the Russians had been "trying to trick us” (Lloyd George thoggkfc 
the remark an unfair one); while as regarded propaganda the evidence was 
that "from Moscow to Tashkent conspiracies worked by Bolshevik agents and 
paid for by Bolsheviljgold are going on.. They do not intend to desist from 
propaganda. The purpose and pith of their government is propaganda through­
out the world. You conclude an agreement with them. The same business will 
go on at Teheran, Baku, Enzeli, Bokhara etc.." He felt that the government 
should be "very cautious at aigning the trade agreement because the two 
conditions have not been loyally acted upon”.
Chamberlain "agreed generally" with him. Lloyd George pointed out 
that, had the agreement been regarded as already binding, then there were 
some things that Britain also should not have done: such as unloading 
rifles at Danzig with British troops, sending a military mission to Poland 
and so Curzon however wanted the "two conditions made effective before 
we sign the agreement".
Bonar Law agreed with Horne. Britain had been "playing with this 
Russian situation too long. You cannot go on talking and not conclude an 
agreement”. Furthermore, the country was "in for bad unemployment. There 
is some business to be got in this way. If we make no agreement the effect 
°n the public mind of the imaginary volume of trade., would be very bad. As
ior propaganda*, if we make no agreement we shall have no leverage against 
the political hostility of Russia.. We shall lose the chance of political
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influence and do it at the expense of losing some trade”. Moreover, he 
'•agreed with Horne that Bolshevism will come to an end under civilized 
conditions”.
Lloyd George shared these views. He had seen a ”good many businessmen
and they have rather frightened me about the next eighteen months”. Bonar
Law and he had met Rylands, the Chairman of the Federation of British
Industries, and found that ’’there are no orders coming in.. We may have
the worst period of unemployment any of us have known. The Russians are
prepared to pay in gold and you won’t buy”. The refusal of Russian orders,
besides, would be discovered add would ’’add to the public discontent”. The
manufacturers were in favour. The financiers naturally wanted their Bonds, X
and "I don’t blame them. But the pressure from the Midlands is all the
other way”. He had, moreover, heard predictions of the fall of the Soviet
government for the previous two years. Denikin, Yudenich, Wrangel, ’’all
have collapsed, but I cannot see any immediate prospect of the collapse of
165the Soviet government”. J
The debate was continued the following day. Churchill contended that 
the Cabinet "were not committed". The scale of the proposed transactions 
was petty compared with the bulk of British trade as a while; and it would 
"only bolster up the Bolshevik government and their military organization”.
He "objected to helping them out of the difficulties which they have made for 
themselves by their Communism”. He felt - somewhat inconsistently - that they 
"should not turn (the agreement) down”, but the government ought to make 
sure that the Bolsheviks had "gives evidence of goodwill and ceased hostilit­
ies in the East..*’ Lloyd George pointed out that they could stipulate that 
henceforward there must be no hostile action. "You can name all the places.. 
Hdanwhile trade is going from bad to worse”. He spoke not as an advocate of 
Bolshevism: indeed, he was on the contrary "trying to prevent Bolshevism in 
this country”. Churchill, unabashed, retorted that he was "on the high road 
to embrace Bolshevism. I am going to keep off that and denounce them on all 
possible occasions’*. He, cCurzon, Montagm and Long wanted conditions to be 
specified and observed prior tojthe conclusion of an agreement.
It was eventually decided to authorise the President of the Board 
°f Trade to conclude a Trade Agreement with Ihssia on the general lines of 
the exchange of notes of June and July; but it should be signed on the under­
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standing that the conditions specified in that exchange shohld be accepted
as its basis, and "definitely re-stated in the Trade Agreement", and that
a provision should be included whereby in the event of either party failing
to fulfil its undertakings the other would be entitled to denounce the
agreement. The attention of the Russian government was to be drawn XX
"either in the agreement itself or in a covering communication to the
Russian representatives, to any specially important respects in which, in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement, the Bolsheviks must alter
their present procedure or policy, e.g to annui their treaty with
Afghanistan, to desist from co-operation with Mustapha Kemal, and from
hostilities or propaganda in Persia, India etc". The Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Waf and India were to communicate with the President of the
Board of Trade regarding these matters. The Prime Minister could announce
that a draft Agreement was in preparation; but the conclusion of a Trade
Agreement "would not be assumed to hamper the discretion of Ministers in
166public statements regarding the Bolshevist system of Government" .
Lloyd George announced accordingly in the House of Commons 
that a draft agreement to carry out the July agreement for trade with 
Russia was in preparation, and that it would be submitted to the Russian 
government within the few 4aye following'*'^ • A meeting of Ministers on 
25 November noted the "growing importance from a political point of view of 
pushing on as rapidly asjpossible with the Russian Trade Agreement. Evidence 
was accumulating that a bad period oljtrade must be anticipated this winter".
A new element was the publication in the press of the|huge orders which
had apparently been obtained in Russia by annAmerican merchant, Mr Vanderlip.
Whatever their truth, the meeting agreed that "from a political point of
the following day. It was adopted after a number of amendments had been 
made, prohibiting more specifically in the Preamble hostile action and 
propaganda against the institutions of the United Kingdom and Dominions, 
and referring back for further consideration the draft letter which was to 
b© handed to Krasin as embodying the government's interpretation of the
VI
Agreement. It was agreed that,fin the case of the Agreement being concluded, 
it should be understood that the Russian government would "not be allowed to
remove all governmental obstacles to trade"168
The dr^ft agreement was considered at a meeting of the Cabinet
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escape responsibility for hostile propaganda by sheltering itself behind
the activities of the 'Third International'"• Divisions within the Cabinet
nonetheless remained serious: the dissent from part of the conclusions
was recorded of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chamberlain, and of
169Curzon, Churchill and Montagu. Three days later the draft Trade Agreement
was handed to Krasin.
The new text, on the basis of which Home and Krasin began
negotiations on 1 December, contained a number of changes of substance
from the terms of the British note of 50 June 1920. Writing to V/ise on
50 November, without prejudice to a more detailed study of the document
171by the Soviet government, Krasin offered a "few observations" upon it.
The period of validity of the agreement was a question of "cardinal import­
ance": the agreement appeared to have been concluded for an indefinite 
period, but either side had the right to terminate the agreement three 
months after it had given notice of its desire to do so. This period seemed 
to Krasin "completely insufficient", bearing in mind the importance of the 
agreement and the practical arrangement of trade dealings. Such a period, 
he thought, would discredit the trade agreement in advance in the eyes of 
the world, and "above all., in the eyes of business people". Contracts for 
railway locomotives, turbines, railway materials and so on required a 
period of two to five years to fulfil. He proposed that the minimum period 
indicated in the agreement for its revocation should be "at least twelve 
months", with both governments agreeing to help to secure the fulfilment 
of contracts based on a longer period. Nor was there any provision for the 
realisation of valuable metals, in particular gold, at normal market
rates and conditions. This, Krasin considered, should be provided for in 
172the Agreement •
The Soviet government communic ated its views on the draft agreement 
on 4 December 1920. As regarded the political principles included in the 
draft, an agreement, it considered, already existed, based on the British 
memorandum of 30 June and the Russian note of 7 July. The agreement compreh­
ended both mutual restraint from hostile action and official propaganda, and 
compensation for private citizens. It was therefore "with some surprise" 
that the Soviet government "found in the draft agreement handed to it 
principles, in respect of which agreement had already been reached,
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changed and made more specific in such a way that the obligations of one of
the parties, Russia, have been significantly increased and widened". The
Soviet government was "not prepared to go further than this agreement or to
alter even one point in it, without holding proper political negotiations"'*'?^
In the course of the opening session of Krasin’s discussions
with Horne on 1 Decmmber, a Rjissian draft agreement was handed to thd
174British negotiators. Subsequent discussion centred mainly upon three 
points: the preamble and consequent application of the conditions of the 
agreement of June 3o/July 7; the question of the treatment of Russian gold 
on the London marketX; and the question of security for Russian exports, 
including gold, against attachment by English creditors of Russia. So far 
as the conditions were concerned, it was disputed #hather they should come 
into force on the signature of the agreement, or should be regulated by a 
political conference after the agreement had been signed, or whether indeed 
they had been binding upon the Soviet government since their acceptance XX as 
the basis of an agreement in the note of 7 July 1920. A Foreign Office 
memorandum, reviewing British-Soviet relations from September until December 
1920 and written on 30 December, inclSed to the view that the agreement would 
be signed on the "basis that the conditions of the note of June 30th become 
operative at the date of signatuXre". Thejquestion of hostile action and 
propaganda, also, must, the British government insisted, be defined more 
precisely than in the note of 30 June. If the British government demanded the 
right to specify where hostile action must cease, it was conceded that the 
Soviet government must be allowed to claim the same right, on a basis of 
reciprocity. The question of debts, it was agreed, should be deferred, but 
should not be prejudiced by the resumption of trading relations'*’^ *
The question of the import of gold from Russia ihto Britain 
remained in dispute. Gold of Russian origin realised on 77/9d an ounce in 
Britain when it was sold to the Bank of England, while on the world market 
it realised 106/ - 120/=. The delegation sought to secure the right tcjthe 
free import and export of gold in the course of the negotiations, so that its 
full price might be realised^*^. Discussion centred upon the prospect of 
securing ’most favoured! nation* treatment for Russian gold in London; but the
Soviet title to the gold remained one for the courts to determine, and it was 
decided accordingly that no definitive clause about gold should be included"*"*^ *
The question of the possible attachment of goods and gold exported
T 7ftfrom Russia remained one of ’’some difficulty” • Krasin at first proposed
that a moratorium bill should be introduced in Parliament, which would
exempt Russian property from such an action pending XK a peace conference.
The British side refused on principle to take such action, and declared that
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the only solution lay in the decisions of the courts . The decision of 
Hr Justice Roche in the case of Luther v. Sagor and Co on 21 December that 
certain definitely identifiable goods manufactured in a definite factory 
within a specified period were the property of the original owners, and that 
the purchasers of them from the Russian Trade Delegation must restore them 
accordingly, was based upon a communication from the Foreign Office which 
established to the court’s satisfaction that the Soviet government had not
1S0been recognized by the British government. In a speech the following
day in the House of Commons, however, Horne argued that if the Soviet 
government had been one recognized de facto by the British government, no 
action for attachment could lie: an opinion based upon the considered judge­
ment of the Law Officers of the Crown. The signature of a trade agreement 
would, however, constitute an entirely new set of facts "so far as the
other Government's claim to recognition as a de facto Government is concern- 
lftled” , It was agreed that following the signature of the agreement, the
decision of the courts on the matter should be tested. If an unfavourable
182judgement resulted, "the English government would find some other way" •
On 20 December Krasin reviewed these problems in a letter to 
Lloyd George. The preamble in the British draft was "very substantially 
different" from the conditions specified in the note of 30 June, and 
contained a number of one-sided obligations which could not be accepted or 
fulfilled by any government. The difference's were set out in an appendix. 
There was no need to include the conditions, which did not concern trdde, 
in an agreement of such a nature; it should be sufficient to rely upon an 
exchange of noXtes. Their alteration, if this were found necessary, should 
be considered at a special conference. Nor could trade develop if the 
ships, property and cash of one side were liable to confideation in the 
other’s country. A moratorium bill was suggested. It was also proposed that; 
ss had been provided for in articles 11 and 12 of the Russian draft agreement
export licence should be granted in the case of gold imported into Britain
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from Russia, allowing it to be realised at its full market price, but without 
affecting British reserves. It was suggested that a twelve-month delay 
following notice of denunciation of the agreement should be substituted^-?
The main points of dispute were considered at a meeting of 
Britihh ministers and the Russian Trade Delegation the following day, Lloyd 
George found "no objection at all” to the specification by Soviet Russia, 
as Britain had done, of particular countries in whichjlts interests might be 
threatened by the propaganda of the other dide. The British government had 
specified certain countries "because undoubtedly a good deal of hostile 
propaganda had been carried on in those particuiar areas against British 
interests", which 6hould be brought to an end. It would, he said, be "almost 
impossible" for him to secure acceptance of the agreement by the government 
unless "those who were specially interested in those particular countries 
were satisfied that hostile propaganda ^ould cease". He did not favour a 
special conference to consider this matter, which in its essentials had been 
included in the earlier agreement. He "might not press", however, regarding 
the inclusion of, for instance, the Caucasus: "he understood there was some 
objection to that on account of its being part of the Russian Empire before
-i Q i
the war". Krasin undertook to seek a reply from Moscow on this issud .
The question remained, however, of the restriction of propaganda 
by private Russian citizens. It was quite impossible, Krasin held, to restra­
in private citizens from conducting propaganda. "He doubted if any government 
could give such an undertaking". Lloyd George was inclined to agree. He 
proposed the prohibition rather of "encouragement or assistance to any 
propaganda conducted outside its own territories" on the part of both 
governments, a formulation which Krasin thought "might be acceptable", while 
he did not formally withdraw the proposal of a Special Conference.
Krasin*s suggestion of a Moratorium Bill, it was pointed out by 
Horne, involved the government influencing the courts "in order to alter 
the legal rights of our citizens, and that waa a thing we could not do".
Lloyd George proposed a test £ase, after the signing of the agreement, in 
which the Court would decide on the basis of a different set of facts from 
those which had obtained in the Luther v. Sagor case, on which a judgement
had that day been made. It the decision was one which the Soviet government
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found unsatisfactory, Lloyd George was prepared to undertake that the 
whole situation be reconsidered.
On gold, he thought it would be difficult to find a way of preventing 
gold other than of Russian origin leaving the country, if re-export licences 
were granted: "we could not allow one set of people to export and not others, 
otherwise the whole system would be interfered with". Ajrevised procedure 
fofc the termination ofthe agreement was submitted, including a six-month 
period, byt Horne warned that "if the Soviet government were to continue 
hostile propaganda in Persia, Afghanistan or India, that would be a fact 
that would lead us at once to ceast to carry out the agreement"*-^ .
The Cabinet met the following day and considered the statement 
which Horne was due to make in the House of Commons. Ir|discussion reference 
was made "particularly to the covering letter which was to be handed to 
Mr Krasin..", the substance of which had not yet been agreed. If the 
negotiations broke down it would be better, it was felt, that this should 
occur over the question of hostile propaganda rather than over tine technical 
questions of debts •
Horne*s statement warned that many of the hopes regarding Anglo- 
Russian trade were "founded on entirely fallacious grounds". The government* 
s attitude, in resuming the negotiations, had "not been (dictated) by a love 
of Bolshevism.. We believe that there could scareely be a greater boon to 
the world at the present time than if you succeeded in entirely destroying 
Bolshevism, which we have seen rearing its head in Europe. But you will not 
destroy it by isolating Russia. The only way in which you will succeed in 
killing Bolshevism will be by bringing Russia and the Russian people under 
the civilizing influence of the rest of the world, and you cannot do that 
in any better way than by beginning to enter into trade and commerce with 
them". Apart from this, Russia was "one of the great producing countries
of the world", providing Britain before the war with one-ei^th of her grain,
i
one-seventh of her butter, one-halfl of her eggs and timber, and four-fifths } 
of her flax. The shortage of these commodities had led to increased prices* 
and "unrest followed amongst the masses of the workers". The government, thertj
-efore, although it would be "years and years" before the eqrlier levels •!
were equalled, was "anxious to see Russia producing again". Sales to Russia,
I moreover, had been substantial before the war, and sales there of machinery
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had been exceeded only by those to India, "It is of the greatest possible 
moment that we should have opportunities of selling that machinery to 
Russia, of selling all the manufactures which our people work into fabrics 
by their hands - that we should especially at the present ttKMXKime be able
-| O n
to give increased employment to our people" .
Conditions had been advanced on the basis of which an 
agreement might be concluded. The general question of debts was to be 
deferred; but private debts were to be acknowledged, if not immediately 
paid off, in order to get trade going. "Unless we get started with trade 
with Russia, there will fce nothing to be paid to anybody", Horne warned.
On the fuastion of propaganda, th^government had found since 30 June thh 
"most active propaganda" going on in Persia, Afghanistan and India of a 
character "most hostile to British interests", A "most definite propaganda, 
originating in Russia, is being carried on in that Eastern quarter of the 
world hostile to British interests, and avowedly fof the purpose of upsetti­
ng British institutions in India", The government had put to the repaasenta- 
tives of the Soviet government that, particularly in Persia, India and 
Afghanistan, this propaganda shouMl "cease at once., if this agreement is
1 O O
6o be carried out" •
At the end of December and the beginning of January 1921 a 
number of further meetings took place between Horne and Krasin, in which 
the positions of either side were further clarified. On 11 January Kr^asin 
left for Moscow for discussions with the 'Soviet government. The responsib­
ility for this further delay in the negotiations, as for previous difficult-
*1 O n
ies, was denied by both sides •
On Kraiin*s return to Moscow, a plenary meeting of the Central 
Committee of the Bolshevik partyjtook place, in which both Krasin and Lenin 
participated. It was decided, Lenin later KXXXX reported, to "give this
question a more important place" and to accept as "correct on our part a ;
tactic of concessions, allowing us to reach a trading agreement with England!1
The agreement would lead to the development of economic relations with the , 
other major capitalist powers^^,
A note was despatched to the British government which stated | 
that so far as the conditions of the trade agreement themselves were
concerned, no differences existed between the two governments which could
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not be resolved by means of further discussions between Krasin and a 
competent British authority. The main obstacle, however, was the introduct­
ory section, which the British government wished to increase and widen 
beyond the limits of what had been agreed in the June-July exchange of notes. 
It was not the case that Bolshevik forces had invaded Persia or Asia Minor; 
nor could the Soviet government be identified with the Third International, 
*any more than the Belgian government could be identified with the 
Second International, which was based in Brussels, or the British government 
could be identified with the international organizations which had their 
headquarters in London, or even with the Third International, of which the 
British Communist Party was as full a member as the Russian, The British 
government had itself been guilty of infringements of the June-July exchange 
of notes, which it regarded as already binding upon both sides; it had 
attempted, in particular, to interfere with the improvement of Soviet relatio 
-ns with Persia and Afghanistan. The Soviet government was, nevertheless, 
prepared to conclude an agreement on the basis of the draft, if it were 
amended fco as to include a reciprocal obligation up&n the British government
as reggrded hostile propaganda,f-and to exclude a recent additional point
192regarding the general debts of previous Russian governments •
The new Soviet note was not to the taste of the Times or of
Curzon, who regarded the new proposed preamble as even "more shameless" than
the "previous tricks" of ChicheEin, and the rply as a whole "even more
193impudent and mendacious than his previous performances" . There was no
official response from the British government; but the Cabinet*s views were
evident in the King*s Speech at the opening of t&e new session of Parliament
on 15 February, which expressed the "hope that the negotiations for a trade
.194agreement with Ru^ Hfeia will,, be brought to a successful conclusion" • Lloyd
George reported that a reply had been received from the Soviet government
proposing certain amendments to the agreement, which were under consideration
by the Cabinet, Krasin would shortly return to London, He himself had been,
. c
declared,"from the beginning a strong advojrate of renewing trade withn
Russia"; he had (or so he deilarert) "never hesitated at all". To love one*s 
ueighbour was "not only good sotlnd Christianity; it is good business
Precisely what good business it might in fact be became apparent
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at this time. The Trading Delegation had entered into negotiations with the
vehicle engineering firm Armstrong, which following the end of the war had
decided to convert some of its workshops into locomotive repait shops. The
possibility arose of commissioning Armstrongs worklts with the repait of
300 Soviet locomotives annually for a period of five years. The order was
"very tempting., allowing the partial reduction of unemployment, from which
British industry was then seriously suffering'1, ^(preliminary draft agreement
was concluded, the final signature of which the Trading Delegation made
conditional upon the conclusion of an Anglo^Soviet agreement, which would
allow gold to be realised at its world market price and would guarantee the
196inviolability of ggods of Soviet Russian origin .It was noted in the 
House of Commonsq? when the existence of the Armstrongs agreement was confirm­
ed by the government, that it would provide for the employment of three
197thousand men now unemployed on Tyneside . Negotiations in Britain, moreover, 
were being conducted by representatives of the Russian Trade Delegation with 
Swedish and german firms for the purchase of agricultural MxxSSii8Jent198.
The orders could readiiby be met by British firms had Anglo-R#ssian trade 
an adequate legal basis.
A further Soviet note, enquiring as to the British reaction to 
the ewtlier communication of k February, was answered by Curzon. The govern­
ment, he stated, was awaiting the return of Krasin, so as to "hear from him
199a detailed exposition of the latest Russian proposals'* . On k March Krasin 
returned, and the negotiations were renewed
Discussing the renewal of the negotiations in the House of Commons, 
Horne expressed the view that "nothing will so upset the Communist system 
there as to resume trade". If the trade was feegun with gold, the system 
then existing would be "so upset" that the Russian people would "very soon 
become ready to adopt individual effort to produce goods which can be exchan­
ged for our commodities". Even if only a small trade could be done, "we can 
look forward to., a better system in Russia" •
Not even this inviting prospect, however, resolved remaining doubts 
within the government. Harmsworth let it be knrNown in the House of Commons 
that, in the view of the Foreign Office, the Kronstadt mutiny, which had 
broken out at this time, revealed the instability and insecurity of the
Soviet reffime^O^
• The Foreign Office officially confirmed press reports turn
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dealing with the risings in Petrograd and Moscow, which reported the
flight of Lenin and Trotsky and the hoisting of the white flag over the
Kremlin. On 8 March a statement was issued declaring that almost all of
Petrograd was in the hands of the mutineers. The Soviet government made
a vigorous protest: the statement, it declared, was "undoubtedly intended
to harm further negotiations between Russia and England concerning the 
203trade agreement”
The mutiny formed the background to the discussion in the Cabinet
on li+ March, when the conclusion of an agreement was considered. The
President of the Board of Trade informed the Cabinet that Krasin had now
returned from Russia with authority to conclude an agreement, subject to
a British guarantee not to supportjhostile action against Soviet Russia, to
respect the independence and integrity of Persia, Afghanistan and the
territory of the Turkish National Assembly, and not to aid in any way
those other than the Soviet government who cAAimed to represent the
government of Russia.
It was pointed out that the draft agreement which Krasin had
taken to Moscow represented, however, the maximum concession of those who
opposed the scheme. Safeguards had been insisted upon to "check Bolshevist
propaganda in the East". In the interval since KraAin's departure this
propaganda had "greatly intensified". Krasin was now adding "extravagant
demands" at a time when the Soviet government’s position - in view, notably,
of Kronstadt - was itself "by no means stable". There were "advantages in
not hastening the conclusion of an Agreement which was desired by the
Bolsheviks mainly in order to enhance their prestige".
The principle of reciprocity with regard to hostile action and
propaganda had, however, already been accepted; not did intelligence reports
204suggest that reliance might safety be placed upon the Kronstadt mutineers • 
Moreover, the economic arguments were strengthened at this timd (in Krasin’s 
view, this had significantly affected the government's decision) by the 
placing of a major order for 600 locomotives by the Soviet government with 
German firms^^. The Cabinet accordingly, with some detailed criticism of 
the Soviet proposals, agreed that they had "already suffered delay in this 
®atter" and that the issue should "now be forced to a conclusion". Subject
the Cabinet's amendments, Horne was authorised to conclude the Agreement.
27k
Two days later, 16 March 1921, Horne and Krasin signed the agreement and 
brought the extended negotiations to a close.
The agreement itself, in its final form, was described as
only a "preliminary Agreement" pending the "conclusion of a formal general
Peace Treaty between the governments of these countries by which their
economic and political relations shall be regulated in the future". It was
concerned simply with the "resumption of trade and commerce between the 
206countries" • The agreement was subject to the condition that each party 
should refrain from "hostile action or undertakings against the other and 
from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda direct 
or indirect against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian 
Sfcviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that KXXX the
Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt by military or diplom­
atic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the 
peoples of Asia in any form of hostile acfeion against British interests 
or the British Empire, especially in India and in the Independent State 
of Afghanistan. The British government gives a simi&ar undertaking to the 
Russian Soviet government in respect of the countries which formed part of 
the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent". All 
British subjects in Russia should be free immediately to return home if 
they wishei to do so, as should Russian citizens in Britain. The term 
"conducting any official propaganda" included the "giving by either party
207of assistance or encouragement to any propaganda outside its own borders" « 
Under the terms of the Agreement, trade was to be facilitated 
ty the removal of any form of blockade or other obstable, by the extension 
of foreign merchant marine status to the ships, crews and cargoes of either 
nation, by the clearance of the sea of mines, and by the exchange of 
officials and official agents with rights and facilities and protection 
for the purposes of commercial dealings. Private postal and telegraphic 
communication was to be restored, and documents and official papers 
concerned with trade should be treated as if issued by a recognized foreign 
government. The British government would not attempt to seize gold, money, 
or goods renXdered by the Soviet government to Britain in the course of 
trading relations. The "funds or other property" of the late Imperial and
Russian Provisional Governmebts in Britain, and of British government funds
and property in Russia, were guaranteed, pending the resolution of these 
questions in a general treaty, which would deal also with the questions 
of patents, trade marks, designs and copyright. The Agreement would come 
into force immediately, and both parties should "at once take all necessary 
measures to give effect to it". Following an initial period of twelve 
months, the treaty could be dissolved after a period of six months, upon 
receipt of notice of termination from either side. The contraventio# by 
either side of any of the provisions of the Treaty, however, or of any of 
the conditions outlined in fche Preamble, would immediately free the other
prtQ
side of its obligations •
A special Declaration was a}.so signed, providing for the "just 
settlement in the formal Treaty, envisaged in the Preamble", of the claims 
of either party or of its citizens towards the other, concerning property, 
rights, or the obligations of existing or previous governments. The Russian 
Soviet government, and the British government also, in the meantime accepted 
the obligation of payment of compensation to private citizens for goods or 
services rendered by them to Russia for which they had not been paid; the 
means of carrying out of which obligation would be determined by the general 
Treaty20 .^
Informing Moscow of the conclusion of the Agreement, Krasin 
noted that Persia and Asia Minor had been omitted from the Preamble, there 
remaining only a restraint in India and in the "Independent State of Afghan­
istan". In general the text "came considerably closer to our original draft".
The obligation not to support the successors of Denikin and Wrangel had
PI obeen included at the final meeting • i
The agreement, Krasin later wrote, was the "signal for the majority :
of states of Europe": by the end of 1921, Soviet Russia had concluded trade j
agreements also with Germany and Sweden, as well as with Finland, Estonia,
Pi 1 *
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Italy • ».
The "fundamental and decisive factor, defining the trade reflations towards |
us of capitalist Europe, was our negotiations and mutual relations with j ?
England". But even the government of Lloyd George, which had "perhaps of all 
the bourgeois governments of Europe the most realistically appraised the 
international situation", consistently hesimtated between the need for the 
0stablishment of tradd with the whole world, which was "impossible without
276
then inclusion of suuh a supplier of raw materials and bread, as Russia”,
i 211and the hope of the "immnent downfall of the Soviet order”.
The agreement itself ”with all its incompleteness., repres­
ented a major victory for Soviet diplomacy, significantly strengthening
212further efforts for the development and consolidation of trade" The 
agreement, it was true, might be broken off by either side; but as Krasin 
wrote in Pravda , the effect of the development of trade and the influence 
of the working class would make this difficult, in the absence of internat­
ional or domestic crises. Ifs conclusion was a "major success"; now "new 
paths, new tasks and new dangers" lay before Soviet Russia2^  He wrote to 
Moscow that in the following few months a real basis for unobstructed trade 
would be established2^.
Initial reaction in the Soviet press was somewhat less 
enthusiastic. The signing of the agreement itself, said the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade*s journal in its editorial columns, sA&d "nothing about how 
long it will last or of the opportunities which it opens before us". Claims 
from third parties were not covered, which if theXy were successful would 
deprive the agreement of meaning for Soviet Russia. The question of the 
realisation of Russian gold was "only partly solved", since only a limited 
quantity could be imported into Britain. There was no certainty that such 
judgements as in the case of Luther v. Sagor would be reversed; and "only 
when a favourable legal precedent is firmly established., will we be able 
to recogniae the Trade Agreement as the basis of our trade relations with 
England"21 .^
Much certainly depended upon the measures taken to implement 
the agreement, above all with regard to the exemption of Soviet goods
brought to Britain from legal action on the part of previous owners • On
12 May, however, the British Appeal Court, in view of the recognition ft# de 
facto of the Soviet government by Britain, reversed the earlier decision 
in the case of Luther v. Sagor and found in favour of the Soviet government, 
thus establishing a legal precedent. In June 1921, the Soviet government won 
a tewt case (Marshall v. Grinbaum) concerning its right to deposit gold in 
a British bank2^. On the basis of these rulings, Krasin sent a telegram to 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade which advised them that "bearing in mind, that
the London market is the most favourable for the sale of our raw material",
it was his opinion that it was now possible to "feegin immediately to send
217our ships with wood and other raw material for fArcos,,, •
Postal and telegraphic communications with the RSFSR were renewed
at thfe beginning of April, and in May 1921 the Soviet trade delegation
2l8was granted the right to issue visas to travellers to Russia • On 11 April
the Soviet government adopted a decree designed to encourage trade, opening
a number of ports for foreign merchant ships, and providing for the framing
219of suitable regulations . A Lloyds* agent visited Petrograd and inspected
220the facilities XKXXX at the port, upon which he reported favourably .
Finally, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement a British trade
mission was selected to represent the British government in Moscow, composed
of Mr R. Hodgson (Official Agent), Mr W. Peters (Assistant Agent) and four
221others. They arrived in Moscow on 31 July • No attempt was made, however,
to convene a conference to make a general peace with Russia. Lloyd George
expalined that the government considered that the ’’first step is to bring
the Trade Agreement into practical working. They are not prepared to make
proposals for a general conference until they have gained experienee of the
222working of this agreement'* •
Chamberlain warned that the amount of trade which there was any
chance of doing with Eussia could produce for the moment "no appreciable
2.27)effect upon our unemployment" . Nevertheless thd agreement, tolgther with 
legal decisions which followed it, was held to feave "established that essent­
ial legal basis for deals with the RSFSR without which no trade would be 
possible**^^; and trade in fact developed considerably. XXX
The agreement led directly to major purchases of coal in Britair 
to meet serious shortages of fuel in Soviet Russia; and in the period until 
the end of the year, nearly a quarter of a million tons of coTOi were 
bought in Britain alone^^. A major order for up to two million poods of gra-
pp/T
in was to be placed in Britain • The volume of Soviet foreign trade as a 
whole, and of Soviet trade with Britain correspondingly, increased consider­
ably. From January to September 1921 Britain accounted for 32.6% of Russian 
imports, and for 33»6% of Russian exports. For the year 1921 as a whole, 
Britain was the most important supplier of imports to Soviet Russia, account­
ing for 35.2% of all imports, and for an even greater proportion of food and 
textile imports; and was overall Soviet Russia’s main trading partner. The
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total turnover of Soviet trade with Britain increased by more than ten times
227in 1921 compared with 1920 • Most business was conducted on the Soviet
side through 'Arcos', which developed trading lifcks with fifteen countries, 
and whose turnover in 1921 amounted to £9 million, compared with £2.8 million
. , nor>228m  1920
The agreement did not, however, effect more than a very limited
and conditional improvement in British-Soviet relations. A number of
important questions, notably mutual debts and claims, were left unsolved.
While the agreement "recognized the Soviet government as the de facto
government of Russia", which, Lloyd George conceded, "undoubtedly it is",
the agents appointed by the Soviet government were not to be recognized as
229XKX diplomatic representatives of Russia by the British government .
It was, as Lloyd George explained to the House of Commons, "purely a trad$ng 
agreement". Claims were to be reserved fot discussion until a general settle­
ment of all the disputes between the governments was US XX made, when the
230government "meant to insist upon them" •
The governments motives for concluding the agreement were, 
however, clear enough. "The view of the trading community was that we 
ought to enter into it"; and neither he nor H o ^ e  had "heard any expression 
of opinion from any great trading community against the renewal of trade 
relations with Russia". On the contrary, Lloyd George found a ^general 
sense of relief that we had done it.. On the whole, the trading community 
came to the conclusion that it was the right thing to do under the circum­
stances".
This was not, however, the only reason for concluding the agreement: 
for there was a change in Russia, he believed, from the "wild extravagant 
Communism of a year or two years ago.. There is a recognition., that., that 
system is an impossible one". All the time "we are simply converting them", 
in what was a "gentlemanly process of instruction". An opponent of the scheme 
would find that ¥Lenin is a man after his own heart if he has only a little 
patience, if he does a little business with him, a little trading, a little 
exchange of comraodiitfXKXX. The moment they begin to realize they cannot 
run their country excdpt upon the same principles which have brought prosp-
erity to other countries, they will begin to realize that the only way to
r279
231
bring prosperity to Russia is to put an end to their wild schemes”
The agreement of part of the Cabinet had been secured, however, 
only on certain conditions, concerning essentially the Preamble and the 
terms of the letter handed to Krasin by Home at the same time as the 
agreement was signed. The letter, it was justly remarked, did "not appear 
to have anything to do with Htrade". Chamberlain explained that "under the 
Preamble of the Trade Agreement, the Soviet government expressly undertook 
to refrain from propaganda against British interests in India and Afghan­
istan.. The letter handed to Mr. Krasin states the action required to be
taken by the Soviet government as an essential corollary of the 
232.Trade Agreement". - The conclusion of the Trade Agreement, the central 
concern of which was evidently with matters other than the development of 
trade, did not significantly alter the supremely political, and therefore 
conditional character of Anglo-Soviet relations. The trend which the 
negotiations had taken, however, from the latter part of 1920, and the 
conditions which now underlay the new agreement, did nevertheless 
suggest that the political antagonism, of which the negotiations and 
agreements were a manifestation, had been located elsewhere. If in 1919 
and for much of 1920 it had appeared that the bourgeois order was itself 
at stake in the deep crisis which then gripped Europe, by 1921 the relative 
stablization in Europe allowed the Cabinet fs attention to focus rather upon the 
emergence in the British colonies, especially in Asia, of a militant anti­
colonialist revolt. Imperial rule appeared to be under vigorous assault; 
and those who assaulted it often appeared to derive ideology, tactics and 
even (it was thought) their material resources from Bolshevik Russia. In 
such circumstances Soviet relations with the developing anti-colonial 
movement in the British colonies in Asia rapidly became central to Soviet- 
British relations as a whole. The Trade Agreement did not resolve that 
basic political antagonism: it re-stated it.
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84 Conference of Ministers,15 September 1920, Cab 51(20) Appendix IV minute 
2 (a), Cab 23/22
85 Cabinet Minutes 30 September 1920, Cab 53(20)2, Cab 23/22
86 Curzon to Chicherin,1 October 1920, 215561/N 38, in F.O. 371.5434*N4512,
20 December 1920; and DVPSSSR Vol iii pp242-4* For the Baku Congress
of the Peoples of the East (1-8 September 1920), see below.
87 ibid. The British note of 30 June (1 July) had in fact specified four
88 iB£adltlons-
8f Chicherin to Curzon, 6 October 1920, DVPSSSR Vol iii No 128 pp237-242
$8 Kkxsksxxx fca Kkxxbk transmitted by Krasin on 8 August (F.O. 371.5431.N70,
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90 Curzon to Chicherin, 9 October 1920, F.O. 371.5431.Nll8, p October 1920; 
and D7PSSSR Vol iii pp317-20
91 Chicherin to Curzon, 13 October 1920, DVPSSSR Vol iii No 133 pp258-9
92 DVPSSSR Vol iii No 144, 21 October 1920, p290; No 160, 30 October 1920, 
P307-8; protocol concerning the setting free of English prisoners of 
war in Baku, Tiflis 1 November 1920, DVPSSSR Vol iii No 167 p313
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94 Cabinet Minutes 11 November 1920, Cab 60(20)1, Cab 23/22. Lloyd George 
had ’’waited", in Krasin’s words, ”to see if the Soviet order would 
fall apart under the blows of the Polish legions” (Voprosy Vneshnei 
Torgovli (Moscow 1928) p279)
95 Lansbury, George: What I saw in Russia (London 1920) xiii
96 ibid xv,22,27 '
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98 Lansbury to Lloyd George, telegramjl4i|C$ebruary 1920, Lloyd George Papers '
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According to Mrs Pankhurst (Soviet Russia as I Saw It (London 1921) 
pl65) Lansbury's first telegram to England was regarded "with amaze­
ment" in revolutionary Russia. It was "regarded as extraordinary that 
a man who is supposed to be a leader of British progress and enlight­
enment, should single out as the first matter for rejoicing, the fact 
that, though bread may be lacking, there is still gold on the domes of 
the churches, and poor peaple are still held by chains of ignorance 
and superstition under the influence of the reactionary church".
He was nevertheless considered a "sincere man" (pl66)#
99 Evening Standard 3 April 1920 (copy in LansburJ Papers Vol 8 No 106); 
Herald 20 March 1920; Times 22 March 1920
100 Wells, H.G.: Russia in the Shadows (London 1920) pp67,69,11,62,64
101 Ransome, Arthur: Six Weeks in Russia in 1919 (London 1919) vi,viii.
His reports appeared in the Manchester Guardian and the Daily News. 
Ransome was better known as a writer of such stories for children as 
'The Chinese Puzzle1, 'Swallows and Amazons' and 'The Imp,the Elf and 
the Ogre1.
102 Goode, W.T.: Bolshevism at Work (London 1920). His papers and memoranda 
were seized on his return and placed under official embargo (p5)«
Colonel Malone was another visitor in 1919 (The Russian Republic 
{.London 1920)).
103 Pankhurst, E. Sylvia: Soviet Russia as I Saw It (London 1921) pl84
104 British Labour Delegation to Russia, 1920, Report (London 1920) p6,27,29
105 ibid p6
106 ibid p85
107 Snowden, Mrs Ethel: Through Bolshevik Russia (London 1920) pll. She 
had returned, a writer in the Fortnightly Review observed, "firmly 
Slugged of the superiority of the traditional English methods to 
those of Bolshevik Russia" (Fortnightly Review Voll09 January 1921 p72 
RussfrM, Bertrand: Theory and Practice of Bolshevism (London 1920) p7 
Pankhurst bp.cit. pl65j~~Nineteenth Century and After Vol 88 December 
1920 p901. The series of articles in the Times began on 30 September 
1920; and according to the introduction provided by the paper it 
constituted an "indictment of the tyranny of the Bolshevist minority".
289
111 Turner, ’Shat we Saw in Russia*, Labour Leader 17 June 1920
112 ibid
113 the Message appeared in the Times 11 June 1920, and in the Call 17 June
1920 p7
111* Times 11 June 1920
115 Times 8 July 1920, 10 June 1920, An article by Turner appeared in the 
Yorkshire Post 10 June 1920; and one by Williams in the Call 8 July 
1920. However 'extreme* the remarks of the Labour delegates in Britain, 
those with which their hosts greeted them must have proved a source 
of some embarrassment, A reception arranged by the Trade Union Council 
of the Province of Petrograd took place on 12 May, the day after the 
delegates' arrival. Lozovsky, in his speecft of welcome, declared that 
the Russian workers would share their revolutionary experience with 
the delegates, and fehare theirs. They would not "hide from you tha fact 
that in the English labour movement we feel nearest to those that stand 
for direct action, for the revolutionary class struggle, the Soviet 
system and the Social Revolution through the dictatorship of the 
proletariat". Zipervich, seconding the toast,thought that the time was 
"not far when we shall gather under the banner of the Third Internation­
al, not only in order to get acquainted with each other, but also in 
order to enter together upon the final decisive fight against world 
imperialism". Turner, who gamely replied on behalf of the delegation, 
admitted that "hot all" members of the British labour movement were 
"class consciius, but they all heartily support the struggle for freedom". 
The proceedings concluded with the adoption of a resolution which 
expressed "intense hope that English labour will quickly emancipate 
itself from the superstition and tradition of a revolution by peaceful 
means and that with an iron hand they may sweep the imperialist masters 
out of their country. That is the answer, that is the help the Russian 
workers expect from their English brothers" (Petrograd Trade Union 
Council: The British Labour Delegation (Petrograd 1920)). This pamphlet, 
with other material, has been preserved in the British Museum, having 
apparently been deposited there by the Delegation.
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^7 Keeling, H.V.: Bolshevism (London 1920) vii 

























Government publications on Russia in these years, it has been noted,
"seem generally to have been attempt* to counteract Opposition propag­
anda" (Vogel, Ron: Breviate of British Diplomatic Blue Books 1919-39 
(Toronto 1963) xii. The remarkable compilation 'A Collection of Reports 
on Bolshevism*, which appeared in April 1919, has already been noted. 
Committee to Collect Information on Rissia: Interim Report (Parliamentary 
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Lenin: Polnibe Sobranie Sochinenii Vol 42 pp97-8 
Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli p279
Soviet archival source, cited in Shishkin, V.Al: Sovyetskoe Gosudarstvo 
1 Strany Zapada v 1917-1923 gg (Hum Leningrad 1969) pl85
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col 1516, 20 October 1920
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145 Daily News 18 June 1920 ; Krasin to Moscow, Soviet archival source 
cited in Shishkin op.cit. pl86
146 Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli p251, 252; and Soviet archival source 
cited in Shishkin op.cit. 186
147 Times 29 September 1920; Shishkin op.cit. pl87
148 Cabinet Minutes 21 September 1920, Cab 52(20)6, Cab 23/22
149 Krasin to Lloyd George, 4 October 1920, Lloyd George Papers F58/2/1, 
and DVPSSSR Vol iii 123 pp228-232
150 Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli (Moscow 1928) p279 - 80
151 Glasgow Herald 29 December 1920
152 Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli (Moscow 1928) p280
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received 11 November 1920, F.O. 371.5431.N2266. Gregory noted in a
minute on 12 November that this note did "not add anything materially, 
except in insolence", to Krasin’s note of 9 November. He conceded that 
it was "more than possible that the Soviet Government could make it 
eiSiSiify unpleasant for us in Georgia and Armenia and in Persia and 
Asia generally, if the trade negotiations were definitely broken off".
The resumption of political fealtions, however, would come, "if unfortun­
ately it has to come", at a "considerably later stage".
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example became public when on 28 February 1921 the Herald reproduced 
a forged Pravda which, it declared, the Special Branch was having 
produced and distributed in Russia. The Home Secretary admitted the 
truth of the charge, and regretted its occunence, in the House of 
Commons on 3 March 1921. The matter does not/ appear, however, to have 
been considered or approved by the Foreign Office. On 16 November (the 
day before the Cabinet meeting at which Lloyd George made his remark)
Mr Tallents reported to London that he had received ’’some hundreds” of 
copies of forged Pravdas by official courier. It contained many statements 
about England, he noted, for instance that there were few Communists 
there. It was ”well printed on good paper” and he did ’’not think that 
the most ignorant Russian would have supposed it to be genuine”, when 
able to compare it with the bad paper of the Bolshevik journals. He
thought the exercise an ’’entire waste of money”. Leeper wrote to Basil
Thomson suggesting that he might be able to throw some light on the 
origin of the papers in question, and recommending the abandonment of 
such efforts (F.O. 371.5446.N2507, 16 November 1920). Thomson replied 
that the paper had been paid for from White Russian funds. But how then, 
a Foreign Office minute observed, had it come to be in the official 
diplomatic bag? (F.O. 371.5446.N3136, 25 November 1920).
165 Cabinet Minutes 17 November 1920, Cab 61(20)6, Cab 23/23
166 Cabinet Minutes 18 November 1920, Cab 62(20)4, Cab 23/23
167 Parliamentary Debates Vol 134 col 2074, 18 November 1920
168 Conference of Ministers 25 November 1920, Cab 65(20) Appendix I 
Krasin discussed the Vanderlip concession with Farbman in an interview 
in the Manchester Guardian on 10 December 1920 (DVPSSSR Vol iii No 216 
PP 376-8). Vanderlip was reported to have broadcast on a programme 
from Petrograd on 22 October that he had been granted a sixty-year 
concession on Kamchatka from the spring of 1921, in spite b|£- the fact 
that his economic theories were ’’dramatically opposed to those of the 
Soviet government”. He considered their position strong, and thought 
that ’’all the combined Governments of Europe” could ’’not break up or 
tear down the present Russian Government” (reported in F.O. 371.5439.
N962,21 October 1920). A report from a confidential source reached the
Foreign Office that the agreement involved ’’several hundred million dollar 














Cabinet Minutes 26 November 1920, Cab. 64(20)3» Cab. 23/23. A Draft 
Trade Agreement had in faot been prepared as early as September (the 
text as revised by the President of the Board of Trade is in Cabinet 
Paper C.P. 2086, 30 September 1920, Cab. 24/114)* Immediately before 
the Cabinet meeting on 17 November, Churchill had submitted a memorandum 
in which he stated in conclusion: "Ought we., to sustain this deadly
conspiracy with the favour and countenance of the British Government?" 
(Memorandum, 16 October 1920, Churchill Papers C 16/53• He had had to 
be persuaded by Birkenhead against resignation: Churchill Papers C 22/3;
cited in Gienny, M.V.: The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, March 1921 
Journal of Contemporary History V.2 (1970) PP* 75»76). Curzon thought 
that the "renewed lease of life" which the proposed agreement would 
give to the Bolsheviks would be "consecrated to no other purpose more 
unswervingly than to the subversion and destruction of the British 
connection with the Indian Empire" (Memorandum, 14 November 1920,
Cabinet Paper C.P. 20999 Cab. 24/llfy He refused to have anything to 
do with the subsequent negotiations.
Minutes of a meeting at the Board of Trade, 29 November 1920, between 
British representatives and Krasin and KLishko, P.O. 371*5434*3620,
2 December 1920. The draft was handed by Wise to Krasin. The text 
is in P.O.371*5434*N4655» 22 December 1920, reprinted in DOBFP Vol. viii
pp. 869-878.
Krasin to Wise, 30 November 1920, DVPSSSR Vol. iii No. 196 pp.351-3 
ibid
Chicherin to Curzon, 4 December 1920, DVPSSSR Vol. iii No. 207> PP*367-9*
DBFP Vol. viii pp.869-878, P.O. 371*5434*N4655> 22 December 1920.
Maxse, 1 Summary of Relations between H.M.G. and the Soviet Government 
from September 12, 1920, to December 22, 1920*, 30 December 1920,
P.O. 371*5435*N4997> reprinted in DBFP Vol. viii pp.866-869.
Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli (Moscow 1928) p282.
DBFP Vol. viii (above note 175) p*868.
DBFP Vol. viii (note 175 above) p868.
Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli (Moscow 1928) p281.
Times 22 December 1920, DBFP ibid pp.868,867> Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei 
Torgovli (Moscow 1928) p.281. The legal representatives of Luther and Co. 
approached the Foreign Office for a statement of the position of the
29k
Soviet government in Britain. Curzon wrote to them, in a letter which 
was endorsed by the Attorney Gdneral and cited in Court, that E.M.G. 
had ’'never officially recognized the Soviet Government in any way"
(Curzon to Linklaters and Paines, 27 November 1920, F.O. 371.5kk7.N2852, 
20 November 1920). The decision, it was noted in the Foreign Office, 
was an "extremely important" one. Gregory thoggtfcj- however, that it 
might have the "unfortunate effect of strengthening the hands of those 
who want us to recognize the Soviet Government, inasmuch as without 
such recognition the Trade Agreement will be largely ineffective. The 
advocates of the Trade Agreement will automatically becoMfc the advocates 
of recognition". The reaction of the Herald of 22 December (which, with 
the Times report of the same date, was included in the file) appeared 
to confirm this prediction. The government, it stated, "must be forced 
to swallow its false pride and face the facts. It must allow ferade tfith 
Russia, and to do so it must recognize the existing Russian Government" 
(F.O. 371.5*fif7*NJ+666, 22 December 1920; minutes by Shearman, 23 December, 
and Gregory, Zk December 1920).
181 Parliamentary Debates Vol 136, col 1876-7, 22 December 1920
182 Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli {Moscow 1928) p28l
183 Krasin to Lloyd George, 20 December 1920, DVP Vol iii Bo 231 pp399-40i+
I8if Meeting of British Ministers and the Russian Trade Delegation, 21
December 1920, F.O. 371.5435.$k777, 2k December 1920; and DBFP Vol viii 
No 102 pp879-892
185 ibid
186 Cabinet Minutes 22 December 1920, Cab 75(20)2, Cab 23/23. A draft of 
the accompanying letter as of 26 November 1920 is in Cabinet Paper 
C.P, 2171, Cab 2V115
18? Parliamentary Debates Vol 136, cols 1866-9, 22 December 1920 (incorrectly 
dated in Gienny art.cit. p80). As Maxse pointed out (’The Political 
Aspect of Trading with Russia', 22 November 1920, F.O. 371.5^3^2966) 
if trade were successful, the Soviet government would have to "modify 
its economic practice", leading to a "very modified and much less danger­
ous Soviet". It was "more than probably that the days of the Communist 
Government as such will be numbered".
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Parliamentary Debates Vol 136 cols 1872-5, 22 Becember 1920
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X89 A communique issued by N.K.I.B., which appeared in the Soviet press on 
30 December 1920, announced that sine e^iritiih government was ’’obviously 
refusing to acknowledge the obligations which it had accepted in the 
July agreement", the Soviet government had decided to recall Krasin 
for the purposes of consulwtation (DVPSSSR Vol iii No240 PP437-8;p438) • 
An exchange of accusatory notes took place: Chicherin to Curzoh 31 
December 1920 (F.O, 371.6853.N5, 1 January 1921X, and DVBSSSR Vol iii 
No 242 pp440-l); Curzon to Chicherin 6 January 1921 (F.O.ibid, DVPSSSR 
ibid pp46l-2); Chicherin to Curzon 9 January 1921 (F.O. 371.6853.N46I 
11 January 1921, DVPSSSR Vol iii No 254 pp458-46l). The test of the 
draft trade agreement which Krasin took to Moscow, dated 6 January 
1921, is in Cabinet Paper C.P. 2431, Cab 24/118.
190 The meeting was held of 26 January 1921. Karpova, F.R. : Zaklyuchitel*ny 
etap Angiho-Sovyetskykh peregovorov 1920-1921 gg. Vestntt LGU (Seriya 
istorii i literatiry) No 14, 1962, Vyp. 3 p43
191 Lenin: Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii Vol 43 p20
192 Chicherin to Curzon, 4 February 1921, F.O. 371.6853.N1665, 7 February 
1921, and DVPSSSR Vol iii No 284 pp501-6.
193 Curzon*s remarks are in DBFP Vol xii pp832-3, and in a minute on 
F.O. 371.6853.N1997, 14 February 1921
194 Parliamentary Debates Vol 138 col 13, 15 February 1921
195 Parliamentary Debates Vol 138 cols 251,419, 17 February 1921
196 Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli (Moscow 1928) p248,249
197 Parliamentary Debates Vol 138 col 780, 22 February 1921
198 Parliamentary Debates Vol 138 col 1391, 28 February 1921
199 Chicherin to Curzon, 21 February, F.O. 371.6853.N2448, 22 February 1921, 
and DVPSSSR Vol iii No 299 ?p530; Curzon to Chicherin, 25 February 1921, 
DBFP Vol xii p834
200 Parliamentary Debates Vol 139, col 12, 7 March 1921
201 Parliamentary Debates Vol 139, cols 537,538, 9 March 1921
202 Parliamentary Debates Vol 139 col 480, 9 March 1921
203 N.K.I.D. Statement, 9 March (published in Izvestiya 11 March) 1921,
DVPSSSR Vol iii No 326 p582
204 Cabinet Minutes 14 March 1921, Cab 13(21)1, Cab 25/24. Curzon found
Krasin»s proposed amendments to the British draffc "wholly unacceptable", 
and refused to participate further in the matter (minute, 8 March 1921, 














Two intelligence reports dealing with Kronstadt were rewciived on 
14 March 1921, Mr Kidston reported from Helsingfors that according 
to agents, the Revolutionary Committee there described themselves as 
’’true upholders of the Soviet system” (Kidston to F.O., 11 received 
lk March 1921 (Secret), F.O. 371.6847.N3223, lk March 1921). The 
Secret Intelligence Service offered the opinion of an Experienced 
agent*, who had made his way into the garrison. He reported that the 
Communists who had been arrested were to be released; that the feeling 
there was ”very confident*, but anti-White”. The Revolutionary Committee 
was composed of seventeen, of whom three were "very left. The present 
tone is non-party, but probably Soviet” (S.I.S. Report 86 (Secret), 
lk March 1921, F.O. 371.6847.N3296, 15 March 1921).
Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli (Moscow 1928) p249 o c v c
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Krasin to Chicherin, 16 March 1921, DVPSSSR Vol iii No 345, p6l5 
Krasin: Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli (new ed., Moscow 1970) p253,255 
ibid p255
Pravda 23 March 1921 (reprinted in ibid pp277-80).
Krasin to Chicherin, 19 March 1921, Soviet archival source cited in
Shishkin op.cit. p254
Vestnik NKVT No 2-3, 1921,pp4-5
judfgment of the Court of Appeal, 12 May 1921, by Lord Justice Bankes, 
who ruled that in view of the recognition de facto of the Soviet 
government by H.M.G. (to which effect a letter from the Foreign Office 
had been adduced in evidence), the acts of that Government "must be 
treated here with all the respect due to the acts of a duly recognized 
foreign sovereign State”. Mr Justice Peterson ruled dm the Chancery 
Division on 13 May 1921 that the gold brought to Britain on behalfl of 
the Soviet government was not attachable in respect of obligations of
former Russian Governments (cases cited in Coates op.cit. p53-4)
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217 Krasin to Lenin and N.K.V.T. 6 June 1921, Soviet archival source 
cited in Shishkin op.cit. p255
218 Godovoi Otchet N.K.I.D. k VIII S'*ezdy Sovetov za 1920-1921 gg (Moscow
1922) p63
219 'Concerning measures, connected with the signature of the trade agree­
ment between the RSFSR and England*, 11 April 1921, DVPSSSB Vol iv
No 44, PP59-61
220 Ekonomicheskaya ZhiznI 14 August 1921, and Soviet archival sources 
cited in Shishkin op.cit. p2%
221 Parliamentary Debates Vol 143, col 1578, 23 June 1921; Izvestiya 
5 August 1921. Hodgson’s instructions are contained in Curzon to 
Hodgson, 22 June 1921, N6993/3779/38, in F.O. 418.55 (Confidential 
Print), No 113 ppl44-5
222 Parliamentary Debates Vol 140 col 111, 5 April 1921, and Col 709,
11 April 1921
223 Parliamentary Debates Vol 140 col 111, 5 April 1921
224 Shtein, Vestnik N.K.V.T. No 7-8, 1921, 1 October 1921
225 Chicherin to Krasin, 4 April 1921, DVPSSSR Vol iv No 30 pp44-5, 
and p771 note 15
226 Lenin and Krasin to the official representative of the RSFSR in
Britain, 7 May 1921, DVPSSSR Vol iv No 74 pl09
227 Vestnik N.K.V.T. No 4-5, November-December 1921, p46,47; Vestnik NKVT
No 2(7) 1922; Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR 1918-1940 (Moscow I960) p21,
where imports and exports are stated to have increased from respectiv­
ely just over six million roubles and nil to 9,344,OOO^and^61,752,000
roubles (it 1913 prices).
228 Soviet archival source cited in Shishkin op.cit. p257
229 Parliamentary Debates Vol 139 col 2506, 22 March 1921, and col
2198, 21 March 1921 (Harmsworth).
230 Parliamentary Debates Vol 139 cols 2506-8, 22 March 1921
231 ibid cols 25o8, 2509, 2510, 2511
3^2 Parliamentary Debates Vol 13&9, C°1 1696, 17 March 1921; and col 23X36,
22 March 1921 (Cecil and Chamberlain respectively). Atk the meeting 
0* 16 March Sir Sidney Chapman handed Krasin the letter "on behalifi of 
the British government which drew the attention of the Soviet govern-
IF
298
ment to events whose continuance would be regarded as a breach of the
understandings in the Agreement and which required the Soviet Government
to give immediate attention to them" (16th meeting of British and Russian
representatives, Minutes, 16 March 1921, F.O. 371.6878.N4032,2 April 1921).
The letter* and the text of the Agreement, were circulated as Cabinet Paper 
f (W at*. /* fi.o. ?ni. kt&sn-. /vs 3£, n riA+tk it*.
C.P. 272.1f, 16 March 1921, Cab 2^/121, The letter appeared in the Times on
17 March 1921, but appearxs not to have been officially published.
Chapter Five: Imperial Crisis and Soviet Russia
The Russian Krade Agreement was evidently concerned only in part with the 
development of trade between the two countries. The requirement contained in 
the preamble, upon the fulfilment of which the Agreement was stated to be 
conditional, specified thA cessation by the Soviet government of "any attempt 
by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encour­
age any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British 
interests or the British Empire, especially in Indian3x^?he Independent State 
of Afghanistan"^. The countries which had been named by the British government, 
the Cabinet was told, were "those bordering on India, or specially concerning 
us from the point of view of its defence". The "guiding principle throughout 
should be the safeguarding of our Empire in the East" • The action which was 
required of the Soviet government in consequence of the signature of the 
Agreement was set out in some detail in the accompanying letter which was 
handed to Krasin at the same time as the Agreement was signed, and which, 
as Lord Robert Cecil justly observed, did "not appear to have anything to do 
with trade "^ .
The letter contained a recital of "facts., characterising the activity 
ofnthe Soviet Government in India and in Afghanistan, not conforming to the 
requirements of the Treaty and requiring immediate cessation if this Agree­
ment (was) to be observed in good faith,,if. The Soviet government in its 
official declarations and in the official press had "made n3> secret" of the 
fact that the "main aim of its policy in recent years" had been the overthrow 
of British rule in India. The British government had for some time been 
aware of "intrigues, which are being carried on by various means and in 
various directions by the Soviet government, by its agents, by people acting 
under its instructions and by its supporters for the achievement of this 
aim". Soviet negotiations with Afghanistan had been directed towards securing 
a "means of disturbing the peace in India through Afghanistan"; and the right 
fcraHKjiHrJE unimpeded movement through the country had been sought 
in order to bring rifles and ammunition to the border tribes which inhabited 
the British side of the border. Relations had also been established with
the tribal leaders most hostile to Britain. Many Indian rebels, also, were
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now working in Bolshevik institutions and with Bolshevik money "in order 
to sow unrest in India and to encourage anti-British feeling in the count­
ries bordering india, mainly in Afghanistan’1. Such people who had arrived 
in Kabul were there ’’with the aim of establishing contact with disloyal 
elements in India”. M.N. Roy, the Indian Communist, had established a 
"forward base for work in India" at Tashkent, with a political department 
and a military-technical centre. If a revolutionary base as far removed 
from the Indian border afe Tashkent could "not threaten India with serious 
danger", it was nevertheless proposed to transfer it to Kabul "as soon as 
circumstances allowed". Emissaries had already been sent to India "for the 
study on the spot of the possibility of revolutionary work, in the army 
or in the peasant or industrial population, or by means of the organization
of extremist political schools on a basis favourable to Bolshevik and
5
revolutionary plans’* •
While the British government did not object to a Soviet-Afghan 
agreement which concerned the "normal form of neighbourly and commercial 
relations", the proposal to grant money, ammunition and aeroplanes to ghe 
Afghan government, and to establish Soviet consulates on the eastern 
border of the country, were declared to be "exclusively., measures hostile 
to British interests’*. The Red Army was believed to have been instructed 
to raise the red flag on the Pamir plateau, as an "indication to the Indian 
peoples that their liberation is near"; and there was reason to believe 
that a "plan of action" was envisaged in the area. Enough had been said, 
it was considered, to "indicate the general character of the activity of 
the Soviet government on the cessation of which H.M.G. must insist as an 
essential condition of the conclusion of any kind of agreement between 
the two governments" •
The mounting wave of unrest in British colonies after the World 
War gave the government every motive for wishing to secure safeguards to 
ncheck Bolshevist propaganda in the East" , which there as in Europe 
niight be expected to stimulate unrest where it did not actually give rise 
to it. The defeat of the interventionary forces allowed the Bolsheviks to 
extend their control to areas of Asia often directly adjoining those in 
which the British government had a direct interest. The question of Soviet
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policy in the East, &8££M?8§ly, and especially that of revolutionary 
propaganda , became an increasingly important issue in the trade negotiat­
ions: perhaps even, as some studies have suggested, that of greatest 
importance^. It had been , equally, an important determinant of British
policy during the period of intervention. Particularly in the south of
Russia and the Caucasus, British policy was broadly concerned to secure
a federal settlement in Russia, and the continued independence of the
states on the southern border of the former Russian Empire, The British
government was not in a position to provide a siffiKisHt number of troops
and munitions sufficient to ensure such an outcome: it could attempt only
to influence events. There was, of course, much that was eminently
traditional in a policy designed to minimise the influence of the Russian
government in the Indian sub-continent. The faJM-reaching social changes
which had taken place in Soviet Russia, however, and the revolutionary
propaganda which sought to promote similar changes in the colonial world,
gave this perennial problem a disturbing new form. Lord d*Abernon, the
British Ambassador in Berlin and a member of the mission to Poland during
the 1920 crisis, wrote that Western civilization was "menaced by an
external danger which,, threatened a cataclysm equalled only by the fall
of the Roman Empire". This was particularly true when "judged from the
special standpoint of the British Empire.. England*s stupendous and vital
interests in Asia were menaced by a danger graver than any which existed
9in the time of the old Imperialistic regime in Russia" .
He was "personally very much afraid", Lloyd George told the 
Cabinet on 25 July 1919, "that a united Russia would be a great menace 
to us in the East". He would consider that the British government had 
failed in its war purposes, he wrote somewhat earlier to the Ambassador 
in Washington, '’unless by the end of the war Russia is settled on liberal, 
progressive and democratic lines'*"^ . He detired such an end not only from 
the point of view of the Russian people, but from that of " the peace of 
the world and the xssKxifc? peace and security of the Indian frontier"^.
The anti-Bolshevik forces which the government supported, however, proved 
unforthcoming on the question of the right to self-determination of states 
which had formerly been part of the Russian Empire. Two months later Lloyd
George broached the question of the "ultimate aim of British policy in 
connection with Russia". It might, he thought, be "in the interests of
302
the British Empire to aim gfH a limited Russia under any government, wheth­
er it was Bolshevik or anti-Bolshevik”. Quoting Lord Beaconsfield on the 
Russian threat, he declared that "the future of the British Empire might 
depemdjon how the Russian situation developed, ahd he personally did not
view with equanimity the thought of a powerful Russia of 130 million 
11inhabitants" • To the House of Commons he expressed his doubts whether 
a reunited Rissia, which was^the aim of Denikin and Kolchak, was in the 
interests of the British Empire. Certainly, at least, it was true that 
it was not acceptable to the other anti-Bolshevik fores' . Denikin*s 
failure inverted the problem. His retreat, the C.I.G.S. told ministers, 
would "inevitably have reflex actions upon the British position in Persia 
and Afghanistan". It was agreed that ^Bolshevist activity in Persia and 
Central Asia was one of the most troublesome problems which the British 
Empire had to face"^.
Alarming reports began to reach the SXKXXKX Foreign Office from 
its local representatives. Chicherin&s assistant, Dr Narimanov, a Baku 
doctor, was reported to have written to the Azerbaidjani government urging 
them to join a "great movement against England"; and the Tashkent Soviet 
had written to the Georgian Prime Minister to the same effect^. The text 
was submitted to London of a proclamation "widely circulated through 
Tfanscaucasia" under the signature of Chicherin and Narimanov addressed 
to the "workmen and peasants of Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaidjan"^. 
Wardrop from Tiflis reported that the Bolsheviks were "sending numerous 
agents to Caucasus and Persia with large funds..*1; and 1500 Bolshev­
iks were known to have left Baku for Persia. The Foreign Office in reply 
found the development a "highly dangerous" one^. Unless some "speedy 
action" were takdn, Wardrop urged two days later, there was a "grave risk
of the crushing of Transcaucasia by (the) Bolsheviks, who will then work
17their will in Persia and Transcaspia and beyond" . Urgent entreaties were 
received from the Persian government for assistance lest the country be
"overrun by Bolshevism**-^. jt was agreed that arms, munitions and if 
possible food should be sent to the Transcaucasian States. Transcaucasia 
was the "bridge which must be defended by the Allies to prevent (the) union" 
Bolsheviks and Moslems, who were believed to have concluded an "agreement 
••• to attack the East**. It was a question of "preventing (a) Bolshevik
invasion of the East", following the defeat of Denikin^"?
Churchill developed this theme in a speech which he made in
January 1920. The Allies, he said, might abandon Russia, but Russia would
"not abandon them". The Russian bear "ranges widely over the enormous
countries which lead us to the frontiers of India, disturbing Afghanistan,
disturbing Persia, and creating far to the southward great afeitation and
unrest among the millions, hundreds of millions, of our Indian population,
POwho have hitherto dwelt in peace and tranquillity under British rule" •
As Lord Hardinge put it in a letter to Paris, Britain was "anxious to
stabjl/ijize the political and economic situation in the Caucasus, in order
that it may serve as a barrier against a possible Bolshevik military advance
instead of becoming a free passage for communication between the Bolsheviks
and Pan-Islamic forces and possibly necessitating our abandoning the greater
21part of Asia and concentrating on the defence of India" •
How such a barrier was to be constructed was, however, by no means
clear. Henry Wilson attempted to demonstrate, at a meeting in the foreign
Office, the military impossibility of supporting Georgia and Azerbaidjan,
despite what he considered a "ridiculous wire" from Curzon urging this
policy, and despite his belief that the areas concerned wo#ld in its default 
22"go Bolshevik" • Wilson attended a meeting of Ministers in Paris on 16
and 18 January which discussed the problems raised by tne fcetreat of
Denikin and the consequent threat to the Caucasus and the Caspian. The 
Caspian, it was stated, was the "pivot of our whole strategical position 
in the East". Its capture by the Bolsheviks would "bring about the final 
downfall of Denikin, turn the frontier of the Caucasus, expose North Persia 
to attack, and immediately increase the resources of the Bolsheviks by 
giving them control of the oil and other produce of these regions. Churchill 
doubted whether it was right to construct the line of defence against a 
Bolshevik advance through the Caucasus, thereby leaving the Denikin counti^y 
"outside the ring fence and inside the Russian bearpit". Curzon pointed out, 
however, the "real difficulty" which "was that the anti-Bolshevik Russians 
had failed". It was agreed that Churchill’s pgfijn was not feasible, but that
enquiries should be made as to whether it would be possible to "galvanise 
the Caucasus people into permanent independence and opposition to the
Bolsheviks*' ^
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At a further meeting two days later Churchill urged that the govern­
ment had a "supreme interest in the Caucasus and the Caspian in connection 
with th^defence of India". Wilson reported, however, that he had traced 
the history of Georgia back to the fcrear 1212, and "could not find any case 
where they had not given in to every enemy.. Their record was one of 
constant cowardice". Two divisions of troops was the "absolute minimum" 
which would be required for such an operation, and neither he nor Marshal 
Foch would be willing to undertake it. "He could not advise action with 
less than two Divisions and it was impossible for us to dtind that force". 
Churchill retorted that control of the Caspian was an "essential element 
in our whole position in Central Asia.. Its loss would lay open to the 
Bolshevists not o$ly North Persia but the Caucasus and the^ountry to the 
South, and would open up a fresh and direct line from Russia towards 
Afghanistan".
in the near future be fighting desperately for the retention of our 
Eastern Empire". Curzon added that "if command of the Caspian was lost we 
might find that before long our whole Eastern Empire was roaking, but if 
we could dominate the Caspian it might alter thw whole situation in the 
East". Wilson replied that the "real question" in his opinion was the 
ddfence of India and Mesopotamia, which was not affected by the command 
of the Caspian unless a very advanced line were held, which he himself 
would not choose. Lloyd George added the "no-one present had suggested for
a moment that the British coflld send three divisions". Hd thought himself
. 24
that the danger of Bolshevism was "not military, but political" •
The Supreme Council, nevertheless, decided to grant de facto recognit­
ion to Armenia (without predudice to changes of frontier), as it had done 
to Georgia and Azerbaidjan. No Power, however, the Foreign Office was told, 
had been prepared to supply the three divisions which the Inter-Allied
25Military Council had XBKHHHKHrtKd considered necessary for their defence . 
In the circumstances the Foreign Office could only disappoint those 
Caucasian states which sought more tangible evidence of the support of 
the British government. On 3 March Curzon told Wardop in Tiflis that the 
Treasury was not prepared to give a loan to the Caucasian republics. The 
Armenian and Georgian governments were advised to direct their attentions
Long believed that our Eastern Empire" was "greater
than it had ever been before. If we did not take immediate steps we might
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rather to the City. The following month Curzon made it clear that there
could be "no question of our giving Georgia and Azerbaidjan active military
27support in case of an attack upon them by Soviet forces". Azerbaidjan, 
deprived of Allied military support, was declared a Soviet Republic in 
April 1920, and Armenia became a Soviet Republic the following November.
The British government, Curzon wrote to Tiflis, was "not indifferent to 
the fate of Georgia"; indeed, the Cabinet was "strongly in favour of
her independence". "Other burdens", however, were "such that they cannot
28say what practical form their sympathy is likely to take". Georgia
accordingly was declared a Soviet Republic in February 1921. Colonel Stokes
wrote to Curzon that the British mission had been successfully withdrawn.
All that had remained to indicate the governments support was a typewriter 
29and a sunbeam car.
The opening of negotiations with the Russian Trade delegation 
offered a more promising line of approach. If it was not feasible militarily 
to defend the borderlands of the Eastern Empire against Bolshevik advances, 
it might nevertheless prove possible to limit the Bolshevik danger by 
requiring that they offer undertakings to their future conduct in return 
for the opening to them of the European market. The Cabinet, accordingly, 
reviewing the withdrawal of British forces from northern Persia and the vulnerable 
position in which this placed Persia and Mesopotamia, found the question 
"closely connected with our general policy towards Soviet Russia". The 
War Office had recommended withdrawal from Batum; but this, it was objected, 
was "tantamount to an invitation to the Bolsheviks to enter and make themselves 
master of Northern Persia, the friendly Persian Government would then fall", 
and there would be an end to the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement which "without 
infringing the independence of Persia had been concluded with the object 
of establishing decent conditions and providing a barrier against Bolshevism".
^he hopes that the Anglo-Persian Agreement might serve as a model for the 
admini strati on of Egypt and Mesopotamia would disappear; in time the Bolsheviks 
would either penetrate to the borders of Mesopotmai, or Persia, "permeated by 
Bolshevism, would go rotten"; and the outcome would be to "weaken our whole 
position in the East". The agreement with Persia had placed no obligation upon the 
government to defend Persia, but this was an "obligation of self-interest which we 
could not afford to set aside, since Persia was a great key position of our
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Imperial defence”• Against this Churchillian view it was argued that there 
was in fact no evidence that the Bolsheviks had designs on Persia; they had 
considerable domestic problems, and communications were bad. It was "more 
probable that they would seek their aims by means of propaganda”, which a 
British pcciipation could not prevent. The government moreover must regognize 
that ”we had not the military forces available to enable us to keep the 
Bolsheviks out”.
It was agreed that policy in North Persia was "intimately connected 
with our general policy towards the Bolsheviks ” which was ”at present 
indefinite and somewhat paradoxical”. The Bolsheviks, on the one hand, were 
"making difficulties” for the government "all over the East”, in Turkey^ 
the Caucasus, Persia, Turkestan, and Afghanistan, and had "not concealed 
their intention to create trouble for us in India”. On the other hand, trade 
negotiations with the Soviet government were shortly)to be initiated and 
Krasin, when he arrived, would be received by the Prime Minister and by 
the Foreign Office. It was "generally felt.ihat advantage should be taken 
of the forthcoming conversations with M. Krassin, if possible, as a condition 
of entering into trade relations, to effect an all-round settlement which 
would include the East.."-^.
Curzon expanded upon thisjtheme at a Conference of Ministers on 
28 May 1920. Any agreement in regard to trade, he thought, would be "imposs­
ible unless a general agreement on the political questions at issue with the 
Soviet government wdre arrived at. It was most desirable that a comprehensive 
arrangement should be aiiiSisS^ fciThe Conference was asked to remetober that 
the recdnt political situation gave H.M.G. an opportunity for driving a 
good bargain”^ 1. The Russian government, Curzon argued in a memorandum, was 
"threatened with complete economic disaster*, and he believed that it was 
"ready to pay almost any price for the assistance which we - more than anyone 
else - are in a position to give”. But the government could hardly consider 
coming to the rescue of the Bolsheviks without "exacting our price for it”.
That price, he thought, could "perhaps better be paid in a cessation of
CS(r<A.U Wt
Bolshevik hostility in parts of the world b£ important to us than the^exchange 
of commodities, the existence of which on any considerable sckie in Russia 
there is grave reason to doubt”^ .
The question of Soviet policy and propaganda in the East accordingly
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assumed a major role in the negotiations^. If guaranteSlr?r88uffe£ Soviet 
government, they might not be observed; but equally, there was at least 
a possibility that Soviet policy might be influenced by an agreement, while 
there was none whatsoever in the absence of one. The accompanying letter 
would allow the conduct of the Soviet government arising from the agreement 
to be specified in some detail; while the agreement itself might be termin­
ated if its conditions were considered not to have been observed. Afghanistan, 
India, Persia and the Caucasus had been mentioned as countries in which 
anti-British propaganda must be abandoned, Horne told the Cabinetjln December 
1920. Krasin had however objected to the inclusion of the Caucasus (the 
independence of which the Cabinet had thought in June the Soviet government 
might be induced to recognize-^) on the grounds that it had formerly been
part of the Russian Empire, and Horne did "not intend to press for specific
35mention” of this area^ . The Preamble of the Agreement, as has been noted, 
required the Soviet government to refrain from propaganda against British 
interests in India and Afghanistan; and the accompanying letter, as Chamberla­
in told the House of Commons, stated the ”action required to be taken as an 
essential corollary of the Trade Agreement”-^.
The National Review wondered "how the authors of the covering letter 
could reconcile themselves to the 1 Trade Agreement* - how the authors of the 
’Trade Agreement* ever consented to deliver this fulmination to their new­
found friends**. The answer, it thought, was "locked in the bosom of the 
Coalition**-^  . Curzon, admittedly, in a memorandum written the previous 
November, had described the Bolshevik regime as one which made ”no secret 
°f its intentions to overthrow our institutions everywhere and to destroy 
our prestige and authority, especially in Asia”. There was "overwhelming 
evidence that the one object at which the whole of their policy is and has 
been aimed is India”. The renewed lease of life which the proposed agreement 
vould give the Bolsheviks would be devoted above all to the "destruction of
•jQ
the British connection with the Indian Empire” • If he and his associates 
in the Cabinet had agreed to the conclusion of the Agreement, it was only 
ineofaraa it might restrain this activity and propaganda. As Leeper put it 
in a minute of 23 April (which was endorsed by Curzon) "If we care about 
***thing in the Trade Agreement, it is the possibility that it may stop 
Bolshevik propaganda against us in the East or elsewhere**-^. The Agreement
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had, indeed, been made explicitly conditional on such an outcome. The 
delicately-posed compromise which the Agreement thus represented was 
subjected to considerable strain in the months which followed.
The wave of mass unrest which affected the colonial world, and many British 
colonies, after the World War undoubtedly owed mihre to the war itself than 
to the Russian Revolution. The war, it has been suggested, produced a
ItO"complete transformation” in the attitude of Indians towards British rule •
India sent more than a million troops overseas during the war; and as the
war developed, ”so did her contribution”^. This, Lloyd George noted, gave
"force to the plea that the principle of government with the consent of the
governed should be extended to India”^ .  The war, moreover, had ostensibly
been fought in defence of the principles of national self-determination and
the rights of small nations. Britain could not, concluded the 1918 Report
on Indian Constitutional Reforms, ”deny to the people of India that for
A3which she is herself fighting in Europe" • These principles, with which 
the Fourteen Points appeared to identify the Allies, strengthened the
movement for independence in other countries also.
In Ireland, Balfour noted, the Sinn Fein movement, though ”based on 
no solid foundation”, had "gained a fictitious and sentimental strength 
from the movement which was spreading rapidly over the world in favour of 
nationality"^. Tilak wrote that not only India, but "every other country
in the world is, at this time, inspired with the new ideals of Freedom,
Liberty, Self-determination and Self-government, woing to the repeated public 
statements of European and American statesmen about the aims and objects of 
the the war"^.
The movement, launched in support of liberal ideals, became increas­
ingly a radical and anti-colonial one when it became cleatf that the implem­
entation of these ideals by the Allies after the war would be - outside of 
central Europe - of an extremely limited character. It emerged, in fact, 
that they were most likely to be implemented where an effective challenge 
was mounted to the imperial authority. It was still a "moot point", the New 
Statesman considered, whether the "shortest cut to an adult and self-govern- 
status" was "to be a good boy or a bad boy". India, it noted, had 
refeived self-government, while Burma, a "good boy", had not^.
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Reviewing the situation at the end of 1919, Henry Wilson noted in his 
diary that ’’the coming year looks gloomy. We are certain to have serious 
trouble in Ireland, Egypt and India”. He was concerned to transfer troops 
from Russia and Europe to these "coming storm centres” so that the "British 
Empire will be wellclothed and well defended against all the bangs and 
curses of the future"^. It was a period, moreover, not only of imperial 
crisis, but also one of the extension of Soviet Russian influence in the 
colonial world, and of the foundation of Communist Parties and the develop­
ment of radical mass movements there. It was not, perhaps, surprising that 
British-Soviet relations became increasingly involved in these issues.
The war, however, had equally demonstrated to the government the 
necessity of strengthening Imperial unity (a conviction which was not always 
accompanied by a sure grasp of the strategic and geographical questions
i o
involved ). The Imperial War Cabinet had been instituted during the war, 
composed of the representatives of the Dominions and India together with 
the British Cabinet. It, and the Imperial War Conference, met in 1917 and 
again in 1918; and an analogous body, the British Empire delegation, attended 
the Paris peace talks. In the decision to summon an Inperial Conference in 
1921 the Times professed to see the "beginning of a definite system of 
Empire Government in peace by an Imperial Peace Cabinet"^7. Such a hope 
was belied by the Conference itself, and. seems hardly to have survived the
(am(«I < -Cou/k /ffif CI\ )
Chanak crisis of 1922, When the Dominions£made it clear that the British 
government could not be allowed to commit them to a war without their 
prior agreement, as had happened in 1914* Yet the following Wear Curzon 
(in a speech as Grand Master of the Primrose League) said that he Moped to 
see "how far by consolidation, by improvement of communications, we can 
develop a common policy in international mafeters, so that the Foreign Minister 
°f this country, when he speaks, may speak, not for Great Britain alone but 
ior the whole British Empire". There had been "great advances" towards this 
objective, he thought, in 1921^.
The revelation during the war of the dependence of Britain upon 
imported supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials led to an effort to streng­
then intra-Empire trade by means of tariff agreements. A committee appointed 
by Lloyd George dealt with the safeguarding of essential British industries, 
the recovery of lost markets and the protection of Imperial supplies from
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from foreign control. Its report recommended that countries of the Empire
should be granted preferential duties on imports into the British market;
and the scheme of Imperial Preference was approved by Parliament in March 
511919 • The 1921 Imperial Conference recommended the "redistribution of the
white population of the Empire in the manner most conducive to the develop-
52mentxajfc, strength and stability of the whole" . ®he Empire Settlement Bill
was adopted by Parliament the following year, providing the sum of £15 mill-
5^ion annually over a period of fifteen years to assist res ttlement^ . The
Movement of population within the Empire proved overwhelmingly to be movement
from Britain to the HfckKX Dominions. A post-war peak of a quarter of a
54Billion emigrants was reached in 1923 • The 1923 Imperial Conference endor­
sed the scheme; and decided to establish an Imperial Economic Committee, 
affirmed the importance of an Imperial wireless service, and passed a resol­
ution on Economic Defence "which implied the possibility of combined action
to protect Empire shipping against discriminatory legislation by other 
55nations" . Imperial bodies of various sorts were founded. An Empire Parlia­
mentary Association received an annual £5,000 Parliamentary grant; and the
56Imperial Institute was also supported by the government^ . An Imperial
Airship Service was proposed, and a scheme was endorsed in principle at the
571923 Conference. Imperial Airways was established in 1924 •
Nor was foreign policy forgotten. The defence of the Empire, Lloyd Geo­
rge told the House of Commons, "ought to be an Imperial concern. It is too 
much to ask these small islands, with the gigantic burdens they are bearing,
•• to undertake themselves the whole burden of the defence of this gigantic 
Empire”. The question should, he thought, be considered by the Imperial 
Conference^®. In pafticular "united action against the spread of Communist
propaganda", a Cabinet Committee considered, should be placed on the agenda
59of the 1921 Conference as suggested by the Indian government . The matter 
came up at the Conference^ sixth meeting, on 24 June. Hughes, the Australian 
Prime Minister, agreed with Curzon*s opening remarks to the effect that 
Bolshevism was the "very negation of all the British Empire stands for”. It 
was "no use shutting our eyes to the fact that against the British Empire 
there is a world-wide conspiracy*• We cannot, we dare not, ignore its 
sinister purpose, its menacing effects". He believed that? it was time "some
r
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deliberate and systematised effort was made to counteract this propaganda
and to tell the world the things for which the British and the Empire
stand”. Montagu added that the evidence was accumulating that the Bolshevik
government was “pursuing by propaganda, and even, indeed, by preparation
for warlike operations, determined action against British interests in the
60East”. He drew attention to the Bolshevik governments “sinister purpose” •
A paragraph dealing with “united action against the spread of
Communist propaganda” waa omitted from the agenda of the 1923 Conference;
byt the Cabinet agreed that the matter might be raised after the Foreign
Secretary*s statement, which “must necessarily include a reference to our
61policy towards the Russian Soviet Government” . There was “ample evidence”,
Curzon considered, in a memorandum prepared for a speech to the Conference,
that the Soviet government would “lose nib opportunity by bribes, intrigue
and propaganda” to destroy the United Kingdom, the British Empire and indeed
"the existing organization of society”. The weight of : theii attack was for
geographic and traditional reasons “diremted against India and against the
position of H.M.G. in Turkey and the Near East”; and “imperial considerations ,
62(required) that it should be resolutely met” . The matter was raised at
the fifth session of the Conference. Lord Peel, the Indian Secretary, said
that the “Bolshevik menace** had not "gone very far^ ifirfS§?a, but it is a
thing which always had to ibe watched”. Sapru, for the Indian government, added
that unrest could hot be identified in every case with Bolshevism; but there
was “every need fibr being alive to the danger and for taking active steps
to prevent the poisdm spreading, and we must be forearmed.. There is no
country which required more or grdater development of publicity or propaganda
on sounder lines than India does", in order to “let the people know really
6*
what the danger of Bolshevism are” . The reality of Imperial unity was 
somewhat more modest than proposals for * united action* might have suggested. 
The Conference, indeed, itself pointed out that it was a meeting of “the 
representatives of the several Governments of the Empire”, and that its 
views and decision^ on foreign policy were “necessarily subject to the action
LL.
of the Governments and Parliaments of the various portions of the Empire”^
Its deliberations had nevertheless made apparent that not just the British 
government, but the Dominion governments also, considered Bolshevik policy
and propaganda a danger not only to the * existing order of society*, but also 
and more specifically to the existence of the Empire itself.
Imperial unity received, perhaps, its most serious early setback in
Ireland; and there was, indeed, no need to go farther than Marx to conclude
that the possession of Irdland lay at the very foundation of the Imperial
edifice, and of bourgeois rule in Britain itself. This view was (no doubt
unconsciously) echoed in Churchill's declaration that Ireland was the "heart's
centre of the Britihh Empire. Any disturbance or movement there produces
vibrations, almost convulsions, throughout the whole of our system of
society^bespite the efforts of the government to assist in the formation
of a "new central party of moderate men in Ireland united in opposition to
the lawless and revolutionary propaganda of the Sinn Feiners", Lord French,
the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, was forced to conclude at the end of the
war that "any relaxation of the Defence of the Realm Act at this moment
would make it impossible to govern Ireland". Any reduction in the military
garrison would be "fatal"; the country was "seething with discontent and
66rebellious intentions" .The following spring Curzon declared that the
situation was "worse than they had thought". Fisher pointed to what hd
considered to be the heart of the government's problem. It was a "very
difficult thing" to ban an association that "had the moral support of the 
67country" . A  lengthy guerilla war led eventually to the signature of Articles
of Agreement on 6 December 1921. The Treaty, Lloyd George told the Cabinet,
Snded the "disputes and frictions between the two peoples" which had "been a
68source of weakness, not merely to teeat Britain but to the Empire" •
The statement proved an optimistic one. In the first place, the 
situation there remained for some time a source of concern to the government. 
There was even a possibility, as Churchill told the Cabinet in April 1922, 
of thet declaration of a Republic.The Viceroy was recalled "ostensibly for 
purposes of consultation", but in fact for his protection; and orders were 
issued to the Army Command to take action in the event of the declaration of 
a Republic. The differences within the Irish political leadership, and, indeed, 
within the population at large, were|the source of these dangers. Churchill 
complained in May of the Irish people's "general reluctance to kill one 
another"^ #
In the second place, the Treaty^fhowever unsatisfactory to many on 
toe Irish side - had been won by what Curzon termed "revolution by murder".
H°w, Balfour woAdered, "could such a state of affairs be said to fit in tith
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the scheme of the Empire?”. The agreement, Henry Wilson wrote, was an "abject
surrender to murderers". He offered to make a calculation as tothe "number
of murders that would be necessary in Egypt and India for those countries
70to achieve independence" . Carson thought that if "you told your Empire 
in India, in Egypt and all over the world that you have not got the men, the 
money, the pluck, the inclination and the backing to restore order in a 
country within twenty miles of your own shore, you may as well begin to 
abandon the attempt to make British rule prevail throughout the Empire at 
all"71.
The point was not lost by either side. When the Egyptian patriot,
the National Review wrote, observed Downing Street "surrendering to the man
with a gun in Ireland, can we be surprised that he should argue that Force
is his only remedy in dealing with British Politicians?". "Funk", it urged,
72"never pays in the long run" • In India "all the wild men" were "on the 
warpath, convinced that if they perpetrate enough murders their ’Leaders' 
will also be invited to 'confer( in Downing Street as to whether the British 
Raj is to peaceably withdraw from Ireland or to be kicked out.. Egypt is 
likewise noting the 'negotiations'". Indeed the most serious feature of the 
Irish treaty , thought the Duke of Northumberland, was its probable effect 
upon British authority in India and Egypt, where the course of the national­
ist agitation was "following the same lines as in Ireland". It was the "fmrst
73Actjin .. the dissolution of fehe British Empire " .
It was, equally, impossible not to notice, wrote a Soviet observer, that 
the colonial movements as it were "mutually supported each other". The 
movement in Ireland or India inspired Egypt;while the Egyptian and Irish
n »
movements found a response in India • The Nagpur Congress of the Indian
Bational Congress adopted a resolution in connection with the death,
following an extended hunger strike, of the Sinn Fein Lord Mayor of Cork,
and supported the Sinn Fein programme, and many of the principles of guerilla
*ar which had found use in Ireland. The I.N.C., indeed, was often described
as a 'Sinn Fein movement'. The parallel with Sinn Fein, the J6fr6Statesman
75agreed, was "in the minds of all educated India" •
Their objective, it might have been thought, had been conceded in 
large degree to the Indian nationalists iAth Montagu's declaration fckaric in
the House of Commons in favour of the gradual development of self-governing 
tostitutions "with a view to the progressive realiation of jpssponsible
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government in India as an integral part of the British Empire”; and this 
proposition was enshrined in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report on Indian 
constitutional reform which was published the; following year. The Govern­
ment of India Amt of 1919, however, disappointed maa£ Indians; the Assembly 
and Council of State which were set up, although both had a majority of 
elected members, had no control over the Viceroy and his executive, who 
could, indeed, ‘certify' legislation and thus secure its adoption on their 
own authority ifcthey wished to do so. The Cumber of Princes had a consult­
ative function only. The Imperial government, moreover, was to judge the 
"time and the measufe of each advance” towards fully responsible governmen?^.
The hope that the scheme might satisfy nationalist aspirations was,
however, effectively frustrated by the adoption at the same time of
sedition and conspiracy acts which allowed political trials without jury
and arbitrary arrest (the Rowlatt Act of 1919 especially). Above all, the
action of General Dyer in firing on an unarmed crowd at Amritsar in April
1919, as a result of which 379 lost their lives and 1200 were wounded,
gravely compromised British rule in the eyes of (efen formerly loyal)
Indians. The reaction of British official circles compounded the offence.
When the details of the massacre became public, Dyer was dismissed from his
post and barred from future military employment. The Hunter Committee, which
investigated the Amritsar and other disturbances^^oncluded that Dyer
had been guilty of a "grave error" in KSJilSming his troops to continue
firing for as long as he had done. No warning had been given; and the crowd
kad been defenceless. Less satisfactory to an Indian nationalist was the
Committee8's view that "in the ordinary case., notice is properly given to
the crowd before they are actually fired upon"; and that hadfiotice been
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given and been disregarded, "firing would have been justified". Xyrnxftx
Dyer's action, moreover, was defended in the House of Lords, and a public 
collection was well subscribed. Carson, in the House of Commons, drew 
attention to the "conspiracy to drive the British out of India and out of 
Egypt,, to destroy our seapower and drive us out of Asia". The preceding 
riots at Amritsar, moreover, had been of a serious character: the mob, for
instance, had "tried to get hold of thd Christian Missionary Society Girls' !
79Sghool", and the "Religious Tract Society's depot was burned" . Yet opposit- ;j 
ion to Dyer's action, Montagu believed, was "fundamental to a continuance of 
the British Empire, and vital to the continuation, permanent as I believe
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it can be, of the connection between this country and India". Churchill, too, 
while he shared Carson's view of the "world-wide character of the seditious 
and revolutionary movement with which we are confronted", nevertheless did 
not believe that it was "in the interests of the British Empire or of the 
British Army" to assume responsibility for such actions.lt was not only 
appropriate, it was also in the feighest degree expedient to make it "absolut- 
ely clear., that this is not the British way of doing tkxxgx business" •
A change had nevertheless been wrought. Until 1920, it has been noted, the 
Congress continued to give "pride of place to the loyalty resolution in 
its proceedings. Its tone was respectful of loyalty, the British people and 
Parliament. It never expressed any desire to break away from the British 
Empire", and its demands for a greater degree of civil rights for Indians 
had been in their capacity as "British citizens". Speeches were frequently 
of "gushing loyalty and warm attachment to the British throne". Amritsar and 
its aftermath, together with the terras of the treaty with Turkey in May 
1920 (which was offensive to Muslims), brought abiut a sharp change. The 
non-co-operation movement was launched at the beginning of August 1920; and 
in September a special session of thejCongress approved and adopted Gandhi's 
programme^.
Montagu's original undertaking had in fact owed much to the circumstance 
-s of the time, in particular to the need to retain Indian support in the 
prosecution of the war; and it had been sanctioned by the Cabinet with 
considerable misgiving. "Constant harping on the theme that we are fighting 
lot fckd liberty and justice and the rights of peoples to direct their own 
destinifes", complained Monxtagu in May 1917, together with the reception 
of the Russian revolution and the position which Indian representatives had 
assumed in the councils of the Empire, had strengthened the movement dor 
reform and had "created a ferment of ideas by which the Government of India 
are evidently somewhat alarmed". If reform were rejected, he noted, the 
ffloderatex element - "such as it is" - would be thrown into the hands of the 
extremists "and we may well be confronted in India with a second Ireland".
A decision to deny reasonable reform would, he thought, be fraught with 
"gravd danger"^2. The situation in India, Chamberlain xdatx told the Cabinet 
on 29 June, was "ccutsing grave anxiety", Nationaljpelf-consciousness was 
developing in India; and the Congress and the Moslem League "could not be
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safely ignored" . An indication that the government favoured at least 
ultimate self-government for India was necessary, he wrote to Montagu, 
to "avoid the growth of a most serious and even dangerous movement 
Curzon agreed that the "strongest case for moving at all" was that if the 
government did "not take charge of the opinion someone else will ( a Home 
Rule movement in India is already active and growing) and there may easily 
grow up a dissatisfaction that would soon become dangerous"^®.
Balfour considered, however, that while government policy should 
be to "increase the share of natives in Indian administration as rapidly 
and to as great an extent as circumstances will permit", the form of govern­
ment operating in the self-governing Dominions was "quite inappropriate* 
for India. He deprecated any "hasty decision to concede to an Oriental 
country a system of self-government whidh was appropriate and jnfcfc in the 
case of the great dominions of the Empire, byt was, in his opinion, quite 
unsuitable to the Dependency". He favoured no more than a "greater share in 
local administration (for Indians) under a benevolent, sympathetic and wise 
suzerainty". Curzon disagreed. The situation "imperatiwwly demanded some 
advance in the direction of self-government". Action of some sort he thought 
unavoidable, for "the position was serious; the revolutionary propagandists 
of the genre of Tilak and Mrs Besant were dangerous, and in the East things 
were apt to move with the startling rapidity of a prairie fire". A declaration 
should be made "as impressively as the unique situation demanded". Chamberlain 
added that the mood in India was one of "alert expectancy". Unless the
government made a "timely and satisfactory pronouncement", the situation was
86"fraught with the gravest of possibilities" •
The decision could not be postponed. The Viceroy reported that the 
"Extremists were having it all their own way; the Moderates were aksing for 
a lead, and being denied it, were wavering". There was a "serious risk of 
their throwing in their lot with the agitators", whose demands were increasing, 
daily. The government's declaration, Montagu told the Cabinet, must contain
the words "ultimate self-government within the Empire". He was aware of the 
objections to the term; but it "had become a shibbolfeth", and could not 
safely be omitted. Curzon objected that this implied a transfer of responsib­
ility to the Sxkx Indian people themselves rather earlier than the Cabinet 
Probably intended. For the good of the country, Britain must continue to
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rule unless India were to "relapse into chaos", or, he hinted, he "dominated 
by somejother nation less well qualified to guide her destinifes"^7. Montagu*s 
declaration was nevertheless made three days later.
The possible significance of evdnts in Russia, evidently, had 
not escaped Lord Curaon. Yet the governments own policies were sufficient, 
it has been suggested, to account for the rapid development of the 
nationalist movement of 1920-22. Beform came too late to satisfy those 
for whose benefit it was intended, and its chances of success were serious­
ly diminished by the repressive legislation which accompanied it. Even 
this, however, represented a concession greater than many in political 
circles in Britain were prepared to accept. Henry Wilson noted in his
diary that Montagu and Chelmsford, the Viceroy, had "set up a Council with
88a libt of natives on it" and had "lost control" . The government itself
became increasingly concerned to counter the "idea, which was prevalent
among many people, both in India and at home, that the British raj was
doomed, that we were fighting a rearguard action in India, and that India
would gradually be handed over to the Indians". On the contrary, declared ■
Churchill, at this time Colonial Secretary, "we must strengthen our
position in India". He had supported the reforms at the time, but believed
that "opinion would change soon as to the expediency of granting democratic
institions to backward races". A way out might, he thought, be found by
extending the system of Native States, "with their influential aristocracies
89and landed proprietors" .
The "false impression should at once be dissipated", Lloyd George 
told a Conference of Ministers the following day, that government policy 
was "ultimately to hand over India td> the Indians and surrender British 
rule in India". It must be made clear that the government had "no intention 1 
of leaving India or of allowing British supremacy there to be challenged".
Any further extension of self-government in India must depend upon the 
Indians showing that^ the^  were "capable of making proper use of the constit­
ution xrk±xk that had been granted to them. There maht be a master in India. • 
We were now masters in India, and we should let it be understood that we 
meant to remain so"^. The Viceroy had been informed that no change in the
1919 Act could be considered, in the event 2>f a conference with the non-co- 
operators; and the House of Commons was told by the Prime Minister that
¥
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Munder no circumstances or conditions” did the Government "propose to
withdraw from, or to impair, the full sovereignty of the King Emperor in 
91India” • The Earl of Winterton, Under-Secretary of State at the India 
Office, later added that xkx±K the 1919 Act had not held out "any promise 
that selfgovernment would be granted automatically on any drbitrary date 
irrespective of the degree of progress shown”^2. He did not himself specify 
the length of the intervening period, but it was implied that it might be 
a lengthy one. Curzon, indeed, had objected to the inclusion of the 
expression of "ultimate self-government" into Montagu*s original statement 
of the grounds that to Indians it might suggest a delay of perhaps a 
generation; whereas the Cabinet "probably contemplated an intervening 
period that might extend to 500 years''"^ .
It was, then, perhaps not surprising that xhkh for some time the 
SiSSl5xS8tshowed little sign of abating. A /very serious situation" existed 
in India, the Secretary of State for India reported in August 1921. Further 
risings, he thought, "must be anticipated". There was a danger of a "rebell­
ion of the first magnitude" for which the troops available appeared inadeq- ; 
uate. Gandhi*s challenge to the government, the Cabinet later agreed,
’could not be ignored" . At the beginning of 1922, however, it seemed to 
Henry Wilson "quite clear" that the Indian situation had "got completely
out of Montagu*s grip. I am affcaid the Empire is gone. Ireland Free State
95is gone, and India from Montagu*s showing is in a very dangerous state"' . 
Lloyd George admitted to the House of Commons that there was "much in the 
state of India that justified grave concern". The situation was reported to 
be "anxious and menacing"^. The Indian Yearbook declared 1922 to have been 
"one of the most anxious (years) in the political history of India"; and fehe 
New Statesman thought the situation "far more difficult and perhaps far 
more dangerous than that of l857"^*
The Cabinet reacted in tjyw ways. The Prince of Wales was despatched 
to India to "arouse the enthusiasm of the masses for the Crown"; or, as he 
put it himself in a communication to the Cabinet, to "foster and maintain 
that feeling of mutual understanding and unity" which he tbna&ed would
"prevail throughout the British Empire", in order that the Future of the
98British Empire might "fully uphold the fine traditions of its past'* , He 
SftJUt met, in fact,by an extensive boycott; and as the Review of Reviews
wr°te, the demonstrations in his favour could notide the "stern realities of
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the new regime". Thousands of leaders of the non-co-operation movement had 
been arrested; yet the situation remained "so grave that to comment upon 
or describe it" was "extremelEy difficult". The government*s congratulations 
to the Prince, the New Statesman thought, appeared to "pass beyond the limits 
of reasonable euphemism". The "failire" of the tour was in fact the "most
QC
serious symptom that (had} yet appeared" of the extent of Indian disaffection.
The arrest of Gandhi in March 1922 appeared to have a greater
effect. It had been carried out, Winterton noted, "after a long period of 
unrest, characterised by much sporadic lawlessness and by several more 
serious outbreaks of violence". Since then, the country had become "progress­
ively quitter" and there had been "some improvement., in the tone of political 
controversy"10? The development was noted and welcomed by the Chairman of 
the Mercantile Bank of India, and ascribed to a "little more resolution in 
the conduct of her affairs". The country was, he thought, "sound at the core., 
if only a reasonable restraint is kept on disturbing el events "101 a report 
published periodically by the Indian government noted, however, a "recrudesc­
ence of anarchical movements" in 1923-^ f. A section of the Bengal press had !
been devoted to "promoting the spread of academic bolshevism". The trade
union movement, it was considered, was "too much bound up with the occurrence 
and successful conduct of strikes". Its development in the immediately 
preceding years was considered "disappointing". Its leaders, in particular, 
had "not in all cases distinguished between economic and political consider­
ations"102.
If developments in Ireland and India posed the most serious 
threat to the Empire, they were by no means the only ones with ihiwh the 
Cabinet had to reckon. Closely associated with the defence of India was the 
British position in Afghanistan and Persia. In Afghanistan, following the i
murder of Amir Habibullah on 19 February 1919, in part as a result of his
strongly pro-British orientation, his son Amanullah declared himself Amir. 
British recognition of his accession was not, however, immediately forthcoming. 
Amanullah reacted by opening relations with Soviet Russia, and declaring 
Afghanistan to be independent of British suzerainty • The Cabinet considered i 
the "disquieting situation" in the country on 6 MaJ. Curzon reported that the 
Amir had recently adopted a "truculent attitude", and had issued a proclamation
of a "most outrageous nature, stating that both Moslems and Hindus in India
Sre ^eing subjigfcted to abominable treatment by the British administration".
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This had followed a statement which had been "tantamount to a declaration 
of complete independence". The atmosphere was "electrical". The month-long 
Third Afghan War ensued; and on its conclusion the independence of Afghanist­
an was recognized and the British annual subsidy was discontinued10*1-.
The fourth clause of the peace agreement provided for a subsequent
Treaty of Friendship. In October 1920 the Amir invited a British delegation
to Kabul for negotiations. It had, however, in the meantime been discovered
that the Amir had concluded a treaty with Soviet Russia, containing clauses
which appeared to the Cabinet "clearly directed against ourselves". The Amir
assured the government that Bolshevik consulates would be required to conform
to international usage; but he had not, as requested, provided thw text of
the agreement. In the circumstances, it was argued in the Cabinet, the
British dele&atiog might be played off against the Bolshevik, and a subsidy
secured from both sides; nor would the lives of its members be safe. Bolshevik
consulates near the Indian frontier, it was felt, could "have no other object
than the promotion of propaganda in India". But the government must "endeavour
to avoid a war with Afghanistan, for which we were prepared neither financially
105nor from the point of view of public opinion" . Something should be done 
also, it was added, to offset the influence of the Bolshevik and Turkish 
Nationalist missions. It was decided to leave the decision to the Government 
of India; and a delegation was in fact despatched to Kabul. It became known, 
howefcer, that the Afghan government was about to ratify treaty with Soviet 
Russia, which provided for consulates near the Indian frontier, for an annual 
subsidy and for war materials and munitions. The Cabinet laid the "utmost 
emphasis" upon the indesirwability of permitting the Afghan government to 
receive a"subsidy from Russia, directed against Indian interests, as well as 
from Ihdia". On the other hand, "in view of our military obligations elsewhere, 
it might be preferable to tolerate a Russian subsidy for the present rather 
than incur the risk of the heavy expense of a fresh frontier war". The 
Government of India was nevertheless informed that the Cabinet still strongly
held the view that a "Bolshevik subsidy would in itself be the strongest pfcima
106facte evidence of arrangements directed against the British Empire" •
Having failed to prevent the signature of the Russo-Afghan fcreaty, 
the Cabinet turned to a consideration of the possibility of offering the 
Afghan government "sufficient inducement in money and arms to make her throw
°Ver Bolshwvist Treaty entirely". The Viceroy of India was informed that
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the British representative in Kabul should ’’naturally regulate his offer
of money etc, according to the completeness of Bolshevik elimination”. Russia
was governed by a Bolshevik government with a ’’known hostility to the British
Empire” and a "known desire to wound what they describe as a capitalist
107government through the East” . The chances of concluding such an agreement, 
however, which had at one time appeared good, steadily diminished. The Gover­
nment of India, which had hoped to secure the /exclusion and discomfiture of 
frhe Bolsheviks", felt it necessary to fall back on a treaty which would
"leave the Afghans free to receive a subsidy and munitions"from them. The
-1 /■)£)
outcome was viewed by the Cabinet with "intense dislike" •
The British position in Persia appeared to have been secured with
the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Treaty on 9 August 1919* The British
government undertook explicitly to "respect absolutely the independence
and integrity if Persia/. Such a statement was not apparently considered to
conflict with subsequent clauses, which provided fora?fie^8rifish°^expert
advisers" with "adequate powers" to work in the Persian administration, and
of officers and arms for the "establishment and preservation of order in the
country and on its frontiers". Control of the Persian customs was envisaged
109as a means of guaranteeing the repayment of a loan . Advances of cash 
WBBe to be made to the Persian government under the terms of the Agreement, 
Harmsworth told the House of Commons, "with a view to the establishment in 
Persia of a Government able to withstand pressure from any quarter". An addit­
ional safeguard was that the South Persian Rifles, a force instituted in the 
middle fif the war "for the purpose of maintaining British interests" SifiSx1'0 
remain under British control under the terms of the Agreement11?
The British armed forces in Persia (v/hich amounted to nearly 100,000 
men, including those in Mesopotamia, at a cost of nearly half a million 
pounds weekly111), were warned to be "prepared, in the event of the naval 
command of the Caspian passing to the Bolsheviks, for Bolshevik aggression 
against Persia from the Caspian, and for an attempt to use Enzeli as a base
for propaganda and possibly for serious operations". A "hold front" should be
112
offered; but provisions also made for a safe withdrawal • There was a 
danger, Chutchill told the Commons, of the "ancient capital of a monarchy 
like that of Persia being engulfed in the tides of barbarism and., being 
swamped and beaten down under the heel of a Bolshevik invasion". British 
forces could not, however, be maintained there indefinitely11-^. It had been
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decided on 12 August that they should remain there until the Treaty had 
been signed. Evacuation would allow the formation of hostile forces on 
the Persian-Afghan border, "possibly endangering the Persian oilfields"; 
while the establishment of a Bolshevist Government in Persia would "immedia­
tely react Kjon Afghanistan""^^.
At this stage it appeared that the situation had "eased considerablyl* 
The Persian Government, it was believed, honestly intended to summon Parlia­
ment at an early date "with a view to the ratification of the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement", which had aroused considerable local hostility. Sir Percy Cox, 
the British representative, reported that the Agreement was not unpopular 
"except in certain extremist interested circles""^^. The hope that
the Agreement might bd ratified was, however, based upon the loyalty of 
the Prime Minister, Mushir-el-Dowleh. The Cabinet was told on 3 November 
1920 that "he had failed us and had resigned", Moreover, while the Bolsheviks 
were engaged in operations against Wrangel, once he had been defeated the
Bolshevik forces would be released and "could be let loose in Persia and
116(woald) involve our forces there in great danger" • The Treaty was not
ratified, and the following spring it was announced that the ifist British
117forces were "in process of being withdrawn", J More than two years later 
Times reported that it was an "unfortunate but undeniable fact" that 
the British were not popular in Persia. They had "not yet recovered", the
H 8
paper thought, from the suspicion aroused by the 1919 Agreement • Here, as 
in India, there was no need to refer to Soviet policy or Bolshevik propaga­
nda tn explaAAAxM the unpopularity and lack of success of the Imperial power.
While Egypt had no place in schemes for the defence of India, 
it was equally possessed by what Balfour tailed " unrealisable expectations" 
at the end of the war^? Balfour acknowledged that the "spirit of unrest"
Ofod been active in Egypt; and he gave it as the governments view that "the 
Egyptians, the Egyptian nativd population", should be associated "in every 
way we can" with the government of the country. Egypt, however, the Sudan, 
and the Suex Canal formeat an "organic and indissoluxble whole"; and neither 
Egypt not in the Sudan was England going to give up any of what Balfour
described as "her responsibilities. British supremacy exists, British 
supremacy is going to be maintained"^? Egypt, Lloyd George explained to f
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an understanding House of Commons, was "not in thd position of other 
nations to whom complete self-determination can be afforded, withott refer­
ence to any external conditions”. The country had the misfortune to be 
••abnormally placed in reference to the world, and especially in reference 
to the British Empire”. Of the four hundred million inhabitants of the British 
Empire, more than three hundred million lived to the east of Suez. Egypt
thus formed a “highway between the Eastern part of this Empire and the
121Western part of this Empire”
Within these terms, the Cabinet must negertheless find it 
more satisfactory if Egypt were a “friendly and Allied country which was i
decently governed, and able to stand on itss own feet”, and able to grant 
of its own accord a ’•strategic base at all times , and to place its harbours, 
railways and other means of communication at the disposal of the British 
government in peace as well as in war, than if the country were to be kept 
in subjection by force and “requiring in time af peace a large permanent 
garrison”. The situation shoull not be allowed to become a “reproduction 
of that in South and West Ireland", Milner urged; but ¥it was rapidly 
moving that way”. Many of the middle and semi-educated classes had in the 
past supported British rule; but it had been the "greatest shock” to him 
to find on his visit what a change had taken place in this regard, and how 
strong the spirit of nationalism had become. Milner considered that “if we 
were to keep any control over the country otherwise than by martial law we 
must break up the 10% of the more educated classes and get some of them on 
our side, even if, in order to do so, it was necessary to make some consider­
able i§Kid»^$i£x • The Egyptians, “who for forty years past we had 
professed to be training to govern themselves”, should be given a chance to 
do so. Phraseology and face-saving, also, were important aspects of a 
settlement: the government was dealing with Orientals who were “very clever
and potentially very naughty children”, but who once convinced of British
122goodwill would become “very manageable” .
Negotiations took place with Adly Pasha, the Egyptian Prime 
Minister, in London in the summer of 1921. While the Cabinet was prepared 
to declare the Protectorate ended, and Egypt an "independent State under a \ 
constitutional monarchy", the country should be bound by a "perpetual Treaty iit*
and bond of peace, amity and alliance" to Britain. A British military occupa- !
I
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tion and a right to the use of aerodromes and harbours was thought necessary 
"to support Egypt in the defence of her vital interests”. A British High 
Commission was to render what was termed ”all possible assistance” to the 
Egyptian government on diplomatic and foreign policy questions. Financial 
and Juducjal Commissions should be appointed in consultation with the British 
government, and that government should ”at all times enjoy the right of 
access to the Egyptian Ministries of Justice and of the Interior”. No exter­
nal loans, or foreign officers in the Egyptian army were to be allowed"*"2?
The negotiations - not, perhaps, supprisingly - were unsuccessful; 
and by November Allenfey, who had been sent on a mission to Egypt, sent 
a telegram from Cairo warning that the decision to refuse Egypt national 
independence ”must entail serious risk of revolution throughout the
country and in any case result in complete administrative chaos” and
1 2 k"serious injury to financial and economic interests” . A Conference of
Ministers considered the question thefollowing day# There was a danger,
Curzon reported, of the “creation of a very serious situation in Egypt”;
the government was probably on the verge of a “serious new emergency”,
which might “strain our available resources to the utmost”. It was urged,
however, that ”if the government were weak in dealing with the Egyptian
situation, they were not fit to run a great Empire”. The governmentls
125proposals ”if anything, might be criticized §&r going too far” .
By January 5-922 the National Reviewjieclared that Egypt was
in a condition of “seething unrest, verging on revolt”. It was officially
admitted that the ”gravity of the present situation in Egypt” could “not
be exaggerated”"*"2 *^ The proposal to abolish the Protectorate before a treaty
was made was, the Cabinet was told, to “concede to Egypt what we declined
to grant to Sinn Fein". The decision might "gravely affect the interests
of the British Empire". It was nevertheless "desirable”to “obtain the
127co-operation of the Egyptians in the Government of the country” • Three 
questions in particular appeared to be outstanding: and there was much 
in them that might recall the Governmentls dealings with India, Afghanist­
an and Persia: "security for the communications of the British Empire, the 
defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression, protection of foreign 
interests in Egypt” . Eventmally the protectorate was ended and Egypt 
las declared an independent country. The Sultan took the title Fuad I.
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The agreement, the New Statesman co^ ngented, represented a "signal defeat" 
for the imperialists in the Cabinet •
The British High Commissioner, however, and the British
garrison remained in the country, and continued control was asserted over 
130
foreign policy t There remained, moreover, an awareness of what Churchill 
termed, in its various forms in Ireland, Egypt and India, a "world-wide 
conspiracy against our country"; and the Cabinet at no point lost sight 
of that near-un±v*ersal source of sedition and unrest, Bolshevism. Reports 
were collected by the Foreign Office on the question, and the appointment 
of an Officer, whose particular responsibility it would be to watch and 
control Bolshevik activities, waa actively considered'1'^'1'. Allenby wrote 
to the Foreign Office at the beginning of 1920 following a discussion 
with the officials responsible for advising on matters of public security ' 
and the organization of intelligence in Egypt "as to measures necessary 
to deal with Bolshevism and cognate problems". The appointment of a junior 
officer attached to Intelligence was, he thought, " e s s e n t i a l A  Mr 
Ingram of the Alexandria Police Secret Service was recommended; and the 
Foreign Office informed Allenby that arrangements could be made in Britain 
to him to "receive training in anti-Bolshevik methods". A further appoint­
ment was under consideration, but domes not appear to have been made^^«
On 18 April 1922, following the governments declaration that 
it intended to end the protectorate and grant Egypt independence, the 
British government through its Moscow representative informed the N.K.I.D. 
that while the protectoxrate was being ended, Britain nevertheless was 
maintaining her special rights in Egypt, and would regard any interference 
in the internal affairs of that country as a hostile actix against Great 
Britain"1^ .  In March 1923 it was announced in the House of Commons that 
four leaders of the Egyptian Communist Party had been arrested for ofgan-
izing a public demonstration. Their headquarters had been raided and papers j 
135weized .
Bolshevik propaganda in the colonial world had, in a sense, become a problem j 
to the Cabiabfr as soon as the Bolshevik revolution had taken place. In |
December 1917 the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information j
issued a memorandum , which was circulated to the Cabinet, dealing with j:
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the manifesto witch the Soviet government had issued * to all the labouring 
class Moslems of Russia and the Orient1. The Manifesto, the Bureau consid­
ered, was "another indication of the ultimate Bolshevik policy, which is., 
a campaign kxxxkxxkl.. designed to overthrow the existing order all 
over the world, as it hal1?! en^ overthrown in Russia"'*''^ . A ’Blue Book* 
was issued in Moscow in the following year under the auspices of the 
N.K.I.D.. Its title page read "India to the Indians: Down with Imperialists: 
Long Live the International". Two copies were forwarded to the Foreign 
Office from Moscow by Wardrop, who commented that the introduction was a 
"malicious attack on British rule In India by a persln who is okviously >.
ignorant of.ithe rudiments of the subject". Translations were being prepared
137into European and Asiatic languages •
In March 1919 it was reported that The Hague had become the
chief centre for Bolshevik propaganda in the East. "Very large sums"
were being spent in propaganda directed at India, Persia "and especially
Egypt". Recant troubles there had feteen "aihmost certainly originated by 
13Bthem" .At the beginning of 1920 the Times warned: "The menace of Bolshev­
ism hangs over fiaia and Europe". The "toad to the East", it thought, "may 
very well be through India". Bolshevism was "threatening our relations 
with Persia, and is almost at the gates of India itself". Paul Dukes 
explained that "for a year after the Bolshevik revolution little attention 
was paid to the East, the Bolsheviks being so confident of an immediate 
Western revolutioh. But in proportion as their expectations sank in the 
West their hopes in the East rose, and they are now concentrated entirely 
on Asia"1^ .
The Bolsheviks, Churchill told a Dundee audience, would "do their 
utmost to stir up rebellion and sedition and fan the flames of class 
hatred in every other land, and especially in the Eastern world, where 
we in Britain nhave such great interests"1Zf0. Evidence of conspiiacy began
to accumulate in the Foreign Office, especially following the Second
Congress of the Communist International (which the government had discussed j 
engaging Pinkerton*s detective agency to report1**1). A report from Copen- j 
hagen stated that the Communist International was "making huge preparations J 
to develop revolutionary propaganda in (the) Near and Far East"; a "general j 
revolt in the E&*£ next autumn" was planned’*, to "hurry on the World !
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Revolution, for which the chiefs of Soviet Russia hawe still great
hopes11^ ^. A further report atated that a secret treaty had been signed
recently at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow by representatives from Turkey,
Persia, Afghanistan, Indian and other Eastern countries, the "main points”
of which were that England was to be "attacked through India” and that
the national movement in India was to be assisted by all^^. Not all*
such reports were taken seriously; and a Foreign Office minute on a
report of Lenin*s sppech to the Secong Comintern Congress, in which he
had claimed the support of 70% of the world*s population, noted drily
that ”if Lenin realljr represented 70% of the population of the world, (>
his speech would be magnificent”^ ^. Leeper minuted, however, on 6 July
1920 that the reports of *huge preparations* for propaganda and of a
*general revolt* planned for the East that autumn appeared to him "reliable*!
They confirmed "several other reports we have lately had from Moscow”, and
demonstrated that ¥the plans in the East are an essential part ofjc the
1A5Bolshevik programme" .
In the period, then, in which the Trade Agreement with Soviet Russia 
was being negotiated, and in the first year or so of its operation, 
powerful and often - it appearedto officialtcircles - mutually related 
waves of unrest swept British colonial possessions in spheres of influence 
in the Middle East and Asia, It had been suggested above that in the cases 
of Afghanistan, Egypt and Persia, British relations with Soviet Russia 
were directly affected. There was much, also, in the character of the 
anti-colonial movement in the two main storm centres, Ireland and India, 
which appeared to establish the agency of Soviet policy or propaganda 
(or, indeed, both).
For some years past and at the present, the Chief Secretary for 
Ireland informed the Commons, "Sinn Fein extremists and their Soviet 
colleagues in Ireland - there is Sovietism In a marked degree in Ireland - 
have conspired to smash the Empire”. Sinn Fein policy was "watched by 
sinister eyes in Great Britain, in Egypt, in India and throughout the 
world”. Its success would fatean the "breakup of amxthe Empire and of our :
-1 j L  ^  j
civilisation • The National Review had no doubt that Sinn Fein was the j
"advance guard of the international conspiracy to destroy the British J1
Empire, of which Moscow is the headquarters”. It was, the Duke of Northum- !,
j j
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between Bolshevism and Sinn Fein"was published. It contained a document 
"captured in Dublin” , containing a draft treaty between the Soviet Russian 
and the Irish Republican governments, and a number of commentaries on it.
The treaty, drafted in June 1920, was a rather inoffensive document, 
which proposed mutual recognition, economic co-operation, and the prevention 
of the transport of military supplies intended for use against the other 
side. Among other things, it entrusted the accredited Itish representative 
in Russia with the "interests of the Roman Catholic Church” within the
154
territory of the RSFSR • Nor did the Republican government appear to 
undertake more than that the treaty should be "very carefully considered”.
Its preamble did, however, include as an object the "liberation of all 
people grom imperialistic exploitation and aggression"; and a memorandum 
written by a Sinn Fein MP, Dr McCartan, clearly envisaged the despatch of
155
a Mission to Russia under his leadership  ^. It was also his view that the
treaty might be interpreted to provide for the training of Irish Republican
naval and military forces in Soviet Russia. The^ouse of Commons was informed
that he was, in fact, at that time in Russia, acting as a representative
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ofthe Sinn Fein Republic • Subsequent intelligence reports stated that
157the Irish Communist Party had received money from the Comintern •
India, Montagu declared, was "notoriously the object of 
Bolshevik propaganda"; although, in July 1920, there was no reason to
158expect am armed Bolshevik attack on the north-western frontiers of India .
He had "no reason to think that the well-known desire of the Bolsheviks
to spread thdir doctrines in India" had "met with any success". The War
Office, however, in a statement released on 13 January 1920, reported the
progress of a party of Bolsheviks and Turks with aeroplaneaqp parts, petrol
and a wireless set in the direction of Kabul. A "large number of propaganda
schools*1 had been opened up in Tashkent, where Oriental languages would be
taught and whence agents wbuld be despatched to India, China and the
Muslim countries. The Tashkent Soviet, at a recent qjeeting, was believed
to have "determined to concentrate efforts first on India" and it was
159intended to open up propaganda schools there shortly • The Viceroy,
Lord Chelmsford, opening the session of the Legislative Council, declared 
the chief menace before them to be Bolshevik propaganda and secret agitation^ 
and announced that a special staff had been set up to de^l with it^O
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The Bolsheviks, the House of Commons was told, were "working against
us all over the world". Lenin was reported to have "assured the Indian
revolutionaries that the whole of the Russian proletarians were watching
with sympathy their attempt to establish a free India" (an objective to
which, Kenworthy retorted, under the terms of the 1919 Act the British
l6lgovernment was officially committed ). A writer in the Review of Reviews.
discussing the ’Bolshevist menace to India*, could "confidently state
that the disruptive influences at present to be observed in the countries
of the Middle East assuredly (had) their origins in Bolshevist Russia".
The headquarters were unquestionably centred in Afghanistan (while Bolshevik
efforts were naturally deprecated by "thoughtful Afghans"). The agreement
with the Afghan government had "undoubtedly been entered into with a
view to the destruction of the last barrier which divides the Bolshevik
162power from the invasion of India" •
Accusations directed at Bolshevik propaganda were often disting­
uished more for their vigourBimusxx than their accuracy: Lt Col Hall, for
instance, in calling attention to the statements of a Mr ’Linovieff* had
16 3presumably in mind either Litvinov or Zinoviev . The government, however,
was evidently disposed to take them seriously. The Russian thousand-rouble
note, the House of Commons was told, had ’Workers of the world, unite*
printed in nine languages on its face, including English. Russian rouble
notes were accordingly declared illegal in India. The restriction would
be lifted if there was "evidence of a cessation of Bolshevik propaganda 
l£li.in India" . Rouble notes to a total value of two and a half million
pounds were surrendered, a sum which the Times found "both surprising
and significant". A "continuance of attempts at Bolshevik propaganda in
16 5the Dependency" must be expected .
Various other forms of propaganda were reported. Bolshevik leaflets, 
it appeared, had been inserted into copies of the Gospels (printed, moreov­
er, in Chinese); and a news service was provided for Indian newspapers, 
the response to which was stated to have been "remarkable". Bolshevik 
financial support, the Times continued, could not be ascertained, but it 
was "certain that led propagandists -take every advantage of Indian suscept- > 
ibilities*’1^.
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Montagu announced that thd terms of the Trade Agreement had been
communicated to the Government of India. A special organization had been
set up there, he added, to deal with Bolshevik activities in India. It
would not be prudent to disclose the details; but ’’every step necessary to
167checkmate them had been taken, I trust successfully" [ A year later he 
informed the House that Bolshevist propaganda had "contributed something" 
to the unrest in India. A "splendid organization", however, had been built
-j /TO
up against this menace •
Writing to the Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office
in February 1920, Curzon expressed his full awareness of the "danger of
subversive doctrines being spread by Bolshevik agents", and his strong
conviction that "no efforts should be spared to check them by all the
X&JBmeans at the disposal of The Viceroy had, in fact, informed him
that officers had already been specially appointed foijthe purpose of counter­
propaganda, the co-ordination of internal and external intelligence, and 
the organization of measures to prevent the ingress of Bolshevik emissarie§?
A more detailed statement of the 'Bolshevik situation., and of the precaut­
ionary measures taken by the Government of India up to the end of January 
lf20' was received in March. A Special Bureau of Information had been set 
up under Lt. Col. W.F.T. O'Connor, with a staff of two. Their first direct 
action had been the banning of rouble notes (on 6 December 1919); and a 
surveillance had been undertaken of the frontiers and the ports. The Bureau 
issued a 'Weekly Report' from the beginning of 1920, which the foreign 
Office received^^.
No "actual avowed Bolshevik agents" had been detected by the 
following October, the Viceroy informed London; but some people were under 
observation who were known to be sympathetic to Bolshevism. Their number 
was "constantly increasing", and many of them were connected with other 
forms of agitation such as strikes, peasants' movements and so on, since 
the Bolshevik movement in the East was "not for the moment mainly Communist 
tut (used) for its purpose every form of anti-British agitation". Precaution­
ary measures included extra vigilance on the part of frontier officials,
*he "appointment of officers on special duty in most provinces to investigated
'eport on, and hinder (th^ spread of Bolshevism", and the proscription of
332
"undesirable papers" such as the Herald. The surveillance and detention
of refugees had also been undertaken, and press and other written propag- 
1 71
anda . An outline of precautionary measures* which was conflled at the 
end of £he year added further details: the movement of jewels was closely 
watched, and anti-Bolshevik fiction was "encouraged". The production of 
suitable films was under consideration, but over-energetic measures, it 
was thought, might arouse an "unhealthy interest in the question in 
quarters where little or nothing may be known regarding it"1'*2.
Ever since the Russian government had fallen into the hands of 
those who were the exponents of the "ruin-producing doctrines of Bolshev­
ism", Montagu declared, India had been the "object of their propaganda".
It wffered a means, he supposed, of striking a blow at what was described 
as the "greatest capitalist institution in the world". India was not a 
fertile soil for such propaganda, whether directed through consulates in 
Afghanistan or schools in Moscow. The belief existed, however, which he 
hastened to add was a "very mistaken" one, that a retreat from India was
contemplated by the government; and Bolshevist propaganda had undoubtedly
173made a further contribution .
While the Special Bureau of Information was disbanded in Indiay
at the end of 1920, this did "not, however, involve any relaxation of the
watch on Bolshevik movements in India", the Government of India made clear.
An officer of the Foreign and Political Department had been appointed to
174carry on the duties which the Bureau had undertaken 7 An Infeer-Department-
al Committee on ’Bolshevism as a menace to the British Empire*, which
met atthe Foreign Office in July 1921, agreed in its Report that there
was "no question of the essential hostility of the Soviet Government
175towards the British Empire" . A paper on ’Bolshevik Intrigue* circulated 
to the Cabinet by Montagu concluded that India still formed the "main 
objective of Bolshevik foreign policy". Every possible medmim was being 
used to damage British interests in India and throughout the East, and to 
bring about a "combined effort converging on India". The general effect of 
these activities, it was considered, had been to bring about a situation
"actually dangerous to the safety of the Empire", requiring "serious steps .
176 •to be taken to counteract their "hostile influence" •
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Further measures, therefore, were taken when an upsurge of Bolshevik
propaganda was detected towards the end of 1922, in connection with the
177Fourth Congress of the Communist International . The Workers! Weekly 
was banned in India, since, it was explained, it had "contained writings
■I r p O
of an Indian revolutionary which (were) seditious in India" ; and a
trial was instituted in the summer of 1923 at which Usmani and other
Indians who had received training in Soviet Russia were charged with 
179conspiracy .
Howeger little evidence was in fact found to connect the Bolsheviks with 
unrest in India, the Government in Britain and in India was evidently 
obliged to take the threat seriously, in circumstances of popular disaffect­
ion unparalleled since the Mutiny, There were many, moreover, who agreed 
with the National Review that the anti-colonial movements in India, Egypt 
and Ireland were something more than what they seemed: that they were 
part, in fact, of a "much greater world-wide Movement which has its centre
- | O r\
in Moscow and is, in fact, the Revolutionary Government of the World" .
The Times criticized the government for "weakly trying to buy off" the
Bolshevik intrigues in India and Afghanistan through the conclusion of
l8lthe Trade Agreement • It is difficult to see, however, that the government
had any alternative, once^the Army had returned to its peacetime footing.
In October 1918 the strength of the Army stood at four million men; a
year later the total was hardly more than a million; and a year later still,
it stood at less than half a million. In 1922, the Army's strength stood
at 217,477 • The attack on public expenditure of the same year found
even these figures exeessive. Geddes' Committee recommended a further
18^reduction of 54,000 men in February 1922 . The "only method of effecting
savings on &°$Si$ir§ca?e", declared the Draft Resolutions on Economy 
approved by the Cabinet in December 1920, "is in the War Departments".
Military expenditure should be limited to the minimum "compatible with the
1 Rl
fulfilment of our Imperial obligations and national safety" .
These objectives proved difficult to reconcile. Considering
military expenditure in February 1920, the Finance Committee of the [
Cabinet found that expenditure "appeared on the face of it excessive",
i
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Yet the number of troops available was Already "quite inadequate to resist
185any serious attacks by the Bolsheviks" in Persia or elsewhere . Wilson 
complained to the Cabinet that he had "not enough troops to carry out the 
Cabinet policy in Ireland, Constantinople, Palestine, Mesopotamia,, and 
Persia, not to mention England, Egypt and India" . Criticism of the 
governments military spending was becoming "every day more insistent, 
particularly from the Government’s own supporters". Yet not the least 
obstacle to reducing military expenditure to its pre-war level was the 
fact that, as Churchill noted, British responsibilities had in fact
187"considerably increased", especially "in regard to Ireland and the East" .
No further reductions beyond those then proposed, Horne told the House
of Commons in March 1922, could be contemplate* in view of the "disturbed
condition of many of the great regions in which the British Empire is
especially interested". As things stood, only two Divisions could proceed
188overseas m  an emergency .
Labour and Liberal spokesmen found the reductions in military 
spending proposed by the Geddes Committee Wquite inadequate". Replying to 
them, Horne noted that the Army had always been based upon what were consid­
ered to be the needs of the Empire; and these were not less than they had 
been before the War, but, on the contrary, "greater than ever they were".
The world was in a "more unrestful condition"; there* were /difficulties" 
in many parts of the world which made it necessary to see that the security 
of the Empire was preserved. Harmsworth was more specific. A Republic might 
be declared in Southern Ireland; independence might be declared in Egypt;
a mutiny might take place in India. The whole Empire was in a "state
189
approaching upheaval" . The government naturally wished to limit Soviet 
revolutionary propaganda in these areas. No more effective means of doing 
so, however, appeared to exist that by attempting to use as leverage the 
undertakings which had been given by the Soviet government under the terms 
of the Trade Agreement; and a move was accordingly made in this direction.
On 5 August &he Cabinet agreed that sufficient use had not been 
made of the terms of the Russian Trade Agreement to prevent Russian hostility 
and anti-British propaganda in Afghanistan and elsewhere". It was agreed that 
the Prime Minister should make representations to the head of the Russian 
Trade Delegation ; and he was to be supplied by the Secretary of State with
details of breaches of the Agreement (the Foreign Office was maintaining
190a series of files dealing with 'Violations of the Trade Agreement*) •
There was ^strong evidence of bad faith on the part of the Bolshevists in 
carrying out the conditions of the Trade Agreement191. Two days later the 
Cabinet was told that the material would be circulated192. On 19 August a 
draft Note to the Soviet government was circulated by the Secretary of 
State for India, setting forth "numerous breaches of the Russian Trade 
Agreement by the Soviet Government". I& was agreed that it should be used 
as the basis of a despatch to be prepared by the Foreign Secretary, to be 
approved beforehand by the Prime Minister. It should contain instances of 
bfeaches of the Agreement and press for explanations, and demand that such 
infringements should cease. It should however "stop short of an actual 
threat of cancellation of the Trade Agreement, which should at this tftggw- 
be held in reserve"19-^.
The British note of 7 September was handed to Chicherin on 15 
September. It drew attention to the failure of the Soviet government to 
give effect to the obligations laid upon it by the Trade Agreement19 .^ The 
"more flagrant violations" only were included, based on "irrefutable" 
evidence. A reply was requested without delay. Hostile activities, upon 
the cessation of which the successful working of the Trade Agreement 
depended, "still continued unabated". The Communist International played 
a large part in the propagation of subversive principles; and one of its 
"foremost aims" was to "undermine British institutions, particularly in the 
East". The essentially subversive character of its aims was clear; as was 
the "close association", if not absolute identity of the Soviet government 
with it.
There was evidence "continued intrigue with Indian revolutionaries 
in Europe". Among other objectionable activities, the Soviet government 
had been "trying to persuade a well-known Indian anarchist, Dr Hafiz, who 
(had)been studying THE MANUFACTURE OF bombs in Vienna, to proceed to Afghan9 
istan to supply a bomb depot on the borders of India in order to facilitate 
their importation into India". He had now undertaken the task of "manufact­
uring smokeless powder in Kabul". In Persia, the government declared that it 
had the strongest reasons for considering that Soviet policy was directed
’principally against British interests"#Rothstein, the Soviet representative
in Teheran (and a former member of the Russian Trading Delegation in Britain)
was believed to be influencing Persian Members of Parliament and "other
Persians of good standing" against the British government. The "obnoxious
work" of the Tashkent propaganda centre had not ceased. In Turkey, the
government thought itself in possession of the "real motives" for the
Soviet governments support of and provision of material assistance to the
Nationalists. The "most serious charge of all", however, was in connection
with Afghanistan, where the Russo-Afghan Treaty provided for a subsidy, a
telegraph line, and for consulates for the location of which
grounds had been professed but which were regarded rather as "prospective
cdntres of propaganda". The Soviet aim was to secure the formation of a
"powerful united Moslem movement which would deal the final blow against
the power of capital and defctroy the colonial system upon which the power
of West European capital rests". The government asked for an assurance
that the "constant flow of inflammatory invective" and "actual hostile
activities by (Soviet) agents", which constituted breached of the Trade
195Agreement, should cease foi-thwith .
The Soviet reply to what Lloyd George rightly termed in the 
House of Commons a "very stern message" was less than forthcoming. Berzin, 
the Soviet representative in Britain, submitted an ‘interim reply* on 26 
September, which noted that many of the charges in the British note would
196"not bear even the most superficial examination" . Litvinov*s formal reply 
was handed to Hodgson in Moscow the following day, and forwarded by him to 
London. It was at once apparent, said Litvinov, that the accusations were 
either groundless, or based upon information or forged documents^*'7.
He had nevertheless considered them carefully. It was no more possible to 
identify the Third International with the Soviet government, on the basis 
of the location of its headquarters in Moscow, where alone freedom to propag­
ate communist ideas existed, and of the membership of its executive of some 
members of the Soviet government, than to identify the Second International 
in Brussels with the Belgian or the British governments, two former ministers 
of which w£re on the executive of that body. Only five ftambians were among
the thirty-one members of the Third International*s executive; and three of j
198 *these were not members of the Soviet government • j
Stalin and Eliave had no relations'with the International, and !
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and neither they nor Karakhan had delivered the reports which had been 
ascribed to them in the British note. Nourteva likewise had had nothing 
to do with the International; and in June 1921, when he had supposedly been 
giving a speech, he had been in fact for that (and the three preceding) 
months in prison. Lenin had not delivered a speech on 8 June as stated; 
nob had the phrases attributed to him occurred in his speeches at other ^
times, which had concerned completely different topics. IIeeNo school of 
revolutionary propaganda and the training of Indian emissaries existed in 
Tashkent; and no relations existed with Dr Hafiz and his smokeless powder 
factory. Strict instructions had, in fact, been sent to the Soviet diplom­
atic representatives in the East, instructing them to refrain from anti- 
British propaganda (a copy of the instructions which had been sent to the 
Soviet representative in Kabul had, indiadi, been communicated to the Prime 
Minister by the Soviet representative in Britain, and circulated to the 
Cabinet’*'"^ ) •
In what way, Litvinov continued, could the assistance given openly 
to the Afghan government in accordance with a treaty, the terms of which 
had been communicated to the British government, be considered an anti- 
British action?The Soviet government expressed its great respect for the 
independence of the countries of the East, and had surrendered all the 
priviliges and concessions in this regard which the Tsarist government had
\
obtained by force. Material and financial assistance had in some cases been !
offered to these countries, but this was in order to compensate for the H
200inequity of their former relationship with Tsarist Russia • -l:
The facts upon which the British note had been based, Montagu wrote
in a note circulated to the Cabinet, had been collected by his officers at
201the India Office, and could be "fully substantiated" . Hodgson, however, 
wrote from Moscow pointing out a number of weaknesses in the British note.
The Third Congress of the Communist International had opened on 22 June, 
and it was therefore (to say the least) unlikely that Lenin had addressed ft 
on 8 June; although the speech which he had made on 5 July did certain passag- 
es "reminiscent" of those which had been quoted. The reports supposedly given, f
to the Congress on 1, 5 and 20 June were open to the same objection. Nuorteva.
had indeed been in prison since March of that year, and it was "impossible" 
lor him to have made the speech which had been cited^^
338
Hodgson wrote to Gregory on 17 October and suggested that there was 
in fact "no evidence ttexto the effect that the (Soviet) Government is 
wilfully evading its obligations". Those who were hostile to the government 
had ±h fast been surprised by the British note. Lenin*s utterances, he 
thought, however indiscreet, were considerably less exceptionable than 
Churchill’s remark to the effect that Lenin and Trotsky were "living on 
the jewels they stole from the women they murdered"^^.
Curzon learned to his consternation that the Foreign Office could 
substantiate only two or possibly three of the charges; and that there 
existed no independent evidence, and certainly no quotable evidence, in 
support of the rest of the government’s case. He had been advised to reply 
briefly, ’’reasserting the truth of our charges, without however producing 
any evidence (because we have not got it)". He declared himself "positively 
appalled at these suggestions and indeed at the entire history of this casw’.* 
A department committee had been collecting and assessing evidence £or months; 
and a document had been issued, asserting the ’’irrefutable and indisputable’’ 
authenticity of the government’s chagges. Indeed he had "grave doubts” 
whether a reply of any kind was possible; in which case there would be 
"nothing left for me but to bear the odium of having made public charges 
which I cannot sustain". Those who had led him thus far, he thought, should 
attempt to extricate him as best they could. He regarded the position 
"with dismay"^**.
A reply was eventually drafted. Silence in answer to such a
challenge, Curzon noted in a minute, "would be held to imply acceptance of
205the charge, or at least inability to meet it" . The British reply, which 
was communicated to Hodgson on 2 November 1921, declared that the chargee 
in the earlier note had been made only after a "prolonged and careful 
investigation in each case". It was "necessarily impossible in many cases", 
however, to specify the source from which the information had derived. The 
speech by Lenin which had been referred to had been delivered in fact on 
5 June. Litvinov’s attempt to dissociate the Soviet government from the 
Third International was impossible to accept: this was a familiatr stratagem 
which had "ceased to beguile". The government had no doubt as to the authen­
ticity of the reported statements of Stalin and KrarMMElieva; nor did it 
aecept the denial of connections with Indian revolutionaries, or of Roth-
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stein’s propagandist activities in Teheran. The Soviet government had
continued to print propaganda in the languages of the East. The British
government had, it declared, "consistently and faithfully" conformed to the
conditions of the Trade Agreement. A "similar degree of loyalty" was insisted
206upon on the part of the Soviet government •
The correspondence, clearly, was getting nowhere. The govern­
ment, Lloyd George told the House of Commons in February 1922, had not been 
satisfied with the Soviet reply to their teaffirmation of the truth of their 
original charges. It was, xliSiSlfiSiKxx, "looking to the opportunity afforied
by the Genoa Conference for establishing a more definite and satisfactory 
207understanding" . Before discussing the new attempt to ’solve the Russian 
problem* which this remark presaged, the course of early Soviet foreign 
policy, and in particular of relations with the countries of the East, 
should be considered.
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Chapter Six: Soviet Russia and Revolution i
tr
The British note of 7 September 1921 was examined in Pravda by Karl Radqk,
He concluded that the documents upon which the British governments accus­
ations were based were "not only forgeries, idiotic forgeries, but the 
forgeries of the Herman counter-intelligence, which have been sold to 
all who wish to buy them\ Their publication, he charged, had followed 
a meeting between Basil Thomson, Head of British Intelligence, and the 
Security Head in Germany, Weisman; but part had already appeared in the 
White Russiah press. He recommended Curzon to subscribe directly to their 
journal, 'Ostinformation*, whose elementary errors had appeared in the
British note, rather than proceed through the intermediacy of Weisman.
2
Their address was thoughtfully appended • It seemed unreaonable to believe 
that Nourteva cou^d be released and address meetings, thoughaccused of 
treason. Lord Curzon, he suggested, might be working on the analogy of 
"some countries where people involved in speculation in Marconi shares 
can remain members of the Government1' (a reference to the pre-war shares 
scandal, in which Lloyd George, among others, had been implicated). The 
despatch of the agitational trains to the East within Soviet Russia was 
a concern of Soviet Russia alone; and as for Afghanistan and Persia, "no 
trains have been seen by anyone., for the simple reason that neither country 
has any railway"^.
Less easily disposed of *as the essential charge of the British
notes, that the Soviet government was improperly engaging in revolutionary
activity. This was not simply the product of Soviet disingenuousness 
regarding the activities of the Communist International. It reflected, also, 
the very real dilemma of the conduct of foreign relations by a socialist 
country with the surrounding capitalist countries with which it was, at 
least for the time being, obliged to coexist. During the period of foreign 
intervention and wivil war, there was no obvious difficulty. The foreign
policy of the Soviet countries, wrote Chicherin, was "simple and clear: the
quest for close links with the world proletariat, sharp hostility to all 
capitalist powers"**. A "most important fact, influencing the whole of our
foreign polic> of this year", had been the "foundation of the Third Intern­
ational". Kamenev also drew attention to the ’'close link between the
first proletarian state - Soviet Russia - and the Third Communist Inter-
5
national. One cannot exist without the other" .
Later in 1919, however, Chicherin found it necessary to point 
out that revolutionary soviet government found themselves in a "somewhat 
different position from revolutionary parties". As factually existing 
governments within a framework of other existing governments, they* were 
"obliged to enter into official relations with them, and these relations 
place on them obligations, which have to be taken into account". A revol­
utionary soviet government by virtue of its character and tasks was necess­
arily in "direct opposition to capitalist governments", and could in "no 
case., participate in their robbers* combinations". The Commissar , never­
theless, was baund by the position of the Government which was "not that 
of a revolutionary party far from power". "When we speak of the positive 
tasks of the Third International, we cannot identify Communist parties 
with Soviet governments, in which Communist partids rule"^.
The distinction might understandably escape a foreign government. 
Tribtsky, on his appointment as People*s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
announced simply that he would "issue some revolutionary proclamations to 
the peoples and then °&§£ up shop"*^ . The new Commissariat took some time, 
in fact, to adjust itself to the refusal of the senior staff to work for
g
the new government, and to appoint its first representatives • Chicherin
himself, moreover (who had officially succeeded to Tribtsky1 s position in
May 1918) achieved membership of the Central Committee only in 1925, and
never became a member of the Politburo. Zinoviev, on the other hand, the
President of the President of the Cominfefern executive, was a man of consid-
9
erably greater political weight •
The Communist International initially assumed, indeed, a virtually 
supra-governmental character. The Workers1 Opposition group within the 
Russian Communist Party appealed to it over the head of the Central Committ­
ee. The questionnwas discussed at the First Enlarged Plenum of the Executive 
Committee in February 1922, and examined by a commission under the chairman­
ship of Clara Zetkin. The appeal, it has been recorded by a contemporary, 
"appeared in the eyes of western Communists to be fully justified"; and
353 ^
they were "supprised" by its failure^? Nor was there any reason for j
the executive necessarily to be located in Soviet Russia. Zinoviev, addre- j
ssing the Secong World Congress, declared that "sgould the proletarian ;
i
revolution be victorious in England or France, we would naturally agree 
to transfer the executive to one of these countries""^.
Only with considerable reservation, then, can Chicherin be 
considered (at least at this period) the authorative spokesman of 
Soviet foreign policy, and the equivalent in position to the Foreign 
Ministers of other states with whom he dealt. The Communist Party, he 
explained, stood at the head of a great state, As a government, it entered 
into relations with other governments, and established firm friengly 
relations with them, andjdefended the political and economic interests of 
the Soviet Republic. 1$ conducted a state policy, defined by the interests 
of the workers. Government policy and party policy, however, were "severely 
separated. Speaking on behalf of the government organs, we place the 
second on one side. The fate of the communist movement, the successes 
and trials of Communist parties are the concern of otherjorgans. Our
1 P
attention", he pointed out^"devoted to the fate of the Soviet state" •
The ambivalence of Soviet foreign policy was aptly symbolized in a Pravda 
cartoon of 1924: a fiery Zinoviev harangued a crowd, while behind him 
a distraught Chicherin held his head in his hands'^.
The Russian revolution had been carried through on the assumption that if 
the Russian workers, a minority in their own country, broke the chain 
of imperialism at its weakest link, the workers in the advanced industrial 
countries would carry it through to completion. As Lenin said in the 
summer of 1918: "We do not close our eyes to the fact that we cannot 
achieve a socialist revolution in one country alone, even if that country 
were less backward than Russia and even if we lived under easier conditions 
than those created by four years of hard, distressing war.. We are deeply 
convinced that in the near future historical events will bring the West 
European proletariat to supreme power, and in this respect we shall not 
be alone in the world arena as we are now. Through this, the road to 
Socialism and its embodiment in life will be made easier"^. The revolujtion-
•s easy success in Russia was deceptive: a conflict with imperialism could
not be avoided, and in world revolution lay its guarantee of s u r v i v a l ^ .
The revolution in Russia was only the "beginning of the world socialist
revolution". There was no doubt that the socialist revolution in Europe
"must and will begin. All our hopes of a final victory of socialism are
16founded on that certainty" . Capitalism was an international force:
hence to conquer it finally was possible only in all countries, not in
one. This, equally, was why the war in Russia was one "against the
capitalism of all countries, against world capitalism, for the freedom 
17of all workers" • The Soviet movement was not Russian, but a form of
the world proletarian struggle; hence the struggle against the Bolshevik
18regime was at the same time a struggle against Bolshevism elsewhere •
Only working-class revolution, Lenin suggested, could end the war.
Italy and Austria were on the "eve of revolution". The crisis in Germany
was either the beginning of the revolution, or at least an indication of
19its inevitability and closeness • History was advancing "hourly" to
the world proletarian revolution. Their cause, he said in spring 1919,
20was "close to victory throughout the world" •
Addressing the First Congress of the Communist International in
March, he noted the strength of the international Soviet movement - even
in England. The victory of the proletarian revolution in the world was
guaranteed; and the formation was imminent of the international Soviet
republic. All the comrades present who had seen the formation of the
‘Communist International and the Soviet Republic would see the formation
of the World Federal Republic of Soviets^. The month of July of that
year, he forecast, would be the Wlawt difficult July": the following July
would be met by the victory of the international Soviet republic - "and
22that victory will be complete and final" •
The new journal Communist International carried the Comintern’s 
May Day appeal in its first number. It announced that the "last hour of 
our oppressors has struck". In 1919 the Communist International had been 
founded. In 1920 "the great International Soviet Republic will be born" . 
The formation of Soviet republics in Bavaria and Hungary was enthusiast­
ically greeted. No efforts on the part of the imperialists, the Soviet 
government declared in a telegram of greetings to the new republics, could 
"save them from the inevitable triumph of communism"^*4-.
The Hungarian revolution represented a different, “more human11
path to Soviet power than Russia, one that might be more appealing to
workers in the West. In this, Ldnin considered, was the "decisive signif-
25icance" of the revolution in Hungary . In Russia, he admitted, there
were a "lot of shortcomings", but he believed that "in Hungary, Soviet
power will fee better than here". In this cultured country, the experience
of the Russian revolution had been taken into account, and the cause of
socialism was being advanced in a well-planned, peaceful an& successful 
26manner • The Hungarian revolution, he thought, would "probably play a
27larger role in history than the Russian revolution" •
Zinoviev, writing in the first issue of Communist International
on fThe Perspectives of the Proletarian Revolution*, noted that at the
time of writing, the Third International had as its main base three Soviet
republics: in Russia, Hungary and Bavaria. But "nobody would be surprised",
he thought, "if by the time these lines had appeared in print we had not
28three, but six or more Soviet republics'* • The victory of communism 
throughout Germany was "completely inevitable"; the final victory might 
come "in the next few months, perhaps even weeks". In a year's time, he 
forecast, they would "already be begining to forget that in Europe there 
was a struggle for communism, for in a year all Europe will be communist^. 
He conceded only that capitalism might last for another year in America 
and in England: but this would be "beside a wholly Communist European 
continent"-^.
This was more than an invocation. The Soviet Russian government
was styled simply a 'workers' and peasants* government', not the government
of a particular country. In the Brest-Litovsk treaty!,lenin noted, they
had placed "the world dictatorship of the proletariat and world revolution
higher than any national sacrifice, however heavy.. Steps were taken
in early agreements, notably in the Treaty with Finland, to make provision
32for supra-national economic organs and planning^ •
The Soviet republics in Hungary and Bavaria, however, foundered; 
and by the end of the year while Lenin expressed his "firm belief" in 
victory, he drew attention to the "difficulties and sacrifices" which had 
been experienced^. Xinoviev admitted that they had been /over-enthusiast­
ic": it was now likely that "two or even three years" would be required
before the whole of Europe became Soviet^**. Communist International
noted later in the year that it had been a "year of difficult struggle..
35we suffered a considerable number of heavy defeats” •
In the first period of the revolution, Lenin wrote, many had 
hoped that in Western Europe the socialist revolution would begin immed­
iately on the conclusion of the imperialist war, ’’since when the masses 
were armed the revolution could develop with the maximum of success in 
several countries of the West". The leaders of labour, however, in his 
opinion, had ’’saved the bourgeoisie at the last minute”^The whole course 
of development which had taken place in Russia between 1905 and 1917 
would now have to be completed^. In 1919 it had seemed to them, Zinoviev 
recalled, that straightaway, on a year or two, they would manage to 
overthrow the bourgeoisie in a whole series of capitalist countries.
There was a time, indeed "when we considered that only a few days or even
57hours remained before the inevitable revolutionary upsurge”3 .
In September Pravda wrote that Italy, where the factories had 
been taken over in Turin, was on the ”eve of revolution”. Yet the bound­
aries of socialism were extended neither there nor in Poland (where 
Zinoviev noted that the tactics of the Communist International would
have been other than they were had the Red Army taken Warsaw)• Their
38forecasts, Lenin conceded, had not been realised^ • The speed and the
tempo of revolution in capitalist countries in western Europe was much
slower than in Russia; and they could not ’’gamble that it will accelerate
(Lenin had always insisted that it was easier for Russia to begin the
revolution, in view of the situation of ’cultural slavery* in which the
% 39proletariat of the western countries found itself) . It was impossible 
to hide from themselves, Zinoviev admitted, that when the Communist Inter 
national had been founded they had all counted upon a much quicker tempo 
of international revolution than had in fact occurred. The ’’stormy revol­
utionary unrest” of the masses at the end of the war, not only in the 
belligerent countries but in ’’such neutral and rich bourgeois countries” 
as Switzerland and Holland allowed them to hope for an extremely rapid 
unfolding of events. ”Not only us, but our worst enemies were at that 
time convinced that socialist revolution on a world scale was going to 
develop at a mad gallop”^ .
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The Third Congress of the Communist International, which met in
June and July of 1921, had to reckon with the failure of the *March action*
in Germany and with the introduction of the New Economic Policy in Russia,
which, Zinoviev stated, was a "political setback for the whole workers*
movement,, that slowed down the tempo of the proletarian revolution". The
reverse, however, was also true: the setback whtth the proletariat of the
western European countries had suffered between 1919 and 1921 had also
influenced the policy of the first proletarian state, and slowed down the
tempo in Russia^. The Congress had to "reckon with a slower tempo of
international proletarian revolution than the First Congress had done"^.
It was realised, Trotsky wrote, that the postwar revolutionary ferment
was over. It was time to turn to "winning the masses" with a united front
tactic, that was, "organising the masses on a programme of transitional
demands**^. No fixed time or tempo could be forecast for the development
of the revolutionary movement^. It was perhaps underfctandable that, as
Zinoviev complained, "some of our friends and enemies" should "interpret
the new tactic of the Comintern- thai tactic of the united front - as a
45denial of the hope of world revolution"
This was to overlook the possibility that events in western Europe 
might yet develop in a radical direction. The "German October" in 1923 
seemed briefly to suggest such an outcome. Zinoviev, writing in Pravda 
on 12 October 1923, declared that the course which the Russian revolution 
had followed from 1906 to 1917 was being reflected in the course of German 
developments from 1918 to 1923* The proletarian revolution was“knocking 
at the door in Germany; one would have to be blind not to see it". A turning- 
point was optimistically forecast in the history not only of Germany, but 
of all humanity. This proved not to be the case. It did, however, seem 
possible that events outside Europe, and in particular in the colonial 
countries in Asia, might compensate for a period (it appeared) of relative 
stability in Europe. While the European working class remained central to 
the achievement of socialism, Lenin wrote, the Bolsheviks should support
the "democratic and revolutionary movement in all countries generally,
46especially in the colonies and in dependent (countries) •
Lenin was in fact pre-eminent among the Bolshevik leaders (and
contemporary socialists) in the extent of his appreciation of the revolut-
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ionary significance of the East. The delegates at the Stuttgart Congress 
of the Second International, where the delegates failed to condemn colon­
ialism in principle (under a socialist government, it was thought, a colon- ; 
ial policy could play a'civilizing role)? WAAsATfgHded by Lenin. The voting 
struck him as of "very great importance", revealing a "particular negative f 
feature in the European workers* movement, one capable of doing no small j
damage to the cause of the proletariat and, for that Mdtfc reason, worth j
serious attention". The economic and material basis had in some cases 
been created, he thought, for "infecting the proletariat of one country *
or another with colonial chauvinismIt was a theme to which we would |i
return in his book on 'Imperialism*. j:
In an article of 1908, entitled 'Inflammable Material in 
World Politics', he noted the "sharpening of the revolutionary-democratic 
movement in Asia", which gave the Russian revolution a "great international 
ally both in Europe and in Asia", and which gave it, at the same time and 
for the same reason, "not only a national, Russian enemy but also an 
international enemy"^. In 'Backward Europe and Advanced Asia', he wrote j.
M
that "throughout Asia, a mighty democratic movement is growing, spreading j
and gaining in strength.. Hundreds of millions of people are awakening '}■
into life, light and freedom". They had a loyal ally in the proletariat 
of the western countries, whose victory would liberate "both the peoples ,
U Q 1
of Europe and the peoples of Asia" . Socialists must demand not only 
the "unconditional, irreversible and immediate liberation of the colonies11! 
they must also give "resolute support to the more revolutionary elements 
in the bourgeois—democratic movements of national liberation in these 
countries". There was "no doubt" that thd victory of the Russian prolet- j
ariat would create "unusually favourable conditions for the development I
50 - !
of revolution in both Asia and Europe" • ♦ ;
Among the first legilative acts of the Soviet government were j
the 'Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia', which provided j
for the self-determination and free cultural expression of the peoples of j
Russia, and the appeal 'To the Moslem Toilers of Russia and the East1,
which noted Jhat "even far-off India” had "raised the standard of revolt"
and was "calling the peoples of the East to the struggle for liberation"51.
i
Moslem customs, beliefs and institutions were declared free and inviolate; I
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and the new government formally renounced the agreements concerning thd 
annexation of Constantinople by Russia, the division of Persia and of 
Turkey. Enslavement need not be feared from the revolutionary Government, 
but from the "bandits of European imperialism". On their banners the 
Bolsheviks carried the cause of the liberation of the oppressed peoples 
of the world; their sympathy and support in return was invited^.
Such appeals were at this stage, no doubt, largely declaratory: 
the Soviet government was hardly in control of the main cities in Russia, 
let alone of the outlying provinces of the former Russian Empire. The *Appeal| 
to the Toiling Muslims* was, however, printed in "millions of copies in j
all the Moslem languages", by the decision of the government; and Buchanan j!
was reported to have been "particularly disturbed" by it^ • In a telegram i'
to the Foreign Office, Buchanan noted that Lenin was "openly inciting i
our Indian subjects to revolt". He and Trofcsky had "singled us out for 
his (sic) attacks"^. The India Office were "greatly exercised" about the 
matter, and desired, as "suppression is clearly impossible, to issue a 
counter b l a s t T h e  Intelligence Bureau, in a *  Short Memorandum* on the j
appeal, described it as "another indication of the ultimate Bolshevik ,j
policy., a campaign of universal sabotage, designed to overthrow the |
existing order all over the world". The Foreign Office with "unusual dil­
igence" attempted to ensure that the appeal was suppressed in all the .
Allied countries • I
The slogans of the October revolution, however, a Soviet observer 
conceded, "did not at once become the property of the popular masses of 
the East". Soviet Russia was concerned in the first years with the struggle •
against the Whites and foreign interventionists, and was cut off from the i
countries of the East^. The elaboration of decrees to implement the j
Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia was the responsibility
58of the Commissariat of Nationalities'' . The geographical sections into 
which the Commissariat was divided, however, showed a concentration on 
the nationalities either in the immediate west of Soviet Russia (Poland, 
Germany, Czechoslovakia) or in the Caucasus. Of eighteen sections, virtually j
the only exceJ>jbion was the Muslim section. Its activity, however, was j
concentrated within the borders of Soviet Russia, and its headquarters
from April 1919 was no nearer the East than K a z a n * A  Turkestan Commiss- I
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ariat existed from November 1918; but it experienced ''preliminary organ­
isational difficulties", technical problems, a lack of activists and of 
a link with the centre. Having the Moslems of Turkestan behind them,
Zhizn* Natsional'nostei. declared in an editorial, meant that "wfc would 
have Afghanistan and Persia, and from there... a path for further influence 
on India and Mongolia". But the millions of Turkestanis had been to that 
time "completely cut off from Soviet construction, or only insignificantly
affected by it". The task of strengthening Soviet influence must be
60undertaken "more urgently"
An article written by Stalin in November 1918 urged "Don!:*t
forget the East". The East was the rewerve and base of imperialism, its
source of well-being and of troops. The task of communism, he declared,
was to "infect these peoples with the liberating spirit of revolution to
raise them to struggle with imperialism.. He who wishes the triumph of
61socialism cannot forget the East" • A "socio-political ferment" was
declared in April 1919 to extend to "almost all countries of the East”.
The Russian revolution and the establishment of Soviet power had no doubt
"played a great role". Soviet power slogans had been raised in Egypt and
Turkey; a "mass movement" against world capitalism was developing, whence
6 ?
it would receive a "fatal blow".
•
Despite the isolation of Soviet Russia from the countries of 
the East, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs reported to the Seventh 
Congress of Soviets in December 1919 that the ideas of the October Revol­
ution (it appeared from the pfcess) had had "enormous influence" on the 
minds of the peoples^f the East6-5. Delegations of "almost all revolution­
ary organizations" had succeeded in making their way to Moscow, at "great 
risk". Links were being maintained "if not with governments, then at least 
with progressive groups of the East", despite "all the cordons of the 
Entente"6**. At the same time, however, it was felt necessary to resolve 
sit the Second Congress of the Moslem Communist Organizations of the Peoples 
of the East that the Bolshevik Party should proceed to "concrete real 
measures to revolutionize the East". There was declared to be a need 
"urgently to proceed to the most serious and broad activity in the 
organization of party work in the East". Further reports continued to 
emphasize the need for contact between the Communist organizations of
the peoples of thd East* Information was still reaching the centre "very 
poorly"6*5.
The defeat of the interventionary forces and the extension of 
the authority of the Soviet government throughout the area of the former 
Russian Empire during 1920 improved contact with the countries of the 
East. At the same time the anti-colonial movement in these countries was 
extending and becoming increasingly radical, while apparently receding 
in western Europe. This development promised more than the emancipation 
of the countries of the East, and their close association with Soviet 
Russia: it would undermine equally the structure of world imperialism, 
and in particular threaten the position of Britain, the greatest imper­
ialist power, through her possession of Inila. Turkestan had a key role 
in such a strategy. It was directly contiguous, it was pointed out, with 
the Moslem countries of the East: Persia, Afghanistan, Khiva and Bukhara, 
and extended across the Pamirs to the "pearljof the English crown", India. 
Turkestan was "as if by nature required tp play the role of realising the 
tasks raised by the Russian revolution". It should become the "forward 
post of the liberation movement of the East"; the Himalayas should be 
held by the Russian proletarian Moslem, "coming to the aid of his brother 
in Persia, India, Afghanistan"66.
Marx, it was argued, had foreseen that communist revolution must 
be preceded by a number of national revolutions of the oppressed peoples, 
and first of all India and the peoples of the East. The extension of 
control over Russian Turkestan in September 1919 offset the loss of the 
Ukraine: for the Soviet fcrder now bordered on Afghanistan and "from 
Afghanistan the road leads to Hindustan, the possible key to world revol­
ution"67. Nobody could build a bridge more quickly, Stalin explained, 
between the West and the East than Russia*s Islamic peoples. "This is bec­
ause a door is opened for you to Persia, India, Afghanistan and China.The
liberation of the peoples of these countries from the yoke of the imperial-
68
ists would.• undermine imperialism at its very foundation" . The establish­
ment of correct relations with the peoples of Turkestan, Lenin declated, 
could be said, without exaggerating, to have a "gigantic, world-historical"
importance. For all Asia and all the colonies of the world, for "thousands
and millions of people, the relations of the Russian workers* and peasants*
republic with weak, previously exploited people will have have practical 
69significance*1 .
The Russian working masses, Lenin told the Indian Revolutionary j
Association in a message of greetings, followed with "unflagging attention
the awakening of the Indian worker and peasant1*. He wished an extension ■
of this movement to "all the workers of the East": for "only when the j
Indian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Persian and Turkish workers^nd peasant
stretch out their hands to each other and advance to the general cause
of liberation, only then is a decisive victory guaranteed over the explo- |
7 0 'iters"' . Soviet Russia should not "limit herself to Platonic sympathy ;
and understanding, but (should) render her active assistance", it was
urged in Zhizn* Natsional'nostei. India was the "citadel of English j
71imperialism, the one place where she can be dealt a fatal blow**' • Another 
writer, in the official journal of NKID, declared that India was "aflame 
with revolution". Serious unrest there might herald the beginning of rev- j
j
olution; and India might play a "most important role in the task of winning j
72international victory over imperialism" •
Any setback to Britain in Turkey, Turkestan, Persia, or Afghanistan |
would "to a major degree**, wrote Radek, threaten her position in India
and Egypt. The Hear East might "become one of the most important fields J
73 Iof conflict between socialism and imperialism" • Britain, moreover, was ;
7 k"only an Empire so long as she holds India". If India were taken away, 
she would become a "small island kingdom". India was the foundation of 
the British Empire; if revolution broke out there, it would lead to 
"enormous changes in the history of mankind". British imperialism was 
"going through a critical period"; the Russian revolution could have a 
"decisive influence upon the fate of India, if her leaders grasp its sense, 
meaning and content". India was the most profitable of the British colonies, 
noted Kerzhentsev in 1919; its liberation would deprive Britan of a 
"huge revenue**: and more than that, it would be the signal for a "whole
7 5series of Asian countries to take up the struggle against imperialism" •
The British government had "always been the enemy of a strong Russia", 
noted Pavlovich; and Soviet Russia was "even more dreadful**. As much as
10% of the Indian national income, it was calculated, had to be surrendered J
76to Britain •
If the natural enemy of the Asian countries was Britain, their 
natural ally, urged Chicherin, was Soviet Russia. The Russian proletariat 
v/as the "protagonist, pointing the way to the working masses of purely 
Asian countries, which instinctively feel a basic unity, linking them 
by the very nature of their economic position with the revolutionary wor­
king masses of Russia", whose revolutionizing influence upon the Asian
77toiling masses was "immensely deep" . Not only economic position, but
Russia*s position as an Asian as well as a European power established
a basis for association. The Russian proletariat, Chicherin noted, was the
first European, but equally the first Asian proletariat to reject the
capitalist yoke. On &his basis, he thought, might develop a "joint united
revolutionary struggle against the international yoke of imperialist
78oligarchy, for world socialism" •
The Bolsheviks now spoke, said Lenin in December 192o,"not only as
representatives of the proletarians, but also as representatives of the
oppressed peibple". The slogan 'proletarians of all countfcfces and oppressed
peoples, unite* had been criticized, and it was certainly incorrect from
the point of view of the 'Communist Manifesto': but the Manifesto had been
written under "completely different circumstances", and from the point
of view of contemporary conditions the slogan was a correct one. "All
Asia is in ferment.. In India a revolutionary movement is forming". The
Entente had made Russia the "direct representative of the whole mass of
the oppressed population of the world.. We speak as the representatives
79of 70% of the population of the world" . The West was "digging its own 
grave in the East"^.
In his speech to the Congress of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples 
of the East, Lenin outlined the attitude that Bolsheviks, and subsequently 
the Communist International, were to adopt towards the revolutionary move­
ment in the East. There was to be close association: the revolutionary 
movement oftthe Eastern peoples co$ld "successfully develop., only in 
direct contact with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic
against international imperialism". But socialist revolution in the East
would "not be only or mainly a struggle of revolutionary proletarians 
in each country against its bourgeoisie”: rather, ifc would be a ’’struggle 
of colonies and countries oppressed by imperialism, of all dependent 
countries against international imperialism": the novel takk of a struggle 
"not against capital, but against medieval survivals"^.
The question was considered at greater length by the Second 
Congress of the Communist International, which met in Moscow i# July 
and August 1920. The uniting of the revolutionary proletarians of the 
capitalist, advanced countries with the revolutionary masses of those 
countries where there was no (or almost no) proletariat, with the oppressed 
masses of the colonial, eafctern countries, was "taking place at the 
present Congress", it was declared. World imperialism must fall when 
the "revolutionary onslaught of exploited and oppressed workers indide 
each country., unites with thd revolutionary onslaught of hundreds of 
millions of mankind, which heretofore have stood outside history, considered
O p
only as its object" .
One of the main tasks of the Congress would be to work out "how
to lay the basis for the organization of the Soviet movement in non-capit­
alist countries". Soviets were possible there; but they would not be 
workers*, but "peasant Soviets or Soviets of the toilers". The understand­
ing of the role and meaning of Soviets had spread to the East; a beginning
to the movement had been made "throughout the East, throughout Asia, among
all the colonial peoples". The main task of the Congress would be to work 
out a "practical basis so that the work which until now has been carried 
on among hundreds of millions.of people in a disorganized manner should be 
carried on in a united, organized and systematic way". If in Russia they 
were forced to make compromises and to gain time, since they were weaker 
than the international imperialists, they knew however that a "milliard 
and a quarter of people represented that mass whose interests we are def­
ending": they represented and defended, in fact, "this 70% of the populat—
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ion of the world, this mass of the toiling and oppressed" •
Discussion of the National and Colonial question at the Congress, 
however, provoked some disagreement with LeAAA*s views. Reporting on 
behalf of the Commission on this question to the Congress, Lenin announced 
that agreement had been reached, following their adoption of some amendments
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to the original theses, and of additional theses proposed by M.N. Roy, 
the Indian delegate8**. The "main idea" of the theses was the difference 
between the oppressed and oppressor nations. The question of the "bourgeois- 
democratic movement" in backward countries had given rise to some disagree­
ment. There was some opposition to the proposal that the communists should i
support it; and it had, accordingly, been decided unanimously to refer 
not to the "bourgeois-democratic" but to the "national-revolutionary |
movement". Thefe could, however, be not the slightest doubt that any 
nationalist movement could only be bourgeois-democratic, since the main 
mass of the population in the backward countries was the peasantry. i
i
Communist parties could advance their cause only in support of such !
peasant movements (while they could not extend their support to reaction­
ary leaders, who did not allow the education and organization of the peasan­
try in a communist spiritt). Granted the support of Soviet Russia and active 
propaganda, the capitalist phase of development was not an inevitable one 
foi? the backward countries. The theses, Lenin thought, would aid the j
development of "genuinely revolutionary work in national and colonial I
85 Iquestions, in which consists our main task" .
Roy, in his address totthe Congress, emphasised the changes which 
had occurred during the war in British India, Dutch India, China and else­
where in the^ colonial world, nass movement was developing which argied j
that fewer concessions needed to be made to non-proletarian elements8 .^ 
Serrati, who intervened later in the debate, opposed any aid whatever to 
bourgeois "national-revolutionary" parties. The theses might, he considered, 
be counter-revolutionary8*^. The theses were nevertheless accepted, with 
three abstentions88. Thesis k called for "closer union between the prolet­
arians and the toiling masses of all nationa and countries for joint 
revolutionary struggle to overthrow the landlords and the bourgeoisie" 
to be made the "cotnerstone of the Communist International *s policy on the 
national and colonial questions". Thesis 9 called for the "direct assistance 
of all Communist Parties to revolutionary movements in dependent or unequal 
ccountries (for instance, in Ireland, and among the negroes of America and 
so on) and inthe colonies89. The conditions of admission tothe Communist 
International, adopted by the Congress on 6 August, required a "particularly
366
explicit and clear attitude” on the question of the colonies and oppressed 
peoples from parties in countries with colonial possessions; colonial 
liberation movements must be supported "not merely in words but in deeds", 
and a "genuinely fraternal attitude" inculcated towards the working people 
of the colonies and oppressed nations^0. The jingoistic labour aristocracy 
of Britain and America, Lenin noted, represented a "most serious challenge 
to socialism", and a major source of strength to the Second International, 
none of whose members appeared to be prepared to assist the colonial 
struggle^.
Moscow and Petrograd, it was urged at the Congress, should become
a "new Mecca for the East", Concluding the Congress, Zinoviev dwelt on the
"gigantic importance" of the fact that among the delegates were "quite a
few" represdntatives of the workers and poor peasants of the East. The
national movements of the East, he declared, would "unite with the European
92and American movement and will deal a final blow to capitalism" • British
capitalism, Radek stated, could not be overcome only in London, Sheffield,
Mamchester and Glasgow: "it must be broken in the colonies. There is its
Achilles heel.."^. The peoples of the Near and Far East represented a
"source of new strength for the Communist International"; and all Communists,
wrote Pavlovich, had "become Asians, i.e. simply Allies of the whole
94struggling colonial and semi-colonial world" •
The work of the Congress was continued at the First Congress of the
Peoples of the East at Baku in September 1920. The decision to hold the
Congress was taken at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist
International at the end of June, together with the delegates to the
Second Congress; and an appeal was issued "to the enslaved popular masses
of Persia, Armenia and Turkey" to discuss "how to unite the efforts of thd
95European proletariat with yours for struggle against the common enemy" .
It was summoned as a "supplement to the Second Congress", or, as Zinoviev
96told the meeting in his address, as its "second half" • He considered 
the Congress a "major historical event" since it demonstrated that not 
only were the advanced workers and toiling peasants of Europe and America 
awake, but they had "all lived to see the awakening no longer of isolated 
individuals but of tens, hundreds of thousands, even millions of workers
of the peoples of the East, who constitute the greater part of the world*s
A
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population and are therefore a^one capable of finally settling the tussle
between labour and capital.." China, India, Turkey, Persia and Armenia
"can and should., begin a direct struggle to establish a Soviet system".
Where there were no urbab workers, "states of peasant toilers* Soviets"
could be established. When the East started to move, "not only Russia but
the whole of Europe" would seem "but a small corner in the vast panorama".
There was a need to "open a new page in our history when the oppressed
peoples of the East will no longer be slaves, when they will not allow
English officers shamelessly to rob Indians and Persians"9'7.
He proposed the declaration of "holy war against the English
and French robber capitalists". On behalf of the Communist International
he declared: "Brothers, we call you to a holy war above all against English
imperialism". The remark was greeted with "stormy applause"; the delegates
stood, shook their weapons and replied "we vow it". Might the declaration
be heard in London, Paris and in all the cities where capitalists were
still in power, said Zinoviev. "Long live the fraternal alliance of the
peoples of the East with the Communist International! May capitalism periih!
Long live the empire of labour!" Applause rang out; and the delegates
replied (according, at least, to the official report) "Long live the unifie-
98rs of the East, our honoured leaders, our beloved Red Army"' .
Radek, who also attended the Congress on behalf of the Comintern, 
anticipated criticism of the Soviet government’s motives. Its eastern 
policy, he emphasized, was "no diplomatic manoeuvre, no pushing forward 
of the peoples of the East into the firing-line in order, by betraying 
them, to win advantages for the Soviet republic.. We are bound to you by 
a common destiny: either we unite with the peoples of the East and hasten 
the victory of the western European proletariat, or we shall perish and 
you will be slaves"99. The struggle against a common enemy, wrote Bravda, 
turned the "proletarians of the West and the peasants of the East into 
close allies". The powerful revolutionary movement in the East heralded 
the "fall of imperialism and the triumph of the world socialist revolution". 
The meeting was a "major event in the history, not only of the East, but in
the history of world revolution" •
The Congress, certainly, appeared not to have passed unnoticed
by those against whom it was directed. British patrol boats covered the
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northern Turkish coast in order to prevent the departure of the Turkish 
delegates to the Congress, A storm arose, however, which caused the ships 
to put into Istanbul, and the delegates, at great risk to their lives, 
crossed the Black Sea, The delegates from Persia were less fortunate: 
while crossing the Caspian Sea they were bombarded by a British aeroplane, 
and two delegates were killed and several wounded1®1.
A manifesto was adopted at the conclusion of the Congress which 
called for the "liberation of mankind from the yoke of capitalist and 
imperialist slaveyy.. In their holy war all the revolutionary workers 
and oppressed peasants of the West will be with you. They will help you, 
they will struggle and die with you.. Long live..the uniting of all workers,
all the oppressed and exploited", of "al} peasants and workers of East
102and West" . It was also thought necessary, hov/ever, to appeal more 
particularly to the "workers of Europe, America and Japan", since "alth­
ough formally you pronounce us equal, in fact we are for you people of 
a lower race"1®^ .
Pav&ovich, who attended the Congress on behalf of the Cominfebrn, 
wfcote subsequently that it had succeeded in making the "first breach in 
the Chinese wall which separated hithefto the peoples of the East, first, 
from each other, and second, from the revolutionary West"1®^ . The Congress 
has indeed termed the "starting point of (the) process of calling in the 
East to redress the unfavourable balance of the West". The full recognition 
of thd importance of the role of the East might be said to date from the 
winter of 1920-110 .^ The Congress, however, had been no more successful 
in elaborating a consistent and effective eastern policy for the Communist 
International than the Second Congress had been. In all the countries of {
the East, Pavlovich suggested, there were present the "prerequisites for 
social revolution". In the first stages of its existence, the revolution *
in thetolonies would not be a communist revolution; but "if from the very j
beginning a communist vanguard stands at its head, the revolutionary j
masses will be led to the correct path for achieving their aims by means j
of the gradual acquisition of revolutionary experience". There could be 
"no doubt" that the Congress of the Peoples of the East would play a "major 
historical role in the speeding up of the process of the separation of
A
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the 'colonies' from the metropolitan countries", and in the "downfall of 
the capitalist order throughout the world"10 .^
This left at least two problems unresolved. The stren^t) of 
tradition, religion and custom among the eastern peoples might be such 
that a revolutionary organization seeking to win their support might be 
forced to make significant, perhaps even strategic concessions to precisely 
that obscurantism from which they wished to emancipate the eastern peoples. 
More important, arguahly, was the problem of an anti-colonial movement 
which, wjdle struggling against western imperialism, the main threat to 
the continued existence of the Soviet state, and welcoming close diplom­
atic relations with Soviet Russia, nevertheless conducted a reactionary 
policy in its own coflntry, involving the persecution of developing communist 
and revolutionary organizations. The composition of the Congress itself 
revetted the heterogeneous nature of anti-imperialist forces in the East, 
and the relative weakness among them of committed communists. It was announ­
ced that 1891 deleggkes had attended the Congress (an examination of the I
107lists of delegates and mandates revealed an attendance, in fact, of 2050 ).
Thirty-two nationalities were pepresented; but the heaviest representation 
was from the Caucasus and Central Asian territories of the former Russian 
Empire, and there were only 7 Chinese delegates, and li* Indians in attend­
ance. Only half the delegates, moreover, described themselves as communists, 
the remainder including non-party groups, anarchists, and others; and there
10Q
were only 1+0 women delegates •
Zinoviev's speech reflected these considerations. They were appeal­
ing, he told the Congress, "not only to those who are of communist persua­
sion, but also to non-party people". For this reason the Bolsheviks would 
"support groups that are not yet atone with us and on certain issues are 
even against us". They must "respect the religious disposition of the 
masses"; to overcome it would require "many years of work". They should 
in general "approach with caution the religious beliifs of the working 
masses of the East and of other countries". The policy pursued by the 
Kemalist government in Turkey, for instance, was "not our policy"; yet 
they were "prepared to assist every revolutionary struggle against the 
British government". The national movement's aim, he suggested, was to
"help the East to rid itself of British imperialism". In the Communist
j
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International, however, they had a "no less important aim of our own, which 
is to help the workers of the East in their struggle against the rich, to 
help them here and now to build thgir communist organizations, to explain 
to them what communism is, to prepare them for the real workers* revolutioi^.
The East was "utterly different from the West" and its interests 
were different, one of the delegates stated; rigid application of the 
ideas of communism would "meet with resistance" in the East. If Moslems 
were to adopt the Soviet system, "some special criterion will have to be 
applied in their case1*. Those from Turkestan had not previously seen Zinov­
iev or Radek or the other leaders of the revolution. He asked them to "remove 
your colonisers, working behind the mask of communism"1'*'®. In the East, 
added another delegate, they "certainly could not count on having a purely 
communist movement"; the movement in the East would assume a petty-bourgeois 
character, and would be a "movement for national self-determination and for 
unification of the East", led by "Supporters of petty-bourgeois revolution 
and democracy". The Third International and the Communist Party must support 
this movement; at the samej;time, however, it "must be said that it is not
this movement that will finally liberate the working masses", which could
111come about "only through social revolution" • The logic of this argument
was apparent in a statement made somewhat later by Stalin: despite the
monarchist views of the Emir of Afghanistan and of his associates, his
struggle for independence was "objectively a revolutionary struggle., since
112it weakens, disunites and undermines imperialism" .A movement mfrght be 
revolutionary, he added, though lacking a proletarian element, a revolution­
ary or republican programme, or a democratic basis. If the argument were 
extended further, a regime might be considered * objectively revolutionary* 
even if its programme was not simply not a socialist, but in fact an anti­
socialist one. Such a conclusion, clearly, could offer little comfort to the 
embryonic communist movement in the East.
The Congress elected a Council of propaganda and Action of Zf8 
members, charged with the publication of a journal of propaganda, the issu­
ing of pamphlets, and the rendering of assistance to revolutionary movements.
A Presidium of seven was formed, two of whom should represent the Comintern 
executive; and the Council as a whole was to operate under the overall control
of the Comintern11-^. Only one issue of the journal ’peoples of the East* ^as
in fact issued^**. A decision to establish a university of the social
sciences for the East did, however, lead to the establishment in the
autumn of 1920 of an Institute of Eastern Languages, whose function
was to provide instruction for "those preparing themselves for practical
115activity in the East or in connection with the East" .
While it seems clear that an over-optimistic view had been 
taken of the possibilities of revolution in the East, it does not appear 
to be correct to state that there is no record that the Council of 
Propaganda and Action ever, in fact, met^^.It is first recorded as 
having met, indeed, on the day following its election, to arrange for
117publication of the report of the Congress and other techniw^A matters •
On 2 November *shoc$ courses* were instituted, the first graduates
emerging in January 1921. A further meeting of the Council was reported
in February 1921. Baku, it emerged, had not been found an adequate
base; and two further Councils had been established at Tashkent and in
the Far East, although it was not yet clear whether these Councils should
be under the control of Baku or of the Comintern directly. A delegation
had been sent to Persia and another to Turkey. A joint technical bureau
11 o
for the Councils had been attached to the executive of the Comintern .
The Council was disbanded early in 1921 (Zinoviev reported for the 
Comintern executive to the Third Congress that it was "working actively” 
but that statement almost certainly erred on the side of diplomacy'*''^} 
but its effective existence , it has been stated, "ended long before tiie 
In a report to the Comintern executive in April 1921, the relative lack
of results was blamed on a lack of workers and resources; but the 
situation itself had been misjudged. The Comintern executive, in its 
circular of thejagenda of the Third Congress, announced the "first success 
es in work among the Eastern peoples". The Baku Congress, it stated, 
was of Qgreat and undoubted historical importance". The forthcoming 
Congress was nevertheless ascribed the task of dealing with the Eastern 
question "not only theoretically., but as a practical matter"^-^
By this time the trade agreement, with its conditions governing 
Propaganda and revolutionary activity in the East, had been signed. It 
has been suggested that the Bolshevik leaders accordingly virtually 
abandoned revAutionary work in thd East, since they had "no desire to
endanger the hope of a provisional modus vivendi with the western Powers^.
A school for the training of revolutionaries in Tashkent, to which
exception had been taken by the British government, was indeed closed
down, and its students transferred to the Communist University of the
123Toilers of the East, which had been established in April . Instructions
to ensure that their action conformed with the provisions of the Agreement
were sent to the Soviet representatives in Teheran and Kabul^^ Decisive
in the Comintern strategy, however, as has been suggested, was the overall
struggle against imperialism; the internal policy of an anti-imperialist
regime, and communist work there, was ultimately of secondary iignfctance.
An important question of revolutionary theory and practice was in any
case involved; and it had already become apparent, before the trade
agreement was signed, that directly communist and revolutionary propaganda
in many eastern countries might be premature.
The episode of the’Ghilan Soviet republic* was perhaps the most
instructive example. Following the seizure by Bolshevik forces of the
port of Enzeli on the Caspian Sea, on 18 May 1920, and the occupation
of Resht, a Soviet republic was established there headed by the **Persian
125democrat", Kutchuk Khan . Kutchuk despatched a message to Lenin, calling
on him and "all the socialists belonging to the Third International for
help in liberating us and all weak and oppressed nations from the yoke of
Persian and English oppressors.. We have a firm faith that all the world
126will be governed by the ideal system of the Third International" • A 
Persian Communist Party was founded on 23 July at Enzeli, dedicated to a 
"struggle against Bbitish imperialism, against the Shah*s government, and 
against all who support them"’^''7
The attempt to introduce a purely communist policy in Gkilan, 
however, as Chicherin reported, "did not lead to successful results". A 
dispute developed between Kutchuk and the Azerbaidjani forces, which ended 
in the overthrow of Kutchuk*s government on 31 July and his flight .
The Central Committee of the Iranian Communist Party on 22 October adopted 
a resolution which admitted the Necessity for the revolution in Persia to 
pass through a bourgeois phase**^^. The Skatchko theses, which were 
published the following year, drew attention to the Persian social struct­
ure, and to the lack in particular of an industrial proletariat. The 
Ghilan adventure had "raised thetJteaJb of Russian domination and thus
weakened the anti-English movement"; and any further armed intervention 
from Russia would harm the interests of the revolution. The Iranian 
Communist Party moreover should "refrain from the immediate introduction 
of purely communist measures" and attempt to form a coalition ranging 
from the middle bourgeoisie to the "left democratic petty bourgeois 
intelligentfj^a". The "impossibility of the early appearance of communism 
in Persia?* should be recognized; and communist measures, and the exprop­
riation of latfge landowners, must be postponed until victory had been 
secured over foreign imperialists'!^ The party*s delegate at the 1922 
Congress of the Comintern admitted that membership had fallen sharply.
His response, howefer, was to express the *hope that With the growth 
of an industrial proletariat the party’s prospects would improve^^.
While it would be wrong, therefore, entirely to discount those 
tactical considerations which followed the establishment of diplomatic 
limks with the western powers, it would be equally mistaken to overlook 
the extent to whiih the reduction of propaganda and revolutionary activity 
in the East sprang from a realization, after the experience of Ghilan 
and elsewhere, that such tactics might be premature, and that gteater 
concessions might have for the present to be made to the strength of 
traditional forms of religion and authority. This was not to say that 
the East had been assigned a less important role in the strategy of 
world revolution. In the East, wrote Lenin to the contrary, the revolut­
ionary movement was growing with notable strength*, compared with a 
"certain unexpected stability" in western Europe. On the introduction 
to political life of the working masses of the East "depended to an 
enormous dggred the fate of the whole western civilisation". British
India in particular would have a "most revolutionary role in the next
132phase of world revolution" .In his last published article, he contrast­
ed the slowness with which the western countries were "completing their 
development towards socialism" with the fact that the East had "finally 
entered the revolutionary movement"; and reflected that "Russia, India, 
China etc. constitute a gigantic majority of the population of the worll^,
The influence of Soviet Russia on the East, wrote a Soviet observer, 
though refraining from the conduct ibf official propaganda or action
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against British interests in Afghanistan or India, was nevertheless 
"constantly growing". This was a consequence of Soviet foreign policy, 
of the refusal to act as an imperialist power, and could not be eliminate 
Some significant successes were indeed secured in the field of diplomatic 
relations with Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey. The "stormy period of the 
Russian revolution" of late 1917 until 1920, when Soviet Russia was 
obliged to defend her independence against imperialist intervention and 
domestic counter-revolution, "significantly hindered the establishment
1^5
of normal relations" bmtween Soviet Russia and Persia" ^ . The Soviet
government had, however, declared the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907
which had divided Persia into spheres of influence null and void; and
a subsequent communication confirmed this decision and declared no longer
in effect any other agreement which might limit or infringe the "rights
136of the Persian people to free and independent existence" J . A further 
note of June 1919 announced a series of measures in compensation for the 
damage which Tsarist Russia had inflicted upon the Persian state, and 
expressed the hope that corresponging compensation might be secured from 
the "imperialist government of England". All Persian debts to the Tsarist 
government were abolished; Russian interference in Persian customs, tele­
graph and postal revenues was ended "once for all"; the Capsian sea was 
to be declared iree for navigation for Persian ships; the Russo-Persian 
border would be adjusted in accordance with the wishes of the local popul­
ation; all Russian concessions in Persia lost their validity; and the 
Russian Bank in Persia, with its lands and branches, was declared the 
property of the Persian people. Roads, railway lines and port equipment 
belonging to :Russia were transferred to Persian ownership. It was hoped 
that the initiative would "open a new era in the history of relations 
between Russia and Persia", and would assist the Persian people to "thfow 
off the yoke of the English and Allied imperialists" and join the ranks 
of free nations'^ *'7.
The withdrawal of British troops from northern Persia allowed the
Persian government tp propose the despatch of a mission to Moscow, in the
belief that the Soviet government would honour its declarations concerning
the Tsarist treaties, with a view to the opening of communications and the
138development of trade. The decision was welcomed by the Soviet government ,
Events in Enzeli and Ghilap however, led to fehe postponing of the negot-
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i&tions until the following November; and an agreement was signed on
26 February 1921, at the same time announcing the abrogation of the 1919
agreement with Britain. Soviet Russia formally renounced again the
forcible policy of the imperialist government of Russian towards Persia,
and related treaties and conventions, and agreements v/ith third parties
to the detriment of Persian interests. Both sides agreed to respect the
principle of non-interference in internal affairs, and to forbid the
organization on their territory of groups with aims hostile tfc the other
party. The Soviet government was granted the right to send forces into
Persia should a third party (again, undoubtedly, Britain) attempt to use
Persia as a base for attacks upon Soviet Russia. The Soviet government
r^hounced all claims arising out of loans made to Persia under the Tsarist
regime, and made over to the Persian people the property and all the
assets of the Russian Bank in Persia, in accordance with its declared
policy of opposition to the colonial policy of capitalism. Provision was
made for the development of trade and the establishment of postal and
139telegraphic communications, and for diplomatic representation •
Rothstein was nominated as Soviet representative in Persia in 
January 1921, and he arrived there on 6 April. Wftile the Persian people 
were reported to have welcomed his arrival, it was nevertheless a comment­
ary upon Soviet relations with progressive* eastern regimes that the 
agreement was strongly championed by the merchants of Teheran^^.
In Afghanistan, Amanullah shortly after his accession to the throne 
addressed a message to his "great and noble friend", his "Excellency" 
the President of Soviet Russia, who had declared the dedication of his/f 
state to peace and the well-being of mankind and the freedom and equality 
of states and peoples, on behalf of the Afghan peoples, "striving for 
progress". The message was welcomed by Lenin and Kalinin, who proposed 
the establishment of diplomatic relations as a form of mutual insurance 
against "foreign robbers"^^. Diplomatic relations were eventually opened 
in October 1919* The Afghan ambassador was received by the Foreign Affairs 
Commissariat, and Chicherin remarked on the "special importancd" which 
was attached to fridndly relations with Afghanistan, in view of her 
geographical position and the "military ability of her heroic people".
Lenin welcomed the representative of a people "struggling against the 
imperialist yoke" in Moscow; and the consul replied that he hoped the
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Russian people would ’’help the whole East to liberate itself from the 
yoke of Kuropean imperialism”. The hour was near, he thought, when the 
whole world would see that there was no place for European imperialism 
in the East^^.
The gift followed of a telegraph station, equipped ’’according to the 
last word of technology”, to the ’’great and famous Emir”^ ^ # British 
dissuasion delayed, but did not ultimately prevent the conclusion of a
treaty on 28 February 1921. The agreement provided that neither party
should enter a political or military agreement to the detriment of the
interests of the other; and for the opening of consulates, with the
normal diplomatic priviliges, on the territory of either party. Both 
parties subscribed to the principle of the ’’freedom of the nations of 
the East on the basis of independence”; and the Soviet Russian government 
agreed in addition to return to Afghanistan some land on the border, in 
accordance with the wishes of the local population, and to render 
’’financial and other material assistance'^^.Thus had been laid, wrote 
Chicherin to the Afghan Foreign Minister, a ’’firm basis for the joint
work of Russiawand Afghanistan, before whom stood the task of freeing
145the peoples of the East from the imperialists of western Europe • The 
ratification of the agreement was recommended to the Afghan parliament
in August: an assembly composed of popular representatives and of ’’landlor-
146ds, big merchants, and the senior figures of the Moslem church” .
Both in the case of Iran and Afghanistan, then, the agreements 
with Soviet Russia included provisions for the development of trade and 
commerce; and received the support of local mercantile and business 
interests which, while evidently influential, could not be expected to 
sponsor radical social change in their respective countries. Trade with 
Afghanistan developed slowly; but that with Iran increased much more 
rapidly, from virtually nothing in 1919(to 5,725,000 roubles in 1921, 
over eight million roubles in 1921/2, and over a hundred million roubles
in 1923/4, over three-nuadters of which was accounted for by Soviet
147imports from Iran . The merchant section , at least, appeared to 
benefit from Soviet support of ’objectively progressive’ regimes. It 
was by no means clear, however, that the interests of workers and peasants
were being comparably advanced.
This emerged perhaps most clearly in the case of Soviet relations
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with Kernalist Turkey, The Turkist revolution was declared by Izvestiya 
to constitute a counterpart to and prolongation of the October revolutlcJ§.
In September Chicherin addressed an appeal to the *Workers and Peasants 
of Turkey* calling for their co-operation in a joint effort to "throw
14Q
out the European bandits" . In April 1920, however, Kemal Ataturk
founded his revolutionary government, and approached the Soviet Russian
government with a proposal for diplomatic and military co-operation#
Chicherin*s reply no$ed the "most lively interest** with which the "heroic
struggle which the Turkish people (was) conducting for its independence
and sovereignty" was being watched in Moscow, and wished its further 
130success #
A Turkish delegation arrived in Moscow the following month to begin 
negotiations. The talks encountered difficulty in deciding upon the 
Armenian situation; but in November Kemal addressed a note to the Soviet 
government sympathising with the "greatness of the sacrifice the Russian 
nation has made in order to save humanity". He was "deeply convinced", 
as were the Turkish people, that "on the day when the toilers of the West 
and the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa realise that international 
capital is using them in order to enslave and destroy them..; on the 
day when the realisation of the criminality of the colonial policy reaches 
the hearts of the toiling masses of the world - the rule of the bourgeoisie 
will be over**^^# The negotiations concluded on 16 March 1921 with the 
signature of an agreement. The treaty noted the "solidarity in the stru­
ggle against imperialism" of its parties. A number of territorial disputes 
were resolved and defined. In view of the association between the national 
struggle for liberation of the countries of the East and the "struggle 
of Russian workers for a new social order", the right was endorsed of all 
nations to freedom and independence, and to a form of ruibe in accordance 
with their wishes# The international status of the Straits was left to 
a conference of the littoral states, provided its decisions did not 
threaten the security of Constantinople or Turkiih sovereignty. All previous 
treatieswhich did not correspond with the interests of bothparties were 
abrogated; and in particular Turkey was freed from financial or other
obligations dating from Tsaristtimes. It was agreed to undertake the 
improvement of postal and telegraph communications, and the free exchange
A
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152of goods and movement of people. Considerable financial assistance
153followed for Kemal*s regime and military assistance in the war with
Greece followed from the visit of Frunze to Turkey in November 1921, whose 
activities, formally limited to the conclusion of an agreement with the 
Ukrainian government, "extended far beyond the bounds of Turko-Ukrainian 
relations"'^*1’•
A success, it might appear, had been recorded on the diplomatic
field: and again at the expense of British interests in particular (whose
forces obtained, perhaps, s o ^  consolation from the arrest of eighteen
members of the Russian Trade Delegation in Constantinople in June. Their
155offices were searched and a revolutionary plot reportedly discovered
Kemal, however, left no doubt that the principles of his movement were
"not Bolshevik principles”. They had "never attempted., to have our nation
accept Bolshevik princ$ples"^^. There was,he stated, "no room whatever
in our country for this doctrine, our religion and customs as well as our
157social organization being entirely unfavourable to its implantation*1 
Not simply were communist theories "irreconcilable with our way of life”; 
it was moreover "evident that we must oppose them",The government, he 
declared, would be "absolutely right in taking measures against those 
who would wish to apply these theories to practice". In relations with 
Soviet Russia, the "question of the principles of capitalism and communism" 
was excluded^^.
Kemal was as good as his word. The Turkish Communist leader Subhi, 
whib returned tojthe country at the end of 1920, was seized at Trabzon along
with fourteen associates and drowned. Local jealousies appear to have been
* 159more directly responsible than Kemal*s government itself . The government
was, however, directly responsible for a legal and * official* Communist 
party, which denied the need for violent revolution, and served, Safarov 
noted, as a "pretext for the persecution of genuine communists, not prov­
ided with official ‘recognition* It was pointed out by a Turkish
delegate at the Third Congress of the Comintern that while the Ankara 
government was fighting the Entente for the independence of Turkey, it 
was fighting, on the other hand, against any communist movement. The 
communist party founded by Kemal had the "provocative aim** bf attempting 
to "end any communist influence in Turkey"; and he was conducting a "vigor­
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ous struggle against Communists”• Suleiman nevertheless professed to accept
the need to continue to support the independence movement, since it was
anti-imperialist, and the defeat of imperialism was the beginning of the 
l6lworld revolution
Radek wrote in Izvestiya that it was "imperative for the|Ankara 
government to understand that it van save Turkey only if it realizes that 
there is no other pelhqpfor Turkey to pursue except the policy of unificat­
ion with the proletarian revolution”. A "true liberation” was possible for
162her "only in a union with Soviet Russia" • In October 1922 an armistice 
was negotiated in the war with Greece, however, and further Soviet diplom­
atic support became less important for Kemal. The Congress of the Turkish
Communist Party was dispersed by the police, and more than two hundred
163communists arrested throughout the country . The Soviet authorities were
ordered to close the offices of the trade mission; and the Sovifet diplomatic
courier was harried and on one occasion was forced to give up his diplomatic 
lfili.bag . The question of the straits, moreover, was to be discussed at 
Lausanne by the western Powers as well as by the states around the Black 
Sea coast.
The Turkish communists were still advised to follow the leadership
of the Turkish middle class, which was considered to be progressive in 
165character . Radek conceded at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern that 
not only were the eastern peoples not led by communists, in most cases they 
were "not even led by bourgeois revolutionaries", but by "representatives 
of the dying feudal cliques, in the person of officers and functionaries". 
The "first duty" of Turkish communists nevertheless remained the support of 
the national liberation movement. "The whole future of the Turskish people 
is at stake. It is a question of whether the latter can free itself, or 
whether it will become the slave of world capitalism". In spite of the 
repression to frhich they had been subjected, Turkish communists diould 
"not forget the near future behind the present. The task of the defence of 
Turkish independence, which is of great revolutionary importance, is not 
yet finished. You must defend yourselves against repression., but you 
must also understand that the time has not yet come for the final struggle 
for emancipation, and that you have still a long road, to travel side by 
sidewwith the revolutionary bourgeois eleijients"^ ^^ #
Further arrests of Turskish communists took place in May 1923, on
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the charge of having "wished to propagate subversive ideas of communism
167throughout the land and to modify the form of government" . Two labour
organizations were forbidden to carry out any agitation or propaganda;
First of May demonstrations were prohibited; and the organ of the Inter-
national Union of Workers was suppressed .Surits, the Soviet envoy,
told the press subsequently that Soviet relations with Turkey were
"defined at the present time by the struggle for national independence
which is still being waged by Turkey, and cannot yet be regarded as 
169completed" . The Fifth Congress of the Comintern, however, which met 
in the summer of 192if, suggested that the decision to offer support to 
Kemal was being reconsidered, Manuilsky, speaking on the national and 
colonial question on behalf of the executive, noted that the Second 
Congress had defined the attitude of the eastern Communist parties towards 
the national liberation movement of a bourgeoisie which was "attempting j
to gain power". In Turkey, the bourgeoisie had now been "carried into !
power by a popular movement". The Turakish communists nevertheless cont- ji
inued to support native against foreign capital: a "serious error of I
tactics". Directives should be agreed upon which would "preserve our \
170 5young parties from the repetition of the same errors" .(A recent Soviet !
study has noted that in attempting an analysis of the social structure
of the colonial countries, the Communist International was confronted I
with problems of "gigantic difficulty". Few marxist studies of the question
171 *existed; marxist theory required not application so much as development - g
The problem was not confined to Turkey. In Egypt, Roy noted at !j
the same meeting, Zaghloul Pasha had expressed himself in "revolutionary S
|i
phrases" and had been accepted as leader by the Egyptian people. He had ;
taken power, however, by exploiting the nationalist movement; and the
whole of the Central Committee of the Egyptian Communist Party had been
put in prison and "horribly maltreated". A nationalist government, evident-
172ly, could come to power "without any national liberation taking place" .
In India, probably the most important country from the point of 
view of British imperial interests, an attitude had to be taken to the 
mass anti-colonial movement under the leadership of Gandhi, a popular 
and courageous figure but incorrigibly backward-looking and non-violent 
in his views. Initially he was given the benefit of the doubt. The
A
Congress Par£y was "slowly feeling ills way towards popular trust, secur­
ing for itself strong support from the people". Gandhi himself was
stated to have "consciously selected the only path open to Indian patriots
173under the present regime of oppression" . In India there was a "wide- i
spread consciousness of national solidarity" and a "desire to finish j
with the existing government order: all this heralds an intensification 
of the struggle". Bolshevik spokesmen were not unaware of the pacifism 
of Gandhi’s views, and of his atavistic social attitudes. But the movem­
ent which he led was held to represent a "major stage in the course of 
the liberation struggle of the Indian people": it was a "recognition of :
the necessity of the unity and solidarity of the Indian people against j
English domination", a "growing protest against the imperialist capitalism 
of the United Kingdom"^^. While the middle class leadership of the 
Congress was not a thorough-going one, wrote another commentator, class 
antagonisms were emerging, as they had in the course of the Russian '
revolution. "In the process of national revolution class contradictions I
develop"; and they were "already making themselves felt in Indian society".}■
At this point the Indian proletariat and the peasantry would "raide the |
175 1question of the social liberation of India" . ,]
i j
Later in the year it was announced that India had "definitely j;
entered the phase of social struggle with the participation of the broad i;
working-class and peasant masses". The slogan of national independence
already did "not reflect the tendencies of her development" from a
176bourgeois into a social revolution .
Communist and working-class organizations, however, remained 
weak; the wave of strikes of 1918-22 died away; and Gandhi called off the 
non-co-operation policy. Gandhi, wrote Roy, had reduced the movement to 
impotence and inactivity. The Congress had "committed suicide by repud­
iating the revolutionary action of (its) own followers. A powerful
177 1
revolutionary movement had been sacrificed on the altar of Gandhism" • !
The Comintern executive, in a message to the Congress in December 1922, 
urged that Gandhi’s methods could not be successful: "British rule aan 
and will be overthrown only by a violent revolution" • In 1920 and 1921, 
Roy told the fifth Comintern Congress, the nationalist- movement had "put
terror into the hearts of the British imperialists"; but that period had 
now passed. The petty bourgeoisie was "ready to compromise with imperialism
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for peace and money”; while the national bourgeoisie supported the Empire 
and had "even asked that the army and foreign relations remain the respon­
sibility of the British government”. It knew that the discontent with which 
it was confronted was an "economic discontent", and wished to be protected 
against it^"^.
Reporting to the Congress, Manuilsky noted that the Commission on 
the National and Colonial question had had to consider "several deviations”, 
among them that of Roy, who had "exaggerated the social movement in the 
colonies at the expense ibf the national movement". The class struggle
l80was "relatively advanced" in India; but this was not the case elsewhere.
A 'Manifesto to the Peoples of the East', however, which was issued by 
the Congress, while affirming the need for an "anti-imperialist united 
front" against the "rapacious international bourgeoisie", specifically 
extended greeting to the "young communist parties of the East" which, it 
noted, were "working and fighting in conditions of extreme difficulty, 
economic backwardness, feudal survivals, and barbaric torture". The !
struggle was one against "native feudalists" as well as foreign imperial­
ists; and every "honest expression" of the national liberation movement i
l8l ;should be supported • i
Relations with the countries of thd East encountered 
organizational as well as doctrinal difficulties. At the Third Cominfefern 
Congress in the summer of 1921, Zinoviev told delegates that the "first 
successes in work among the peoples of the East" had been secured. He 
added however that the Congress would have to approach the Eastern question 
"not only theoretically, as during the Second Congress, but practically". 
Without victory in Asia there could be no victory of the world proletarian
182 'revolution: this should become the guideline of every communist . An 
article written before the Fourth Congress, however, a year later, repeated i 
the call for a "practical approach" to questions which the Second Congress j 
had considered "in a general and purely theoretical way". The Congress j
should attempt to "find a way leading to the close organizational union j
of the national revolutionary movements of the East with the struggle of 
the advanced proletariat". In particular, it should work out "concrete 
forms of co-ordinated action between the communist zayafefcies of the. 
oppressing countries and thd oppressed masses of the East". There was a 
need for a "shift from declarations" tojaction^"^.
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Manuilsky nevertheless found it necessary to tell the Fifth Congress
that, while there was no need to reconsider the decision of the Second
Congress, the meeting should devote its attention to the "means of their
better application in the given concrete circumstances". The Second Congress
had been "unable to indicate concrete means of realising a united working-
class front between proletarians and colonies" • The first five years
of activity of the Comintern, Zinoviev wrote, had seen "only a beginning..
to serious revolutionary work" in the colonies and semi-colonies. The
following five years, he suggested, should be dedicated to work in just
this area. There was a need for "more, far more attention to the East, to
185colonial and semi-colonial countries"
In the East the revolutionary movement should aim "above all at
English imperialism", added Zinoviev. When the English workers under
communist leadership joined wif$ the national liberation struggle of the
peoples of the East, "then the proletarian revolution will be victorious
186in the East and throughout Europe" • The Communist International differed
from previous Internationals in its claim to be a world, not simply a
European organization . It remained clear, however, that the support
of the anti-colonial movement on the pafct of the workers, or even Communist
party members, of the metropolitan countries would not always be clear
and unequivocal. It had been claimed, for instance, that "from the first
foundation" of the British Communist Party that party had taken up a
"clear stand against British imperialism" and had "carried out continuous
188
activity in support of the national liberation movements" • Quelch, how­
ever, one of the British delegates at the Second Congress (and subsequently 
a member of the Central Committee of the British party) had pointed out
that the average British worker would regard it as treason to support the
189colonial resistance to English rule .
The British party's introduction to its edition of the Theses of
the Second Congress did call upon its supporters to "iniajfcfcte and help
small Communist groups within the subject countries preparatory for the
future struggle, and (to) keep these in close touch with the Communist 
190Party at home" . The Theses adopted by the Fourth Congress, however, 
drew attention to the "quasi-socialist tendencies towards colonialism of 
some categories of well-paid European workers". In particular, the creation 
of separate European communist organizations in the colonies (in Egypt
and in Algeirs) was, it was declared,a "conce&led form of colonialism"
191which only helped imperialist interests . Manuilsky, at the Fifth
Congress, announced that he had "found no document in which the English 
comrades (had) clearly and unambiguously demanded the separation of the 
colonies from the British Empird". The French party had gone so far as 
to omit sections of Comintern documents, and one section had even condemn­
ed the International for appealing to people of a different race. The
British comrades, he added, were "even more deserving of reproach for
192their passivity in the matter of colonial propaganda" •
There was, then, little reason to doubt the concern of the Communist 
International to secure the overthrow of world, and especially of British 
imperialism. It was equally apparent that a unumber of serious difficult­
ies were frustrating its attempt to do so. The disguised colonialism of 
the Second International parties seemed only incompletely to have been 
eliminated from the very heart of the movement, the western European 
Communist parties; and major organizational and technical problems remain­
ed. More crucially, no answer had yet been found to the problem of 
mounting an effective and united challenge to the imperialist Powers, 
through close fraternal links with anti-imperialist governments in Asia, 
without at the same time sacrificing the (often opposed) interests of 
developing communist and working-class organizations in the same countries 
The policy of helping the bourgeoisie of the Eastern countries to "erect 
a strong barrier against the imperialist designs of the British and other 
capitalists" might, Chicherin admitted, "to those of us who are not cap­
able of a dialectical argument., appear a betrayal of communist principles 
The "bourgeoisie-oriented stand taken by the Workers1 and Peasants* 
Government", in particular, while it appeared likely to strengthen the 
"struggle against imperialism, irrespective of what form it takiS^, appear 
ed likely to do so often at the expense of the developing communist and 
revolutionary movement in the eastern countries.
It was this latter aspect of the question, the impact of the 
Bolshevik revolution and revolutionary principles upon the Asian peoples 
and emerging political elites, and the development of marxist parties, 
which particularly concerned the British government. Yet it appeared that 
those who werejto be centrally involved in the struggle against Western
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colonialism applied a nationalist rather than a revolutionary interpretation
to events in Russia. In the case, for instance, of Ho Chi Minh, one of
the hundred thousand Vietnamese in France during the war, so strongly
patriotic were his views thqt it has been considered an open question
where he would have stood politically had any French political party
other than the Communist party espoused a deliberate policy ifaf eventual
195ftindependence for the colonies . He has himself related that at the 
time he supported the October revolution ’’only instinctively.. I loved 
and admired Lenin because he was a great patriot who liberated his 
countrymen”. At fiist "patriotism, and not communism” had led him to 
Lenin and the Communist International. The most important question had 
been which International supported the colonial peoples' struggle. He 
was read Lenin's theses on the national and colonial question, and 
•although thd political terms were'Very difficult to understand”, the 
answer seemed clear. "From that moment I completely supported Lenin and
19 h
the Third International” . Writing in Pravda in 192k on 'Lenin and the
Colonial Peoples', he admitted that the black and yellow peoples did
not know who Lenin was, or where Russia was situated; but they had heard
that in that country the exploiters had been expelled, and the people
culed their own country "without.. Governor Generals”. They had learned
that Lenin was appealing to white people to help black and yellow people
to "liberate themselves from the oppression of all foreign oppressors:
195Residents, Governor Generals and the like” . A new programme, it has
been noted, against colonial rule had been provided for the nationalist-
minded Vietnamese intellectuals and workers. In South-East Asia as a
whole during the 1920s, the "major ingredients” of marxism were "nationa-
196lism and anti-imperialism” •
The Bolshevik revolution, according to Mao Tse Tung, brought 
197Marxism to China (while it was true that portions of the Communist
Manifesto had been translated into Chinese as early as 1906). Within
a year or two, the debate on China's future was "completely altered”,
and interest in the Russian revolution "gradually deepened throughout
198
the Chinese intelligentsia” • Mao's thinking, however, continued to 
find a place for traditional Chinese themes and anarchism besides marxism;
and Li Ta Chao, who in November 1918 had drawn attention in an article
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to the 'Victory of Bolshevism1, offered in a discussion of his 'marxist
199views' "something less than a wholehearted endorsement" of marxism .
Popular unrest in China began after the war as a movement in defence (8f
the principles of self-determination, betrayed by the decision of the
Versailles Conference to cede Shantung province to Japan. The radical
nationalism of the May hth Movement counterposed itself to imperialism;
but it was not revolutionary. Lenin was firs^ translated into Chinese in
1919^9 Li believed that the October revolution should be commemorated
by "all the people of the national states which, like China, are victims
of oppression.." He regarded Lenin as the "liberator of the oppressed
peoples of the world"; his death was the "greatest loss" especially to
the oppressed nations of the East, like China. Lenin, however, if a
revolutionary hero, appeared not a marxist theorist but one who sympath-
201ised with Chinese national aspitations •
The Russian revolution was noted by the Cabinet on 29 June 1917
as among the factors which had "affected political feeling in India
materially". Balfour noted on 5 July the "increased mental turmoil
engendered by the Russian revolution"; and Montagu argued, in a Cabinet
paper, that it was among the factors which suggested the expediency of
202a substantial reform in that country's constitutional position . The 
Indian press, it was remarked, was "full of articles and notes on the 
Revolution". The editor of the 'Modern Review' of Calcutta declared that 
"all men and women of India who have heard of the revolution in Russia 
understand its meaning and know what a vast range of peoples it will 
affect for the better; they will have their minds filled with longings j
for political betterment and with a conviction that they themselves are 
not unfit tox exercise political power and rights". The editor deprecated j 
the suggestion that there could or "ought to be a revolution in India \
like the one which has taken place in Russia". It formed, nevertheless, '
a reminder to British statesmen that the right of nations to free politi- j
cal institutions applied as much to India as to Russia, Belgium and Se?85a. | 
The government's Report on Indian constitutional changes, which was 
published in 1918, commented: "The Revolution in Russia and its beginning 
was regarded in India as a triumph over despotism, notwithstanding the ,
fact that it has involved that unhappy country in anarchy and dismember- I
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ment; it has given an impetus to Indian political aspirations"^**.
It appeared to be nationalist ideas, however, rather than revol­
utionary ones which had thus been stimulated in that section of Indian 
opinion which stood in opposition to colonial rule. Their ideas of 
Bolshevism, confessed the Bombay Chronicle, were "very vague"; afcthough 
it was clear that their programme "took into consideration the necessities 
of the peasants". The Calcutta Bengalee considered that the movement was 
"comprehensively national"; the "result of a unity of patriotic outlook 
and sentiment which., had begun to manifest itself for some time". Even 
the murders, the unrest, the spolitiation and the disregard of laws, wrote 
the Madras Hindu, were "symptomatic of the apotheosis of a nation. The
Bolsheviks, wrote the Modern Review, were "striving to make Russia better
205and nobler than anything she has ever been" ,
It was indeed "paradoxical" that while the Revolution was well
received in India and affected the political life of the country, the
revolution's socialist principles "appeared to the Indian leaders as
206something foreign to their country" . Jawaharlal Nehru, who made a 
visit to Soviet Russia at about this time, noted the extent of interest 
in India regarding developments there. This was, he thought^ because its 
example might help them to "find some solution for the great problems 
which face the world today", the more so since conditions in Russia were 
not very diddimilar to conditions in India. His impressions were "very 
favourable": indeed to be in a Russian prison, he suggested, might be 
"far preferable than to be a worker in an Indian factory". They had grown 
up in the tradition, carefully nurtured by Britain, of hostility to Russia. 
While, however, there was intense antagonism between British imperial 
policy and Soviet Russia, Russia, he thought, "above everything., desires 
peace", and ordinarily should form the "best of neighbours" to India. The 
age-long rivalry of Britain and Russia was "based on the greed and covet­
ousness of British imperialism", which Indian interests surely lay in 
ending. India herself had "nothing to fear from Russia"^®'*.
On the question of the rights of nations and self-determination, 
British policy compared very badly with Soviet. It was, indeed, noted at 
an early stage by the nationalist press that unlike Britain, Soviet Russia
not only promised but implemented the principle of self-determination^^.
The President of the Calcutta session of the Indian National Congress,
which was held in December 1917, drew attention to India's new "free
and self-ruling neighbours across the northern frontier". In future,
he declared, unless India wron self-government, she would "enviously
look at her self-governing neighbours and the contrast will intensify
her interest". The parallel suggested itself continually between Tsarist
209rule in Rnds&a and British imperial rule in India . What was partic­
ularly appealing to Nehru, also, was the "great progress made by the 
backward regions of Central Asia under the Soviet regime", whose problems 
appeared similar to those of India. The Russian revolution appeared, he 
later recalled, to have succeeded in "bringing up the underdog and..
210equalizing people". It was also welcomed as a "counter-poise" to Britain •
The Indian nationalists* sympathies, however, were "very much
with Lenin and the others, wi &  knowing much about Marxism". He himself
had not read anything about Marxism by then. While all in favour of
Russia, it would be, he thought, "absurd to copy blindly what had taken
211place in Russia"; and he was "very far from being a communist" . This 
was even less true of Gandhi himself: who wrote that "hardly ever" had 
he known anybody to cherish such loyalty as he had done himself for the 
British constitution. With "careful perseverance", he had learned the 
tune of the National Anthem, and he "joined in the singing whenever it 
was sung". He held that India could achieve achieve her complete emancip­
ation only within and through the British Empire; and vigorously 
assisted the recruiting cappaign during the war. The repressive legislat­
ion introduced by the government after the war altered his attitude; and 
in particular, the Amritsar shooting demonstrated to him what "inhumanit­
ies and barbarities"the British government was "capable of perpetrating
212in order to maintain its power" • Yet his views on violence, and his
dislike of revolutionary methods, remained unchanged; nor did he espouse
Bolshevism. India, he wrote at this time, "does not want Bolshevism. The
people are too peaceful to stand anarchy.. Let us recognize the Indian
psychology. The average Musselman of India is quite different from the
average Musselman of other parts of the world.. The Parsis and Christians
213love peace more than strife" .
In the movement as a whole there was "marked ignorance" about 
Bolshevism; and in no way, it has been asserted, was Russian influence
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214reflected in the nationalist programme of action . Subsequent members
of the Indian Communist Party, certainly, have recorded thd "very
superficial" character of their knowledge of Marxism, and the lack of
Marxist texts* Lenin was even seen as divine providence* "Lemiim is the
instrument of God's will", declared the father of one subsequent member*
The trials of Indian Communists, ironically, helped to clarify the
215political issues involved • Even the leaders of the emerging Indian 
labour movement tended to assign a spiritual task to the unions* Lala 
Lajpat Rai, who presided over the inaugural session of the All India 
Trade Union Congress in 1920, declared that "foreign capitalism must 
be opposed in common by all workers because the interest of workers all 
over the world is one and the same". At the same time, however, he 
repudiated marxism, since it would bring to India, a land of "mighty
2ig
spititualism, the evils of expiring industrial civilisation" ,
The anti-colonial movement, admittedly, appeared both to be widening
and to be becoming increasingly radical. The Indian National Congress,
which Nehru found in 1912 to be "very much an English-knowing upper class
affair where morning coats and well-pressed trousers were greatly in
evidence", a Ssocial gathering" rather than a political session, became
affeer the war a mass movement? The trade union movement developed rapidly;
in 1920 the All India Trade Union Congress was formed. Gandhi's first
big civil disobedience campaign was inaugurated, being suspended in
February 1922 whern excesses occurred "at a moment when it might have
Pi 2
become a full-eclae revolution"
The Congress was pledged to 'swaraj'; but while this meant political 
independence and democracy to the younger men, this was not necessarily 
true of all the leaders. The motive force of the movement remained, accord­
ing to Nehru, "nationalism pure and simple". Gandhi was "continually
laying stress on the religious and spiritual side of the movement", which
219"took on a revivalist character so far as the masses were concerned" .
A number of Communist-aligned groups existed at this time, gener­
ally in exile and often, it appears, enjoying some Soviet subsidy* Roy, 
the most prominent figure, published a paper called originally Vanguard 
of Indian Independence from 1922, copies of which, and of Roy's book 
'India* in Transition', were soon reaching India • A number of emissaries
1
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maintained contact with western Europe, and with Moscow, Attempts,
however, to build up an Indian Communist Party continued to be frustrated
by personal jealousies and antagonisms, Radek told the Fourth Comintern
Congress that "one must., see thiggs as they are11. In India, in the
"great trade union movement,., in this great wave of strikes, we pkky
no role^ ts yet.. We have not yet taken the first step as a real workers*
221
party*1 . The attempt, moreover, to win over the Congress to a more j
]
radical position were decisively rebuffed at the Gaya Congress at the |
end of 1922, a "clear defeat" for the Communists; and the attempt to j
secure the election of Das in place of Gandhi was unsuccessful, despite \ 
Das*s repudiation ofjviolence and his adoption of an **anti-Bolshevik ?§§e’.’ j
The government nevertheless continued to consider non-violencd a "cloal$
to cover some vast secret design which would burst forth in violent
upheaval one day. The Rowlatt sedition had followed the appointment in
1918 of a commission to inquire into the "criminal conspiracies connected j
223with the revolutionary movements . The Russian revolution, the Viceroy 
declared, had been "seized upon as a pretext on which to base claims to 
sweeping changes'*. Addressing the budget session of the Imperial 
Legislative Council in 1919. Lord Chelmsford again warned the country 
of/the menace of Bolshevism to India. He informed the Council of the 
establishment of a special staff to deal with the danger of Bolshevik 
agents and propaganda. The official report for the year noted that areas 
of Central Asia had been "disturbed by the pioneersjof intrigues and agnnts 
of disintegration.. To the German arms there succeeded the more formidable 
menace of Bolshevik ideas" . The Times declared that its view had
"always been., that the tentacles of conspiracy extended far beyond India 
and that., the secret leaders were in touch with (the) Russian Bolshevik 
movement"^^.
Government intelligence seems, however, to have remained more than 
equal to this - apparently - serious threat. Roy*s journals were discov­
ered in transit, and many emissaries arrested. In 1923 cfcy^ sorship was 
tightened, copies of the Vanguard were seized, and surveillance was
p p c
increased. The movement was left "crippled and disorganized" • The 
Peshawar Conspiracy Case of May 1923 dealt a "severe, almost paralysing 
blow", it has been stated, to Indian Communism. The Cawnpore Conspiracy j
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trial led to the imposition of four-year sentences upon those leaders 
who appeared as defendants, and had a further disruptive effect upon the 
movement. The communist, however, as distinct from the nationalist move­
ment in India had never begun seriously to threaten the British position. 
The appeal judges in the Cawnpord case conclided that the conspiracy was 
"absurd and unbelievable", and had at no time been a serious threat to 
the state^^.
Yet the concern of the imperial Power was ultimately understand­
able. While there was abundant historical precedent for Anglo-Russian 
rivalry in the area, Britain*s "stupendous and vital interests" in Asia 
were now, in the words of the British ambassador in Berlin of the time, 
"menaced by a danger graver than any wrhich existed in the time of the old 
Imperialistic regime in Russia". The Bolsheviks now had the1 weapons of 
class-revolt propaganda, appealing to the proletariat of the world, and
p p  Q
the quasi-religious fanatacism of Lenin" • The imperial Power faced, in 
a colonial world alive with revolt, an adversary which combined an 
historically challenging role with teachings of class revolt and colonial 
liberation which attxracted support not only in India and in thd colonial 
countries, bit in Britain itself. It was, in the wirdxmstances, almost 
beside the point that the radical and working-class movement remained in 
a tiny minority within the broader nationalist movement. The implicit 
threat was, and was recognized to be, a very real one.
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Chapter Seven: Conferences
For the greater part of 1922 relations with the Bolshevik regime neverthe­
less remained within a European H^amework. This reflected in part the 
pre-eminence of Lloyd George, whose concern with European affairs was 
the inverse of Curzon's Asian preoccupations; and it reflected also the 
important role which Lloyd George*s personal staff, the much-abiased 
"Garden suburb", had assumed in the making of foreign policy. There was 
Parliamentary criticism of this "pseudo Foreign Office", and of the almost 
Presidential position with which it appeared to invest the Prime Minister"*" 
A more important factor, perhaps, was the accumulation of evidence in 
apparent support of the view, which no Cabinet member seriously doubted, 
that Bolshevism was impossible as a basis of society, and that while some 
verbal concessions remained necessary to the doctrinaire and intransigent 
section of the Soviet leadership, the 'Realists' under Lenin*s direction 
were in fact abandoning it. In such circumstances it appeared to at least 
a section of the Cabinet that significant, indeed crucial concessions 
might be gained through direct negotiation with the Soviet leaders. It 
required simply to be put to them that the economic restoration of Russia 
could not be accomplished without the participation of foreign industrial 
and commercial enterprises. While western businessmen, moreover, were of 
course in no sense concerned with ‘political* questions, they would undoub 
tedly require 'adequate guarantees' for the security of their property, 
and an assurance of 'impartial, treatment' in the courts of law. While 
presented as a 'practical' matter requiring simply a business-like and 
non-political discussion, it could nevertheless not be overlooked that the 
implementation of such principles would require the radical modification, 
at the very least, of many of what were considered to be the fundamental 
principles of the Bolshevik regime.
There had, admittedly, been no shortage of forecasts of the 
imminent downfall of Bolshevism. If nothing else, wrote the Review of 
Reviews at the end of 1917» starvation and cold were "sure to bring about 
the fall of Lenin's Government at no distant date". The question was only 
whether the new regime would be a constitutional government or a restorat­
ion of autocratic monarchy^. A year after the Bolshevik revolution, it
stoutly maintained that the government had lost the support of "all sections
of the Russian people, even of the most ignorant workmen and peasants”. It
was relying only on the ’’bayonets of a motley crowd of armed cosmopolitan
hirelings whom they call the International Red Army”; and its collapse
was expected within "weeks, if not days""*.Despite the failure of such
prophecies, Bonar Law told the House of Commons that he remained of the
opinion that a ’’Communist government is impossible, and cannot last',if.
The Soviet government continued to confound such forecasts. It
did appear to be the case, however, that while the the government itself
had not been overthrown,the principles upon which it ruled had been
reluctantly abandoned under the force of circumstances. By late 1920 it
had become clear, v/rote one journal, that the Bolshevist system had
"completely broken down", and was "quite incapable of reconstructing the
15
ordinary life of the country" . The introduction of the New Economic Policy
the following spring (which effectively de-nationalized small-scale trade
and industry and agriculture) appeared to suggest that the Bolshevik
leadership itself shared these views. The Tenth Party congress, which fehdo-
rsed fehe new Policy, was declared to have resulted in a "unanimous resolut-
6ion in favour of the abandonment of Communism" .
The Communistic experiment, reported the New Statesman, had failed,
as all in Russia acknowledged save a "handful of desperate doctrinaires".
Ldnin himself was "driving the Russian State furiously back on the road
to capitalism". The moneylenders, it concluded, had "returned to the Sempl?*.’
In well-informed quarters, the Times noted, the belief existed that Lenin
was persuaded of the failure of Bolshevism, and that it was "only a matter
of hitting on a suitable formula to re-introduce the capitalistic system
into Rjissia".8 The Foreign Office was informed by Peters from Moscow that
the two previous months had been marked by a "complete change in the Soviet
internal* economic situation". The Soviet government was now "consciously
q
encouraging the growth of capitalism" . Russian share prices improved on 
the Stock Exchange. The abolition of private enterprise and private commerce 
had been admitted a "disastrous fiasco", wrote the Economist; and there 
were now signs that the "more moderate members" of the leadership, such as 
Lenin and Krasin, had won their way. It added delicately that "from a 
business point of view" there were "undoubtedly big possibilities""^.
Lloyd George, then, was not alone in finding "indications of a
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complete change of attitude in Russia". A speech delivered by Lenin on
1 November, to which he directed the attention of the House of Commons,
was an admission of the "complete failure of the Communist system". Lenin
admitted that they had "been wrong, he admits they have been beaten". It
amounted to a "condemnation of the doctrines of Socialism": a "very
remarkable condemnation and exposure of the doctrines of Karl Marx by..
the only may who has ever tried honestly to put these doctrines into
operation"*^. Lenin, he informed the Cabinet, "was moving away from
communism". The government should accordingly "support the anti-communistic
12elements in Russia" •
The impression of Bolshevik weakness was reinforced by the famine 
which affected the Volga area in 1921-22, following an exceptional drought 
and compounded by the loss of stock and equipment in the civil war period. 
About fifteen million people were threatened with starvation. On 21 July 
an All-Russian Committee for Aid to the Hungry was set up under the pres­
idency of Kalinin; and the Comintern executive appealed to workers in the 
West for assistance both in July and in December.^ In August agreements 
were signed with representatives of the American Relief Administration, 
and with Frijhof Nansen, representing a Red Cross Conference^. The British 
response was less generous. "Obviously", the National Review pointed out, 
"we can’t trust the regime whicfiaf>roduced the famine to relieve it, because 
Bolshevist mentality is incapable of dealing Walbly between the different 
classes". The Times added that relief would mean "maintaining the Bolsh­
evists in power at the moment when their middeeds have wrought themselves
out in their inevitable consequences and ard threatening the collapse of
the whole hateful and criminal system. To any such attempt we ate most
15emphatically and resolutely opposed" . Some assistance was in fact prov­
ided through the agency of private bodies such as the Imperial War Relief 
Fund, the Save the Children Fund, the Friends' Emergency and War Victims
16Relief Committee, and the Workers' International Famine Relief Committee • 
It was pointed out that the "menace Bolshevism to our own 
civilisation" might be "disarmed by generosity"; and that if the effects 
were allowed to run their course without adequate relief from outside, the
result might be "incalculably disastrous throughout vast portions of Europe
uud Asia". It was, Lloyd George urged, "so appalling a disaster that it 
ought to sweep every prejudice out of one's mind and only appeal to one
k07
emotion - pity and human sympathy”. He nevertheless held that it must he
a principle of Allied assistance that the administration of relief should
be controlled by those who provided it; and that the Soviet government
should, in addition, be pressed to recognize all its financial obligations
17as a condition of such assistance • Gregory noted in a minute otf a paper 
by Leeper on ‘Political Aspects of the Russian Famine*that the Soviet 
government was ”not one with whichnwe can deal as an agency for relief”, 
despite an ’‘insidious and indirect pro-Bolshevik propaganda” in “fairly 
reputable sections of the press” in favour of Nansen’s proposals. The 
Soviet government moreoever was “virtually anarchy itself. Its disappearance 
would thereiffdJre alter little fro# that point of view, whilst from every 
other it would relieve Europe of a nightmare”. The government of India had 
urged, in fact, that “complete anarchy in Russia would be preferable to 
the existing regime”^ .
Am meeting took place between Lloyd George and Berzin, the Russian 
representative, on 5 August 1921, at the latter*s request. Lloyd George 
raised the question of debts and propaganda; and a further meeting took 
place the following day at the Board of Trade^^. The matter was dealt with 
by a Commission appointed by the Supreme Council of the Entente on 10 August, 
whose task was to “consider the possibility of aiding the starving populat­
ion of Russia”, under the chairmanship of the former French ambassador
Noulens. It adopted a number of resolutions on 1 September; and a note
same 20was communicated to the Soviet government on k September along theag? lines •
The Commission declared it “essential” to despatch a “committee of experts”
to Russia to examine the problem on the spot. The Commission was to be
composed of thirty members representing the five Powers, and permission
21was sought for its journey to Russia • Chicherin in reply objected to the 
inclusion of Noulens, who had been among the most "hostile and treacherous” 
enemies” of the Bolshevik government when previously in Russia, and had 
openly called for armed intervention. As one of the most active organizers 
of the blockade he was, in fact, held responsible to a considerable degree 
for the famine itself. His appointment was a "programme in itself”. The 
Commission in any case was attempting to substitute a long and complex 
investigation for direct and immediate assistance. Neither the American 
bod^hor Nansen had found such a study necessary. The proposal was a “mockery 
°f the millions who were starving and dying
1The International Commission decided to meet further at Brussels on
256 October; and a conference was held there between 6 and 8 October 1921 .
The furnishing of credits by western governments was made dependent upon 
the despatch to Russia of the Commission of Inquiry; and the granting of 
credits and help for the general economic recovery of Russia was made 
dependent upon the recognition by the Russian government of its debgs and 
other obligations, and upon the provision of guarantees for future credits. 
Lloyd George, the Soviet Foreign Ministry pointed out in its annual Report, 
had described the attempt to use the famine to force the Russian government 
to recognize the Tsarist debts as a "diabolical plat"; but he had never­
theless added that only such a concession could create the "atmosphere of 
confidence essential in business circles"^.
The conclusions of the Conference led the New Statesman to declare 
that "no more contemptible document" had been published in the two previous 
years. The decision amounted, in fact, to a "refusal on the part of our 
governments., to help Russia". The proposal for the recognition of debts 
as a condition of assistance had apparently been put forward by the British 
representative at the Conference, despite the fact that the Trade Agreement
expressly reserved this question to a future peace settlement (as Krasin
25noted in a letter to Moscow on 11 October, and in the pt?«ss ). If the 
Soviet government was not assisted from abroad, it would be strengthened, 
not weakened. Britain, in any case, needed the trade which a prosperous 
Soviet Russia could provide. In the circumstances the "shameful recommend­
ations" of Brussels amounted to "incredible stupidity": a crime "not only
against the Russian people, but against fcbfeh the honour and the material
26interests of the British people" • The government did eventually provide
some assistance to the Red Cross for Russia: but the medical goods, clothing
27and food supplied were surplus stores, valued at only £100,000 • The
Foreign Office also permitted the export to Russia of a gift of sacramental
28wine for the Russian Church *Beyond this, explained Lloyd-Greame, the 
"only way” in which the necessary confidence could be restored was by 
"establishing those conditions upon which alone credit can be given and 
fcaintained in all civilized commercial communities"^.
The Conference’s did at least, the Economist noted, succeed in 
drawing a "very limited recognition of its liabilities from the Soviet 
GovernmentChicherin, in fact, had originally proposed a declaration
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accepting the Tsarist debts, in view of what he considered to be an 
unfavourable international situation. Lenin replied the following day, 
however, disagreeing both with this estimate and with the proposed init­
iative^* An announcement on the question of debts, based on a text 
written by Chicherin with Lenin*s amendments, was endorsed by the Polit­
buro on 27 October, and published the following day* Agreement in princ­
iple to recognize pre-war Tsarist debts (but not other categories of debt)
was linked with the proposal to call an international conference which
32should discuss reciprocal claims and mattefs of dispute . The text, as 
communicated to the Foreign Office, declared that the Soviet government 
would recognize the old debts under certain circumstances "corresponding 
with its own intentions at the moment". The Soviet government had always 
"declared its intention of assuring an adequate return to foreign capital­
ists who would assist in developing the natural wealth of Russia and in 
re-establishing her economic machinery". I& was "absolutely essential", 
however, that a definite peace should be concluded between Russia and 
the western states. No people, it held, could be bound to pay thd "price 
of chains fastened upon it for centuries", in the form of Tsarist debts* 
ii was, nevertheless, prepared to make several "highly important concess­
ions" on the question. It was prepared to meet the claims of the numerous 
small holders of bonds, especially in France, for whom recognition of the 
debts was a matter of "vital importance"; and to recognize also the oblig­
ations towards other states and their citizens which arose from statd 
loans concluded by the Tsarist government before 191*f, provided that 
"special conditions and facilities" were devised to enable it to do so.
The western powers, for their part, must conclude a "definite and general 
peace" with the Soviet government, and extend to it their official recogni 
-tion. The questions which remained in need of discussion might best be 
resolved by an international conference, which alone could resolve the 
claims of both sides and achieve a general peace settlement^.
Curzon*s reply to Krasin sought "further information" on the 
question of the loans which had been made to the Tsarist government after 
and concerning compensation for the seized property of foreign 
nationals. The Soviet reply stated, however, that these questions were 
*80 complicated and to such an extent interonnected" with the problems of 
the economic restoration of Russia and of Europe that they could be
Zfio
resolved only at the proposed international conferencd. All discussion
of such problems in dispute among the powers should be|postponed and
considered only at the conference^.
The famine, meanwhile, stretched into 1922. Following a lecture
by Nansen, demonstrating the "wildernesses” into which the Russian corn
lands had been turned, the New Statesman returned to the point that for
Britain it was Mto put it brutally - a quetion not simply of the lives
of peasant children on the Volga, but of food and trade and employment
for our own people". They did not know of a better investmnt thttfe the
British government could make than a loan of a million, or half a
million pounds to Russia. There were Englishmen walking the streets
35unemployed, it added, because of the Volga famine .
The Cabinet in March considered mhing a grant of a quarter of a 
million pounds to match a similar sum subscribed by the public. Churchill 
objected. The famine, he stated, was "mainly due to the inconceivable 
wickedness of the Soviet government, who could greatly mitigate its 
ravages if they diverted for that end money they were now spending on 
maintaining a hmge Red Army, purchasing arms and equipment, and organizing 
propaganda against civilized states". Curzon admitted that this was true, 
but nevertheless supported the grant on humanitarian grounds. The Secret­
ary of State for India opposed the grant in view of the "Soviet's unmitig—
3 6ated war on civilization" • Lloyd George, for whose benefit a decision
was postponed, "deeply deplored" but was unable to change the Cabinetfs 
37attitude . A supplementary estimate for £100,000 was introduced into 
the House of Commons on 17 March. Thejmoney, it was announced, would be 
handed over to the British Red Cross "to be distributed by their agents
38in Russia" in conjunction with thejcther British voluntary organizations .. 
The decision was widely attacked as a niggardly one. After all, Maclean 
pointed out in the House of Commons, if it were maintained that Bolshevik 
maladministration had been responsible for the famine, it might equally 
be maintained that the famines in India bore some relation to British 
government policy. The government, it was remarked, would have insulted 
the public’s humanity and intelligence less had it "frankly refused to 
give a penny". On the lowest estimate, the country could "not really 
refuse not to relieve Russia: for it is to our matetal interest that the 
Russian corn-lands and those who work thm should be kept in existence"^.
It was also, admittedly, to the material interest of British
investors to secure the recognition of the sums which they had invested
in Russia before the revolution, and of the debts incurred by the Tsarist
and Provisional governments. Here the British stake was smaller than
that of France: while France stood first among investing countries in
40Russia before 1914, Britain stood third • A detailed Soviet investigat­
ion reckoned the shard of total foreign capital invested in Russia by 
French nationals at 32%, and the British share at 22.6%^. The extent 
to which the Russian state was in debt to the British was stated to 
amount to over £360 millions at the end of March 1921; and this excluded 
the interest due since the end of 1918^.
British investment, however, was more strongly concentrated in a 
number of areas and sectors of the economy. Nearly jjwo-thirds of the 
total British investment was in mining and oil extraction; and there 
were considerable sums invested in the textile industry^. In oil, the 
North Caucasian enterprise, acquired by Shell Petroleum di ring the war, 
with a capital of nearly £900,000 and property in the Grosny Oilfields, 
had fallen into Bolshevik hands and was believed to have suffered 
considerable damage; and no dividend had been declared since 1915* The 
Ural Caspian had over a million pounds invested in a refinery and pipelin®sa 
and had declared a dividend of 9% in 1914-5• The Baku Consolidated Oil­
fields embraced four emterprises with a capital of a similar sum^. The 
Russian general Oil Concern had about two and a half million pounds inv­
ested near Baku; the Anglo^Kaikop Corporation had somewhat les than half 
a million pounds invested; and the Spies Petroleum company, with property 
at Grosny, had over a million pounds invested, and had declared a 7i% 
dividend in 1914« No recent information was available concerning these 
properties, the Economist noted; in particular it was not known to what
extent they had suffered damage. Share purchasers were, it consideEd,
45even at low prices ’’taking very much for granted”
The investors and creditors themselves had suffered their misfort­
unes with some fortitude. The Council of Foreign Bondholders set up a 
Russian Committee in March 1918 whose purpose was to ”represent British 
financial and mining interests in Russia”, and go ”watchthe interests of 
the holders of Russian securities’’^ . A public meeting was held on gl June 
to deal with ’’Russia's financial obligations and the ways and means of J
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safeguarding the interests of foreign holders of Russian State Bonds and 
other securities”. The circumstances, the chairman admitted, were "as 
unpleasant as they were unparalleled". It was "impossible", however, to 
believe that a country like Russia could remain permanently without credit, 
and unable to borrow a penny on the money markets of the world. Russia 
was a country which "urgently required capital for the development of its 
vast resources", and it was "quite incredible that she is going indefinit­
ely to bar the door to its introduction". Another speaker thought it " selff 
evident" that the "first step that the next Russian Government would take 
was the resumption of her liabilities as a State debtor". The Russian 
Committee was officially constituted^7.
The Spies Petroleum Company regained control of its property in
February 1919, but was forced to withdraw again at the end of If 20. Its
chairman nevertheless expressed confidence that "wha> commerce goes on
I o
between Russia and this country, our property will come back to us" .The 
general meeting of the Russian Mining Corporation was toldjthat "unfortuna­
tely, for many reasons", the Kolchak regime|had failed in its efforts^ ? and 
the Bolsheviks had secured control of the country. It was believed, however 
that the properties had not been nationalized; andjthe enormous natural 
resources of Russia, it was declared, wo\jld only ultimately bejcieveloped 
by a combination which included and recognized the "rights of "property, 
the need for intellectual employment of capital andjthe employment of 
trained technical and scientific brains to direct not only that capital 
but labour itself"^. The Bolshevik declarations would last "exactly as 
long as the Bolshevik rule itself, and^ not a day longer" declared Russia, 
a journal "in the interests of Anglo-Russian trade", at the end of 1917*
The nadir of Bolshevik rulie, it added, had been reached in the regime*s 
"attempt to ‘nationalize* banking, industry and c©mmeree". Russian property 
owners, its readers were assured, would "not tolerate wild Socialistic
experiments"^0 .
Many former factory owners in Russia, the^ouse of Commons was told, 
were meanwhile in a "state of destitttAon". "Many who (had) occupied 
good positions", added Sir H. Cowan, might be "compelled to enter the 
workhouses"^. It was to attend to the interests of this group that the 
Russian Committee had been formed, composed of men "active in Anglo-Russian 
business"; and a committee of bondholders was also established, with a
kl3
with a number of banks and issuing houses as members. The committees, it 
was thought, could be sure of ’’every consideation ancjrhole-hearted co-oper­
ation from both the coming government and the financial community of
Russia”, whose interests were expeted to be ’’identical with those which
52they set out to safeguard” • An Association of British Creditors was
formed in September 1921 to supplwrent these efforts. It was hoped to bring
^influence to bear in the right quarters, in order to compel recognition
of thd debts to British creditors of Russia, andjthus to bring about a
resumption of commercial relations on the right lines..” The Association
was stated to represent directly or indirectly 350*000 British investoss,
traders and industrialists interested in Russia, whose total claims
against the Soviet government amounted to £300 million. The Soviet econony
required capital; that capital would necessarily come from outside the
country; and adequate guarantees of its safety were required. Its policy
included the restoration of all property, ’freedom of labour*, free disposal
of products on the home and foreign markets, and full recognition of the
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inviolability of the person and the rights of private property .
Among the more prominent figures assodtted with the Anglo-Russian 
Committee, and subsequently the President of the Association of British 
Creditors of Russia, was Leslie Urquhart. Urquhart was president of the 
Russo-Asiatic United Society, an amgamation of entepprises which had 
extensive interests in copper, coal, siltoer and other minerals in Siberia. 
Urquhart himself, a mining engineer, had workd in Russia for twenty-five 
years, where he had been a partner in variousjindustrial enterprises and 
several St Petersburg banks. During the rtule of Kolchak in Siberia, the 
enterprises over which Urquhart presided were re-opened .Urquhart himsilff 
had no doubt that the Bolsheviks Bid ’’not representjRussia and the Russian 
people”; and that Russia would eventually re-establish ’’freedom and that 
discipline and that sanity of mind which together form the only basis of 
real progress"^.
At a meeting in Arpil 1918 of the debenture holjlrs of thelrtysh 
Corporation (one of the bodies amalgamated the folloirng year into the 
Russo-Asiatic Corportaion) Urquhart declared that the ’’so-called nationll- 
ization of individual enterprises by special decrees of the self-appointed 
Bolshevik government, to be worked by ignorant workmen for their benefit 




have their property restored to them sooner or lhfeer; and the "siggs
56were not wanting that a reaction towards reason was taking place” .The
Corporation had discovered gold ore in Siberia, and ’’but for the present
events in Russia” would be making ’’large profits”. Although two thousand
miles from Petrograd, however, a ’’reflex of these anarchist influences”
did reach and seriously affect the discipline of theRussian workmen, the
relations between workmen and mnagement, and the”nomal operation of our
business". The proletariat and peasantry, however, were ’’too ignorant
for industrial political life”; an^the ’’present anarchist or Bolshvik
government (was) artificial and cannot last”, assuredly not beyond the 
571917118 winter . No damage had been suffered to the Corporation’s
properties, he reported at the end of 1918, as a result of Bolshevik
control; and when the Czecho-Slovaks took control of Siberia coal and
coke production had been re-started. The managing director of the mines,
Feodosiev, had joined a committee of the Siberian government under Kolchsk,
”a good friend of mine”. Urquhart urfeed Allied intervention 5"military
58assistance”) in European Russia .
The Irtysh Corporation, together with the Tanalyk and the Kyshtim
Corporations, were amalgamated in October 1919 into the Russo-Asiatic
Corporation*^. The new Corporation controlled capital assets of twelve
million pounds, and lay claim to two and a hlf million acres 'of land in
the Urals and West Siberia, with freehold and leasdhold mining rights,
agricultural and forest land, and concessions, and much equipment. Profits
60were estimated at nearly two and a half million pounds a year .At the
meeting at which the amalgamation was agreed in December, Urquhart drew
attention to the ’’enormous resources” which existed of metals; and to the
fact that the plant was largely undamaged. BolstnHsm, he remained convinced,
61was ’’nearing its end” • He deprecated negotiations with the Soviet 
Russian government before it had acknowlddged its debts; and announced 
that he would not let one pood of Russian gold lave Britain without 
attempting to arrest it, since his companies were owed a total of £56 
million by the Soviet government^. Thew was reason to believe, wrote 
Krasin, that attempts to attach the property of th^Soviet government at 
this time by legal process Mdid not take place without some formof 
participation of Urquhart"^.
Following the signature of thejfcrade agreement, however, and the J
1legal decisions which derived from it, and not uninfluenced, no doubt,
by changds within Soviet Russia and an apparent readiness to invite the
co-operation of foreign capital, Urquhart contacted Krasin and suggested
6ha businesslike conversation. The offer Was accepted . The belief that 
negotiations were to begin inspired a ’’marked revival of speculative 
activity” on the Stock Exchange. It was rumpured that thejnationalized 
properties might be returned, including the oif interests, and that the 
export of 70% of the produce would be allowed. Thefeusso-Asiatic Corpora­
tion was ”by far the most important" of the Russian mining enterprises 
in which Britain was interested, thefeconomist noted; but there werej.--------------
several others .
The conclusion of an agreement, however, had clearly been anticip­
ated. Urquhart wished to discover whether it might be possiblejto resume 
work under the conditions which now existed; an^Krasin replidd with a
"detailed and honest exposition of the conditions in which Russian industry
66worked following the end of the blockade andup to the present” . Some 
serious impediments to an agreement were foundjto exist. Urquhart neverthe­
less reported to the first Annual General Meeting of Russo-Asiatic Consol­
idated that the discussions had been of a ’’practical, helpful and very 
friendly nature”. The £56 million figure for compensation claimed had 
been queried, but he regarded it as a "very conservative one”, from which 
certain very important assets had been entirely omitted. The discussions 
with Krasin, he informed the meeting, had been inaugurated "after discuss­
ions with and on the advice of the Board of Trade". He quickly found common 
ground with Krasin in their joint desire for the "resuscitation of the 
economic life, peace and prosperity of Russia". A number of difficulties 
remained, which he hoped would be settled very shortly to their satisfaction* 
The agreement with the Soviet government mighty he thought, ptwide a "firm 
basis on which foreign capital may re-enter Russia"; while hejwas also at 
pains to point out that they had "no concern, as foreigners, with the 
politics of Russia"* His optimism was evidently founded in part on a form 
of ’historical inevitability*; a belief that thq["laws of Nature govern the 
Political economy oftthe universe which no giternment, however powerful, 
can contend against". Communism as a system of state economy had failed 
completely, and a "considerable change" had taken place " in the directicn 
of bourgeois ideas", which marked the beginning of the re-establishment of
1of favourable conditions for capital in Russia. It was a processx which
could Mnot be checkedn: "there is no economic system but the capitalist"^
Krasin, communicating the substance of the negotiations to Moscow,
noted the influential position of Urquhart in relation to British policy
(Curzon, for instance, was one of the trustees of his Society), and
reported his belief that the mines could bdworking at their pre-war
68capacity within a year • A reply was received, which was favourable in
principle, and Urquhart arrived in Moscow to begin more detailed negotiat-
69ions on 20 August 1921 .
The negotiations in Moscow continued until 12 September. Writing
in the same month, Krasin, a member of the special commission appointed
by the Soviet government to consider thejdraft agreement with Urquhart,
admitted that the differences between them were "still too large, and
70maybe negotiations this time will not reach a favouable conclusion" .
Urquhart continued to insist upon a concession for ninety-nine years,
upon the right ton export production free of dmty for this period, and
upon the return of all his enterprises in thelcondition in which they had
71been before their nationalization . Urquhart returned without an agreement,
and called upon Krasin in the middle of October to inform him that current
"politico-economic conditions in Russia" were such that the negotiations
72would not be continued . A copy of Urquhart*s statement to his sharehold­
ers was sent to the Foreign Office on 12 October; arn^ the following day 
a telegram was despatched to Moscow informing the Soviet authorities of 
the bBeakdown of the negotiations'^. In a meeting with a Foreign Office 
official, Urquhart expressed the view that the Bolshevik regime would 
"come to an end when the growing hatred of the Jews will culminate in their 
massacre, as in his opinion the Jews represented what is efficient in the 
present Russian regime"^.
Therd had appeared "every prospect", wrote the Economist, that the 
negotiations with the Soviet governmat for the return of the Russo-Asiatic 
Society*s properties would be carried to a successful conclusion. A 
"lively little gamble in shares" had ensued. The news of thB rupture of 
the negotiations "came distinctly in the nature of a surprise". Share 
prices had fall en sharply. It had naertheless, the paper thought, been I
the correct course to return to the position of a claimant against the 
Bolshevik government. "Sooner or later" Russia would "return to sanity"*^.
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Urquhart explained his decision rim a letter to Krasin on 11 October 1921, 
on behalf of his board, which was subsequently made public. Of the twenty- 
seven clauses of the draft agreement, nine remained obstacles to agreement. 
The measure of disagreement with thejsoviet governmnt on ’’vital points” of 
the draft contract was so great, and the attitude of the Soviet government 
and prevailing economic conditions were such, that the flovifety oould 
’’not see our way at present to continue negotiations for the return of our 
properties”. The Society refused to consider an excess prfits tax; and 
demanded that its workmen, natives as well as foreign nationals, be exemptt 
from the normal labour regulations. ijc oneession for 99 years was demanded, 
rather than the 72 year period which had been offered; the right of purch­
ase by the government after a period of years was not accepted; and in 
cases of arbitration a foreign expert should adjudicate, rather than 
members of the Revolutionary Courts who were ”not of too high intelligence” 
and were all members of the Communist Party. An agreement with trade union 
representatives, attached to the main agreement, was not acceptable (the 
Economist agreed that the conditions which had been made were "hopelessly
impracticable, as to render operations out of the question. In the union
76executive "the extremists" were, it thought, "in control” ). Urquhart
concluded with a number of stern references to the Cheka, whose power had
now "eclipsed that of the Soviet government", and to the "subversive effoirts
against the institutions of the capitalistic countries” of the Third Intef-
77national, which confirmed the company’s decision .
7 PiUrquhart, commented Pravda, had misunderstood N.E.P. • He had 
assured Krasin that the members of his company were "not concerned, as 
foreigners, with the politics of Russia"*'7^ . The Russo-Asiatic proposals, 
however, concerning the judicial system and labour l-fjLslation Of Soviet 
Russia undoubtedly involved in their turn radical changes in the social 
system which had been established after the Bolshwik revolution. The policy 
of granting concessions to foreign capitalists, indeed, had already aroused 
considerable concern in party and especially in trade union circles. At 
the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions, held in March 1921, a 
total of 150 questions were sent to the platform on this question alone.
It was officially admitted that the question of granting concessions to 
foreign capitalists was "provoking disquiet in party circles". As Radek 
pointed out, "there must not in future be two sets of laws in Russian
Zfl8
territory, laws for free workers working in Siviet enterprises and laws
80for slaves working for foreign capital"
The New Statesman was inclined to attach "small credence" to the "tale
8lof woe put about" by Urquhart . Another approach to the ‘Russian problem1,
indeed, began to emerge towards the end of the year, A consortium should
be formed composed of financiers and industrialists of fsrr countries,
France, America, Britain and Germany. The major role should be played by
German interests; and it was envisaged that German repayment of reparations
82might thereby be facilitated . Krasin was summoned to Downing Street on 
16 December, and together with Sir Robert Horne was infcmed of Lloyd 
George's opinion that the restoration of Russian railways, agriculture 
and industry "might most effectively be accomplished by a syndicate of 
private financiers from England, France and Germany". German agents, "in 
view of their greater acquaintance with Russia", would undertake the 
major part of the work on the spot. In the course of a meeting with 
Stinnes, they had come to the conclusion that the control of some Russian 
railways might serve as a guarantee (Lloyd George told the Cabinet the 
same day that foreign control of the Soviet customs was also under consid­
eration for this purpose^).
Krasin replied that foreign undertakers might find it difficult to 
cope with the "peculiar conditions" of the work of the Russian railways; 
but apart from this, the Soviet government refused in principle to consid­
er transferring even the control of railways to private syndicates. The 
main difficulty in the way of the further devdlopment of trade with Russia 
lay rather, he thought, in the lack of recognition of thejsoviet government 
and of a peace treaty. There was a possibility that, in the absence of 
stable and peaceful relations with the western powers, the railways might 
be utilized to organize opposition to the government. The support of the 
western, ani in particular of the British,governments was necessary,Oj
otherwise the efforts of the financiers would not be sufficient ,
The proposal was considered further at a meeting on 30 December in 
Paris, attended by bankers, financiers and govsimsfct ministers from 
Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. It approved a British proposal that 
ah international private financial consortium be set up, charged with 
assisting the restoration of the railways, ports and commerce of eastern
419
Europe, especially of Austria, Poland and Russia. The initial capital of 
£20 million would be provided by the memberjstates, and the pofits accruing 
Ifie German partner would be devoted to the repayment of reparations^.
The Supreme Council, in the course of the meeting at Cannes at 
which it was decided to summon an international economic conference at 
Genoa tfte following March, adopted a resolution on 10 January dealing 
with the international consortium. The resolution, in accoiilance with the 
decisions of the earlier meeting with regard to the formation of an inter­
national consortium , approved the establishment of an ’’International 
Corporation with affiliated National Corporations for the purpose of the 
economic reconstruction of Europe and the co-opeaation of all nations in 
the restoration of normal prosperity”. A Committee was set up to examine 
the project in greater detail., and to proceed v/ith the organisation of
or
the Corporation
The Committee, which met in London from 21 to 25 February 1922,
decided upon the establishment of a central corporation with a capital
of £2 millions, and of associated national corporations with a capital of
£20 millions, in which not only the founder-states should participate but
also America, Japan, Denmark and Czechoslovakia. The earlier proposal had
declared that no prospprit^ was possible ’’unless private property is
respected and law and order maintained”: a provision which, it was noted,
88clearly applied chiefly to Soviet Russia . The Committee decided that 
the consortium should have no dealings with states which did not recognise 
all their previous debts and obligations, and compensate all foreign natio­
nals for the loss of their property; and. which did not establish a legal 
system which would ’’comprehensively guaafcntee and encourage commercial 
activity”^ .
The proposal, however, scarcely advanced beyond this point. American 
participation was not forthcoming; and more importantly, the project 
aroused considerable opposition within Germany. It was argued thfct the 
more or less colonial character of the agreement would meet \jith resistance 
within Soviet Russia; and that it might be more advantageous to attempt to 
develop bilateral relations. Stinnes, and to a considerable extent Rathenau 
revised their attitudes towards the consortium. The consortium proposal 
did, however, bear a close relation to many of the economic plans which 
the Genoa Conference considered?^
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Business circles, indeed, offered cnsiderable support to the
proposed Genoa Conference. Manufacturers and merchants, it was pointed
out, wanted trade with Russia "far more than they want., the restoration
90of the emigres, or the payment of the Tsarist bondholders” . The National
Provincial Bank's chairman told its annual meeting in January 1922 that
while some business had been done writh central Europe, the situation was
still ’’far from satisfactory”. He expressed their hope that the forthcoming
conference would arrange for the ’’regeneration and reorganization of that
part of the world and the subsequent resumption of trade on a more
normal basis”* The chairman of Martins' Bank was also inclined to
"welcome the approaching International Conference at Genoa". McKenna,
the chairman of the Midland Bank (and a former Chancellor of the Exchequer)
noted that the country's trade could n$t recover its pre-war level while
"so many countries continue in their present broken-down condition”*^.At
Barclays Bank, Goodenough declared that it was "essential to make a
determined effort to reshbre the financial stability of Europe as a first
step towards better markets"; and he thought that England should "take
the lead" at Genoa. The Westminster Bank's chairman added that until the
country's export trade was regained, the outlook "must remain far from
cheering". What they needed most was the restowtion of the markets of
92central Europe and Russia . "Most far-seeing financiers and industrialist^
the Economist considered, also realized that the "effective co-operation
of the present rulers in Moscow" was "essential to the solution of Russia's
economic problem". Full political recognition it thought an "essental
93preliminary to any programme of economic reconstruction" .
Such a clear perception of the country's economic interests was 
not, however, shared by all members of the Cabinet. Not merely the 
possibility of full recognition of the Soviet government, but even the 
notion of dealing with them in conference at all, arouadd deep misgivings. 
This was in part a reaction to what was termed the "conference craze" and
Lloyd George's "love of international limelight". There were no votes to 
'be collected in Genoa, the National Review pointed out, "not even Bolshevist 
▼otes". The conference was seen as a "talisman to restore the f^ULng
fortunes of the Coalition"^. The early patft of 1922, indeed, provided 
auch evidence of Conservative unwillingness to continue to support the
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Coalition. Thomas Jones was told in March that three-quarters of the
Cabinet were disloyal to the Prime Kinistef. There was a fear that Lloyd
George might retufn from Genoa with lots of "* resolutions * and try to
95run another election on false hopes like that of December 1918" . The
prospect of success at Genoa, indeed, appeared to the Economist the "one 
influence" which bound Lloyd George to office^.
Within the government, however, Curzon for one viewed with 
"grave misgiving and with a strong personal dislike" Lloyd Georgefs 
tendency to seek a rapprochement with Russia, whose govenment he found 
"deplorable" and "detestable as mueh in its principles and in much of its 
practice". He was concerned by the proppect of a possible de jure recogni­
tion of Soviet Russia. Unable to attendjthe Conference himself through 
ill-health (if for no other reason), he wrote to Chamberlain that he 
could not accept the recognition by Britain alone of the Spvket government.
The trade resulting from the Trade Agreement had been a "farce"; while the
97propaganda had continued and was continuing unabated • Churchill wrote
to him that he was also "concerned about this Genoa business". The course
taken by the Prime Minister, he thought, had left the Foreign Office "very
little chance of bringing its special aptitudes into play". Lloyd George's
great objective, it seemed to him, was Moscow: th make Britain the country
"in the closest possible relations v/ith the Bolsheviks, and to be their
protectors and sponsors before Europe". He himself was "unable to discern
q8
any British advantage, however slight, in this"' •
Moreover, on what was l®gely a Russian issue the government was, he 
thought^ being "driven into something perilously near a complete break 
with France". The price ofjboycotting Russia, however, was beginning to be 
realized, noted the Review of Reviews. Thejsense that Russia was necessary 
to world recovery had become "too strong and general for French opposition 
to block the way"?^ Lloyd George outlined the position to Benes in London 
in February. Britain was an industrial nation, dependent to a great extentt 
on makkets for the sale of industrial production. InternfctionAl trade was 
vital for Britain. As it was, two million people were unemployed, at a 
cost to the exchequer of £100 million a year. Hey wished to go forward with 
France; but it would be "very foolish for France to drive us to go forward 
with Russia and Germany for economic reasons", for he was "determined to 
have peace"^®. The meeting at Genoa with 'Boches and Bolsheviks', Wilson
was told by h'orthington-Evans, would "take place whether the French agree 
to it or not"^^-.
The Prime Minister was nevetheless obliged to make a numberjof 
concessions with regard to the Conference to secure at least the acquie­
scence of of the Cabinet and the French government. These concessions go 
far, in fact, to explain its ultimate failure. The Supreme Council*s 
resolution, adopted on 6 January, provided for an Economic and Financial 
Conference to be held in February or early March, to which all the 
European powers, including Germany, Austria, Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria 
should be invited. Such a conference was regarded as an "urgent and 
essential step" towards the economic reconstruction of Central and 
Eastern Europe, a necessary part of the relief of the wide-spread suffering 
of the European peoples. The removal of all obstacles in the way of trade, 
the provision of substantial credits for the weaker countries and the 
co-operation of all nations in the restoration of normal prosperity were 
envisaged. Certain "fundamental conditions" were stated: no nation could 
have dictated to it any particular "system of ownership, internal economy 
and government**; but before foreign investors would provide capital, they 
must be assured that their property was secure and that their rights would 
be respected and the "fruits of their enterprise secured to them". This 
sense of security could not be re-established unless the governments of 
countries desiring fordign credits undertook to "recognize all public 
debts and obligations" and accepted* the '’obligation to restore or compen­
sate all foreign interests for loss or damage caused to them when property 
has been confiscated or withheld". They mutk also establish a legal and 
judicial system which sanctioned and enforced commercial and other contracts 
with "impartiality". All nations, further (again, clearly, with particular j
reference to the Soviet government), should "undertake to refrain from I
propaganda subversive of order and the established political system in !
other countries than their own", and "refrain from aggression against |
their neighbours". The Soviet government could recAtve official recognition. I
"only upon acceptance of these stipulations. An official invitation to the
102Soviet government was approved on 13 January • Already, however, the 
agenda and basis of the Conference, on French insistence, had been framed 
so as virtually to exclude the possibility of a significant advance.
The fall of Briand and his replacement by Poincare made French ■
participation even more problematical. At the beginning of February a 
lengthy memorandum was received from the French governmaiit, noting that 
it could refuse to take part in the conference were it to be held under 
conditions which would "compromise the French government's rights or 
threaten their interests". If, in particular, it appeared that the Soviet 
government did not accept completely and in advance the conditions agreed 
upon on 6 January, the French government would not be prepared to send 
delegates to the Conference. It was "indispensable" that the invited 
Powers announce, before any discussion, their "compile agreement on the 
fundamental principles recognized as the necessary basis of their collab­
oration and the essential condition of their meeting". It was also necessayy 
to make clear, regarding the peace treaties of which a number of the 
states to be represented at Genoa had not been signatories, that the 
French government could "not in any circumstances agree that any of the 
clauses of these treaties should bejdiscussed'.’ It might, also, be necessary 
feo "envisage international stipulations providing special elements of 
secutilby" regarding the rights of property; and to p^ace foreign citizens 
mnder their own national jurisdiction, where the law governing private 
contracts in a country proved unsatisfactory. The establibment of a new 
order - "or rather, the re-establishment of a whole old order in ecQUBmic^'- 
appeared to be required in the Russian case. The niftire of the preparatory
work was such that "three months at least" should elapse bef<fcre the 
10^
Conference met .
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in discussion of the 
memorandum with the French Ambassador, expressed the opinion that it might 
mean either o# two things: legitimate doubts concerning the meaning of the 
resolutions adopted at Cannes, or an attempt to prevent the Conference 
from taking place. The former, theAmbassador hastened to assure him , wax 
the correct interpretation. The British government, however, was 
incliaed to regard a postponement as sine die, and would not accept t$e 
proposal. The Italian government, responsible for convening the Conference, 
did not wish its postponement. A team of French technical representatives, 
it was sgggested, should visit Britain for discussions^^. A note embodyingg 
this proposal was sent to the French government on 11 February^^.
There could be no question, however, Krasfcn informdd Wise, of 
preliminary conditions". Berzin, the deputy Soviet representative in
kzk
London, wrote to Litvinov that in his opinion the Soviet delegation at
Genoa would have to give a direct reply to the question of whether or
not they accepted the Cannes conditions. There was nothing, in his personal
opinion, absolutely unacceptable in the conditions: although they were
admittedly worse than those which Wise had earlier outlihed. They should
avoid a binding answer before the Conference met; but they might be
accepted as a ’’basis for discussion at the Confer£nce”^ ^ .
Krasin, in the course of a meeting with Lloyd George and
Curzon, informed them that the Soviet government could not accept the
Cannes conditions nor sign them, since they were one-sided in their
application and the formulation of many paragraphs was unacceptable for 
107many reasons • Lloyd George replied that the Cannes Conference had 
regarded the agreement of the Soviet government to participate in the 
Genoa conference as in itself evidence of agreement with the principles 
embodied in the Cannes resolutions. If the Soviet government refused to 
recognize the conditions, the Conference might be prejudiced; certainly, 
it would be made easier for Poincare to refuse to take part. The Soviet 
government should announce its acceptance of the Cannes resolutions, and 
its willingness to consider their practical application. Here the Soviet 
government could defend its point of view. The Cannes conditions were, 
after all, ’’only the conditions on which every civilized government conduct­
ed its affairs”. Until the Russian government acknowledged (but not necess­
arily paid) its debts, he feared that the business community could not 
be brought whole-heartedly to accept any arrangements with Russia. He 
hoped for an unqualified answer. Krasin (who was aware of L&oyd George’s 
concern to improve his political position through a successful initiative
1 rtQ
in the foreign policy field ), continued to object to the signature of
conditions before attendance, which would amount to a contract, with no
109guarantee of reciprocity . Lloyd George was able to give the House of
Commons no greater satisfaction on this point than that Russia had accepted
the invitation of the Italian frime Minister, in which special attention
'’had been drawn to several of the paragraphs of the resolutions agreed upon
at Cannes. The Soviet government’s acceptance had been "without any protestt
110qualification in respect of those eeadifcieHe paragraphs” •
It remained to convince the governmBfct. A Conference of 
"Hi&irBters on 27 March was told of the need to re-start European trade.
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No results had followed from the Brussels Conference the previous year. It
was essential that not simply experts, but the "political representatives
of Governments should meet and endeavour to arrange something to re-efctablish
the trade of Europe”. Some members of the Cabinet, he wrote to Chamberlain
three days earlier, did "not realise how &rave the trade situation is’.’ He
had been making inquiries fora some time among men whose judgement and
knowledge of business he trusted afcto the trade propsects. The replies had
111been "invariably not merely gloomy, but seriously pessimistic” .
Owing tb the attitude of the French government, reparations 
would not be under discussion. There remaind, however, the important 
questions of the exchange, transit arrqngWments and recnstruction of parts 
of Europe, especially of Austria and Russia. Russia, in fact, was the "most 
difficult question?? with which the Conference would have to deal. It was 
necessary -feb have a "clear and definite” acceptance of the Cannes conditions 
from the Soviet government. In the event of their acceptance, the question 
would arise of the recognition, for a probationary preiod, of the Soviet 
government. The Allies, Lloyd George suggested, should take their decision 
according to the view they formed from the conduct of the Soviet delegation 
"as to whether they h8fi|a^antii2d Communistic principles in dealing with 
foreign Powers, or not”. There were two parties in Russia, "one entirely 
communistic, and the other prepared to abdn^on Communism in dealing with 
foreign countries. He did not know which was on top at present". If it were 
the latter, however, he thought it would be a "mistake to send then away 
with a refusal to do business". As h^put it in a letter to Chamberlain, if 
the Communist Party was ascendant in Moscow, there could be no question of 
recognition. If however, the "party that is prepared to surrender its 
Bolshevism and to make terms with th^Western capitalists has captured the
Soviet authority, then it would be folly not to help Russia to return to
1X2the community of civilized nations" •
It would, Lloyd George insisted, be "useless" to go to Genoa with 
instructions that in no circumstances could recognition be granted. He 
understood that there was a strong feeling among his colleagues and in the 
Bouse of Commons against recognition. He was personally *prepared to 
rtepect the view taken by several of his colleagues, and "very anxious thatt
they should march together on this question". It was clear that it was 
Impossible to t£ade with Russia unless the traders had some status in the
£••• 4
Courts; and it was even more important - indeed, essential - to trade to 
have peace in Europe.”At present there was no peace”. Were a pact signed, 
it was his idea that Allied agents, consuls and so forth should enter 
Russia and that all Allied subjects should have a status in the courts. 
Russia, similarly, should have agents and representatives in Allied 
countries. It was proposed to take the Cannes resolutions as the basis, 
and to add to it a European Pact of Peace, which would have thejeffect of 
guaranteeing peace in eastern Europe. Full diplomatic recognition of the 
Russian government should be postponed until the Allies were sure of its 
bona Aides. Until that time Russia would be represented only by an unoffic­
ial Charge d’Affaires, with access to the Foreign Office, but not to the 
Court^^.
The Cabinet, Churchill objected, had not been consulted about the 
Cannes resolutions. He expected a reference back beftre any decision was 
taken. He expressed the ’’gravest doubt as to whether the Soviet could 
carry out those (Cannes) conditions”. Th^Russian government, judging from 
Krasin’s meeting with the Prime Minister, had been willing to agree to no 
more than that the Cannes resolutions might be the ’basis of possible 
agreement*. The French government had reserved its right to refuse to give 
de jure recognition at Genoa, whether the Cannes conditions were accepted 
or not. Lloyd George 4rew the Cabinet’s attention to the ’’frightful prospect 
of international trade. In any event these proppects were sufficiently 
bad for any government, but they were hopeless unless peace could be 
established in Europe. Despite the Lodd Chancellor’s advice that the 
discretion granted to the British delegates at Genoa was ’’limited and 
guarded”, allowing at most a limited recognition to facilitate business, 
Churchill continued to refuse to take ”side^ji« againfc Russia as a whole 
in favour of a band of dastardly criminals”.
The matter was taken up again the following day. It would first 
be necessary at Genoa to decide, Lloyd George suggested, whether it was 
possible to do any business at all with the Soviet representatives; but he 
. felt that the British representatives shoulcjhave thejauthority to proceed 
he had indicated. Curzon said that he understood the proposal; but his 
Idea was not, nevertheless, to give recognition. His ’’main idea” was that
v*Qliniio account should the British government act alone in this matter”. Wflth 
J^Ls the Prime Minister agreed. Even a qualified recognition, Curzon noted.
would amount to de .jure recognition. Lloyd George did not, hoifrver, even 
in the event of the acceptance of the "necessary, but somwhat humiliating" 
Cannes conditions by the Bolsheviks, contemplate their * ceremonial recogn­
ition1. He read an extract from a letter sent to him by the Home Secretary, 
"indicating that M.Lenin was abandoning his Communistic principles. If this 
were the case, by recognizing him we should be supporting those in Russia 
who were in favour of moderation". He had, in fact, already told Benes thatt 
in his opinion European help was "absolutely essential to the Bolshevikfcs 
and that they could not do without it. For this reason he thought the 
Bolshevists would give any terms that the western Powers asked. If Lenin 
came back|from Genoa with nothing in his hands, he would be overthrown"'*''^.
There were two questions to be considered, Lloyd George told the 
Cabinet. The first was the economic conditions under which British traders 
could be induced to undertake trade in Russia; and the second the "larger 
question at the base of our economic troubles, the unrest in eafctern Europe, 
which disturbed the trader and made him suspicious. There was a state of 
"something like menace along the Russian frontier"; half of Europe, in factt, 
was "living under a condition of oiaace of war". The first objective of the 
Genoa Conference, he thought, should be to establish a pact among all the 
nations of Europe against aggression. Russia muj#'undertake not to attack 
Roumania, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and vice vasa. "Until some 
such condition of peace was established there would not be an effective 
revival of trade".The President of the Board of Trade hi prepared a paper, 
in consultation with leading businessmen, which indicated serious industrial 
and commercial prospects for at least two years to come. Very little dimin­
ution of unemployment, in particular, was foreseen, "owing in part to the 
international situation". As far as Russia was concerned, efforts to restore 
grading relations had been "only partially successful", and the Soviet gov­
ernment had failed to carry out the conditions as strictly as they had a 
right to expect; but the fact remained thfct Russia was still outside the 
comity of nations, and "until that fact was changed the full restoration oft 
trade would be difficult". The first objective should be paaee, and the 
second to "establish complete commercial relations with Russia. Some degree 
of recognition was necessary, in order to allow access to the courts of law.
Britain should not act alone; but equally, to refuse to recognize Russia
all had beeijagreed would allow countries which stood "least in need *£t
428
of Russian trade” to prevent any agreement.
The recent interview of a major figure in Russian trading circles 
suggested that ”Lenin personally was largely responsible for the promulgat­
ion of the recent economic laws”, which amounted to an Abandonment of 
communism”. If the Russian delegation came to Genoa having "practically 
surrendered their Communistic principles and willing to enter into negot­
iation with Capitalistic communities”, they ought to give ”all necessary 
support to the anti-Communistic elements in Russia, and declare that if 
Communistic principles are abolished we are ready to assist” in what he 
described as the "economicfdevdlopmnt of Russia”. Full diplomatic and 
ceremonial recognition would not, however, be granted until the Powers had 
”had an opportunity of satisfying themselves that a genuine attempt had 
been made to carry out the decisions reached at Genoa”. The Lord Prmvy 
Seal added that preliminary to any form of recognition was full acceptance 
in substance of the Cannes conditions, and recognition would not include 
the right of representation at Court. Full recognition would be granted 
subsequently only by decision of the Cabinet.
Curzon thought that it was impossible, at that stage, to be more 
precise than to affirm the desirnability of acting with Europe as a whole. 
No-one knew the degree of Russia*s acceptance of the Cannes conditions.
Only in its later stages would the Conference be in a position to come to 
a decision upon the question of recognition. In his view, by that time 
the Russian delegates would have established a claim to recognition, or 
they would not have done so. It would be "ridiculous” for the British 
delggates to stand out either for or against recognition if the great 
majority of the European powers were opposed. He attached "more importance 
to acting with Europe than to any other point”. Chutehill, again, found 
even this position difficult to accept. The Cabinet, he thought, should be 
consulted again. The Trade Agreement had been made on the understanding that 
if its terms were violated it would be terminated. Those terms had since 
been ^repeatedly broken”. The Cabinet, nevertheless, was being asked to 
"go still further to meet the Soviet government. He thought that the prospect 
of increased trade was not likely to fee a matter of consequence in the 
following two or three yeafs; while the only aim of the Soviet government 
ia attending the Conference was to gain piastige in order to ”rivet their 
shackles even more closely on the ignohant peasants”. He was bitterly sorrow!
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that at a time of a strong Conservative majority, "in a country", moftover, 
"deeply devoted to the monarchy", it was proposed to accord this favour to 
the Bolsheviks. He hoped that the Prime Minister intended to take only such 
practical steps as were necessary for the resumption of trade,
Lloyd George said that he would tell the House of Commons that 
the government was definitely disappointed with thejactions of the Russian 
government, and must be assured at Genoa that there was a bona fide 
acceptance of the conditions laid down. Chamberlain clafiflied the proposal: 
the British representatives would not act in isolation or without a 
general consensus of opinion; no advance would be made in British diplo­
matic relations with the Soviet government unless that government acceptedd 
the substance of the Cannes conditions; andjin the event of their acceptan­
ce, believed to be bom fide , the British delegates should grant "that 
diplomatic recognition which is required to make the agreement a success", 
but would "not give full ceremonial recognition beyond that involved in 
the appointment of a Charge d1Affaires". Lloyd George pointed out that 
these were "tremendous restrictions"; but the Cannes conditions must 
"in substance., be accepted". Payment of debts incurred by governments, 
for example, was "at the root of civilized government". Full recognition 
should not be granted, the Cabinet ruled, until experience had shown that 
the agreement had been loyally observed by the Soviet government; and the 
results of the Conference should be subjet to the approval of Parliament, 
The proposal, as outlined by Charafe«r]An, was approveM^
The Prime Minister outlined before the Cabinet on 2 April £he 
substance of the speech he intended to make the following day dealing with 
the Conference, During the probationary period, before the granting of 
fill ceremonial recognition, the Soviet government should have to show 
that they not only intended themselves, but had "established sufficient
control over powerful and extreraelCommunistic organizations in their
117midst, to enable them to honour their engagements . Nor, despite the 
acknowledgement at Cannes that forms of government and economic systems 
were matters for the countries concerned and not for others to dictate 
to them, did it appear that even the constitution of the Soviet state 
would be allowed to remain inviolate. As at present framed, Harmsworth 
informed the House of Commons, it offered "no judicial protection, in 
the sense ususllay understood, for the rights or property of British s
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The Conference had been called, Lloyd George told the House of
Commons, to consider the ’’problem of the reconstruction of economic
Europe, devastated and broken into fragments by the devastating agency
of war” . International trade was ’’disorganized”, currency exchange
’’unworkable”, and ’’vast areas”, upon which Europe had hitherto depended
for a largd proportion of its food supplies and raw material, had been
’’completely destroyed for all purposes of commerce”. The revision of
existing treaties, and the question of boundaries and reparations, was 
119not possible . The ’’main theme" of the Conference was father the 
establishment of peace, confidence and credit, currency, exchange, transpo 
-rt, the machinery of international trade. Britain depended more, probably, 
on international trade than any other country in the world: the problem 
was "of the most vital importance to the population of this country”.
Russia, he noted, was the most controversial matter which would
come before the Conference. Yet he believed that trade, business and
employment would not be restored in Europe until peace was established:
the danger of "hordes of savage revolutionaries to be let loose upon
Europe” was "not without some foundation". This would reduce Europe to
the ’’terrible condition of famine, pestilence and desolAfcion in which
Russia is". Trade would introduce elements of rationality and stability:
for once introduced, it "would bejin the interests of thejcountry itself
to retain it”. Europe, besides, needed what Russia could supply. Russia
before the war had supplied a quarter of the world’s exported wheat, and
two-thirds if its hemp; two-thirds of Europe’s flax, and half of Britain’s
timber. Russia, in fact, was the greatest underdeveloped country in the
world. It had labour, and needed capital; and this would not be forthcomigg
"without security, confidence and peace, internal as well as external”.
Germany, moreover, would be unable to pay the full demand of reparation
120until Russia was restored •
Acceptance of the Cannes conditions meant in substance that 
Russia must "recognize all the conditions impo#d and accepted by civilized 
communities, as the test of fitness for entering into the comity of 
hatlons”* Debts, for instance, must be recognized, if not settled immed­
iately: ”a country that repudiates her obligations because she changes hear 
government ±& a. country you cannot deal with - certainly not in these 
days when governments change so often”. The propebfcr of foreign nationals
A
where it had not been destroyed must be restored, and compensation paid. 
"Impartiakl tribunals” must be set up which were not the "creatures of 
the Executive". A complete cessation of attacks upon the institutions of 
other countries must be made. Lenin, hsjbelieved, had male an "admission 
of the complete failure of the Communist system". If this represented a 
"real determination" on the part of the Soviet government in its dealings 
with the West to honour t$e principles of "respects EftieiimeS£epi£l?A, 
respect for the rights of individuals, fair play to these who make invest­
ments there, acknowledgement of honourable debts", then there was a "real 
basis upon which we can treat". Access to the courts, and some form of
representation, would then follow; but not full recognition until the
121Soviet government had given "actual proof., of her bona fides"
Bonar Lav; welcomed this assurance, while prepared to "let them
try" to reach a worthwhile agreement at Genoa. Recognition, he thought,
ought not to be given to the Soviet government: this might "strengths
that government against a possible change from within", which was bound
ultimately to materialize. Whatever the Soviet government promised, "if
the system in its own country is that there is no private property, then
trading with Russians is a contadiction in terms. It cannot be done"; and
he had no belief in any other kind of trading that might bejproposed. If
the conditions proposed to the Soviet government were carried out, not
simply accepted in principle, then he would recognize that government
the following day: but he was "bound to day" that he believed thAt "these
conditions are impossible under this kind of government" (a kind
government described by another Member as an "asiatic barbarism that
122destroys everything it touches" ).
Chamberlain wanned that the Conference was "not going to cfeate 
a new world”, even if it succeeded • "Extravagant expetations” were 
"wholly misleading”. The question of unemployment could not be solved by 
a single conference, nor even by a sigle government. Under thejnost favour­
able conditions, it would take a long time for its solution”. All that 
the government hoped of the Confenance was that it might enable the world 
%q "take one step forward"^^. This was the more unlikely, as Wedgwood 
ttoted, in view of the prAor exclusion of the related questions of repara1>  
lone.and the revision of the Peace Treaties^*-*
: $£0 expectations aroused by the summoning of the Conference were
based, equally, upon an inaccurate estimate of the strength (and consequentt 
capacity to resist pressure) of the Soviet government. While N.E.P. did 
represent a setback for the Soviet regime, the Observer*s Moscow corresp­
ondent pointed out, it was far frorn the restoration of capitalism which 
British liberals had always confidently forecast. It was a mistake to 
think that the Bolsheviks were going to accept any scheme which the 
European powers proposed without a fight. European public opinion would 
be **surprised not only by the shrewdness and sagacity of the Bolshevik 
spokesmen, but still more by the stiffness of their settled conviction
of Russia's ability to assist European peace and economic revival, and
125not merely be helped by Europe".
As early as December 1921, Krasin hdH in fact ugged the extreme
necessity of preparing for the forthcoming European conference, collecting
126documentation, and nominating representatives . At a session of the
All-Russian Central Executive Committee on 27 January Chicherin's
acceptance of the Genoa invitation was approved, and a delggation was
nominated, led, as had been requested, by Lenin, but under the deputy
leadership of Chicherin, who v/as invested with "all the powers of Chapman
should circumstances prevent the attendance of comrade Lenin at the Conf-
127erence" (as proved to be the case ). The other maiabers of the delegation
included Litvinov, Krasin, Ioffe, Vorovsky and Rakovsky; altbgether it
numbered sixty-thrde
They wished for peaxse|)ic co-operation, Chicherin told the meeting,
"but we will struggle against economic co-operation taking the form of
129the economic domination of Russia" • The text of the Cannes resolutions 
which was forwarded to Chicherin by the Italian Foreign Minister on 13
January did in fact contain a significant omission: while it was stated
that no country had the right to dictate to another its economic order or
form of government, the right to its own system of ownership was not
mentioned, although it had been indued in the resolution to which the 
Supreme Council had given its a p p r o v a l L e n i n  wrote to Chicherin on 
26 January 1922 requesting him to obtain a copy of the resolutions in the 
language in which they had been framed. In the draft directives which 
he produced at the beginning of February, he urged that the delegates 
8hould quote "particularly often" the first point of the^Cannas resolutions 
incite original form, which, it had become clear, provided for the right
Conference represented more than two years' work on the part of state
and scientific institutes into the question of the losses which Soviet
Russia had suffered as a result of the period of foreign intervention 
132and blockade • The work was directed by a special commission under the 
auspices of the Commissariat of Finance by V.G. Groman^^^.It was emphas­
ized that the sum of damages for which the Allies were held responsible, 
amounting to 39 million gold roubles, was in fact an under-estimate, since 
only claims which could readily be quantified were taken into account^**.
A more important factor, perhaps, in allowing Lenin to maintain
that "we will not make an agreement which is not advantageous fcrus", was
135the development of economic relations with Germany . A proposal by
Krupp to establish an armaments factory in Russia was endorsed by Lenin
in January 1922. Its acceptance was neeessary, he thought, "right now,
before the Genoa Conference. For us it would be endlessly important to
conclude at least one, and preferably several concession contracts with
136German firms in particular" J . Relations with the German government and 
with German industrialists developed to such a point that a draft treaty, 
on the lines of that subsequently signed at Rapallo, was ready for sign­
ature in Berlin in April, when the Soviet delegates were stopping over
137in the course of their journey to Genoa . More than rhetoric, in fact,
informed Chicherin1 s assurance to the pressjon the eve of the delation's
departure that it would defend the inviolability of the Soviet system and
the sovereign rights of the Soviet state. If an agreement were not reached
138
at Genoa, it would be reached at some later dafee •
The conference, it was noted, was officially designated an 'international
economic conference': but this did "Hot prevent its organisers from forming
139a political combination and raising political questions" • It was, in 
fact, precisely the patently political character of the meeting on which 
the American government based its refusal of the invitation to participa^l? 
The question of the acceptance or not of the Cannes resolutions was negot­
iated at the opening session of the Conference, on 10 April, by the 
chairman's formula that he had declared that the pngramme of the conference
k 3 k
would be based upon the decisions taken at Cannes, and that he regarded 
his proposal approved in the absence of objections'*'^. Chicherin had 
stated in his opening address that his government "noted and approved in 
principle the substance of the Cannes resolutions”, while reserving the 
right to amend and make additions to them”. More contenllous, however, 
proved a proposal that in order to strengthen peace ”so far as that is 
possible within the limits of the political and social order existing in 
the majority of the countries” a general reduction of arms should be agre­
ed, and a lessening of the load of militarism through the reduction of 
armed forces and the banning of poisonous gases and other forms of war.
This \apiestion, the head of the French delegation pointed out, was not on 
the agenda; and attempt to discuss it would meetjaa final and categorical 
refusal on the part of his delegation . The raising of such questions 
by the Soviet delegation was, however, largely tactical: Lenin had pointed 
out, in draft directives forjthe dekgation, that ’’one of the main, if not 
the main political task" at Genoa was to attempt to isolate the pacifist 
section of the opposing side, and reach not only a trading but a political 
agreement with it'*'^. The proposal v/as accordingly withdrawn. It had 
already become apparent that, as Litvinov had written to Chicherin, the 
"main, if not the only ^pestion at Genoa will be the Russian one”^^.
Serious discussion, however, devolved upon the four Commissions
into which the Conference at this point divided itself. Three Commissions
examined respectively financial, economic and commercial, and transport
matters, in accordance with articles -^,5 and 6 of the programme agreed at
Cannes; but most attention centred upon the first, Political Commission,
which was charged with discussion of the first three articles of the Cannes
programme, but which was in effect "entirely devoted to the Russian qu^ tJjfe^ Lj1
While all states were represented at the plenary sessions, not all had the
right to participate in the work of the commissions and sub-commissions:
IkSand the influence of those excluded was in fact "extremely limited" •
Germany and Russia were represented, as well as the five 1 inviting1 
powers, on all four Commissions: but neither they nor the other particip­
ating states had participated in th^[rawing up of the Experts* Memorandum, 
which had been discussed and approved at a meeting in London from 20-28 
March, and which was used by the five inviting powers as the basis of 
their proposed resolutions^^. The first section of this document, the
"restoration of Russia", specifically excluded from its scope as political1
the questions of legislative maseutts to give effect to its content, the
relation of such acts to existing trade agreements, and "several others".
This consideration did not, however, appear to hirtfe inhibited discussion
of a number of other principles, apparently designed to secure (in the
words of the secretary of the Soviet delegation) that "foreign capital
1 l±R
should feel at home" in Russia • Russia*s economic restoration was 
stated to depend "to a significant degree" upon the assistance of fofciggn 
enterprises and foreign capital. Foreign businessmen, however, would 
refuse to render such assistance "without a major alteration in existing 
conditions’*. Fundamental was the inviolability of the right of ownership 
of land and the distribution of the harvest; once this was established, 
foreign assistance in the form of equipmot and credits would not be slow 
to materialize. In industry "definite measures" were necessary to provide 
for the freedom of activity of the foaign entrepreneur and of his staff, 
the security of their industrial operations and fixed capital, and their 
right to import necessary articles and distribute their production. The 
Soviet government must accept all the financial obligations of its predec­
essors , and accept responsibility for all damages suffeEd by foreign 
nationals.
Considerable changes were also required in the judicial system: it 
must be separated from the executive, the supreme court must be run by 
professional judges not liable to dismiss#!, the law must be equal to all, 
and guarantee the foreigner against arbitrary arrest and the infringement 
of the inviolability of his home. Foreign nationals in Russia must have 
the right of free entry and exit; they must be exempted from forced labour 
obligations or loans; and not subject to discrimination. Foreign industrial 
enterprises should have the right of import of equipment and produce; the 
entrepreneur’s home could notjbe searched, and in th^event of his arrest the 
appropriate Consul must be informed; and enterprises owned or run by 
-foreigners must have "complete freedom" includding the right to hire and 
fire workers, and to earn a "normal profit’*,The memorandum, the Soviet 
delegation replied in a further communication, despite its expressed 
concern for ’justice* and the economic restoration of Russia, amounted to 
a proposal for **not simply the exploitation, but the enslavement of the
Jf36
working population of Russia by foreign capital", while nevertheless
avoiding the basic question of the means of securing the restoration of
1^9the Russian economy •
The following section of the Experts* Memorandum concerning 
the ’Restoration of Europe'*, and its provisions relating to the work of 
the Brussels, Porto Rosa and Barcelona international conferences (at 
which Soviet Russia had not been represented), formed the basis of the 
work of the financial, economic and transport commissions. The work of
150these commissions concluded respectively on 29 April, 5 May and 26 April . 
The solution of the problems before them, however, as the Financial 
Commission noted, "depended upon the solution of major political problems". 
Their "main attention", the Italian representative noted, should be devot­
ed to the political side of the question. Balanced budgets and many other 
matters depended upon the "general and political position of each country";
the the Commission:** s work should be considered as an "introduction to the
151political work we must carry out" •
The main emphasis of the Conference accordingly focused upon
the work of the Political Commission, and upon the informal negotiation
which take parallel with (and often to greater effect than) the cohference- 
152hall discussion • The other Qommissions, Chicherin wrote, were "only 
153decoration" . The First (Political) Commission wax divided in turn into
15*f
two sub-cm/hAissions, the first of which met on the same day, 11 April •
More important negotiations followed, however, three days later at Lloyd
George's headquarters at the Villa d'Albertis. These, Chicherin is reported
155to have stated, were the "only thing that happened at Genoa" • Lloyd 
George opened with a criticism of the Soviet counter-claims, which had 
just been received. He had himself a proposition. Russian war debts could 
perhaps be set off against the Russian claims; the preQwar debts could be 
repaid after a long moratorium, of ten or even fifteen years; but the 
government could not negotiatxe on behalf of the private creditors, who 
must be repaid, or the private claimants, to whom their property must be 
restored. At a second meeting Lloyd George offered to reduce the war debt, 
but agaxin insisted that the claims of private citizens he satisfied, by 
the restoration of their property and the payment of their debts. Again, 
however, it was not found possible to reach an agreement. There was a
precedent, Chicherin claimed, for the Russian counter-claims in the
"Alabama" case; the restoration of factories was not possible (some had
in any case been absorbed by others); and the working alass would oppose
any such move. Soviet Russia was ready to consider western claims, but not,
it appeared, vice bersa^"^.
The Soviet delegation nevertheless communicated the substance
157of the Allied proposal to Moscow, where it was considered by the Politburo • 
On 20 April Chicherin wrote to Lfcoyd George suggesting that Russia's 
economic position was such that that the country should not be required to 
pay in full its foreign debts and obligations. The delegation was prepared, 
however, to accept the Allied terms on all points other than that concerni­
ng the right of foreign nationals to the restitution of their property, 
provided that a number of points were conceded in return: the annulment 
of the war debts and interest payments; and "sufficient financial assist­
ance" to allow the country to emerge as quickly as possible from its 
existing economic situation. In the absence of such* assistance, no point 
was seen in accepting financial obligations which it would be impossible to
meet; nor could the Soviet government reasonably be expected to repay the
159
debts of its predecessors while it remained without official recognition • 
It was pointed out to the Soviet delegates by Lloyd George and 
Worthington-Evans that Aven the right of former owners to prior consider­
ation in the granting of concessions would be unacceptable to the French 
and Belgian delegates, and that without them the Political Commissioh 
could not resume work. It was eventually agreed that the former owners
should be given the use of their property, or agreed compensation; and
l60this was included in Chicherin's letter of 20 April • This concession
was opposed by a number of memfebrs of the Soviet delegation, and it was
not in fact endorsed by the Politburo. Chicherin stated in a letter, however
that it had been accepted tactically, in order to avoid a total breakdown 
l6lin negotiations •
The sub-commission, nevertheless, failed to reach agreement,
and a committee of experts was set up to examine Chicherin*s letter in
detail. The question of the granting of credits to Russia was discussed on
16229 April, but no decision was reached • The possibility of agreement had 
in any case been sharply reduced by the announcement of the signature of 
the Rapallo treaty between the Soviet and German delegations on 16 Apri^©
The treaty, which was published on 18 April, ’’disturbed the whole Sonference
l6*ffor several days”. Its publication had the effect of a ’’bomb” • The
British delegation, Gregory wrote to Curzon, was "very much disturbed.# It
was at once realised that the whole situation was transformed". The exist-
l65ence of a secret military sontfention was also suspected •
The French delegation left the committee of experts, and
the German delegation was denied the right to participate further in the
166Conference. All commission meetings for that day were cancelled • Ax note 
was addressed by the Allies to the German delegation, accusing it of 
dealing with the Russian delegation on the matter of dispute behind the 
back of the Conference • • The continuation of the Conference itself was 
prejudiced: French participation became yet more grudging, and the Soviet 
government, having secured under article 2 of the Rapallo treaty the recog­
nition of its nationalization of foreign property as well as a diplomatic
and tactical coup, became even less concerned to satisfy the claims of 
168Allied nationals . The Conference, Gregory recalled, was left to 
discussion of secondary questions which had no particular purpose, "or at 
least, none that would have {justified the continuous session in foreign 
parts of so many of the leading politicians of Europe". Gregory and Litvin­
ov (and, indeed, others) agreed in finding the Bapallo treaty the "only
169concrete achievement" of the Conference •
The reply which the Soviet delegation issued to the London 
memorandum on 2k April did offer to acknowledge pre©war debts; but the 
right of foreign nationals to the use of property which they had formerly 
owned, and was not nationalizaxd or requisitioned, was condeded onljr "where 
this was possible in view of the socio-economic system and basic lawx of
tt 170
the Russian republic • According to the secretary of the Soviet
delegation, the meeting of the committee of experts on the same day hast 
a "decisive character". In the course of questions and answers exchanged 
especially between the Belgian delegate Cattier and Rakovsky, it became 
clear that the "basic root difference" which was reflected in the essence 
of the two social systems, in the two world-outlooks and in the two attitud 
-es to the Russian revolution, centred upon the third point of the London 
memorandum, which dealt with private cairns . Tox one side the essence of 
the Russian revolution was the abolition of the private ownership of
171capital; while the other side wanted i£s restoration • The Russian
delegates, as the Cabinet was told, were "proving very intractable and
unreasonablg"^*?^*
It proved difficult to agree upon a further Allied memorandum,
drafts of were prepared by the British and by the French delegat­
ions; and the document which was transmitted to the Soviet delegation
on 2 May was not, in fact, officially endorsed by either the French or
173the Belgian delegations . The restoration of the Russian economy, the 
Allied note stated, required the capital and expertise of the West, As 
soon as it was learned in the West that former owners could return to 
their former enterprises and lands, establish new ones, run them in 
security, and secure a reasonable profit, they would do so, and bring 
with them capital, labour and knowledge* This and the acknowledgement of 
debts would secure that "establishment of confidence" which in turn would 
guarantee the provision of such assistance from the West. The British 
Trade Facilities Act could be extended to Russia, guaranteeing the 
extension of private credits to the extent of £25 million; and analogous 
provision might be made in France, Italy and Japan* The Soviet government 
in turn, must refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries, and from attempts to upset the political or territorial 
status quo in other countries; and must suppress any attempt to aid 
revolutionary movements originating within the country. The Soviet 
government must accept all debts and state obligations although payment 
would not immediately be demanded. No responsibility was accepted by the 
Allies for losses and damages in Russia after the revolution; although a 
reduction in the sum of debts would be made, in view of the economic 
position of Russia. Obligations towards private citizen^ must be accepted 
and an agreement concluded with them within a year; failing agreement, 
arbitration should be accepted. The claims of foreign nationals must be 
returned, restored or, if this were not possible, they must be compens­
ated,** in order to "encourage the renewal, of the economic activity of 
foreigners in Russia". Measures for the protection of persons, labour 
and property of foreigners should be taken; and the position of the 
residence of foreigners and of their trade in Russia , and the legal 
system, should be arranged as originally outlined in the Experts1 Memo- 
randum^^.
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This memorandum , in the view of the Russian delegation, represented
a step back even in comparison with the Experts' Memorandum, and showed
little concern for the letter of the Cannes resolutions. Logins and credits
were essential for Russia, the restoration of whose economy was in turn
necessary for Europe itself. Guarantees were ready and also legislation,
which would give security to foreigners wishing to work and to bring
capital into Russia (a document was circulated at the Conference outlining
the changes in Russian legislation relating to the person and to property 
175in 1920-22 )<» A list of concessions which it was proposed to grant to
foreigners was also ready. The question, however, had hardly been consider­
ed: the recognition of state debts and of private claims had been made a 
prior condition. The future was being sacrificed to the past, and to small 
groups of people; and besides, Russia was not the only state represented 
at the Conference to have refused to recognize debts or to confiscate the 
property of foreigners. No credits for the Soviet government had been 
mentioned, but only for private citizens wishing to trade with Russia.
This was useless if there were no funds with which to restore the transport 
system, as well as industry and agriculture. Concerning the suppression of 
revolutionary propaganda, the Soviet reply observed that this was to intro­
duce a political question; but apart from this, could it lie held to deny 
political party and trade union activity? Russia was ready to recognise the 
public debts, if the losses were recognized which had been suffered by 
Russia as a result of the intervention and blockade. The delegation had 
gone so far as to offer to recognize all public debts and obligations and 
to renounce all counter-claims on condition that satisfactory credits were 
placed at the disposal of the government. Of this latter point there was, 
however, nothing in the Memorandum; while the provisions with which it was 
sought to bind the Soviet government internally were contrary to the social 
system of Soviet Russia, and to the first point of the Cannes conditions. 
Difficult financial questions should not, the reply concluded, prevent 
agreement on other questions, facilitating the economic restoration of 
Europe and of Russia"^^.
Little now remained to be discussed. The first sub-commission 
of the First (Political) Commission met on 16 and 17 May to consider a 
proposal to establish a committee to examine further the differences
kfL
between the two dides, under the headings of debts, private property and 
177credits • The two sides, it was proposed, should meet at The Hague on
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26 June for this purpose • Chicherin objected to the exclusion of the
German government from the proposed representation, and to the choise of
The Hague, whefce the Soviet government had no diplomatic representation.
The Allied proposal was, however, finally adopted, after Lloyd George had
defanded the choice of location and the method of forming two commissions,
Russian and Non-Russian, for the purposes of discission. It was further
agreed to fefrain from any act of aggression or propaganda, not only in
Eirope but in general. As Lloyd George pointed out, Britain, having major
interests in the East and in the Far £ast, was convinced of the need fot
the treaty to oblige Russia to refrain from any offensive or propaganda
"not only towards the West, but also towards the East., towards all those
territories where Englnand had her interests. If the obligation was
interpreted as concerning only Europe, England could not sign it”. The
chairman noted that the agreement was as Lloyd George had interpreted it.
The matter was further discussed at a fifth meeting o|g the sub-commission
later in the day, where Lloyd George offered to provide evidence of hostile
Soviet propaganda. Chicherin's sustained objection to The Hague as the
location of a future meeting was overruled on a vote, but tpii Soviet deleg-
179ation was assured of the same privileges as the other delegations .
The sub-commission's decisions were endorsed by the Political. 
Commifcfcion on 18 May and by the STonference at its Third Plenary session on 
19 May. The report of the Economic Commission was adopted, its chairman 
observing that "one of the most effective means of re-establishing a healthy 
stability in Europe” was the "equipping, encouragement and improvement of 
the peasant class”. Sealing with the work of the First Commission, Lloyd 
George declared that the Soviet memorandum of 11 May had had a "fatal” 
effect. It hail led to a reaction against the spirit of concession; and "if 
it were to be the last word of the Russian government, I would genuinely 
despair ofjthe prospects of The Hague”. Russia, he felt, needed the accumul­
ation of wealth and experience which the world could place at her disposal; 
while the world needed thd products which Russia could provide. He hoped 
that the Russian representatives at the Hague would make allowances for the
l8d"prejudices'* of the West on busAmess relations •
The non-aggresi&on pact was a noteworthy achievement, said Jiloyd
Geogge; and the reports and recommendations of the Financial, Economic and 
Transport Commissions were "full of valuable suggestions" which could lead 
to the revival of the continent "if they were accepted and implemented"
(which had not, however, been the case of the resolutions produced at the 
Barcelona and other international conferences which preceded Genoa, and
l8lwhose work the three technical Commissions had essentially recapitulated ). 
The chairman of the final session noted rather more frankly that the Conf­
erence had "not perhaps achieved all that was hoped and expected of it"; 
and Chicherin added that its direct results had not satisfied &he expect-
182ationx which it had aroused among the peoples of all countries .Neverthe­
less, noted the chairman, it had "opened the way to a new European policy^^.
The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, meeting two 
days before the Conference had formally concluded, approved the actions of 
the Soviet delegation. The delegation had "correctly carried out its tafeks" 
and had given a "decisive rebuff to the efforts of fhfceign dapitalists to 
re-establish private property in Russia". It had equally correctly reflect­
ed the interests of Russian workers in concluding the Rapallo treaty with 
Germany, on the basis of complete equality and reciprocity. At the same 
time, the extent of conflict among the western Powers, the strikes in 
Britain and Denmark, and the civil war in Ireland and the struggles in 
India, Egypt and Turkey against foreign capitalism demonstrated the 
continuing character of the "decline of the social-political system of 
capitalism"^^.
It was impossible, Maisky wrote, to deny that the Gdnoa Confer­
ence, considered by itself, was a failure. "Exactly nothing" had been done 
towards the solution of the problems which it had discussed; the revision 
of the Versailles settlement had been excluded by the Cannes resolutions; 
disarmament had been excluded as a result of the French attitude; and while 
the question of Rjissia had been discussed, "the character of the discussion 
was such that it not so much brought nearer, as put farther xxay its
satisfactory solution". There could, in consequence, be no possibility of
185the economic restoration of Europe • The position of French and Belgian
capital , he wrote, could be summarized in one brief word: "give. Russia
ldSshould 'give1 a great deal. In exchange capital promised us nothing" 0 
It was not, noted another Soviet commentator, a meeting of merchants at 
Genoa so much as a clash between two world-outlooks, a "struggle between
kk-3
proletarian socialism and bourgeois individualism". It was a continuation
of the struggle of the civil war for the principles of 1917* against
Russian and foreign capitalism. The central question had. been that of private
property; and Genoa represented "one of many., steps to the new social
order". That new order would be efctablished, however, "not by the agreements
of diplomatists but by the movement of the working class"^*^.
The invitation to the Conference itself, however, whatever its
results, was a "symbol of the political and moral victory of Russia".
The Conference was the first opportunity which Soviet diplomacy had been
188offered for a "major intervention of an international character" . For 
the first time, after five years of separation, there had come together 
for the discussion oi^$8fitical and economic questions the representatives 
of Russia, on the one hand, and the representatives of the other Powers of 
Europe, on the other. The discussion had for the time being concluded with­
out result, wrote Maisky, but it would "inevitably be continued", in view 
of the "necessity to both sides of a minimum of business relations". If a
modus vivendi were not worked out by the meetings at Genoa and The Hague,
189it would nevertheless eventually be found , Already, hxowever, Russia
had been listened to by thirty-three powers, and other claimants to
represent the country had been excluded: which meant that the Soviet
government had effectively been recognized. The conclusion of the Rapallo
treaty, while it might have only a limited economic importance, had
190"enormous" political importance • Despite the conclusion of an agreement
among the Powers not to enter separately into relations with the Soviet
government, of which Litvinov informed the Foreign Affairs Commissariat,
the* existence of the Entente had become fictitious. Russia, moreover, a
Pravda editorial declared, could for the meantime increase its production
191many times without a foreign loan •
The Cabinet in Britain congratulated Lloyd George upon his
192conduct at the Conference. It proved more difficult to convince the 
House of Commons and the public that Genoa had not been, as the Economist 
put it, "almost entirely barren of results, apart from the Russo^German 
Treaty": which was "if anything, a retrograde step". Genoa had not been a 
failure in the sense that nothing had been achieved, wrote the Contemporary 
Review; but that the Conference had succeeded in justifying initial hopes 
and beliefs it was "manifestly impossible to contend". A lack of united
purpose had made itself apparent from the first. While Lloyd George had
been ^pushing with ’hlmost fanatical* enthusiasm for a liberal settlement,
the French representatives had been "thwarting his endeavours by every
193expedient and at every turn" • The net results of the Conference, wrote 
the Review of Reviews, were "nil11, gor whatever had been accomplished had 
been done outside it or in spite of it. In particular Rapallo had been the 
"turning point of the Conference., its one permanent and tangible outcome. 
Whatever semblance blfiere had been of unity and common endeavour was dispe­
lled, never to be re-created. It appeared, the Econmmist noted, that "the 
extremist section h$lds more power in Russia than was assumed, and that 
the moderates probably (could) not carry whole-hearted recognition of 
private property rights", which were the "sine qua non of restored
19*fcommercial intercourse" on anything other than a gold or barter basis •
The main purpose of the Conference, Lloyd George,-lfold the House
of Commons, had been the restoration of financial and trading relations,
the improvement of diplomatic relations, and the removal of disputes which
whre endangering the peace of nations. Overall, as a result of the
deliberations and recommendations of the Commissions, he hoped for a
195"great improvement11 . "Great things" had been accomplished. The Russo- 
German traaty, admittedly, was a !fereat error in judgement"; but it showed 
equally the "sinister possibilities of leaving this question alone/'. As he 
told the Cabinet on 23 May, "the Russians were among the most incompetent 
people in Europe, whereas in some respects the Germans were the most 
competent. They would run their revolution in ways which would be much 
more attractive to our people.
Without the assistance of ed other nations, he thought, it 
would be impossible for Russia, whatever the form of its government, to 
"extricate itself from (its) pit of squalid misery". The Soviet government 
at the same time, was clearly master of the situation for the presdni'. The 
"treasures of Russia could not be unlocked to the outside world exempt 
through them". The policy of force "had been tried before, ahd had failed" 
and at Genoa not even the most anti-Soviet representatives hai suggested 
it. The British Empire delegation had accordingly concluded that in the 
interests of the peace of the world some arrangement with Russia was 
necessary in order to save the misery in Russia itself, to enable Russia
to make her contribution to the needs of the world, necessary in order to
help in the swelling of that volume of trade upon which somx many millions
of people depended for their daily bread, necessary in order to give a
sense of stability, necessary "above all, to avert those evils which lurk
in the future if nothing is done to unravel this tangle of misunderstanding".
The Soviet delegation, however, had been seeking credits from
those countries and nationals who had been dispossessed or whose eailier
advances had been disavowed. Credits could be provided, but on condition
of the "restoration of the confidence upon which credit is based". The
Russian counter-claim was "one that we could not acknowledge". The Russian
memorandum of %% May, moreover, showed that "extreme theorists" had
overawed the "practical statesmen of the Soviet system". Theorists, he
complained, could "not realize the difference between a logical proposition
and a business one". Most of their gold, however, had been exhausted, and
major concessions had been offered. This and the question §& creditxs
would be considered carefully at The Hague; and Lloyd George was "very
hopeful that when we come to an examination of the practical details,
197something may be achieved" <>
Asquith found the results of the Conference "depressingly,
and even distressingly meagrd". The fault lay in the abstention of America,
the half-hearted particiaption of France, and reparations, which were "at
the root of the whole European situation", but had not been considered.
Sir A. Shirliy Benn, the President of the Association of British Chambers
of Commercd and President of the Federation of British Industry, and a
donsultative member of the delegation at Genoa, noted however that with
unemployment at the levels which then existed, "trade with every possible
customer is absolutely essential to national prosperity". Russia*s needs
and resources were such that it was "impossible to set., limits on its
trade potentialities". The longer, he thought, the country delayed in rep
establishing contact with Russia, "the lesw became the chance of saving
198
out' very considerable property and investments in Russia" •
The augury for the Hague Conference was not, however, a favourable one.
The German government had not been invited; and the American government,
199which had, decided not to participate • The representatives of the 
states invited, moreover, had only powers ad referendum : they were * experts*;
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not plenipotentiaries, with the power only to refer proposals to their
199
respective governments for a decision • Nor could it be overlooked that
many of the Allied representatives had an interest in the proceedings
which was more than academic. The chairman of the French delegation,
Alphand, was director of the department of state property of France and
director of the bureau for the defence of the private property of French
citizens in Russia; and another member of the delegation had formerly owned
200a rubber factory in Eussia • The chairman of the Belgian delegation 
was also the head of the Belgian bak§ which held most Russian bonds, and 
another member of the delegation was represented on the committee for the 
defence of Belgian interests in Russia. Andersen and Petersen, who repres­
ented Denmakk, were also the director and the secretary respectively of
201the Danish society for the defence of claims in Russia •
The "real soul" of the British delegation, Maisky believed,
was Leslie Urquhart, the President of the Association of British Creditors
of Russia, who was acting, the government explained, to represent the
202interests of British bondholders at The Hague • Such people, the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury explained, were the "truest friends of Russia and 
of Russian civilization". The "interests of bondholders and of property 
holders" were the "test of that confidence, that recognition of common 
obligations which must be accepted by the Russian government if it expects 
to restore its credit and to place itself once more in a position to take 
advantage of the assistance which can be given to it by the jpint resources 
of Europe". The proceedings at Genoa and The Hague were, he thought, "steps 
which may lead the Russian government back from the clouds to the solid 
earth"203.
In the cirsumstances it was, perhags, not surprising that the
Hague Conference concerned itself with something which was hardly the
"practical solution.• apart from political considerations" of the Russian
204-
question which the chairman of the British delegation suggested • How, 
wondered Stein, had questions which were clearly political at Genoa, and 
had even been discussed in the Political Qommission, now become technical 
at the Hague, in a "miraculous transformation". Wfiting from The Hague, 
he noted that it was "not in the least" the case that no political questions 
were discussed: the aim was rather to be able to "remove any awkward points
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205points from the agenda, ’declaring' them 'political'" •
More important, perhaps, was the relation between the Hague 
Conference and its predecessor. It had been made clear at Genoa that the 
Hague meeting should continue and complete its work. The chairman of the 
First Commission at Genoa summed up the proposal as the "continuation in 
The Hague of negotiations begun here in Genoa", for which purpose a commiss­
ion of experts should be established to "continue in another place the 
work begun in Genoa". The chairman of the final plenary session, at which
the proposal was formally adopted, observed that ghe Hague Conference would
206be "only the continuation, the outcome of efforts made here in Genoa" •
At The Hague, however, the head of the French delegation protest­
ed that no such decision had been taken at Genoa, and that the meeting was 
"not the continuation of Genoa, but a completely separate business conferen­
ce, which should begin work from the beginning". The British delegate,
Hughes, declared that the Genoa Conference decisions could not be ignored,
no±r did he intend to do so, although the succeeeding meeting had not been
207bound by any formal resolutions • The British delegation, however, while
initially it had been prepared to discuss the compensation of those who
had formerly owned property in Russia, in the course of the Conference
came closer to the French view thag only restitution of confiscated property
could be accepted. It was "perfectly ]d(alin to everybody", LloydQGreame
stated at a session on 12 July, that the "only effective for$ of compensation
for seized property" which it was within the power of the Russian government
to furnish for the time being was the "restitution of the property concerned
208wherever possible.. We came here to learn what could be restored" # It 
was eqhally apparent that the Soviet government would "not agree", as Radek 
wrote on the eve of the Conference, "to the restitution of the private 
property of foreign capitalists". Most of the iron, coal and oil of the 
country would pass into the hands of foreigners; and the government would
209be left with no means of promoting the economic development of the country 0 
The very organization of the Hague Conference made a contribution 
to its lack of success in dealing with the problems with which it was 
confronted. The meeting was divided into two Commiswions, the Russian and 
the Non-Russian; and the Non-Russian Commission, representing all the parti­
cipating states with the exception of Soviet Russia, met at The Hague for ten 
days in advance of the arrival of the Russian delegates. It was decided to
kkS
set up three sub-commissions to deal respectively with private property, 
debts and credits; and the Russian delegation, which arrived on 26 June, 
announced that it would participate as a delegation in each sub-commission, 
rather than be divided into isolated pairs of representatives (as was 
evidently intended)^^.
211The sub-commission meetings began on 27 June • The chairman
of the sub-commission on credits announced that it was a "conference of
experts, empowered only to recommend certain measnras to their governments
*ad referendum111, and that "political questions were excluded". Young, the
British delegate, noted that capital would require the confidence to extend
credits to Russia; but this* was a question for the other commissions. The
212first sta&e of their work should be the collection of facts • At the 
second session, accordingly, Litvinov indicated that the Soviet government 
estimated a need of foreign credit to an extent of over three thousand 
million gold roubles (about £330 million) over a period of three years.
A "large part" of this sum would in turn be expended on foreign goods. Ife 
did not, however, include privately arranged credits for the development 
of concessions; and the figure was a "minimum". Sokol*nikov addei that if 
the restoration of the Russian economy were not undertaken without delay, 
the "last hope, either financial or material, of Russian creditors securing 
a significant part of their claims will vanish1*. The matter was "not an 
exclusively Russian problem, but has an international financial importance"* 
A further session provided the opportunity for questions to be put; but 
Krasin made it clear that concessions were not envisaged on the railway 
network^^.
At the session on Ik July, however, the loan which the Soviet delegates 
had sought was declared "impossible in the current economic and political 
situation of Europe**. The most that could be done was the mobilization of 
private capital and its encouragement with guarantees. The recognition of 
debts, Young added, was essential in order to assure private capitalists 
that their investments wereri secure. Litvinov in reply pointed out that 
compared with its position at Genoa, the Soviet government was now prepared 
to accept the principle of compensation were a satisfactory overall arrang­
ement made; and to accept a government guanantee, not a government loan. 
European industry was in need of markets, and glad to sell in Russia, but 
needed long or short-term credit. The Non-Russian delegations, however, had
4|9
provided not even a list of foreign property claims; and in contrast to
their position at Genoa, nob demanded restitution,not compensation, for
foreign claimants. The only answer to their proposal had been general
observations. Russia could not meet foreign obligations without a certain
minimum of credits. The^y had received onl£ "very interesting lectures
21 ^on the meaning of confidence" •
The sub-commission ofi debts began with a similar disclaimer: 
those present were there as "experts, men of business, who consider real 
facts, not devoting their attention to any political questions". The 
distinction, it became apparent, was equally unreal. Succeeding sessions 
were devoted largely to questions addressed to the Russian delegation 
concerning the Soviet budget and other technical questions. At the fourth 
session, however, Sokol'nikov pointed out that the Soviet government was 
unable, even if it were willing, to accept the debts and interest payments 
of its predecessors. In order to do so, an economic agreement with the West 
was necessary, and a lengthy moratorium. The chairman, Alphand, considered 
that circumstances might force the Soviet government to "submit to the 
general law which governs relations between civilized states, and recognize 
the obligations accepted by preceding governments". Litvinov replied that 
the Soviet government would accept no obligations at all until "completely 
ceftain of her ability to fulfil them"; nor, it was added, would the recog­
nition of debts be an action unilaterally performed by the Soviet government© 
The delegates, however, the chairman noted, were not the representatives of 
the private claimants (although many of them, as has been noted, combined 
this function with their formal responsibilities). Andersen thought that 
the "most convenient form of guarantee" would be the "transfer of the admin­
istration of all income of the Russian government to an International Commi­
ssion. To the possible objection that this would be an infringement of the 
sovereignty of Russia he answered that states which were bankrupt could 
*(not ailow themselves the luxury of pride". It appeared difficult, also, to
decide upon an acceptable form of arbitration in the event of disagreement
215between private creditors and the Soviet government • Agreement, m  any 
case, depended upon the decisions of the sub—commission which was dealing 
with the question of e*e4i%«w private property©
The question of private property, in Stein's view, was "central" 
both at Genoa and again at The Hague. The "whole history of the Hague
Conference" was "essentially the history of the negotiations on private 
2l6
property • The chairman of the sub-commission oft private property, 
Lloyd-Greame, suggested at their fisist meeting that the purpose of their 
deliberations was "not simply the question of the satisfaction of the 
claims of private owners; it is a probHem of restoring Russian industry". 
Everyone knew, he thought, "what a major role foreign entrepreneurs played 
in Russia in the past". Their discussions, he urged, should be of a 
"practical and businesslike character", avoiding "general questions". The 
members of the Non-Russian Commission were "practical business people".
The "whole question" was whether conditions could be guaranteed "capable of 
engaging the confidence of those who would have to invest their money in 
Russia", money which was evidently "outside the control of the government". 
A detailed list of claims against the Soviet government would not however
be available, as Litvinov had requested; 'this would take "many months"
+. 217to prepare •
Litvinov presented a list of concessions available to the third
2l8session. It was not, he noted, an exhaustive one .The general conditions
applying to such concessions were specified according to current Soviet
legislation: thus trade union membership* would not be required of sill
employees of a foreign concessionaire. The chaifman wished to know which
enterprises on the list had formerly been owned by foreign nationals; and
which formerly foreign-owned enterprises had been excluded. Their property
was not, in fact, being returned, nor to the previous owners, Cattier
declared. Litvinov replied that former owners should have precedence in
view of the fact (if for no other reason) that theifc experience was greater
but they should not have an absolute right, if a better offer were made.
The Russian delegation, he complained, after two weeks, was still being
219regarded as "some kind of central information bureau" •
The list was unsatisfactory, Lloyd-Grearae pronounced at the fourth 
session, were it to be regarded as a final one. An "insignificant part" of 
formerly foreign-owned property was included; and it was not clear what 
compensation would be offered, and to what extent such essential principles 
would be satisfied as "non-interference of trade unions in the running of 
enterprises" and so on. The list conformed, Litvinov stated, with Soviet 
economic pftluis; and compensation could not be discussed until it became
^51
clear what assistance would be forthcoming for the restoration of the 
economy. The Non-Russian Commission, as Krasin noted, insisted upon the 
restitution of private property; while the Russian delegation, while requir­
ing foreign capital to assist in the restoration of the economy, based its 
proposals upon the economic needs of the country: concessions were being 
offered because they might be useful to Russia, not because the property 
had previously been owned by foreigners. The restoration of private property
was a utopian notion: transport had been nationalized, and there had been 
220other changes. The Soviet government, Cattier declared, appeared not to 
be prepared to advance any rule in accordance with which it would be 
prepared to return property to its former owners; nor was it necessarily 
prepared to provide compensation, failing the reaching of an agreement on 
credits. The list presented, aaid Lloyd-Greame, was limited and unsatisfact­
ory; there was no guarantee of restitution; and there was no guarantee that 
the former owners would automatically receive concessions. The "only form 
of real compensation which the Russian government could give at the present 
time11, he suggested, was ’’restitution of property in all cases where that 
is possible”^^*.
The following day a resolution of the second sub-commission was 
forwarded to Litvinov by the chairman of the Non-Russian Commission, Paten, 
to the effect that the Commission ”no longer found it appropriate to 
continue its negotiations with the Russian Commission”. A^imilar resolution
adopted by the third sub-commission had already been communicated to the
222Russian delegation • It was the ’’unanimous opinion of the chairman and
members of the three sufct-commissions” that should Litvinov make a declaration
altering the previous position of the delegation then the ’’door to contin-
223uation of the negotiations would not be closed” • Litvinov in reply sugge­
sted that the position was ’’mainly the result of the fact that so far there 
had not been a plenary meeting of Ibbth Commissions”. None of the commissions, 
he pointed out in a further letter, could come to a final conclusion without
. . . 22kbeing in possession of the final conclusions of the other sub-cnm&issions • 
A/plenary session of both Commissions accordingly took place on
22519 July • Litvinov in his address suggested the possibility of inquiring 
of the Soviet government whether it might be prepared to recognize the 
debts of previous Russian governments towards private citizens, even though 
credits might not immediately be forthcoming. Lloyd-Greame thought this
k $ 2
statement was "extraordinarily important", signifying a "new stage in
their negotiations". Cattier, however, understood the proposal differently
than had the British delegate: Litvinov had offered to submit a number of
questions to his government, but had gone no further. He had, indeed, made
it clear that no guarantee could be given as to what the government's
226response might be • The Non-Russian Commission, in a resolution adopted
subsequently, declared that it could "not find the basis of an agreement
within the terms" of Litvinov's declaration. It did, however, consider that
the "line of conduct indicated in this declaration" could, if "accepted
by the Russian Government, and if it is loyally carried out, contribute to
the re-establishment of the confidence which is^iecessary for the co-operation
of Europe and the reconstruction of Europe". It was also "calculated to
create a favourable atmosphere for such further negotiations as may be
227considered opportune by the governments here represented" •
The .Soviet delegation's report to the Soviet government
stated that the announcement that no governmental or government-guaranteed
ptivate credits would be forthcoming had precluded a successful outcome
223for the Conference as a whole • The main result, wrote Krasin, should be
considered in the political field the "recognition of the fact that at
present no general agreement is attainable between the capitalist powers
and Soviet Russia. This was the consequence not of the position of the
Soviet delegation, but of th*±e "utopian position" of the French and
Belgian governments compared with their "more moderate" counterparts in
France and Italy. Soviet trade was nevertheless "steddily developing".
Sooner or later, he forecast, an agreement with the foreign states would
be concluded. This was likely to take the form, however, of "separate agree-
229ments.. differing in character" o
The Hague, Stein considered, saw the "collapse of the idea of 
a general agreement with Russia"; while the "idea of separate agreements 
was born". Maisky agreed with Stein that the path ahead was not one of 
"one genera}, agreement with the bonngeois world, but the path of separate 
agreements with individual countries and states"• Beyond this, wrote another j 
commentator, it was clear that for the immediate future the Soviet governm- ■
ent would have to rely on "internal resources" for the development of the
4.230 economjr •
The Conference had bfought the minds of the Russian delegation,
^53
thought the Economist, "nearer to the realities of the situation and to
231the level of practical commonsense" • Defending the Conference in the 
House of Commons, Lloyd-Greame declared that it had been a "long step 
forward on the path towards a Russian settlement"• The "sole hope" of 
Russian industries lay in "bringing back the skill and experience of those 
who did so much to build them up in the past". In this respect the Russian 
delegation had shown a "complete misconception of facts and actual possib­
ilities", The final phase of the Conference offered, however, "real hope of 
concrete results". The Russian delegation's proposal represented a "very
distinct, indeed a remarkable advance", he thought, on their previous 
232position • The guarantees required o£ Russia, considered Lord Robert
Cecil, amounted to the "abandonment of the very foundation on which the
whole of their economic system is based". Nothing would get better in
Russia, however, Lloyd George replied sternly, and it was "no use pretending
they will, until Russia falls in with the civilized world". Getting the
western capitalist was "essential to Russia, to enable her to run her
manufactures". The Soviet government, where it was possible, must "put back
the owners of property into their former position", and provide inducements
for investors in Russia; this, he insisted, was a "purely business proposit
-ion". Soviet experience had shown, he thought, "how impossible it is to
233govern a country on these disastrous principles" •
The Non-Russian Commission at The Hague concluded its activity
with the adoption of a resolution poihting to the "desirability of all
Governments not assisting their nationals in attempting to acquire property
in Russia which belonged to other foreign nationals and which was confiscated
since November 1st 1917» without the consent of such foreign owners or
concessionaires"• It also noted with "satisfaction" the "complete unity"
23^fof its twenty-six members •
It was no use disguising the fact, however, -Clynes told
the House of Commons, that Britain had "rather different interests from
some of the Allies whose representatives so often act with us in these
recurring Conferences". Nothing, in particular,was to be gained by pretending
that the British point of view was identical with the French point of view^#
The Conference, in fact, virtually brought to an end the attempt of the
western Powers at "transplanting again the exotic plant of capital upon
236Russian soil" on a collective basis • Other governments, thought the
k5k
Fortnightly Review*s observer E.J. Dillion, migl^ t well follow "Germany's
237example and conclude separate agreements" wit£ Soviet Russia . More
|
dangerous, even, than formal propaganda, thought the Times in an editorial,
was the "temptation continually being held out to business men and to
statesmen, with the object of committing them ostensibily to enterprises of
doubtful profit in Russia and ultimately to involuntary collusion in the
238Bolshevik purpose of overthrowing the present European order" •
The best that the British government could do, a Foreign Office
memorandum argued in May, was to "put the whole subject of Russia to sleep,
239if we can., for six months.." . Less than two months after the Hague
meeting had concluded, however, a preliminary agreement had been signed by
Urquhart and Krasin in Berlin; and the Maikop group, despite the disapproval
of the Foreign Office, was reported to be approaching the Soviet government
2*f0with a view to negotiating a concession • The agreement with Urquhart 
settled in his favour most of the points which had earlier been in dispute. 
All the properties previously owned by Russo-Asiatic were to be returned on 
a 99 year concession basis, with the right reserved for the Soviet government 
to buy them back after forty years had elapsed. The Soviet government, also, 
was required to offer material assistance to the concessionaires to an
extent which was estimated by Urquhart himself to amount to the payment of
2*fl . . .half of the Society's claim for compensation • The Society had in addition
2^2been conceded the right to hire and fire its employees •
The agreement, wrote the Economist, represented "another Bolshevik
compromise with 'capitalism'". Russo-Asiatic shares on the Stock Exchange
were a "lively market, advancing sharply on the news of the agreement".
Ratification seemed certain. Share prices dropped towards the end of the
month, however, in view of the "fear that there may arise difficulties in
2^3the way of carrying out the agreement" •
Krasin's views were, in fact, not representative of those of the 
party leadership. He was convinced that the swift restoration of the 
economy could not be accomplished without the participation of foreign 
capital, which argued in turn a 'realistic' foreign policy • Lenin had 
already given his opinion, however, that the concession should be given 
only if a major loan were granted to the Soviet government; and he drew the 
attention of the Politburo to the report of the commimsion which had been 
established under I.M. Mikhailov, which had concluded that the damage to
^55
to the properties was largely the result of the actions of the Urquhart
company itself, and recommended that not all the formerly foreign-owned
2^ -5factornes should be offered on concession •
The agreement was discussed at three meetings of the Politburo in 
Septembef and by the Central Committee on 5 October. On 6 October the
2k6agreement was formally turned down by thie Soviet government • While
Lenin was clearly and indeed, understandably concerned lest the agreement
serve a^s a precedent and lest it come to be regarded as a belated concession
of that compensation which had been refused at Genoa and The Hague, the
2k 7Soviet government explained its action in other terms . It was impossible
to endorse the agreement, the decree stated, despite the fact that in
normal circumstances it would have been welcomed, in view of the absence
of "friendly, stable and normalized relations" with the British government.
This was particularly evident, it was thought, in the efforts of the British
government to exclude the Soviet government from the equal discussion of
matters which affected its interests in the Near Eadt and Black Bea: a
reference to the exclusion of a Soviet delegation from full participation
2^8in the forthcoming Lausanne Confefence o
This, thought the Economist, was "rather hard on the company and
Mr Urquhart". It was, however, still "not yet clear that the moderates are
in control in Soviet Russia"; and the idea of the rights of private property
of the Soviet government and of foreign capitalists were, evidently, "by no
means identical". The present disappointment, however, might be "fully
oLq
compensated later on" • Thfc agreement, Urquhart told an annual general
meeting of the Society on 23 October, might yet come to be "regarded as a
milestone in the progress of Russia from a ruinous and unpracticable
Communism towards a modified form of Capitalism". He regarded tha agreement
as "still in suspense. It failed to secure the necessary endorsement for
reasons that had nothing whatever to do with its business aspects. They
were political reasons". The Bolsheviks, the Times added the following
day, were moving to the Right. But they had a "long way to travel yet before
it will be possible to give fill recognition to their Government. The Soviet
251
Government's conversion to capitalism is only half-hearted" •
The agreement, however, Urquhart declared, would "before very long 
be duly ratified". There was simply "no other way in which the Soviet rulers 
can now hope to win the confidence of the British investing public and undo
the harm done by an act of precipitate stupidity". The temporary decrees
and laws of the Soviet government, he was sure, could not long override
the economic "laws of Nature" which were’^ bove those made by hiiman kind",
252and would noc long tolerate "Communistic theories" .
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Chapter Eight: The Tories and Soviet Russia
The position of the Coalition steadily worsened throughout 1922. The Genoa 
Conference, Lloyd George’s ’gambler’s last throw*, failed to improve his 
political fortunes: indeed, its effect was more probably the opposite. The 
Irish settlement placed a considerable strain upon the Coalition and upon 
the Conservative Party in particular, especially following the murder of 
Field Marshal Wilson in 1922 (June). The crisis at Chanak, in the Near East, 
at the end of September 1922 appeared to suggest that the country might 
havd been plunged into war but for the presence of mind of the local military 
commander, General Harrington, who delayed delivery of the Cabinet’s 
ultimatum until the need was past. Internally, there was the ’honours 
scandal’ and the continued loss of by-elections. The Conservatives, meeting 
at the Carlton Club on 19 October, resolved to leave the Coalition. Lloyd 
George resigned, the King sent for Bonar Law, and Parliament was dissolved 
on 26 October. In the general election which took place on 15 November the 
Conservatives gained an overall majority of 88 seats; and a Conservative 
government, remarkahly short of the more prominent and experienced members; 
of the party, was formed.
The new government did, admittedly, include Lord Curzon; and he
remained in the new as he had been in the outgoing government, Foreign
Secretary. An important change was nevertheless effected in the conduct of
foreign relations. Part of the charge against Lloyd George was that his
powers were verging on the presidential; and in particular, that his
personal secretariat was eclipsing the Foreign Office within the latter*s
proper sphere of activity. Curzon, complained the National Review, had been
"one of our worst, because among our weakest Foreign Ministers". It was no
no means clear that he was capable of "retrieving British policy from
10 Downing Street"^ *. Until the fall of the Coalition, indeed, Spender wrote,
2
Curzon had been "scarcely more than a spectator of events’* •
Lloyd George's taste for the international limelight, and the opportun­
ity afforded him by the conference diplomacy which followdd the conclusion 
of the war, accounted for part of the change. The *garden suburb*, which 
originated in 1916 as a personal staff for Lloyd George billeted in huts 
in St James' Park, accounted for another part. The proceedings of internat—
k?3
ional conferences were entrusted to the Cabinet staff, rather than the
Foreign Office, until the formation of Bonar Law's government; and the
•garden suburb1, equally® handled League of Nations business until this
time''** It naturally reflected Lloyd George's political enthusiasms; and
where, as in the Near East, these proved to be an embarrassment to the
government, the * garden suburb* inevitably received a part of the blame*
Much of the criticism of the government*s foreign policy in Parliament%
stated Colonel Wedgwood, was not ’’criticism of the Foreign Office so much
as criticism of the pseudo-Foreign Office in the Garden City across the
road* That is where most the ground for criticism has been, particularly
k
m  connection with the middle of the Near East” •
The matter reached the point of a formal debate in the House
5 byof Commons in June * The suburb was held to be passing Parliament and
the civil service, and giving Lloyd George almost presidential powers*
Why, asked Maclean, was the suburb and not the Foreign Office handling
international conferences and League of Nations business? Lord Robert
Cecil noted that therd had, for instance, been a British delegation of
some ninety-one members at the Genoa Conference, only three or four of
g
whom had been fro® the Foreign Office * Austen Chamberlain assured the
House of Commons that the Secretariat were "not themselves authorized to
take the initiative in any matters of administration, in any matters of
legislation, or in any matters of executive action”* Over a hundred MPs
nevertheless voted against the government on the issue, and the criticism
continued* The Conservative election manifesto promised that the Cabinet
Secretariat ”in its present form” would be brought to an end, and that
League of Nations business and the work associated with international
conferences (even those which Bonar Law attended as Prime Minister) would
7
be transferred to the Foreign Office *
Following the election a reduced Cabinet Secretariat, under
g
Hankey, was retained; but the ’garden suburb' was abolished * The change 
of government, then, involved more than the substitution generally of 
Conservative polities for those of the Coalition; with reference to foreign 
policy it carried with it a reassertion of the central position of the 
Foreign Office in the making and implementation of policy. The dominant 
influence was no longer Lloyd George, whose inclination was to seek to 
secure his ends with the Sftviet government through 'businesslike' discussion
kyk
rather than through the despatch of threatening diplomatic notes; but Curzon, 
more inflexible in Russian affairs, and more concerned with the fate of the 
Bmpire, and of British possessions in Asia, to which, it has been suggested 
Soviet policy and propaganda were seen as a serious threat. These changes 
were directly reflected in British relations with Soviet Russia.
Asked whether the new government intended to continue its predecess­
or^ policy in relation to Soviet Russia, McNeill, the Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, pointed out that the question of diplomatic 
recognition depended upon the conditions which the Soviet government was5 
prepared to accept and implement. These conditions were, according to 
Bonar Law, the recognition of debts, the restitution of property or effective 
compensation, and cessation from political propaganda. No steps had been
taken since the Hague Cohference to "reopen negotiations with the Russian
9
government on the questions there dealt with . The Foreign Office began
regularly to refuse entry visas to Soviet trade officials1^ 1
The change in policy towards Soviet Russia reflected in part a
reaction against the supposedly overcordial policy which Lloyd George had
promoted; and in part also, it reflected the disappointment of industrial
and trading circles with the results of the 1921 Trade Agreement, and with
the outcome of the negotiations of Urquhart with the Soviet authorities.
Krasin, on his own request, was received by a Foreign Office official; but
not, as had previously been the case, by the Prime Minifcter and his Cabinet
11colleagues • He wrote to Moscow on 25 January 1923? "Practically we have 
no political relations at all with England at the moment, and as I expected, 
Bonar Law and his Cabinet colleagues display no wish to meet or negotiate 
with us"12.
The new positioh became clear in the arrangements made for a
Conference on the Near East for the revision of the treaty of Sevres, to
be held at Lausanne. It appeared to Berzin, the deputy official representat­
ive in London, from his meeting^ with governmental spokesmen in September 
that it was intended not to invite Soviet Russia to the Conference. Whilfc 
Lloyd George was apparently in favour of their invitation, Curzon inclined 
against. No answer had yet been received to the Soviet notes of 12 and Zkr 
September1^. In a further note of 19 October, Chicherin again expressed 
concern that despite her special interest in sesuring a peaceful solution 
to the Near Eastern problem, no answer had been received to the Soviet
k?5
government's expression of a desire to participate in the Conference, which
l*fwas to meet m  the immediate future • A note was eventually received on
27 October from the governments of Britain, France and Italy, recognizing
that the question of the straits demanded particular discussion and the
participation of states which had not been party to the recent hostilities.
The Soviet government was accordinly invited to send delegates for the
15discussion of this question at the Conference . Curzon explained to the 
Cabinet that he "anticipated nothing but hostility" from the Soviet repres­
entatives. Lloyd George had worked "indefatigably and sincerely" to reach 
an agreement with Soviet Russia, through the Trade Agreement, and at the 
Genoa and Hague Conferences. He Nevertheless believed the Soviet government 
"still to be in a position of special and inveterate hostility towards the 
British Empire". Their representatives would strongly oppose the British 
position at Lausanne. Their goal "had always been Constantinople"; thd 
Bolsheviks were "Communists with wide Imperial aspifcations". Any other
solution of thd problem of the straits than a Russian solution would be
l6"incompatible with Soviet dreams" •
Chicherin in reply declared "completely unjust and in no way 
justifiable" the exclusion of the Soviet representatives from the discussion 
of other questions. The Conference, clearly, was intended to discuss rather 
more than the revision of the treaty of Sevres. It had not been found 
appropriate,to invite Bulgaria, but Japan was to send representatives. 
Chicherin continued to insist upon the participation of Soviet representati­
ves in the work of the Conference, upon an equal basis with the states also 
17participating 0 In a further note of 2k November, however, despite the
refusal of the inviting powers to accept his earlier suggestion, Chicherin
announced that a four-man delegation would represent Soviet Russia at the-
Conference. No official notification of the opening date of the Conference
had been received; but it was apparent from reports in the J>ress that the
Conference had, in fact, already begun its work. The Russian delegation
l8would leave "forthwith" for Lausanne •
During the Chanak crisis the Naval Intelligence department had
reported a "close association by the Soviet government with the Turkish
19nationalists, with strong indications of support" • He would like, Curzon
told the Cabinet, to "bring about a break between Tiir#ey and her Soviet 
20allies" . In this object he was largely successful. The Turkish represent-
atives , despite the obligation in the 1921 treaty with the Soviet state
to consider the question of the straits the concern of the states which
bordered £he Black Bea, accepted the British rather than the Soviet draft
convention on the straits question, and began separate negotiations on
the basis of Curzon1s draft. The Soviet delegation was not admitted to the
second stage of the Conference*s proceedings, which began on 23 April,
on the grounds that the question of the straits was not on the agenda. On
2k July 1923 a peace treaty was signed with Turkey, and a convention on the
straits question, based largely on Curzon*s proposal, was accepted. The
Lausanne convention was signed in Borne on l*f August; it was not, however,
21ratified by the Soviet government .
Relations with the Soviet government, meanwhile, had become such 
that Kenworthy initiated a debate in the House of Commons on 29 March on 
the ’’present policy of this country with regard to Russia**. British interests, 
demanded, he thought, a ’’clear, settled and sagacious policy., towards the 
Russian Republic”. British policy should endeavour to support the ’’moderates, 
who are getting powerful, and not playing into the hands of the extremists”. 
The government had nevertheless ’’gone out of its way to pin-prick and annoy 
the Russian government and people in every possible manner”. In the Near 
East, the Soviet government had been ’’insulted and affronted”; at Lausanne,
Curzon was believed to have attempted to ’’purposely humiliate the Russian
22representatives there” • Krasin had dequested an interview with the
Fofeign Secretary or his Undersecretary after the change of government; but
this had been refused. In Russia, British merchants and business men, and
important business houses were doing business, ”in spite of the government**,
and had ¥ound, ”as a rule, that such little attention and assistance as they
can look for to our indeterminate mission” was ’’diminishing'*. Business
people, he thought, were suffering from the absence of regular relations
L 23
between the British and the Soviet governments .
McNeill, replying for the government, believed that "one of the 
most essential necessities of any government” was "some definite civilized 
legal system, especially one to which traders can look for the enforcement 
of contracts, since Irgde rests upon contracts, and for a definite civilized 
administration of justice”. The four conditions with which the Soviet 
government was required to compljr ’’remained unfulfilled”. It was, moreover, 
the ’’greatest possible delusion” to think that propaganda had been stopped,
**77
or that the promises of the Soviet government had proved effective in
this regard. The Soviet government had, moreover, been ♦responsible for a
series of "barbarities with which the whole civilized world is at present
didgusted and dismayed". So long as these polities continued to be pursued,
the Soviet government could seek no greater degree of recognition than it
2**had already received from the British government •
The succession of events whicfc had so distressed McNeill, and which led
directly to the presentation of an ultimatum to the Soviet government at
the beginning of May, dated in the main to the previous year and earlier.
Mr C.F. Davison, whose case the government now espoused, had been arrested
as early as September 1919? and imprisoned for four months in Soviet Russia.
He had been shot in January 1920. Failing a "full statement/ concerning this
"outrageous crime", wrote Curzon to Chicherin on 2 October 1920, the British
government would be forced to conclude that murder in cold blood had been
25committed; and "full compensation" would be demanded . Chicherin replied
that Davison had, in fact, been connected with a "notorious fuel scandal",
part of the proceeds of which had been deooted to counter-revolutionary
activity. He had been properly sentenced in accordance with prevailing 
26legislation • Curzon, undaunted, returned to the charge on 3 January 1922. 
Davison’s murder had been "nothing less than the judicial murder of a 
Bfitish subject under regolting circumstances upon trumped-up evidence". The 
government reserved "full liberty of action"; and should the evidence against 
Davison, having been examined, proved defective or insufficient, full comp­
ensation would be demanded, |Pailing this, "every publicity" would be given
27to this "scandalous case" •
The claim to examine the evidence of the case was not accepted by
the Soviet government; moreover, the Soviet government might equally demand
to examine the evidence against "innumerable Russian citizens executed by
the British authorities prior to the signing of the Anglo-Russian Trade
Agreement", notably the "most scandalous*case of the execution of the twenty-
six Baku commissars who had been killed in September 1913 with the "complic-
28ity" of the British military authorities . Litvinov was told in reply that
a "careful examination" of the matter had led the British government to
conclude that the charges were "baselesa", and were founded upon "deliberate 
29missatements" • He continued to maintain, however, that it had been an
V?8
"undoubtedly premedixtated crime", and in the absence of "conclusive 1
evidence" the charges would not be withdrawn^®
The case of Mrs Stan Harding was raised in the House of Commons
on 23 March 1921. A British subject, reportedly "by no means anti-Soviet"
in her views, she had gone to Soviet Russia in June 1920 as a correspondent
31of the New York World. She had been detained there for five months on the
chargd of being a membeafr of the British Intelligence Department. The charge,
32Harmsttorth declared for the government, waa untrue. He add£d later that 
no application for redress of injuries would be made by the government,
Mrs Harding having proceeded to Russia "on her own responsibility and with 
a safe conduct from the Bolsheviks at a time when it was known that His 
Majesty’s Government refused to give passport facilities for Russia". Bertr­
and Russlll, who met her at Reval, concluded that the responsibility for 
her arrest "lay not so much with the Soviet government as with a certain 
Mrs Harrison", an American lady of good family, who had been longing to
escape from Russia. She was in fact an American spy, employed also by the
British government. Mrs Harding knew that she was a spy, and was accordinly
33dehounced by Mrs Harrison in order to secure her arrest ® Continued pressure!
in Parliament led, however, to the statement that she could lodge a claim, j
3*f Iand that representations were being made on her behaldt • '
f
Curzon raised the matter in a communication on 3 September 1921®
Mrs Harding's case, he wrote, was giving rise to "pressing questions" in 
the House of Commons; and the government considered that it was of "such a 
nature that the Soviet government should meet it by exceptional measures".
Mrs Harding had been arrested, confined in a solitary cell, "containing a 
verminous plank bed", and accused of being the chief of the British secret ' 
service organization in Russia. Part of the evidence which had been offered 
in support of this charge was that she had assisted Mrs Harrison, then 
representing the Baltimore Sun in Moscow, knowing her to be a member of the 
secret service. After a prolonged period of arrest she had been allowed to 
leave Moscow on 26 November 1920. Hodgson was authorized to endorse Mrs 
Harding's statement that at no time had she been a member of the secret 
serviee; and to seek compensation "commensurate with her sufferings during 
imprisonment on a flase charge whilst visiting Soviet Russia with the 
explicit approval of that§overnment". A "very unfortunate impression" would 
be created, in view of the "wide notoreity" of the case, should the case j
V? 9
35not be admitted •
His representations, however, Hodgson reported, had been ’’without
success". Litvinov had pointed out that at that time a state of war had
been in existence between the two countries; and that counter-claims
36might be made against the British government • Further British pressure 
led to the quotation in reply of the case of Babushkin, the Russian consul 
in Meshed, Persia, who had been arrested with his whole staff on 25 Ottober
7n
1918 by the British military authorities . Twom months later, Lloyd-Greame 
announced for the government in the House of Commons that it did "not 
consider that any useful object would be attained by pursuing this matter 
further with the Soviet government". Mrs Harding's claim would be consid­
ered together with other private claims when these matters were finally
38resolved • It was, indeed, later urged that since Mrs Harding's imprisonme
-nt appeared to have been due to the actions of Mrs Harrison, an American
citizen, who had agreed to act aH an informer for the Soviet government,
39redress should be sought, in fact, from the American government 0
The position of the church in Soviet Russia, equally, provided 
a source of dispute. The sale of church treasures to provide for famine 
relief, it was stated in the journal of the Trade Delegation in Britain, 
had first been proposed by a group of churchmen; and had been approved by 
"almost all" the clergy, and specifically, in a circular, by Patriarch 
Tikhon. There were precedents for such action; bells from certain churches, 
for example, had been melted down to make cannon for Peter the Great's army. 
The Central Executive Committee decreed that those treasures should be 
appropriated which were not used in religious services, and had nodefinite 
religious value. Local soviets were to collect such articles during the 
following month and hand them over to the Commissariat of Finance, on 
behalf of the Central Commission for Famine Relief. The details were to 
be published in the local press, and a religious representative was to be 
included on thebody which reviewed and examined the appropriations.
This course of action had led in a few places to the "bitter 
opposition of a few fanatical clergy"; but church sentiment as a whole 
was stated to have supported the government's decision. Articles to a 
total, value of twenty million gold roubles had been received by April 1922. 
In some cases, however, church treasures had unaccountably disappeared
before the commissions arrived to collect them; and this had been met with
H • 4.- ,Ao"vigorous action" •
Patriarch Tikhon had issued an appeal on 28 Eebruary 1922 to remove
valuables from the churches. He had in the past, noted Pravda, been involved
in counter-revolutionary activity. On this occasion, following discussion
*flwith representatives of the clergy, he resigned • He was brought to trial
in May 1922, but discharged following his unconditional disavowal of
counter-revolutionary activity 0
In a communication of 1 June from the Archbishops of York and
Canterbury and other church figures in Britain, the "most serious protest"
was made concerning what was stated to be an "attack on the Russian church
in the person of Patriarch Tikhon". Public opinion and the conscience of
Christians and of the "whole civilized world" could not silently witness
such an injustice • Karakhan, replying on behalf of the Soviet government,
noted that no attack upon the church as such had been made, but only the
presentation of charges against some of its members, including the former
Patriarch, of opposition to government decrees, which had themselves been
designed, he pointed out, to "savd<( the lives of tens of million* of men and
children". In the dispute with the Patriarch the government had been opposed
only by the more privileged elements of the church hierarchy, those who had
been the most closely connected with thd Tsarist nobility and with capital;
and it was precisely this group, he noted, rather than the population as
a whole or even the maj'ority of the clergy, which was being supported by
the British churchmen. They had not, evidently, found it necessary to
protest against the blockade, which had been conducted by the British
government at the expense of Russian workers, peasaats and their children 0
British church leaders, suggested a writer in the Communist Review, were
"not troubled about religious persecution in Russia". They were however
"keenly sensitive to any working-class government weakening the property^,
the material basis, of the Church11 ©
Matters became worse when in March 1923 Cardinal Cieplak,
Monsignor Butkevitch and a number of priests of the Polish Roman Catholic
Church were brought to ferial on the charge of espionage and other treasonable
k6activities during the civil and Russo-Polish wars .The British agent in 
Moscow, McNeill told the House of Commons, had "unofficially represented to 
the Soviet Government, early in the proceedings, the lamentable impression
*f8l
which would be caused on public opinion abroad by such action11; and he had 
that day been instructed to continue his efforts. The Russian Trade repres­
entative® had been "asked in a¥ friendly way to do anything he (could) to
if7
avert a disastrous sentence" • The Times drew attention to the "wanton 
persecution of the Christian Faith" in Russia. "Thousands" had been executed 
"simpljr because they believed in God" • The clerics had in fact opposed 
decrees separating the church. from the state, and the appropriation of 
superfluous Church valuables for famine relief; and Butkevitch had in 
addition been in touch with the Polish government during the hostilities I
i|,Q , |
of 1920 • On 26 March Cardinal Cieplak was sentenced to ten yexars' !
imprisonment and Monsignor Butkefiteh was given the death sentence. The
British agent in Moscow, the House of Commons was told the following day, 1
had "done all in his power", under "repeated instructions" from the London
50government to save the ecclesiastics from these "barbarities" •
The matter was subsequently raised with the Soviet government.
The question of fishing rights and territorial waters also complicated 
relations between the two governments. In March 1922 a protest was made 
concerning the arrest of two British-owned vessels, the 'Magneta' and the 
'St Hubert', by the Soviet authorities. The government had been informed, 
Harmsworth told the House of Commons, by the Bussian Trade delegation that 
a twelve-mile territorial water limit tjad been claimed 4 The government had 
protested^.
The owners of the 'Magneta' claimed compensation from the Soviet
government, but it was not possible for the government to "assume any
52special responsibility in this connection • The 'St Hubert' was seized
53on 3 March 1923 and taken to Murmansk, where it remained until June 1923 •
It appeared, however, that the vessel had been fourteen miles from shore 
at the time of its arrest, and further representations were made by the
c/i
British agent ih Moscow • It was noted that the 'Magneta* had been arrested 
between nine and ten miles from shore, and had not infringed the three-mile 
limit. While the Foreign Offfi.ce was prepared to consider the elaboration if 
a convention to regulate fishing along the northern coast, it could nit 
accept a territorial limit greater than three miles; and could not therefore 
accept, as had been sfc&ted, that the ships concerned had been fishing in 
Soviet territorial waters. The 'St Hubert' should be released forthwith,
kS2
and compensation paid to its owners and to those of the Magneta* and its
55crew o
The Soviet Foreign Commissariat, i n its reply of 22 March 1923, point­
ed out that the position in international law was unclear: a three-mile 
limit was not generally recognized, and the British government had been 
willing to discuss the whole question in conference before the war. The 
Soviet government, it was suggested, was acting within its rights in 
claiming a twelve-mile limit on the northern coast in its decree of 2k May 
1921, in accordance with which the British ships had been arfested, and
which safeguarded what was in fact the sole means of livelihood in this
56
area • This was not accepted in Hodgson’s reply of k April. The British
government could not agree that a twelve-mile limit constituted Russian
territorial waters, or that the arrested vessels were fishing illegally.
In the absence of an assurance that this course of action would not be
repeated, it was announced that a British naval vessel would be despatched.
to these waters, the commander of which would be instructed to take such
action as was necessary to protect British fishing vessels outside the 
57three-mile limit . This amounted, as Karakhan pointed out, to an attempt
forcibly to impose a three-mile limit upon the Soviet government. RetalkLfc-
ion was threatened^.
The Soviet government had been responsible, it was stated in a
British note of 19 December 1922, for the loss of the ’Magneta’, which
had sunk while in Soviet custody following its arrest. The vessel had been
compelled to remain in a dangerous zone in consequence of its arrest, while
59other ships in the vicinity had been free to proceed elsewhere • The 
Soviet reply refused to accept either direct or indirect responsibility;
60
and thought further correspondence inappropriate • All the British
fishermen arrested by the Soviet authorities were released in February 1 9 2^.
On 31 March, however, a steam trawler, thd ’James Johnson*, was arresfed
62
off the Murman coast. ’’Immediate inquiries” were ordered in Moscow •
It was, however, the religious issue which was taken up in Hodgson’s 
letter to Chicherin of 30 March 1923* The sentence of death on Monsignor 
Butkeviteh had been fonfirmed by the Presidium of the Central Executive 
Committee. He made, however, an ’’earnest and final appeal” for a stay of 
execution. The implementation of the sentence could ’’not fail to produce
63
throughout the civilized world a feeling of horror and indignation” • A
k8 j>
rdply was received the following day, which noted with asperity that 
Russia was an "independent country and a sovereign state", and had the 
"unddniable right of passing sentences in conformity with its own legis­
lation on people breaking the law of the country". Any attempt from outside 
to interfere with this right or to "protect spies and traitors in Russia" 
was considered an "unfriendly act and a renewal of the intervention which 
has been successfully repulsed by the Russian people". In view of the 
actions of the British government in Ireland, India and Egypt, moreover, 
appeals in the name of "humanity and the sacredness of life" were not 
considered "very convincing". Hodgson declined to receive the note. Weinstein 
nevertheless affirmed that the original communication had been an "entirely 
inadmissable attempt at interference in the internal affairs of the independ­
ent and sovereign RSFSR"; and suggested that other means would be found to 
acquaint the British government with the content of the note intended for
. ,6kit o
There was sufficient ground, thought the Daily Telegraph, to recall
the British mission from Moscow, and in effect to annul the trade agreement.
The question of the annulment of the trade agreement had not yet, Bonar
Law wrote to Henderson, been discussed by the Cabinet. The prosecution of
the churchmen, the arrest of the British trawlers and the violation of the
conditions of the trade agreement were nevertheless "serious questions".
If action were required tha approval of the House of Commons would be 
66sought • No trade could be aarried on, wrote the journal of the Russian
Trade mission, if the agreement were terminated. "There must., be no mistake
about the position: the ending of the Trade Agreement would mean the ending
67of all trade with Russia" .
Relations nevertheless continued to deteriorate. The Cabinet 
discussed the seizure of the ’James Johnson’ on 25 April. It agreed that 
the Foreggn Secretary should prepare, for the consideration of the Cabinet$ 
a draft despatch to the Soviet government, quoting the "numerous recent 
incidents" of an"unsatisfactory and discourteous attitude" concerning the 
trawlers, the execution of Mr Davison, and the questions of "propaganda 
contrary to the Trade Agreement, the studied insolence of the replies of 
the Russian Soviet government to our representations Regarding the trial 
of the Russian ecclesiastics, and any other similar cases’*. It should be 
pointed out that if an acceptable reply were not received within a certain
W k
68period of time, "our present de facto relations would be severed" •
The state of relations with Soviet Russia was discussed the same 
day in the House of Commons. McNeill referred to a "series of acts cannife&ed 
by the Russian Soviet government, of which British subjects (had) been the 
tfictmms", which had "excited the profound indignation" of the government 
and of the country at large. These incidents testified £o a condition of 
affairs which demanded, and was receiving, the "earnest attention" of the 
government. They could not be considered or treated Separately, but were 
"parts of a whole directly affecting the relations between H.M.G. and the 
Soviet government". It was proposed to address a "serious communication" 
on the matter to the Soviet government. In the meantime, the British agent 
in Moscow would "not cease to exert his influence in the strongest possible
manner" in the case of the trawler, where the action of the Soviet author-
. . 69lties was regarded as being "wholly without justification" •
On 28 April, accordingly, Hodgson communicated a note to Chicherin
protesting at the seizure of the 1 James Johnson*. The trawler had been
engaged in fishing nine miles from the Murman coast, in waters which the
British government could not accept as under Russian control. It must take
70a serious view of the situation thus created • The Soviet reply rehearsed 
the history of the dispute and the Soviet government's point of view; and 
noted that in accordance with a IwM of 1890, fishing was prohibited in the
coastal waters of Ceylon to a distance of 6, and occasionally as £#r as 25
miles from shore. The three-mile limit, based upon the range of fire of 
coastal defence, had been pronounced obsolete by the Institute of Internat­
ional Law; and there could not be any objection to the regulation of the 
question by an international conference, or by bilateral negotiation. The 
Commissariat of Justice had meantime taken over the case of the 'James 
Johnson' and suspended the sentence originally imposed, which might now be
7JD
annulled. The 'Lord Astor' and another British trawler were arrested subseq­
uently at a distance of four miles from shore. In view of the decision of the
Supreme Court, however, Chicherin told Hodgson, the ships might be expected;
72to be released shortly •
McNeill's 'serious communication* was discussed by the Cabinet 
on 2 May, with Curzon in the chair. The draft despatch to the Soviet 
government was approved with a number of amendments. The advantages If 
basing the published British case on "actual extracts from the despatches
k&5
which had passed between the Soviet government and its agents'* outweighed 
the possible disclosure of the secret source from which the despatches had 
been obtained, "more especially as this was actually known to the Russian 
Soviet government". It was agreed to add to the end of the despatch a 
passage to show that if "satisfactory treatment was not given to the demands 
of H.M.G. the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement would be terminated under Article 
xiii of the Agreement and that not only would the British Trade Mission be 
withdrawn from Moscow, byt the Russian Trade Mission would have to leave 
London".
The British agent in Moscow should be consulted concerning the 
position of British subjects in Russia in the event of a rupture of the 
Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, and sh&uld be authorised to "take such steps 
as he thought advisable to facilitate the departure of British subjects, and 
in any event to warn all British subjects in Russia confidentially that 
within ten days of the receipt of the despatch by the Russian Soviet govern­
ments it was not improbably that the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement would come 
to an end". In this event the British agent would leave Moscow and British 
subjects would remain "at their own risk". It was agreed that the Home 
Secretary should keep the members of the Russian Trade Delegation in Britain 
under observation, "in order that if any attempt should be made to detain 
the British Trade Mission in Moscow or ather British subjects as hostages, 
such corresponding actions might be taken here as should prove feasible".
In the meantime steps should be taken to provide for the return of the
73captain and crew of the 'James Johnson' •
Curzon on the same day a copy of the memorandum which he was Jro 
communicate to the Soviet government. In the event of no reply being 
received after a period of ten days had elapsed, he was instructed to 
"return to this country with your whole mission"; and he should return
7*f
"without further delay" if a "clearly unsatisfactory" reply was received . 
The memorandum itself, thd 'Curzon note', was communicated to the Soviet 
authorities on 8 May. It objected to the "tone and character" of the notes 
recently received by the British agent in Moscow from the Soviet Foreign 
Affairs Commissariat, and considered it doubtful, with relation to these 
and a "large number of similar incidents", whether relations between the 
two countries could continue upon such a basis. The British government 
could no longer with "due self-respect continue to ignore the repeated
k86
challenges11 which the Soviet government had "thought it fit with apparent 
deliberation to throw out"; and a "definite conclusion" was now sought* 
There had been a "series of outrages inflicted upon British 
subjects in the past few years, for which no apology had been offered and 
no compensation given", of which the "most conspicuous" concerned Mr 
Davison and Mrs Harding* The British government was "unable to allow the 
matter to be trifled with any longer": liability must be admitted and 
compensation paid. In contravention of generally accepted conventions of 
international law, moreover, a series of acts had been perpetrated by the 
Soviet authorities involving a "wholly indefensible interference with 
British shipping and acts of indignity against British subjects". The 
cases of the 'Magneta1, the 'St Hubert* and the 'James Johnson' were 
recalled; and an assurance was sought that compensation would be paid, 
and that British fishing vessels would not in future be interfered with 
outside the three-mile limit.
In the case of the trial of the Soviet ecclesiastics, the British 
government had refrained from expressing an opinion upon the nature or 
validity of the charges brought against them, conceiving that this was a 
mattef oni which they were not called to pronounce. The prosecutions, howev 
-er, were declared to form part of a "deliberate campaign undertaken by 
the Soviet government, with the definite object of destroying all religion 
in Russia, and enthroning the image of godlessness in its place". This had 
excited the "profound consternation and., provoked the indignant remonstr­
ance of the civilized world". The correspondence which had ensued had been 
"not merely insinsistent with that standard of courtesy which ordinarily 
prevails in the relations between governments, but (placed) the continuance 
of those relations in grave jeopardy"; and the withdrawal, of Weinstein's 
two communications was accordingly demanded.
More important was the question of the observance of the obligation 
in the terms of the Trade Agreement to "refrain from hostile action or 
propaganda", an undertaking which while "loyally and scrupulously observed 
by H.M.G.", had been "consistently and flagrantly betrayed by the Soviet 
government". Following the correspondence of the autumn and winter of 192J1* 
there had been "some slight curtailment" of the activities of Russian 
agents in Asia, the Soviet authorities "apparently realising that the 
Trade Agreement, from which they derived such substantial advantage, might
k8>7
be imperilled by unduly rash conduct". These "pernicious activities" more 
recently, however, had been "vigorously resumed", especially in Persia, 
Afghanistan and the Indian border areas. In Persia, the Russian Minister 
at Teheran had been "tireless" in his activities; he had assisted Indian 
seditionists, and had attempted to stir up "anti-British movements and 
rebellion in that part of the world, with the sums of money which had been 
sent to him bybthe Soviet government for the purpose. In Afghanistan an 
"even more favourable base for enterprise" existed, owing to the proximity 
of the "turbulent tribes within the Indian border". Raskolnikov, the 
Soviet representative at Kabul, kad "distinguished himself by exceptional 
zeal". Some two-thirds of the spending of the Legation had been devoted to 
this purpose (although it was, admittedly, noted that Raskolnikov had had 
occasion to complain to Moscow concerning an "insufficiency of funds", and 
apart from a sum of money, the effort of subversion in Waziristan had 
amounted to nothing more incriminating than ten boxes of cartridges).
The Soviet government, however, Curzon noted, had "not failed to 
carfy its efforts further into India". Seven Indians, grained at Tashkent 
and Moscow as "Communist agitators", had been arrested in November 1922 on 
their arrival from Moscow; and a number of £100 banknotes, originally 
issued to an official of the Russian Trade Delegation in London, had been 
cashed in India "on behalf of a revolutionary Punjabi in touch with other 
Indian seditionaries who are known to have been closely associated with 
the Russian representative in Kabul". Again, admittedly, in an appeal to 
Moscow for funds for the support of Indian revolutionaries, Raskolnikov 
had declared that in the absence of a substantial sum, the existing organ­
isation would "collapse". Sums had, however, been allocated (it was charged) 
at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, for the assistance of 
the British and Indian Communist parties; and for the despatch to the 
countries of the East of sixty-two Oriental studdnts "trained in propaganda 
schools under the Third International".
These were "but a few selected examples among many scores of 
similar incidents", relating to Egypt, Turkey, thd British Dominions, "and 
even Great Britain". Unless these acts were repudiated and apologized for, 
and the officials responsible for them "disowned and recalled from the seene 
of their maleficent labours", it was "manifestly impossible" to continue 
with an agreement "so one-sided in its operation". Unless within tdn ritays
488
of the receipt of the memorandum the Soviet government "fully and uncondit­
ionally" complied with its terms, the Trade Agreement would be regarded as 
75terminated •
The note was warmly commended by the Association of British Credit-
76ofcs of Russia, by religious opinion, and by a large section of the press .
The memorandum ,the Economist considered, was "not a model of moderation".
In some respects, indeed, it was "extremely controversial": the note was
not justified in its assumption, for instance, that there was international
agreement on the principle of the three-mile limit. The Foreign Office had
77undoubtedly made up its mind to bring the Trade Agreement to an end • The
government should remain firm, urged the National Review, in "seeking redress
for the Outrages in Lord Curzon*s powerful indictment". "However popular as
a parliamentary performance", it noted, the "eating of one*s own words is
78never an effective diplomatic operation" • As Gregory noted m  a minute, 
the difficulty was that "if we once begin discussing with the Soviet govern­
ment, we shall lose our chance of dealing with them in the way we had contem­
plated, as we can hardly impose a second ultimatum once a discussion has 
begun"^.
The Soviet reply was in fact a moderate one. The British government, 
Chicherin toldthe Moscow Soviet on 12 May, was composed of "extreme react­
ionaries’*, who were badly informed concerning the situation in Russia, and 
believed that Lenin’s illness had seriously weakened the Soviet state. The 
early hopes that N.E.P. represented a capitulation to capitalist forces 
had been disappointed; and a mood of disenchantment had set in. The proppect
of a rift, however, was still opposed not only by the workers and the Liber-
80als, but also by a section of the Conservatives • Litvinov’s reply was 
calculated to strengthen their case. It noted that reaction had been increas­
ing in strength in recent months, "accompanied as ever by a growing enmity 
towards the Soviet republics". The "sharp and unjustified hostility" of the 
British note had nevertheless come as a surprise. Ultimata and threats 
were not the way to settle "private and relatively unimportant misunderstand­
ings between states". The British government had derived some benefit, as had 
the Soviet government, from the provisions of the Trade Agreement; and the 
establishment of peaceful relations with Soviet Russia was besides a "most 
necessary factor for peacex and for the re-establishment of (the) economic
k&9
well-being of all (the) countries of Europe in which to no small extent 
Great Britain is interested”. There had been, on the British side, not a <
few cases in the previous two years of actual challenges on the part of the 
British government, "not only to (the) Soviet government, but also to 
(the) whole Russian people11, as manifested, for instance, in the disregard 
for|tie^ie??iement^o?^a^lar§f^nuSiBeer of international questions*. The 
Soviet government had not raised such questions as the ’’intense activity" 
of British agents in the Caucasus and elsewhere because it had "not lost
8lhope of (a) general settlement of all questions in dispute and at issue" •
The accusations contained in Curzon's note were a "combination
of invention, with deciphered parts of telegrams tendentiously manipulated
82and arbitrarily extended" • The British government must know better than 
anyone else, "if they are cofcrectly informed, that (the) Soviet government 
seeks an establishment of friendly relations with (the) peoples of the East 
not by intrigues and gold, but by measures of real unselfishmesa and friendly
1
feelings to them". The British note appeared to imply that the Soviet gover- j
I
nment "should have no policy of its own at all in the East, but should j
everywhere support English aspitations. (The) Russian government has taken !
no such obligation on itself". British demands had however at no point been 
specified, and no willingness had been shown to allow matters in dispute to 
be discussed©
An ultimatum had been sent threatening the ending of diplomatic ;
relations based upon apparent infringements of the interests of private j
British citizens by the Soviet government; infringements which, moreover, \
with the exception of the cases involving British trawlers, had not . taken 
place in the period in which the trade agreement had been in force. Compen­
sation was offered if this treatment was extended also to analogous Soviet 
cases. The question of the territorial limit should be discussed at an 
international conference; but the British trawlers mentioned had meanwhile 
been released. The charge of persecution of religion was "baseless"; and 
the Britirti government’s apparent attempt to interfere in an internal 
Soviet matterhad accounted for the "unusual tone" of Weinstein’s first 
letter. It had however been returned and might be treated, together with
i f
his second letter, as "non-existing". The matters in dispute were in fact 
so insignificant in comparison with possible consequences of rupture that
*f90
their settlement might easily be arranged by means of a bilateral conference,( 
which might also ’’regularize Anglo-Soviet relations in their fukl extent"^2^  
An effort was made, moreover, to mobilize public opinion ’’not only 
in the working class, but even in the liberal-bourgeois trade world" against
O-z
the inflexible position taken up by Lord Curzon Krasin, who gave an
interview to the press on 13 May, declared that the rupture of relations
would have "catastrophic consequences" which would be "impossible to foresee!?
There was no doubt, however, that all trade between the two countries would
cease, in the absence of a legal foundation for commercial transactions;
while there would be now no obligation upon the Soviet govefhraent to refrain
from anti-British propaganda and action in the East. Such questions as had
arisen could, however, be resolved only by means of discussion between the 
8*ftwo sides • Only the trade agreement, the deputy representative, Berzin, 
told the press, made possible the existence of trade between the two count­
ries; and if British businessmen considered that its annulment would not j
85 ■affect that trade, they were making a serious mistake . Such trade as was j
i
conducted with Russia, wrote the Economist, small though* it was, would be ! 
much more difficult to undertake if a reversion o«££urred to the position 
which existed before the Trade Agreement had been negotiated. The rupture, 
it warned, would prove "most acceptable to certain Bolshevik extremists |
and would be a definite setback to the N.E.P."<> The government should be j 
"guided in this matter by the realities of the situation rather than by the j
dictates of passion and righteous indignation". The Stock Exchange, indeed, i
r
appeared already to have anticipated such an outcome: Russian shares, it j 
was reported, had improved somewhat "on account of the political outlook 
being read as clearer"^.
On l*f May Curzon informed the Cabinet of the "general tenor" of J
87 1the Soviet reply ; and the following day, the text having been circulated,
he gave the Cabinet a detailed criticism of its contents, "exposing in each I
case the weakness of the argument and the lack of foundation to each of the
counter-accusations against the British government, as well as pointing out j
that there was only one item in which the demands of the British government
had been met, namely, the release of the captured trawlers and their captains
and crews". Curzon was authorized, however, to grant an interview to Krasin
upon request, in which he should continue to "insist upon acceptance of the
k91
demands contained in the British note as a condition of the continuance of
the Russian Trade Agreement”. Krasin, moreover, should be allowed ”a few day#11
88in order to communicate with the Soviet government .
Replying to Parliamentary criticism later the dame day, McNeill 
declared that ”from the very first this question of the cessation of prop­
aganda was part and parcel of the Agreement itself”; but the Soviet govern­
ment had "never observed” its obligations in the matter. It was ”out of the 
question” to provide proof ofi origin for the statements quoted in the 
British note such as would satisfy a court of law; but he insisted upon 
their ”absolute trustworthiness”. The Russian reply on the questions of 
propaganda, compensation for private citizens, and the trawlers had been
/entirely unsatisfactory”; and to withdraw from the damdnds which had been
89made was ’’impossible” • There had been ’’instance after instance” of propag­
anda against British interests, stated Lloyd Greame, in Afghanistan and 
India, ’’encouraging insurrection against the British Dominions”. In the
ipeeting with Krasin, arranged for 17 May, the government would require j
90 isatisfaction in ’’all the essential respects” .
91 'Lloyd George, with whom Krasin had just had a lengthy meeting , 
urged that ’’every caution” be taken, lest the ’’extremists” in Russia be 
encouraged. Sit Allen Smith added that the ending of the trade agreement 
would mean handing over the British position in Russia and the trading I
relations which might have continued to exist in future years to others.
British traders would be "entirely separated from what might be our very
92 !best and most profitable market”. !
i
Sir E# Grigg, speaking on 17 May in the continuation of the 
debate, was also ’’very anxious that there should be no breach with Russia”©
The trade agreement was ’’not a small issue”: the part of the country which 
he represented, Lancashire, was "deeply concerned in the possibilities of 
reviving markets in the East and the Near East at the present time”. The 
government, he thought, should leave no stone unturned in the effort to I
avoid a breakdown in relations. Captain 0’Grady had seen z Krupps locomoti- j
ves in Russia; and Krupps was not, he remarked, a "sympathetic or philanthr- j
opic association". He wanted this work for his Leeds constituents. Baldwin, j
for the government, reserved the power to act as it saw fit; but clearly 
suggested that the government was not unmindful of the considerations sugge­
sted by its critics. He hoped, he told the House of Commons, that the
k92
government would "find our demands are met fairly and reasonably, and that.*
a rupture maynf>e aseedfciAl"'^.
This appeared the more likely when on 22 May Baldwin became Prime
Minister, on the resignationnof Bonar Law, and to the chagrin of Curzon,
who had been taking the chair at meetings of the Cabinet in Bonar Law's
absence. Baldwin represented, according to a Soviet commentary of the time,
business circles which did not wish to "complicate their position by a
9 if
conflict with us" . On 2o May he told Thomas Jones: "We must try to avoid
a break with Russia,,. Curzon will see Krasin and try to arrange the withdra-
95wal by the Soviet Government of their Afghan propagandist agents" .
96A further conciliatory memorandum followed from Krasin on 23 May •
In the interests of avoiding a rupture new concessions were offered: a 
three-mile limit would be agfeed with the British government until a 
conference had regulated the matter, and compensation would be paid; compen­
sation ex gratia would be paid in the cases of Mr Davison and Mrs Harding;
Weinstein's two letters would be taken back; and the question of propaganda ,
97in the East should be discussed independently • These concessions, noted
the British reply of 29 May, "in large measure" satisfied the claims wh&ih
had originally been made; and "no insuperable difficulties" appeared to
remain. The question of fishing in norther waters appeared capable of
settlement in the manner proposed; and the "moderate claims" of £3,000 and
£10,ooo were advanced on behald respectively of Mrs Harding and Mrs Davison
in the interests of a swift agreement. The "unqualified withdrawal" of
98Weinstein's letters was noted with satisfaction •
There remained, however, the "all-important question" of hostile 
propaganda carried out against the British Empire and British institutions* 
There had been "no satisfaction whatever" on this point, on which the fate 
of the Trade Agreement depended. An assurance must be given that the Soviet J 
representatives against whom protests had been lodged, Shumiatsky and Rasko­
lnikov, would "within a reasonable space of time be transferred to some other 
areas where their duties will not bring them into contact with British 
interests", althpugh their dismissal was not specifically required. A new 
declaration on propaganda was attached for the endorsement of the Soviet 
government, reiterating the obligations contained in the Trade Agreement, 
and undertaking "not to support with funds or in any other form persons or 
bodies or agencies or institutions whose aim is to spread discontent or to
^93
foment rebellion in any part of the British Empire*, and to impress upon
its officers and officials the full and continuous observance of these cond- 
99itions” • This, the Cabinet agreed, was a ’’pivotal issue between Great 
Britain and Soviet Russia”***^ *
The Soviet government expressed its ’’entire satisfaction” that a 
number of points in dispute appeared to have been resolved; and agreed to 
pay the sum of compensation which had been suggested by the British govern­
ment in the cases of Mr Davison and Mrs Harding* It agreed,in response to 
the wishes of the British government, also to take the ’’extremely major 
step” of accepting also the new declaration o£ propaganda, despite the fact 
that it altered and extended the obligation* originally contained in the 
Trade Agreement with regard both to the area to which it applied, and to 
the nature of the undertaking^*^*
The Soviet government, Curzon told the Cabinet, had now ’’given 
way on every point with one partial exception”. The wider definition of 
propaganda had in particular been accepted. Agreement had not been reached 
on the CabinetSs original demand that the Russian representatives at Kabul 
and Teheran be transferred elsewhere: but it had been learned that the 
Russian representative at Kabul was in Moscow, and would not be returning 
to his post. Curzon was asked to note this fact in his reply; and to state 
that if the Soviet representative at Teheran became involved in further
anti-British activity, the application of a general prihciple to bind both
. 102sides should apply, and ’’the deliquent should be expelled from the service".
Curzon communicated a memorandum on these lines to Krasin on
13 June; and with it the correspondence, it was suggested, might be ’’brought
to a conclusion”^*^* The question of the recall of Raskolnikov, Chicherin
insisted, was an internal matter, which could not form the subject of
discussion with another government; but it was not denied that he would not,
in fact, be returning to his post, and it was stated that instructions
would be given to Russian diplomatic fepresentatives in accordance with the
understanding which had been reached. The correspondence was considered 
IQif
closed * This, noted Litvinov, was the ’’final chord in all the music about
105Lord Curzon’s ’notes”’ * While the government did not consider, Baldwin 
told the House of Commons, that a conference with representatives of the 
Soviet government could at present usefully be convoked, agreement had at
106least been reached, McNeill told the House, upon certain specific issues •
k 9 k
The negotiations with regard to the Trade Agreement, the Cabinet noted with
107satisfaction on 20 June, ’’were now completed" •
Curzon was congratulated by Baldwin at the Cabinet*s meeting on
11 June on the "highly successful issue of these difficult negotiations"^.
Curzon himself wrote to Lord Crewe that he thought he could "claim to have
won a considerable victory over the Soviet government", and he expecfed them
109to "behave with more circumspection for some time to come" • The rupture 
of trade relations, noted the Economist, which had seemed probable, appeared 
now to have been definitely averted; and so far as they could be expected 
to go, "short of abject humiliation", the Moscow government had gone. The 
Times considered that a "very satisfactory measure of success** had been 
achieved. While not wholly breaking with the policy of the Coalition govern­
ment, the Foreign Office had now "shown a refreshing vigour and resolution 
in dealing with a Government which (had) displayed special enmity tpwards 
the British Empire"'*’’^ .
The question of diplomatic recognition, nevertheless, the Economist 
considered, would have to be "very seriously considered in the near future^l 
This was, perhaps, a measure of the extent to which the Soviet government 
had succeeded in securing the active support of public opinion in Britain, 
notably by alarming business and trading circles with regard to the prospect 
of trade between the two countries were the trade agreement annulled. The 
"cautious and conciliatory policy11, it appeared to a contemporary Soviet 
observer, of the Soviet representatives had succeeded in averting the danger
of a breaking-off of relations upon which the British government appeared 
112to have decided •
Raskolnikov, stated the NKID official ^report, had sought to return
113to Moscow before the ultimatum had been delivered • Hodgson, indeed, repor­
ted from Moscow on what he believed to be reliable authority that it had 
been decided to recall both Raskolnikov and Shumiatsky, following complaints 
regarding their activity from the Afghan government, before the British
HZf
ultimatum had been received • The Soviet government had not, in fact,
recalled its representatives from Kabul and Teheran, Curzon*s "essential
demand"; and it was declared to have been "not a victory, but a defeat" for 
115him . Raskolnikov Remained at Kabul until the end of the year, and Shumia-
ll6tsky was still at Teheran the following year • The assumption of the Prime 
Ministership by Baldwin, Chicherin considered, representing business circles
^95
favouring relations with Soviet Russia, had forced Curzon to compromise.
The Soviet government had yielded on a number of secondary points, but had
117refused to recall the two diplomatic representative^ •
It did not appear, either, that the main aim of the ultimatum,
the humiliation of the Soviet government in the eyes of the East, had been
achieved. Soviet relations with Afghanistan, it was represented, had actually
improved as a result of the ultimatum; and the reaction of Iranian public
opinion, and of traders and merchants, had been sharply criticial of the 
xi8ultimatum • Trade negotiations between the two countries were actually in
119progress at this time, and a treaty was signed the folliwmng year • The
period following Curzon's ultimatum, Chicherin told Arthur Ransome, had seen
not the deterioration, bjit the strengthening of relations with other count-
120n e s  and the conclusion of new and far-reaching agreements •
X
Following the transfer of Krasin to Paris, Rakovsky was appointed to take
his place as Soviet representative in Britain. It was evidently too soon,
however, to conclude that the crisis was over to the solution of which
Kxrasin had applied his talents. Rakovsky was appointed to his new post on
23 July after the British representative in Moscow had informed the Foreign
121Ministry of the willingness of the British government to receive him • A
diplomatic passport had been issued and Rakovsky was ready to leave when on
1 August a polemical attack upon him appeared in the Morning Post , hased
apparently upon a report of a spedch which he had made as reported by a
Kharkhov newspaper. He was reported to have said that the highest point of
the revolutionary movement was approaching in England, that the British
Empire was in imminent danger of collapse, and that his official position
could be used to spark off a revolution in BritAAn. Reference was also made
to a brochure of hisspeeches, entitled 'England and Russia', which had
recently appeared, containing a sharp attack upon British imperialism, and
122
urging non-acceptance of the terms of Curzon's note •
Aquestion was afcked about his appointment that day in the House of
Commons; and on 2 August the Soviet Foreign Ministry was informed that the
123
British government now refused accept Rakovsky into the country . An 
urgent telegram was despatched to Hodgson , instructing him to make "immedi­
ate investigations" with regard to the Morning Post's allegations; and if 
the facts had been accurately reported, to inform the Soviet government that
k 9 6
the British government took so serious a view of the incident that their 
agreement must withdrawn to receive in London a person Hso unlikely to 
conduct the trade relations with their country in a loyal or acceptable 
manner”. Rakovsky was to be warned not to leave until the matter had been 
cleared up; and on 3 August instructions were sent to the Home Office that
1  ph.
Rakovsky was if necessary to be refused permission to land at the ports »
Chicherin wrote to the British representative on 9 August to
protest against this decision: Rakovsky*s speech had been misleadingly
quoted, he insisted, and the speech which had been contained in the brochure
had appeared at a critical time in Anglo-Soviet relations and before his
125appointment had been made • Hodgson reported to London that he had exami­
ned the papers in question, and had found lfno expressions of Rakovsky in the 
least resembling those quoted by (the) Morning Post”. It appeared that he 
had, on the contrary, expressed the view that he could not, as an Official
representative of the Soviet Russian government, interfere in British
126internal affairs. He had been unable to locate the pamphlet * Four days
later he added that the pamphlet, which he had now examined, was being
withdrawn, and he believed the Soviet government were ’’really unaware of 
127its existence” • Leeper noted in a minute regarding the pamphlet, of 
which the Foreign Office had obtained a copy, that Rakovsky had spoken at 
a moment of crisis (following the murder of Vorovsky; the pamphlet had 
black borders) and when he had had no official responsibility. He believed 
that ”if we really want to get rid of the very unsatisfactory Trade Agree­
ment, then this incident is not quite big enough to afford the necessary 
leverage”^2^.
Berzin, the deputy Soviet representative, wrote to the Morning 
Post on 10 August , and stated that its evidence appeared to have been 
derived from the Riga Poslednia Novosti of 28 July, a publication ’’notorious 
for its unscrupulousness and mendacity”. A Foreign Office representative 
visited thd Morning Postx’s editor and found the paper’s explanation ’’very 
thin”. It was ’’difficult to avoid the conclusion”, Ovey noted, that the 
Horning Post had been ’’tricked and that they (had) no corroborating evidence1! 
Rakovsky’s visa should n o t S o u g h t ,  aify longer be withdrawn, although 
the Morning Post was ’’still hopeful” that proof to sustain their charges 
would ’’eventially be found”12^. On 30 August the Foreign Office informed
130
Reters in Moscow that the government was ’’prepared to accept Mr Rakovsky” •
^97
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Not once, however, in the three months following did Curzon receive
him, on the tenauus ground that he was not the diplomatic representative of
131a fully recognized state • The notification, indeed, that the RSFSR
government had been merged into that of the USSR, with which other states
should maintain official rdlations, was received with some scepticism in
the Foreign Office. The "obvious propagandist element11 in the change of
name was nlted; and it was proposed to ignore the new development by not
acknowledging the note, and by continuing to address Moscow as the Russian
Soviet government. Such communications as wefe addressed to Rakovsky were
addressed to him as the representative of this government, not of that of 
132the USSR f a designation which was considered to have expansionist connot­
ations. The Soviet government, moreover, McNeill told the House of Commons, 
had "not yet fully implemented all the undertakings given by it in the 
course of the correspondence which took place earlier in the year". The 
government intended Hot to relax their "efforts to obtain the full satisf­
action promised at that time"^^.
Curzon, it seemed to Chicherin, te.d clearly played the major role in the
despatch of the ultimatum. This representative of extreme reaction had
shown his "irreconcilable hostility" towards the Soviet government at
Lajtsanne, and had refused to consider any compromise whatever with it.The
main role in the ultimatum was played by the East, where the British
government had mistaken Russian secfet agents for the process of historical
development. "To this day", Chicherin believed, he remained "psychologically
I3L.
vice-Regent of India" • For the rest of his life, Beaverbrook agreed,
Curzon had been "influenced by his sudden journey to heaven at the age of
39 (when he had been made Viceroy of India) and then by his sudden return
135seven years later to earth, for the remainder of his mortal existence" . 
Some consideration should be given at this poijjt, then, to Curzon*s exper­
ience and the assumptions which informed his conduct of foreign policy, 
a field which remained his responsibility in successive governments after 
the war, and in which he was able to exercise his authority in an increasin­
gly personal fashion after the fall of the Coalition.
It was, it appears, a lecture given by James Fitzjames Stephen 
which Curzon attended as a schoolboy at Eton which first awoke his belief 
that in India lay the key to a new and dynamic imperial achievement. Stephen
k9S
had told the boys, he related to an audience of fellow Etonians on his
appointment as Viceroy, that ’’there was in the Asian continent an empire
more populous, more amazing, and more beneficent than that of Rome; that
the rulers of that great dominion were drawn from the men of our own people;
that some of them might perhaps in the future be taken from the ranks of
the boys who were listening to his words". Ever since that dayt said Curzon,
136the "fascination and., aacredness of India" had grown upon him • Stephen, 
the author of a celebrated attack upon Liberalism entitled 'liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity', had acted as a member of the Legislative Council in India under 
Lord Mayo for over two years. India he described as for him, a second 
university education; and his book represented, he declared, "little more 
than the turning of an Indian lantern on European problems". India he found 
the "best corrective in existence to the fundamental fallacies of Liberalis^. 
British government there, he wrote, was "essentially an absolute government, 
founded, not on consent, but on conquest. It does not represent the native 
principles of life or of government, and it can never do so until it repres-
1 70
ents heathenism and barbarism" •
Stephen's arguments, it has been noted, supplied the educated
classes with an intellectual argument in support of the continuance of
autocratic rule in India, and for the maintenance of the political integrity
of the Empire. They supplied one of the main intellectual contributions to
139the faith of English imperialism . Curzon was at one with Stephen m  
advocating for India an enlightened British autocracy, whose legitimacy 
derived not from the consent of the governed but from the government's dedi­
cation to the moral and material advancement of the subject people. It was
from this source, rather than from the more pragmatic Henry Maine, that
14qCurzon drew his inspiration • In contrast, moreover, to Oxford Idealism
which was in the ascendant in Balliol College where Curzon was a student,
and which might have appeared to "supply the most obvious links between
political ideas and Empire", authoritarian Liberalism of the Stephen school
had deeper historical roots, and " of much more importance,•• an intellectual
iZfl
content which had a much closer bearing on practical affairs" •
Curzon travelled extensively in the Middle and Far East, contrib­
uting articles to the Times and collecting material for a number of books 
which by 1895 had given him an "established reputation for knowing more about
■I liO
the East than any living politician" • Appointed Viceroy in 1898, he
^99
defined his mission as one to "preserve intact and secure, either from 
internal convulsion or external inroad, the boundaries ofmthat great and
lZf3
Imperial dominion" . His term of office, devoted to the energetic pursuit 
of this object, ended unhappily in 1905 when Curzon resigned, following a 
disagreement with his political superiors in London. The fortunes of the 
Empire in the East, and especially of British India, nevertheless remained 
the dominating concern of his political life; and it was this consideration 
which, more than any other, underlay his conduct of policy when he became 
Foreign Secretary after the war* As Radek put it, Curzon "considered English
policy and the world position from the terrace of the Indian Vice-regal
1 Vf palace" 0
India provided, as Curzon pointed out, the "principal, indeed 
almost the only formidable element in our fighting strength", an army 
which was "capable of being hurled at a moment*s notice upon any point 
either of Asia or Africa" (any point, that was, "where native troops can 
properly be employed"'*'^). Elsewhere, he could emvisage in Persia^that 
the "nomad tribes of the south*• may one day stand in line with British 
redcoats"^^.
Of decisive importance, however, was the fact that India repres­
ented the "true fulcrum of dominion, the real touchstone of our Imperial 
greatness or failjire"^^*! India was the "centre and secret of eas» Imperial 
dominion"* India was "not only an important part of any Imperial organizati­
o n  in the future, but., so important that withoufe her the Empire could 
not continue to exist". India had been the determining influence in every 
considerable movement of British power at the East and South of the Medit­
erranean: a movement which had "converted us^  from a small island with
1^7trading and maritime interests into the greatest land Power of the world" * 
It was "ohvious", Curzon considered, that the "master of India must, under1 
modern conditions, be the greatest power in the Asiatic continent, and 
therefore, it may be added, in the world"* Hence his belief that the 
"secret of the mastery tff the world" was, "if they only knew it, in the 
possession of the British people" • The continued existence of Britain, 
he told his constituents in March l893i was bound up in the maintenance, 
or "even in the extension of the British Empire"* India was the "strength 
and greatness of Britain"; and "every nerve a man may strain, every energy 
he may put forward", could "not be devoted to a nobler purpose than keeping
l4o
tight the cords that hold India to ourselves” . As long as Britain 
ruled India, she was the "greatest power in the world”. Should she lose
possession of that country, she would ”droo straight away to a third-rate
,.150power”
The imperial connection, equally, was of benefit to the Indian 
population. It was, wrote Curzon, the Empird's "highest claim” to Indian 
gratitude to have "educated their character and emancipated their intellig­
ence”. This was at the same time, regrettably, the source of "many foolish 
things” and of "many vain aspifcations”, for the rule of India was "still, 
and must for as long as we can foresee, remain in British hands''1^1. The 
'Advanced Natives', he wrote, desired a "larger control of the executive 
for which they are as yet profoundly unfitted and which theywwill never get 
ffom me ”. He wrote to Balfour about the "extraordinary inferiority, in 
character, honesty, and capacity" of the Indians. It was often said that a 
prominent 'native* should be made a member of the Executive Council. The 
answer, he told Balfour, was that "in the whole continent there is not an 
Indian fit for the post”1^ .  The justification for British rule in India 
was not, in any case, that it was exersised with the consent of the governed 
but that it represented (at least to those who exercised it) the necessary 
tutelage of an advanced civilization over a backward one. It expressed, 
simply, the "fundamental" difference between the "standard of living, the 
economic aptitudes^ and the social and moral concerns of Asiatic races and 
of communities of European origin". On the whole his travels around the 
world had revealed to him a "satisfied and grateful acquiescence in our
domination"1^ .
For to Curzon there could be no doubt that the Empire represented 
the work of more than human hands. The Empire, he considered, was "under 
Providence, the greatest instrument for good that the world has ever seen"; 
it might still remain "one of the instruments through which He chooses to 
speak to mankind"1^ .  In Empire, Britain had found not merely the key to 
glory and wealth, but the call to duty, and the means of service to manklSS 
Curzon was not beyond amending the text of a hymn so as to exclude a verse
156which made reference to the passing away of earthly empires ; yet he had 
no doubt that the British had come to India "in obedience to the decree of 
Providence and for the lasting benefit of millions of the human race”. He
501
was, he declared, ”an Imperialist heart and soul. Imperial expansion seems
tonme an inevitable necessity and carries a hoble and majestic obligation”;
and of British government abroad he stated his firm belief that there was
"no government in the world that rests on so secure a moral basis, or is
157more fiercely animated by duty” .
Formal religion had little part in Curzon*s life, and it appears
that when comparatively young he found, although he had been brought up
within it, that he could not accept the essentials of the Christian faith^*^.
Yet speaking at a banquet in February 1903, he declared that if he had
thought ”it were all for nothing, and that you and I, Englishmen, Scotchmen
and Irishmen in this country, were simply writing inscriptions on the aand
to be washed away out by the next tide, if I left that we were not working
here for the good of India* in obedience to a higher law and a nobler aim,
then I would see the link that holds England and India together severed
with a sigh. But it is because I believe in the future of this country and
the capacity of our own race to guide it £ea?wa*d to goals that it has never
hitherto attained, that I keep courage and press forward”(it was in many ways
xm± inappropriate that this lofty justification of imperialism was offered
159to a Chamber of Commerce meeting )o The Almighty had placed the British
hand on the "greatest of his ploughs, in whose furrow the nations of the
world are germinating and taking shape”"**^ . Britain, it has been noted, ”of
all European countriesin the nineteenth century made the most profession of
l6lChristianity, partly becuase it had the biggest empire” e To Curzon and
those who shared his views, it went without saying that what God had thus
joined together, no subject people might break asunder®
Curzon had in any case littlex sympathy for either the peoples
of the East of for their cultures. He wasted no time on the ’’sterile nonsense
that passes for philosophy in the East”; Korea he found ”one of the dirtiest
and most repulsive countries in the world”; and while as Viceroy he devoted
much effort to the preservation of India’s past, for him, as for may others,
Indian art and architecture were ’’really a matter of archeology, something 
162dead” m Throughout his period of office, he sought to identify the interest 
-s of India’s traditional aristocracy, the princes and large landowners, 
with those of the British government: in the not unreasonable belief that 
the entrenched conservatism of the princes made them natural allies of the 
paramount power. The native chief, he wrote, had become an ’’integral part”
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of the imperial organization of India; he had become a "colleague and a 
163
partner” In general they were, he found, ’’enthusiastically attached to
the British connection”. The dducated classes, however, were divided, with
a ’’small section. • incurably hostile and disloyaij.”® The masses, however, were
l6*finterested only in ’’food and wages” . The masses in Persia he found gener­
ally favourably disposed towards British influence in their country: leading 
him generously to conclude that it was "no rare experience to find a very 
fair apercu of the political situation forulated by men in a comparatively
165humble station of life” • They were ’’very strange people, these natives”, 
he reflected; there was "scarcely anything that they will not accept from 
their rulers"'*’^ .
Generally, he found substantial loyalty tot the person of the 
Sovereign; and as the spirit of nationality assumed "more active and 
insurgent forms" in India, he thought the feeling for the Crown might be 
"of increasing value”. He was reluctant to subject it to any "hazard", such 
as the establishment of a royal residence in India; but in every residence 
or building of government and in Durbar Hall and Court House, Curzon arranged 
that a picture of the King should be "hung up in a prominent place. The lit­
tle things", he explained, were "not thought greatly of at home - but they 
couht for much in the East" • An elaborate and ceremonial Coronation 
Durbar took place in 1903* It was a means, he declared, of lifting an "entire 
people for a little space out of the rut of their narrow and parochial lives" 
and of letting them "catch a glimpse of a higher ideal, an appreaiation of 
the hidden laws that regulate the march of nations and their destinies'*. A 
somewhat more straightforward means of attracting support and "bringing
home to the masses of the Indian people the historical significance of the
168occasion", a remission of taxation, was overruled in London •
English people, he wrote, and still more Ehglish rulers, were in
India in order to set an example. Every one of their actions should be
open to inspection; each deed should be a duty. They could hold India only
by their "superior standards of honour and virtue and by getting the Natives
to recognize them as such". Truth had been given a high place in the moral
codes of the West before it had been similarly honoured in the East, "where
l69
craftiness and diplomatic wile have always been held in much repute" .Part 
of this duty lay in ending the indifference with which the British authorit­
ies had habitually regarded what was delicately described as "carelessness
503
on the part of soldiers when out shooting11* He ordered the hssue of shooting
passes to be limited in October 1900, following the "allegedly accidental
deaths of a number of Indians at the hands of British soldiers turned sport- 
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smen" • The natives, he explained to Lyttleton, were "crooked-minded and 
corrupt. We have therefore got to go on ruling them". Thqy could do so with 
success, however, only "by being both kindly and virtous". He might, he 
admitted, be "talking rather like a schoolmaster; but after all, the millions 
I have to manage are less than school children"’*'^ ’.
Curzon shared the disillusion of his menton Stephen with the 
extension of the franchise and other democratic reforms of the late ninet­
eenth centyry (and, indeed, he showed no enthusiasm for the subsequent 
enfranchisement of women); and central to his imperialism was the belief 
that by this means a threat to the moral fibre of the nation mi&ht be 
averted. "As for the priceless asset of national character", he wrote,
"without a world to conquer or duty to perform, it would rot to atrophy and 
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inanition" 0 Of the benefits of British rule in India to Britain, Curzon
was inclined to mention less the material than what he called the "moral and
educative ones". The Indian army he considered the "finest available school
of manhood and arms". The Indian civil service was a "training-ground for
British character that is not without its effect both upoh the Empire and the
race". Not only had India put money into their purses and extended the
British imperial sway: it had, more importantly, "exalted and disciplined 
173our character" 0
This was not to suggest that Curzon was unaware of the economic 
importance to Britain of her imperial possessions. He was, indeed, for a 
year a member of the board of a short-lived compamy, the Persian Bank 
Mining Rights Corporation Limited; and in the course of his travels in 
Persia, he systematically noted the location of the oil wells which lay 
along his route. He was, also, dor some time the chairman of the Imperial 
Bank of Persia1^ .  It was the prestige and wealth arising from her Asiatic 
position, he stated, which represented the "foundation stones of the British 
Empire"^-* India, he noted, was "one of the main fields for the employment 
of British capital.. She supplies to us in abundance the raw material of a 
great deal of our industry and much of the food on which we live, and., she 
furnishes the richest market for our manufactures". India was the largest 
purchaser of British produce and manufactures, and notably of cotton goods;
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and was the largest producer of food and raw material in the Empire, and 
the principal granary of Great Bfitain1^ .  The Indian radical, said Curzon, 
objected that the low level of the levy on imported cotton goods had been 
fixed in the interests of Lancashire : as indeed, he added, "it was"; and 
they objected also that the expatriation of the profits of British enterpr­
ises in India represented an economic loss. To Curzon, however, the profits 
of business were "the property of the owner, to do with as he pleases"^^* 
Persia, he noted in his travels in that country, was a country 
"providing an extensive and profitable market for England and Anglo-Indian 
trade", with whose ruler a good understanding was consequently "in the 
highest degree desirable". Britain had an "inherited right", he thought, to 
a "commanding interest in Persian trade", ani interest which was however 
entirely legitimate and certainly "no offspring of national cupidity or 
desire for material aggrandisement". Indeed, he found that the increasing 
movement of Englishmen and of English capital towards the shores of that 
countryto be evidence of a "new-born, or at least re-aroused, concern for 
its welfare", and of a "consciousness that its vxlfivnce is in a measure 
hound up with our own" (a remark of the adcuraay of which he was not, 
perhaps, entirely aware). The development of Persian resources by Bersian 
means should meet, he urged, "not with suspicion, but with encouragement": 
provided, however, that British commerce was "not hampered". The loss of
control over India, similarly, might lead to the loss of that country1s
179"splendid and unfailing markets, shut against us by hostile tariffs" •
India was the lynchpin of this moral and material global edifice. 
That country had become the "strategic centre of the defensive position of 
the British Empire"; and its frontier was as "essential to the defence of
1S0the Empire as the defence of the Channel itself" • Curzon had no doubt
that the country against whose influence the British position must be
maintained was the "ever-swelling shadow" of Russia. Indeed the "basic idea
of Curzon1s foreign policy", as Radek noted, was and remained the weakening 
l8lof Russia . In ffersia he found that the Russian presence, "witnessed with 
a sort of paralysed quiescence by the native peoples", loomed like a 
!,thunder-cloud over the land". In recent years Russia had made significant 
advances; and there was evidence that her ambitions fell as yet "short of 
realisation". Those ambitions were, he thought, "distinctly, and in parts 
avowddly, hostile"; and they extended to parts of Persia which he specified
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in his study of Ssrzzx that country, and even to Korea and elsewhere • 
Russia, Curzon explained, "though a nation of no commercial 
aptitudeslf, had "conceived the ambition of controlling the markets of 
Central Asia". Her dark designs there were contrasted with the "indomitable 
gallantry" of British merchants, whose business there was "entirely legitia- 
ate". The passion for territorial aggrandizement was, he considered, a 
"dominating influence in the Russian mind". The local inhabitants, however, 
a "naturally craven race", "woefully deficient in patriotism", were inclined 
to regard a hypothetical Russian advance with "mingled resignation and
-| Q-z
respect" • If the Persians were unwilling or unable to defend themselves, 
others, evidently, must do so in their place. There could he no excuse, he 
thought, for "any supineness in developing®. Anglo-Indian influence". The 
"preservation., of the integrity of Persia" must be considered a "cardinal 
precept of our Imperial creed". Persia was a country in the shaping of whose 
future the British nation had it "in their power to take a highly honourable 
lead". Curzon was in the circumstances understandably distressed by the 
tendency which the Persians appeared to display to "mistake interest for
184-self-interest in others" •
In his period of office as Viceroy Curzon urged a definite policy to
check the advance of Russia towards India through Persia, Afghanistan and
Tibet; and authorized an expedition to Tibet in 1903-^ to assefct British
185interests in the face of what Curzon believed to be a Russian threat •
The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907* dividing Persia into spheres of influe­
nce, aroused his deepest misgivings. An agreement with Russia, he had writt­
en, was "one of those sentimental hallucinations that., it is impossible 
to remove from the British mind". The Convention itself, he charged in Parl­
iament, had "thrown away to a large extent the efforts of our diplomacy and 
our trade for more than a century; and I do not feel at all sure that this
treaty in its Persian aspect will conduce either to the security of India,
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to the independence of Persia or to the peace of Asia" •
Harcourt, reading his Russia in Central Asiau wrote to beg that
the author would "not make war on Russia in my lifetime". Curzon did, at
least, lay constant stress throughout the world war upon the Eastern Theatre;
and sent British forces to Persia for the "very necessary duty of controlling
1 ft?
the insurrectionary movement" • He vigorously championrd the anti-Bolshev- 
ik forces in Russia inside the Cabinet, laying particular emphasis upon the
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the bearing which the conflict had upon imperial interests in the Near East
and Asia. At the end of the war he found it possible to tell the House of
Commons that the British flag had never flown over a "more powerful or a
more united Empire than now". He had conceded on the matter of Montagu(s
declaration on the advance of India* towards self-government within the
Empire; but he notaed that the Cabinet was "really making concessions to
India because of the free talk about liberty, democracy, nationality and
self-government" which, he considered, had become the "common shibboleths
of the Allies", and because (perhaps not unreasonably) they were being
"expected to translate into practice in our own domestic household the
188sentiments which we have so enthusiastically preached" •
By September 1919* however, it had become clear to him that the
world was "very troubled", and that while peace had supposedly been seuured,
active and murderous war was going on in at least a quarter of the recent
areas of struggle* The tafek of the government in such circumstances was full
of incident; and even fuller of disappointment and perplexity, he told Lodfd 
189Lansdowne • The withdrawal of British forces from Persia was ultimately 
found necessary, although Curzon had opposed this "immoral, feeble and 
disastrous policy". The Anglo-Persian agreement, while it might go a long 
way, it waa noted, towards meeting "some at least of what were believed to 
be Persian aspifcations", included the appointment of a British head of the 
armed forces and of the country's finances, a necessity which was stated to 
have followed from the "huge finfncial interests which (Britain) now possess­
ed in the country". It was not ratified, however, as has been noted abovef 
and in February 1921 a± treaty was signed dith the Soviet government. There 
dould now be little prospect of the realisation of Curzon's vision of a
"rejuvenfcted Persia freed from the menace of Russian militarism on the North
190and supported by, and be^olded to, Great Britain" • Persia appeared now
to be "marching of its own accord", Curzon told the House of Lords, toward*
an end which he could "not attempt to forecast" but which could not, he
191thought, "be other than most unfortunate" •
Curzon was understandably inclined to take issue with what he cons­
idered to be Lloyd George's excessively conciliatory attitude towards the 
Soviet government. Only with difficulty had he been induced to shake Krasin 
by the hand at the outset of the British-Soviet talks in the summer of 1920 
in London. Wells, who visited Russia at this time, gave Curzon his opinion
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that, whatever its imperfections, the Soviet government was then the only
possible government in Russia, and that whatever the personal feelings of
British ministers, it would be necessary to work out a modus vivendi with
them. Curzon, Wells later told Maisky, "was simply unable to understand me.
For him, Bolshevik Russia was simply a criminal, which had as quickly as
192possible to be destroyed" •
It might appear inconsistent that he had given his support to
the conclusion of the Trade Agreement in March 1921. Yet he had earlier
argued that "no safeguard should be omitted" by which might be secured "in
perpetuity" that "noblest achievement of the science of civil rule that
193mankind has yet bequethed to man", the British Empire in the East • If, 
as became increasingly probably, the Bolsheviks remained in power, it might 
prove the least unsatisfactory arrangement to conclude an agreement with 
them, which should be essentially a bargain: the agreement itself, providing 
for the development of trade between the two countries (in which the Bolsh­
eviks were believed to be extremely interested), should be signed in feturn 
for and upon the condition of a suspension of such aspects of their foreign 
policy, and of the activity of organizations under their direct or indirect 
control, which complicated the task of the imperial power in Asia. Little, 
it was thought, would be gained forthe British side by such trade as might 
develop; and the Bolsheviks, equally, might not abide by the undertakings 
which they had given. Nothing, however, would be lost in this case; while 
there was at least a possibility that the existence of the agreement would 
constrain their anti-British and anti-colonial activity. Curzon expressed 
this view (which, hs has been noted above, he shared with a section of the 
Cabinet) in anote to the Cabinet in May 1920. The Bolsheviks, he believedf 
were "threatened with complete economic disaster" and were willing to "pay 
almost any price for the assistance which we more than anyone else are in 
in a position to give". The rendering of such assistance could hardly be 
contemplated without "exacting our own price for it": which could best be 
paid through the "cessation of Bolshevik hostility in parts of the world 
of importance to us"1^ .  An undertaking upon both parties to refrain from 
activity or propaganda prejudicial to the institutions or interests of the 
other party, applying in particular to British possessions in Asia, was 
included in the trade agreement accordingly: it was the price of Curzon*s 
support.
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Baldwin allowed Curzon more independence in the conduct of foreign policy
than had Lloyd George. Curzon was able, consequently, to draw attention to
the contractual nature of the trade agreement with the May 1923 ultimatum.
The agreement was conditional upon the cessation of Bolshevik propaganda in
the East; and since little otherwise was to be gained from it, it would be
terminated if that condition were consistently infringed. There was some
justice, nevertheless, in Chicherin1s view that an appreciable change had
become apparent in British policy with the accession at this time of
Baldwin to the Premiership. It was the general opinion of those who knew
him, wrote the Manchester Guardian's London correspondent, that the new
Prime Minister took "rather a more moderate line than Lord Curzon's on the
Russian question", which he saw from "a rather different angle after his
195long experience of trade affairs" • Within the Conservative party, in
fact, Curzon's views were representative of a traditionally important bjit
now peri^kps subsidiary section, connected with landed estates and imperial
possessions. Curzon himself was described by Lord Davidson as an "ancient
196monument and constructed like one" • The Tories were "now a businessman1s
party", under the leadership from 1911 of a Glasgow-Canadian iron merchant
(Bonar Law), followed by two Midland industrialists (Baldwin, Neville Charab- 
197erlain) . The interests of the latter group were better met by the maint­
enance of trade relations with Soviet Russia; and they argued, in turn, a 
more flexible line of conduct with the Soviet government.
The House of Commons which had been elected was best known, perhapf
in Baldwin's remark about a lot of "hard-faced men who had done well out of
the war". The "prevailing type", he noted early in the following year, was
198a "rather successful looking business type which it not very attractive" • 
Lord Davidson drew attention, in a letter to Lord Stamforotham, to the "high
percentage of hard headed men, mostly on the make, who fill up the ranks of
the Unionist Party. The old-fashioned country gentlemen, and even the 
higher ranks of the learned professions", were "scarcely represented at all". 
Lloyd George remarked that he had the impression of addressing not the House 
of Commons, but the T.U.C. on one side, and the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce on the other^^#
So far, certainly, as the Unionists were concerned, there was 
some substance to this observation. About 260 businessmen were represented
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in the House of Commons, compared with an inter-war average of about 200®
The Federation of British Industry, noted the Economist, took "no part in
politics whatever’1 • It did, however, happen in the ’’ordinary course of
events” that between seventy and eighty MPs were connected with firms which
were members of the F.B.I.^^. It was calculated in 1923 that some 255
directors of public compfukiesx or landowners were represented in the House
of Commons, and a further 272 in the House of Lords* About a fifth of the
former represented firms involved in engineering, shipbuilding and metals,
and a further fifth came from the world of finance, land and investment* The
F.B.I. had a Parliamentary Committee, and a 'Liaison Department' was set up
1918• The connection was in no danger: 66 MPs, and 70 members of the House
201of Lords were known to be directors of companies belonging to the F.B*L.
Lloyd George's supporters in the House of Commons, the New Statesman report-
202ed, represented capital to an average sum of 51 million a head ® A detailed
examination concluded that the opposition to the Labour Pdrty in Parliament
resembled a ’’mass meeting of employers and shareholders, assisted by their
legal representatives"^^©
Directors of firms which were members of the F.B.I. were often
prominently represented in government: Horne, Chamberlain, Lloyd-Greame and
others* Sir Eric Geddes, formerly Minister of Transport, became President
20*fof the F.B.I. in November 1922 • The assumption of the party leadership
by Bonar Law in 1911» indeed, has been seen as the "final open assumption
of power by the party's capitalist wing”* Bonar Law, noted Amery, had few
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interests outside business, "and politics when they became his business” •
Within the Cabinet he was a "business man for whom an agenda was something
to which decisions were to be got as quickly as possible”® Bonar Law saw
himself as a "man at the head of hhe big business who allowed the work to
be done by others and gives it general stnispee^ion"* Such was his conception
206of the role of the Prime Minister •
Baldwin, thought the Mew Leader, represented big business; and
~ ~ 207
with his success the F.B.I. had "definitely (assumed) the reins of power" •
It was, indeed, partly on this basis that Davidson had recommended his 
candidature in a memorandum written after Bonar Law's resignation* Baldwin, 
Davidson observed, had "the confidence of the City and the commercial world
P0Q
| e n e r a l l y B a l d w i n  followed his father both into the old-established
510
family business and into the House of Commons (where his father had had the 
distinction, of no other, of having introduced cider to the Members* Bar^^)• 
fflhe family business was already of major dimensions before the world war, 
and Baldwin left affairs largely in the hands of subordinates. He did, 
however, become Vice-Chairman of the company on thedfeath of his father, and 
he became also a director of the Great Bestern Railways and of Lloyds BaniP'. 
In Parliament he gravitated naturally towards the Business Committee of 
Conservative MPs and to a series of positions in the government attached to 
the Treasury, the Board of Trade and the Treasury, eventually becoming 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. He brought to his condict of affairs a conscio­
usness of the family business, a place as he described it **where I knew and 
had known from childhood every man on the ground., where I was able to talk 
with the men not only about the troubles in the workd, but troubles at home
and their wives11. It was a place, moreover, where Wstrikes and lock-outs 
211were unknown** • His policy in social matters, it has been remarked, was the 
"straightforward expression of the benevolent but firm philosophy of the
West Country employer, now translated to the supreme charge of the country*s
212economy'* .
'Business', then, was increasingly origin of MPs, and especially 
of the Conservative party, after the war, at the expense of traditional 
landed sources of support. The accession to the leadership of the party of 
Bonar Law, and more particularly of Baldwin, argued that party leaders 
increasingly came from a business background, and tended to conduct the 
affairs of state, as of a large corporation, in a 'practical* and 'business­
like* fashion. Traders, who had an occupational interest in the development 
of commercial relations with foreign countries, broadly favoured a firm but 
not inflexible attitude to relations with Soviet Russia; and both Bonar Law 
and Baldwin, indeed, inclined to the view that "business could be done" with 
the Soviet government. Curzon*s background was a more traditional one, and 
he was an established political figure before Bfcnar Law had entered Parliam­
ent, He was, too, less willing to compromise with the Soviet government at 
the expense of imperial interests. Yet a rigid distinction between moderate 
business' and inflexible 'empire' would also be misleading. Curzon, as 
haa been noted, had some involvement in commercial life; while Baldwin shared 
his concern (at the time of the ultimatum) that the Soviet government should 
withdraw its "Afghan propagandist agents",,and Bonar Law, it has been noted*
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"always put the greatness of the British Empire foremost among his aims", :
213
and was a strong advocate of imperial unity . A commitment to the maint­
enance of the Empire was, in fact, common to MPs of all parties, even when 
(as was not infrequently the case before the world war) the representatives
of the colonial people couched their submissions for representative govern-
21
ment and self-government in explicitly Gladstonian Liberal terms .
There was some material foundation for this solicitude for the
position of the imperial power in the East. The British economy, it had
been noted, devdloped a "characteristic and peculiar pattern of international
relations. It relied heavily on foreign t r a d e T h e  internal market was
a shallow one; and throughout the period from the 1870s to the 1920s domestic
215exports accounted for 16-20$ of the national income o Profits from overse­
as raw materials provided an "exceedingly important part" of the total 
profits of the great combines that were formed in Britain innthe 1920s.
The huge scale of the total British investment in companies operating
2l6overseas gave a "heavy overseas emphasis to British capitalism" . The
overseas market was especially important for major industries: cotton, iron
and steelo j
Within this framework, the position of developing countries,
especially of the Dominions, was an important and increasingly important
one. The export of capital, for instance, flowed tn this direction to the
extent of 68$ of the total before the war; and by the late 1920s, this per-
217centage had incrdased fo 8l$ » The proportion of U.K. exports which went
fco the Empire was 32.2$ in 1913; by 1922 it had increased to 40$. Between
1913 and 1927, the proportion of total British imports accounted for by the
Empire increased from 20.5$ to 27$, and the proportion of Empire imports
2l8
accounted for by Britain increased correspondingly from 37*2$ to 46$ .
The part played by India was a particularly important one. Only
20$ of that country*s exports were sent to the U.K.; but the U.K. accounted
for 70$ of Indian imports21^. Since the war, India had taken a larger amount j
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of imports from the U.K. than Canada, Australia and South Africa combined • 
The Indian trading deEtcit with Britain ("politically established and 
maintained"), *Home Charges* and interest payments on the Indian public 
debt operated to the advantage of British financial interests, and had 
made and continued to make an important contribution to the British balance j
of payments surplus221. Much of British world shipping activity was baaed j
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upon the great export trade of bulky goods from India, and upon India*s
central position in the trade of the Far East. It was, moreover, "one of
the great investment fields of British capital": by 1005 nearly £350 million
or between a sixth and a seventh of total British investment overseas was 
222in India 0 By 191*f, 10% of the British national income was estimated to
derive from overseas investment, of which half came from imperial possess-
223ions o
The influence of these involvements upon the formulation of British
policy was the more immediate in view of the more central role which the
government now occiipied in the economy. The short era of decontrol, it had
been remarked, was followed by an ’’unprecedented era of state intervention
in business", an intervention "obviously in favour of business". The British
government had become part-owner or subsidiser of the Suez Canal, the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company (191*0, the Cunard Steam Ship Company(l90*f), and the
Marconi Radio Telegraph Company (1913)* The state’s role in telephones, air
22*ftransport, radio communications, and broadcasting was greatly increased • 
The government had aaaumed some form of interest in the running of businesses 
or even industries which were based at least in part outside Britain; and it 
had begun to assume responsibility for prices, employment and a range of 
aspects of the functioning of the economy which might often depend in their 
turn upon developments overseas. The staategic importance of imperial econo­
mic co-operation became apparent in the course of the world war, and it was 
consciously strengthened after it. The government’s attitude to the fate of 
its colonial possessions could hardly, in the circumstances, be one of 
indifference: the threat which Soviet policy offered to the British imperial, 
position might be exaggerated, but it could not be xgwaxwd disregarded*
513
1 National Review Vol 8 0  October 1922 opl70-l•w—— —w*—
2 Spender, Fortnightly Review Vol 1151 1 March 192^ f p322 j
3 Parliamentary Debates Vol 155 col 217* and Taylor: English History I
191^-19^5 (Oxford 1965) pl31
k Parliamentary Debates Vol 152 col 105*f, 27 March 1928
5 Parliamentary Debates Vol 155 col 213f, 13 June 1922
6 ibid cols 217,2^9
7 ibid col 225; Craig ed», British General Election Manifestos 1918- 
1966 (Chichester 1970) plO, Bonar Law's election manifesto
8 Hankeyfs struggle to preserve the Secretariat is recorded in Roskill, j
S.W.: Hankey: Man of Secrets Vol ii 1919-1931 (London 1972) pp30*f-20 j
9 Parliamentary Debates Vol 159 col 25^« 29 November 1922; ibid col 67X*f; j
I
and ibid col 3136, Ik December 1922 j
10 Soviet archival source, cited in Shishkin: Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i ;
Strany Zapada p3^0 j
11 Parliamentary Debates Vol l6l col 1923* 15 March 1923
12 Soviet archival source, cited in Karpova,R.F.: L.B. Krasin - Sovetsky 
Diplomat (Moscow 1962) pl*f8
13 Berzin to Karakhan, 27 September 1922, DVPSSSR Vol v No 267 p598; the 
Soviet notes of 12 and 2k September 1922 are in DVPSSSR Vol v Nos 2^9 
and 2&k
Ik Chicherin to the representatives of the RSFSR in Britain and Italy (to 
be communicated to their respective governments) DVPSSSR Vol v No 283
pp621-2 j
15 DVPSSSR Vol v No 301 p653
16 Cabinet Minutes 1 November 1922, Cab 6^(22) Annex iv, Cab 23/32
17 Note from the government of the RSFSR to the governments of Britain* 
France and Italy, 2 November 1922, DVPSSSR Vol v No 301 pp650-3
18 Note from the government of the RSFSR to the governments of Britain, 
France and Italy, 2k November 1922, DVPSSSR Vol vi No 7 pl8
19 Conference of Ministers 29 September 1922, Cab 52(22) Appendix vi,Ca^^^
20 Cabinet Minutes 1 November 1922, Cab 6^(22) Annex iv Cab 23/32
21 Istoriya Vneshnei Politiki SSSB Vol i  1917-19^5 (Moscow 1966) ppl75-6*
The diplomacy of the Lausanne Conferencw is discussed in Nicolson,H: 
Curzon, the Last Phase (London 193k; 1937 ed) pp28l-350; a lengthy 
'Record of Proceedings' is in Parliamentary Papers 1923 Cmd l8l*f
51^
22 Parliamentary Debates Vol 162 col 8l4f, 29 March 1923; col 8l6 (split
infinitive in original)
23 ihid cols 817-8 , 820
2.k ibid cols 8^f,8*f8
23 Curzon to Chicherin 2 October 1920, Parliamentary Papers 1923 Cmd l8 f^6 p3
26 ibid p*f
27 Curzon to Chicherin 3 January 1922, ibid pp5*6
28 Litvinov to Chreon 7 Marcg. 1922, ibid p7
29 Curzon to Litvinov 20 December 1922 ibid pll
30 Litvinov to Curzon 12 January 1923 ibid pl2
31 Nineteenth Century and After Vol 92, July 1922 p2, Mrs Harding
32 Parliamentary Dekfcates Vol 139 cols 2602-3* 23 March 1921
33 Parliamentary Debates Vol ikk col 1515* 1^ July 1921; Russell: Autobio­
graphy Vol ii pl09
3 Parliamentary Debates Vol lMf col 1759* Vol lk6 col 1628
35 Curzon to Chicherin 3 September 1921, Parliamentary Papers 1922 Cmd l6^J^ j
36 Hodgson to Curzon 29 September 1921 ibid pp6,7; ibid p9»10 January 1922 jj
37 ibid p9, 10 January 1922 * j
38 Parliamentary Debates Vol 151 col 215^, 15 March 1922 |;
39 Parliamentary Debates Vol 159 col 673* 29 November 1922, Sir B. Chadwick [
^0 Russian Information and Review Vol i No 16, 15 May 1922 pp364,365 i
*fl Pravda 12 May 1922, 17 May 1922. Tikhon*s proposal for the removal of
valuables was described in a Pravda aartoon on 1 June 1922 as a 'New
Ikon-omic Policy*•
*f2 according to DVPSSSR Vol v p7^7 note 108
DVPSSSR Vol v pMfl
Karakhan to the RSFSR representatives in Britain, Austria, Germany and 
Italy, DVPSSSR Vol v No 179 *  ^  June 1922, p^ f* K ) ,4 - *fl;  and in Russian i i
Information and Review Vol i No l8 , 15 June 1922 p*f27 j
^5 Communist Review Vol iv, 2 June 1923 p79* W. Paul
^6 Times 28 March 1923 j|
^7 Parliamentary Debates Vol l6l col 1756* 15 March 1923
^8 Times f^ April 1923, cited in Russian Information and Review Vol ii No 26 [
7 April 1923 p^03; which also noted (No 29 28 April 1923 p^50)that arti­
cle 13 of the constitution, which specified freedom or religious and of 
anfii-religious propaganda, had been stated by one British paper to have j
obliged every citizen to conduct anti-religious propaganda. j
515
49 Russian Information and Review Vol ii No 26, 7 April 1923 p403
50 Parliamentary Debates Vol 162 col 270, 27 March 1923; Times 2 April 1923
51 Parliamentary Debates Vol 151 col 1754 13 March 1922, Vol 152 cols
429-30 22 March 1922. The information had in fact been circulated through 
the British Trawlers* Association ibid Vol 152 col 1879 3 April 1922
52 Parliamentary Debates Vol 152 col 1880, 3 April 1922. The *Magneta*
was arrested on 31 January 1922 nine miles from the Murman coast. It 
sank on the night of 1 February during a storm, and the British agent
in Moscow was informed of this on 13 and 20 February in communications
which, while they expressed regret at what had occurred, protested at 
the practice of Ihifeggal fishing in Soviet territorial waters and asked 
that those firms engaged in it be informed accordingly (DVPSSSR Vol v 
p727 note 49).
53 DVPSSSR Vol v p 727 note 49
54 Parliamentary Debates Vol 153 col 67 10 April 1922, Vol 153 col 960
1 May 1922. The Harebell was instructed to offer British fishing vessels 
the maximum protection of which it was capbale, using force if necessary 
(instructions, issued 30 April 1922, F.0. 371*9552 N7848 No 24)
55 Grove to NKID 15 March 1922, DVPSSSR Vol v ppl65-6
56 NKID to Grove 22 March 1922, DVPSSSR Vol v No 90 ppl63-5
57 Hodgson to NKID 4 April 1922, DVPSSSR Vol v No 115 p213
58 Karakhan to Hodgson 13 April 1922, DVPSSSR Vol v No 115 pp212-3* Further
correspondence is in ibid No 278 14 October 1922, pp6l5-6
59 Peters to NKID, 1$ December 1922, F.0. 371*9552.N7848 No3» and DVPSSSR
Vol vi No 54 pll5 (and note 52 above)J""'"nKID to Peters, 26 December
60 1922 in F.0. ibid and DVPSSSR Vol vi No 54 ppll3-4
61 Hodgson telegram 26 February 1923* Parliamentary Debates Vol l6l col 462 
7 March 1923
62 Parliamentary Debates Vol 162 col 876, 9 April 1923
63 Hodgson to Chicherin 30 March 1923* Parliamentary Papers 1923 Cmd 1863
64 Weinstein to Hodgson 31 March 1923, ibid p3*^» ibid 1 April 1923 p4,
Hodgson; Weinstein to Hodgson ibid 4 April 1923 p4-5
65 Daily Relegr&ph 9 April 1923* cited in DVPSSSR Vol vi p6l6 nojre 59
66 19 April 1923* in ibid
67 Russian Information and Review Vol ii No 28 21 April 1923 p434
68 Cabinet Minutes 25 April 1923* Cab 21(23)2, Cab 23/45
516
69 Parliamentary Debates Vol 163 col kZk^ 25 April 1923
70 Hodgson to NKID, 28 April 1923, in F.0. 371.&332.N784-8 No 22, and
DVPSSSR Vol vi No 167 p28A--5
71 Litvinov to Hodgson for H.M.G., DVPSSSR Vol vi No 167, 7 May 1923 p280-3
72 Chicherin to Hodgson 11 May 1923, DVPSSSR Vol vi No 171 p287; Hodgson
to Curzon 11 received 12 May 1923, F.0. 371.9332.N78*f8 No 25
73 Cabinet Minutes 2 May 1923, Cab 23(23)2, Cab 23A5
7k Curzon to Hodgson 2 May 1923, Parliamentary Papers 1923 Cmd 1890 p5
75 DVPSSSR vi No 172 p297; the memorandum is in Cmd 1890 pp6-13, and in 
DVPSSSR Vol vi No 172 pp297-302; refs to official British text above
76 The views of the Association of British Creditors were expressed in
a letter of 9 May 1923 (in F.0. 371.9366,^-175 10 May 1923); a lfefeter 
of 10 May in the Times reported that ameeting had given expression to 
its "warm appreciation" of the British note, and its "entire equanimity" 
regarding the possible breaking-off of relations with Soviet Russia. 
McNeill received a letter on 2 May 1923 from Rev. G.A. Piper, the Vicar 
of Nailsworth, containing a resolution of protest adopted hy his parish­
ioners with regard to religious persecution in Russia on 2 May 1923
(McNeill Papers, F.0. 800.227)
77 Economist 12 May 1923 p987. There had nevertheless been, it wrote, in
the previous two years a "steady evolution in the internal organization 
of Russia and a marked progress., towards a state of affairs in which 
it was increasingly possible fox make contact with the new Russia".
78 National Review Vol 8l June 1923 p506
79 Gregory minute, 7 May 1923, on F.0. 371. 9366 .N^ -012, 7 May 1923
80 Chicherin DVPSSSR Vol vi No 175 12 May 1923 Pp30*f-9
81 Litvinov to Hodgson, 11 May (transmitted 12 May) 1923, in F.0. 371.9369*
N^526, 22 May 1923; and in DVPSSSR Vol vi No 172 pp288-96, and Parlia­
mentary Papers 1923 Cmd 187^ . A demonstration took place in Moscow on
12 May to protest against the Curzon ultimatum; but it is unlikely that 
that unduly concerned the Cabinet, for while Curzon had been hung in 
effigy, there was "little sign", according to Hodgson*s report, of "act­
ive hostility to Great Britain., except among the communistic youth" 
(Hodgson to Curzon 15 May 1923, including photographs, F.O.- 371.9369. 
N4525, 22 May 1923).
82 Strang recorded in a minute of 12 May 1923 that the Secfcet Intelligence
517
Service vouched for the reliability of their information, which had come 
frog! a 'trustworthy* agent with access to NKID files (F.0. 371 *9366.N*f*f99,l8 
83a quoted according to the textin Cmd 187^  (note 8l above) pp2-8 -^923
|
83 NKID: Godovoi Otchet za 1923 g® (Moscow 192*0 p37
8*f Russian Information and Review Vol ii No 32 19 May 1923 p505-6, and I
DVPSSSR Vol vi No 176 pp309-3H, 13 May 1923
85 Russian Information and Review Vol ii No 32 19 May 1923 p506, and 
DVPSSSR Hoi vi No 182 p320
86 Economist 19 May 1923 pl0*f2, and pll55
87 Cabinet Minutes l*f May 1923* Cab 26(23)2, Cab 2jf/k$
88 Cabinet Minutes 15 May 1923, Cab 27(23)1, Cab 23/*f5 ,
89 Parliamentary Debates Vol l6*f cols 300,299,303*30*f,309*319* 15 May 1923
90 ibid cols 375*376*377*37^-® A report of the meeting between Curzon and 
Krasin on 1? May is in F.0. 371®9367.N**501, 19 May 1923. Krasin, it 
was agreed, would communicate with his government and a further meeting 
would take place. Ho statement was issued but the Times judged that the 
time limit would "not now be enforced" (l8 May 1923). Krasin, his widow 
recalled, wore a top-hat and morning suit for the occasion, "judging, 
quite rightly, that Lord Curzon would appreciate this respect for cere­
monial" (Krasin: Leonid Krasin p212)
91 according to Karpova: Krasin ppl51,152; he also met a number of financi­
ers and business people
92 Parliamentary Debates Vol l6*f cols 320,323; col 36*t-
93 Parliamentary Debates Vol l6*f cols 772,779? cols 793 (O'Grady),8ll
9*f NKID: Godovoi Otchet za 1923 g® p38 j
95 according to Jones* diary, quoted in Middlemass and Barnes: Baldwin
(loddon 1969) p207
96 Krasin memorandum 23 May 1923, F.0. 371.93^9.N*f675»2*f May 1923; and 
Parliamentary Papers 1923 Cmd 1890 pp3-^* DVPSSSR Vol vi No 188 pp325~7
97 ibid; also in Cabinet Paper C.P. 250(23), Cab 2*f/l60 j
— — — i
98 Parliamentary Papers 1923 Cmd 1890 pp*f-9;-p9; and DVPSSSR Vol vi pp327-30j
Curzon to Chicherin 29 May 1923* F.0. 371.9369#N*f839* 30 May 1923) 1
99 ibid, quoted according to Cmd 1890 pp6-9. The India Office prepared a j
draft formula on propaganda, which was sent to Gregory on 25 May 1923 j
(F.0. 371.9369^5379* 15 June 1923)



























Memorandum, k June 1923, Parliamentary Papers 1923 Cmd 1890 pp9-13» j
and DVPSSSR Vol vi No 19*1- pp33*t—8 (communicated to on 9 June
1923 with a covering letter for Curzon, and received by the Foreign
Office on 11 June: F.0. 371.9368 „N52*f*f, 11 Juhe 1923) ^
!
Cabinet Minutes 11 June 1923, Cab 30(23)2, Cab 23/^6 I
Curzon to Krasin 13 June 1923, Cmd I89O ppl3-*f, DVPSSSR Vol vi No 19*f
pp 388-9 i
Chicherin to Curzon 18 June 1923, DVPSSSR Vol vi No 202 pp353-^ |I
Tanin (Litvinov) : Mezhdunarodnaya Politika SSSR (1917-192*0 pl6 
Parliamentary Debates Vol 165 cols 969,970, l8 June 1923 j
Cabinet Minutes 20 June 1920, Cab 32(23)7, Cab 23A6 !
Cabinet Minutes 11 June 1920, Cab 30(23)2, Cab 23/*f6 
RonaMshay: Curzon iii 356, letter of 13 June 1923 
Economist 16 June 1923 pl33^; Times editorial l*f Hpne 1923 
Economist ibid
Tanin (Litvinov): Mezhdunarodnaya Politika SSSR ppl6, 15 
NKID: Dodovoi Otchet za 1923 g. p39
Hodgson to the F.O., 7 June 1923, F.0. 371.9368.N5132, 8 June 1923.
His communication was minuted in the Foreign Office on 8 Hune, and it 
was endorsed that the recall of Raskolnikov had been decided in March, 
since when he had been awaiting a successor; but queried the report 
with regard to Bhumiatsky*
Ganetsky: Angliisky Imperializm i SSSR (Moscow 1927) p55 
NKID: Godovoi Otchet za 1923 g. P*+l
Kratky Obzor Vneshnei Politiki za 1923 g®, DSPSSSR Vol vi Appendix iv, ;
l*f January 192*f p592
NKID: Godovoi Otchet za 1923 g* p7*Hl |
Yusupov: Ustanovlenie i Razvitie Sovetsko-Iranskykh Otnoshenii pl71 
Interview between Chicherin and Ransome, Manchester Guardian* Corresp- 1 
ondent, 20 June 1923, DVPSSSR Vol vi No 206 pp357-60; p357-8 
NKID: Godovoi Otchet za 1923 g. pl5^, 100
Morning Post 1 August 1923, in F.0. 371.9356.N6617, 1 August 1923 
NKID: Godovoi Otchet za 1923 g. plOl; Tanin op.cit# p27 
F.0. to Peters, 1 August 1923, ‘urgent? F.0. 371.9356.N66l7,lAugust 1923 
and to Horae Office, 3 August 1923, F.0. 371®9356,N66l7. An earlier 
report had noted that Rakovsky was an ,factive, able and dangerous rev- '
519
olutionary", and instructed that he should not be granted a visa or allowed
to land at a British port without further reference (F.0. 371.9332.N367,12
January 1923, Secret).
125 according to NKID: Godovoi Otchet za 1923 g. plOl; both this communicat­
ion and the passage which has been cited in the Godovoi Otchet have been 
omitted from DVPSSSR Vol vi
126 Hodgson to F.0. & August received 3 August 1923, F.0. 371.9356.N6669,
3 August 1923
127 Hodgson to F.0. 6 received 7 August 1923, F.0. 371.9356.N66$g
128 a copy of Rakovsky: Angliya i Rossiya (Goslzd. Ukrainy 1923, *l-0pp) is 
in F.0. 371.9356.N6767, 7 August 1923; Leejber's minute is in ibid 11
August 1923
129 Berzin to Editor, Morning Post 10 August 1923, in F.0. 371.9356.N7013,
12 August 1923; Ovey minute, 22 August, and Lee|)er minute, 28 August 
1923, in ibid.
130 F.0. to Peters, 30 August 1923, F.0. 371.9356.N7013
131 NKID: Godovoi Otchet za 1923 g. ppl01-2, Tanin op.cit. pp27,28
132 Ovey to Hodgson, 15 XM^ttnber 1923, F.0. 371«9356.N7652,19 September 
1923; F.0. to Rakovsky 27 October 1923, F.0. 371.9356.N8202,17 Octobj^
133 Parliamentary Debates Vol 168 col l8l, l*f November 1923, McNeill 
styled him the "chief official agent appointed in succession to M.Krasin 
for the purposes of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement”.
13*f Chicherin to the Moscow Soviet, 12 May 1923, DVPSSSR Vol vi No 175 p306
135 Beaverbrook: Men and Power 1917-1918 (London 1956) pxv
136 Curzon: Speeches on India (London 190*f) I.iv, 1 James Stephen*
137 Stephen, J.F. : Libefty, Equality Fraternity (187**, new ed. Cambridge 
1967, ed. R.J. White) p25,pl,pll
138 quoted by Stokes: The English Utilitarians and India (Daford 1959) p288
139 ibid p298
l*fO ibid p312. Maine is described as "another instance of a great formative 
intellect drawing part of his life to Indian affairs and later drawing 
his Indian experience into the main current of English thought”.
l*fl Stokes: The Political Ideas of English Imperialism (Oxford i960) ppl2,21
1^2 Edwardes, M : High Noon of Empire (London 1965) p35
1^3 quoted in ibid p6*f
Radek: Vneshnyaya Politika Sovetskoi Rossii (Moscow 1923) p57
520
l*f5 Curzon: The place of India in the Empire (London 1909) ppl3,12,27 
l*f6 Curzon: Persia and the Persian Question (London 1§92, 2 v.) i 612 
l*f6a Ronaldshay: Life of Curzon i 315
l*f7 Curzon: Place of India in the Empire pp&9,10,11,12 
l*f8 ibid pl2; p xii, Problems of the Bar East (London 189*0 
l*f9 quoted from Ronaldshay: Life of Curzon i 192
150 Curzon to Balfour, 31 March 1901, B.M. Add. Mss. *f9732, cited in 
Judd, D. : Balfour and the British Empire (London 196*0 p251
151 Curzon: Place of India in the Empire pp37,38,39
152 Curzon to Godley, 9 April 1901, quoted in Dilks,D: Curzon in India
i: Achievement (London 1969) pl05; Curzon to Balfour,31 March 1901,
B.M. Add.Mss.49732, cited in Judd: Balfour and the British Empire p251
153 Curzon: Place of India in the Empire p*f*f; Ronaldshay: Life of Curzon
i 133* Curzon, in fairness, had nib greater faith in the political or 
executive capacity of women. He eventually accepted the admission of 
women as membbrs of the Royal Georgraphical Society; but the extension 
of the franchise to them was, he thought, the ’’fashionable tomfoolery 
of the day11, and he was for a time the President of the Anti-Suffrage 
League (Rose,K : Superior Person (London 1969) P7*t; Mosley,L: Curzon:
The End of an Epoch (London i960) pl97 (of American ed.). ’’Give me a 
girl”, he wrote, ”that knows a woman*s place and does not yearn for 
trousers’* (21 June 1893, in Mosley op.cit. p63). He accepted the 
Represdntation of the People Act, which enfranchised women, with some 
reluctance, and only following its approfal by the House of Commons.
15**- Curzon: Problems of the Far East p v; Stokes: English UtilitabiBnas p3W
155 quoted in Thornton: Imperial Idea and its Enemies p72
156 Ronaldshay: Life of Curzon ii 230
157 quoted by S. Gopal, *Lord Curzon and Indian Nationalism 1898-1905*, 
in St Antony*s Papers 18 (South Asian Affairs 2) (London 1966) p67
158 Ronaldshay: Life of Curzon iii 590
159 ibid ii *fl8
160 ibid ii *f2*f
161 Kiernan, V.G. : Lords of Human Kind (London 1969) p62
162 ibid pl39, quoted; Ronaldshay: Life of Curzon i 191; Edwardes: British
India (London 1967? new ed. 1969) p205




























Curzon: Place of India in the Empire pl8 
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the curtailment of freedom of speech and press and of association; and
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years of Liberalism in Indian politics, Moore concludes, Jailed to 
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219 ibid pi46
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Chapter Nine: Recognition
The Curzon note, McNeill told the House of Commons, had been approved by a
great number of Chambers of Commerce throughout Britain. A majority of them,
he added, and the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce besides, had ,fexpressed
the view that the Trade Agreement is of no value to British trade"'*'. The
following month he found it necessary to correct this impression of the opinion
of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce. Its resolution had not declared that
the agreement was "of no value": it had in fact expressed the hope that the
government would "put Russo-British trade upon a more normal and reciprocal 
2
footing" • The Chamber felt, McNeill reported, that the Agreement had "not
advanced the interests of British trade in the manner anticipated". It was
hoped that the government would take advantage of any negotiations to "secure j
equitable and reciprocal rights for British traders, together with preferential '
3 I
treatment" •
What the Contemporary Review*s commentator noted was that while "at the 
present time British diplomacy in its general aspect" was "dominated by the 
economic factor", there was "not a word" in Curzon's note which revealed any 
concern for British economic interests. He found "odd" the "entirely different 
standards d>d> diplomacy towards Russia from those used in other cases". The 
state of unemployment was such, he added, that the volume of trade which would 
be lost in the event of the abrogation of the Agreement was "worth dwelling on".
Writing three months later, the same correspondent noted that while the
’’City, the industrial North and progressive opinion throughout the country"
supported the government's policy in western Europe since it appeared to aim 
at the restoration of ncrtrmal peace-time conditions and the recovery of trade, |j 
these same groups were "perplexed by the inconsistency of the Government in j 
its dealings with Russia". The government's policy here was the "despair of , 
all those realize the importance of the present opportunity for British markets f 
in Russia". There was a danger, moreover, that this opportunity might be"lost, 
and that our competitors may forestall us" * It will be the argument of this 
chapter that business and.financial circles, which had broadly supported the j 
the stern line of conduct which Lord Curzon had urged upon the government !
in the latter part of 1922 and the early part of 19231 thereafter came increas- j 
'.ingly to favour the development of closer trading and commercial relations with
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Soviet Russia, and to accept the diplomatic recognition of the Soviet govern­
ment which this policy appeared to require. This change in attitude was largely : 
paralleled by the changing orientation of the Conservative party, and the i
increasing pre-eminence within it of those who, such as Baldwin, had a business j 
background and more directly espoused the interests of commercial and industrial ii 
circles. Baldwin, indeed, appears ho have been not unimpressed by the evidence ji 
of the value and potential of the Russian trade which w & b e  made public by those |
t
who sought to preserve trading relationssc from the rupture which Curzon's f
ultimatum appeared to threaten. Yet with Curzon at the Foreign Office, it proved! 
possible only to defend the Trade Agreement, not to advance beyond it, if 
necessary to the diplomatic recognition of the Soviet regime, in the direction 
traders and industrialists - if not all sections of the City - had now come 
to favour. It required, paradoxically, the election of a Labour government 
before these views were embodied in official state policy.
Economic and financial reforms in Russia encouraged the view that an awareness 
odt economic rationality was returning - at lasjp - to the conduct of trading 
and business relations in that country. The Russian financial reforms, the 
Economist commented, showed a "very strong desire to put the finances on a 
sound basis, similar to that existing in other countries". They represented a 
"great step forward"^. Five private banks, it was announced, had been establish­
ed in Russia; and although much remained to be done, it was "gratifying to
note", the Economist wrote, that the "first steps" had "already been taken in
7the return to a regime of free enterprise" • The Soviet Russian cotton industry, 
it reported, had "really somewhat improved of late". Output was increasing and
g
the productivity of labour was increasing • More importantly, a new currency 
was announced for 1923» in which one old rouble should be the equivalent of a 
hundred old roubles. The introduction of the new currency, considered the I
journal's Russian correspondent, was an "achievement of the greatest importance"^ 
suggesting as it did the creation of a stable paper standard. The financial !
position of Russia towards the end of 1923 was "much better than a year ago"®
The system was a "great step forwards" in the direction of a return to normal
, 9
and stable conditions •
These forecasts were not without foundation. Production in heavy indust­
ry in Russia in 1923 rose to nearly kOft of the pre-war level, and to three times 
the volume that had been achieved in 1920. The area under crops reached 91*7
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million hectares, compared with 77*7 million in the previous year. The harvest 
was approximately 70/^ of the pre-war level. Grain was now available for export. 
The broad gauge railway network now slightly exceeded the pre-war system in 
length, and the number of locomotives approached the pre-war figure. Exports 
from Soviet Russia in 1925 exceed by two and a half times those for 1922; and 
for the first time a favourable trade balance was achieved with the outside 
world"^. With world trade remaining in depression, the interest of businessmen 
was understandable.
The major banks were similarly aware of the need to restore European 
trade, including that with Soviet Russia. Addressing the annual meeting of 
the Midland Bank at the beginning of the year, Reginald McKanna (himself a 
former Chancellor of the Exchequer) pointed out that foreign trade had such 
"exceptional importance’1 that anything which inhibited it must ’’deeply affect 
bur national prosperity”. In particular the situation in central and eastern 
EArope was ’’not only destructive of our markets there, but must also hamper 
our export trade more or less all the world over”. The chaifman of Martinis 
Bank noted that with the "disturbed state of Europe", and the "unsettled" 
nature kof reltaions with Soviet Russia had "greatly interfered" with the 
machine tool industry and with other sections of the engineering industry^.
The National Provincial Bank’s chairman declared that his greatest cause of 
concern was the state of foreign trade - "the very lifeblood of our industries" 
t but no improvement could be hoped for until "some settlement" had been effect­
ed in the "distressed countries of Europe". Russia as a potential buyer, he
12adddd, was "practically non-existent" • Some small beginnings, wrote the 
Economist, had been made in trade; but Russia remained "practically outside 
the orbit of the world's commerce, and that fact alone remained a very depress­
ing influence"^.
Some sections of business, indeed, already found the Russian trade of 
such value that they were opposed to the ending of the Trade Agreement to which 
Curzon's ultimatum appeared likely to lead. At the height of the crisis the 
’Becos* group, an amalgamation of engineering firms with a close interest in 
the Russian fcrade, with a share capital in excess of fifty million pounds, 
circulated among MPs a memorandum signed by its principal directors expressing 
'the view that the break-off of relatione with Russia would have an unfavourable
/
f^febt upon British trade, and in particular upon the shipbuilding industry 
Shttd- shipping (about >a hundred British vessels had been engaged by the Soviet
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authorities in 1922), and upon those factories wheee Soviet orders had been 
1^
placed • Mernfield, Ziegler and Company, a "leading firm of cotton brokers
and merchants" in Liverpool, wrote to their MP (who forwarded the letter to
the Foreign Office on 11 May 1923) informing him that large contracts had been
concluded, and asking him to use "all (his) influence to prevent a commercial
rupture between this country and the Soviet Government"^. The views of business
and of Chambers of Commerce which were submitted to the Foreign Office on 12
June by the Association of British Chambers of Commerce were largely approving
of the government's action. Dundee Chamber, however, expfessed the view that
it "would give a great fillip to trade" were it possible to have commercial
relations with Russia placed upon an "ordinary permanent basis". Ruston and
Hornby, a Lincoln manufacturer of agricultural and other equipment, declared
that anything which retarded the recovery of trade with Russia would be a "great
deal to our detriment". They would lose certain substantial contracts "©n the
verge of maturity", and their business in general would suffer "definite and 
l6grave injury" . A Foreign Office meeting on 11 May, which considered the
implications of a rupture, was told by the Board of Trade representatives that
were the Trade Delegation to be expelled, it was likely that British firms j
which had concluded contracts with it would "in some cases apply for special '
permission for members of Arcos to remain behind". The Board of Trade, a minute
noted, did "not pretend to like" the possibility of an expulsion of the Russian
17delegation, but Wrecognized that political considerations must predominate" • i 
The Manchester Guardian Commercial, in a survey of business opinion 
reported on 17 May, found a "definite body of opinion in favour of the retention , 
of the Agreement". The times were such, it was considered, thag even a relativ­
ely small volume of trade should not be lost; while trade with Russia was, in 
fact, likely to increase appreciably in the current year. It found that "many j 
businessmen", on the other hand, believed that the loss of Russian orders at 
their existing level would "make little difference and would almost certainly 
not affect employment in this country"^. Business opinion generally, it reported} 
the following month, was "for the most part, unfavourable to the Anglo-Russian j
Trade Agreement""^. !
i
Financial opinion was no more favourable. The Association of British ;
^Creditors of Russia wrote to the Foreign Office, on Leslie Urquhart's initiative, 
^pporting what measures it mJLght be found necessary to take against the Soviet 
fpvernment. Drquhart^Litvinov no$ed in a letter, had played "first violin" in
20the capppign to have the Agreement denounced • A meeting convened by the
Association, at which a representative of the Federation of British Industry |
!
had been present, was "unanimous in denouncing the existing agreement with t
Russia as an agreement which legalised the robbery of British nationals ,
which action has helped to finance the Bolshevik Government since the signing
21of the agreement" • The attitude of City financial circles towards Russia,
22the Westminster Gazette reported, was "one of complete aloofness" •
Trade with Soviet Russia had, nevertheless, developed considerably
since the Agreement had been signed, notwithstanding the Morning Post’s
forecast that it would lead only to the export of stolen jewellery and human
23hair from Russia in exchange for aims . The signature of the Agreement, Lloyd
George told the House of Commons, had had "substantial results", if not those
which had been expected in some quarters. It was announced that imports and
exports in the periods April-June and July-Septeraber following the Agreement
were respectively £46,9^0 and £l*f3»285, and £122, 587 and £616,^50^. For the
year 1921 imports from Russia were valued at £2,69^*67^ and exports at £2,l8l,
007. These figures represented almost entirely transactions made after the
25end of March, upon the basis of the Trade Agreement •
In 1922 a further major advance was recorded. Imports to Britain rose 
by more than three times to a total value of £8,102,829, and exports increased
26nearly twofold to a figure of £3,6^-0,62*f • Comparing the first three months
of 1922 with the corresponding period of the previous year, it was apparent
that imports from Russia had increased more than twofhld in value; while exports
and re-exports had increased by a much greater factor, as much as fourteen
27times, the trade delegation's journal calculated • In the following year
British exports to Russia declined slightly (to £2,^-91*650), but imports
28increased hy more than a million pounds (to £9,266,100) •
Trade with Soviet Russia remained a small part of British trade as a
whole. In the year 1923* imports from Russia amounted to less than 1% by value
of total imports, and expofts to Russia formed an even smaller proportion of 
29total exports . Trade with Finland and the Baltic states was separated from 
that with Soviet Russia in 1922 and 1923; if it were included, thus securing a 
closer comparison with trade with the former Russian Empire, and including 
entrepot trade, the figures were appreciably larger. Nearly 20# of all British
imports in 1923* it was stated, came from Russia and Finland^0.
Trade with Britain formed a rather larger proportion of total Soviet
foreign trade. Nearly half of Soviet Russia's exports in 1921 went to Britain,
31and nearly a third of total Soviet imports came from there • This accounted
for 30.6% of all Soviet foreign trade, a greater proportion than was accounted
for by either Germany (2^.590 of the U.S.A. (1 7 In the following year,
1922, British trade dropped to 21.6?b by value of total Soviet foreign trade,
behind trade with Germany (29*3$)• In the 1923-^ trading year, however, trade
with Britain accounted 21.3$ by value of all Soviet fofeign trade, a greater
proportion than was accounted for by either Soviet trade with Germany (18.590
or with the U.S.A. (9*7%); 2-nd these relative positions were maintained in the 
33following year .
The figures for the turnover of trade between the two countries, 
however, concealed that fact that Soviet exports to Britain accounted for an 
increasing part of the total. The turnover of trade with Britain increased in 
value from 30 million roubles in 1920 to 231 million roubles and then to 607 
million roubles in successive trading years. While exports more than doubled 
from each year to the next, however, reaching 373 million roubles in 1923-^, 
imports rose rapidly until 1921-2, but thereafter declined to a lower figure 
in each of the two following years. In the three years to 1923-^, an unfavour­
able Soviet trade balance with Britain was converted into a favourable balance
x/f
of 139 million roubles • While, therefore, the total value of trade between 
the two countries declined in 1922-3 compared with the previous year, this 
represented a drop in the value of British exports to Russia greater than the 
variation in the value of Russian exports to Britaih, which had in fact incre­
ased^^.
The volume of Soviet imports in 1921-2 reflected the famine in the
Volga area, which had led to the suspension of the plans for importing which
36had originally been made • In this year, the import of foodstuffs accounted
for 3596 of the value of all imports, compared with 13*3% in 1913« This figure
declined sharply, however, in the following years to 12*3% and 8.5# respectiv- 
37ely • Imports related to the industrial sector correspondingly rose m  
value from 19% (1922) to 7^»3% (1923-20^« The proportion of Soviet imports 
from Britain accounted for by foodstuffs dropped from 22.7% by value in 1922 
*0 in 1923. Raw materials and semi-manufactures (71*8#) and manufactures
2^3.5%) accounted for the
>0* growth of Eovlet exfcbrts followed the recovery of the economy; and
%k particular food supplies, which had formed 1.2% of total exports by value
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in 1921-2, increased to 35*7% of the total in 1922-3 • Agricultural produce
increased from a third to more than a half of the total of Soviet exports by
*flvalue m  this year • Almost all the export of food supplies in this year
was accounted for by bread, the "significant export” of which began in February 
Zf2
1923 • Exports to Britain in 1922 were dominated by wood (3256 by value), oil
(25%) t flax (12%) and related products^. In the following year, however, the 
export of foodstuffs increased from 1.6% to 16.5% of the total, a significant
ZfZf
rise • Only 2.3% of all bread exported in the 1922-3 trading year went to
Britain; bug over half of the weight of Soviet exports of wood and oil (52.6%
k-3and 50.1%) represented exports to Britain • Soviet Russian exports to Britain 
in 1923-^ totalled nesrljr three hundred million roubles, over *f0% of which was 
accounted for by raw materials (largely sawn wood, timber and fur); followed
k-Sby fuel, foodstuffs and grain
The expoft of a number of commodities to Britain was already 
considerable, and increased notably in 1923-^- The import of wood and wood 
products increased in value from two and a half million pounds in 1922 to 
three and a half million pounds in 1923 to nearly five million pounds in 192*f, 
an overall increase of from 6.5% to 9«3% of the total value of all British
Zf7
wood imports • The import into Britain of Russian barley increased from five 
thousand metric tons to more than twice this amount in the first half only of 
192^ ; or in value from 826,000 roubles in 1922/3 to more than ten times this
figure in 1923/^* The export of butter to Britain increased in value in the 
same period from five million to nearly fifty million roubles. The export of 
eggs increased approximately sixfold in the same period; while the export of 
wheat increased from a quarter of a million roubles to nearly ten million 
roubles. The export of foodstuffs as a category increased from seven to over
Zf9 *
sixty million roubles • While in many cases these figures amounted only to
fractions of the corresponding figures for 1913* they were increasing rapidly
and in the case of at least oil, textiles, wood and foodstuffs had come to
hold a significant place in total British imports.
The development of Soviet trade with Britain was paralleled by an
expansion of the operations of the Soviet trading apparatus in Britain, in
particular of Arcos, the first Soviet export-iraport organization to be establi-
30
' shed abroad and "practically the only institution" trading in Britain in 1921 . 
Considerable business, it was stated, had been conducted before the signature 
•f the Trade Agreement. Buying operations began in October 1920 and nearly
531
two million pounds* worth of orders had been placed by the end of the year^*.
Purchases in 1921 had amounted to over four million pounds in value by the
52end of September; and purchases for the year totalled £*f,777,918 . Sales
were only ’’infinitesimal" before the conclusion of the Trade Agreement, but a 
"steadily increasing volume" of sales was recorded from May 1921, and "substa­
ntial" business , the Trade Delegation's journal reported, was done in the
55last quarter of the year. The most important article of sale was timber •
th.ro 0Sales in Britain in 1921 amounted to one and x quarter million pounds in value,
5k
of which two-thirds was accounted for by the sale of wood and oil • The total
turnover of Arcos amounted to over nine million pounds in 1921, nearly fourteen
million pounds in 1922, nine and three quarter million pounds in 1923 (sales
increased but purchases were halved in value), and nearly six million pounds
in the first half of 192 -^, representing an increase over the same period of
55the previous year of 10*3% •
Arcos, it was noted, "swiftly extended its activities beyond the borders
of England", opening several offices and agencies in other countries and in
the USSR: in Constantinople, Paris, New York, Riga, Moscow, Leningrad, Tiflis,
56Rostov and other cities • Thus of the four and a half million pounds' worth
of purchases made by Arcos in the first half of 192^, about a million pounds
represented purchases of other than British-manufactured goods; which were
often, however, transported in British-owned shipping. A board was formed in
January 192^ f to exercise overall control over Arcos in London, which now
comprised eleven separate sections, and over Arcos offices and agencies 
57elsewhere e
The development of Arcos was apparent in the growth of its paid-up
capital, which increased from an original £15,000 to am million pounds by 
58January 192^ • It was apparent also in the establishment of furthef more
specialized joint-stock companies £6r the furtheringg of Soviet trade in
Britain. Some, such as 'Kniga', established in November 1923 to cater for the
59import and export of books, were based on Russian share capital only * Arcos 
Bank, equally, was set up on 5 July 1923 with a fully paid-up capital of 
£250,000, charged with the issuing of travellers' cheques valid for Soviet 
Russia and generally facilitating trading operations^0. 'Rusangloles', however, 
up in February 1922 to handle the export of wood, was a 'mixed' company, 
with a large (minority) British ownership of the share issue..Foreign (non- 
&M*ian) capital accounted for l*f.5% of the total share capital of the twenty
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6ltrading companies set up in 1922, 1923 and 192*f • A number of these companies
were concerned only with export to Britain; while on the other hand, Arcos
itself had imported twice the value of the goods it had exported in the course
of its activity from its foundation to the end of September 192^. The sales
of Arcos in this period amounted to b5»2% of all sales of all Soviet trading
62bodies in Britain • A clientele had been established among the "oldest, most
eminent English firms" • Arcos was refused membership of the London Chamber
of Commerce at the beginning of 1923; but indicative of the change in business
opinion was the establishment of business relations between the Russian State
Bank and Lloyds Bank the following October, and the moves to establish an
Anglo-Russian Chamber of Commerce , for which purpose a committee of statd
6borganisations and business people was set up in Moscow • The move was sugg­
ested, it was reported, by the Business Clhb in England, and a meeting was 
held on 23 October which sp£raped the formation of an eight-man organizational 
bureay^.
A "definite improvement" in the economic and political relations of the two
countries, noted the official report of NKID for 1923* took place from the
summer onwards, when English trading and manufacturing dircles became "more
and more interested in the USSR", A "very major role" in this connection was
played by the visit to Moscow in August of a group of prominent English
66financiers and industrialists on behalf of Becos Traders Ltd • The delegation
included representatives of many of the leading British engineering firms:
John Denny, a shipbuilder; a representative of the Manchester engineering
works, Harley; Sir Charles Wright of Carter Shipyards; representatives of
Brightside Foundry and Engineering Company of Sheffield, Croasley Brothers,
oil and gas engine and plant manufacturers of Manchester, and others* It was
headed by F.L. Baldwin, a cousin of the Prime Minister and a director of
67Baldwin and Company • Another leader oft the delegation and director of
Becos Traders, Mr A.G. Marshall, had been involved in the organization of
Russian trade in 1918 on behalf of the British government, and submitted a
number of memoranda on the question to the Foreign Office, where he was a
68
familiar if not always a welcome figure • Becos Traders itself was an amal­
gamation of eighty-two Jabobfc** firras, including as well as those represented 
^ipoh the Russian such firms as Nobel Industries, Ferrodo and
^frraati* Becos waS designed to "serve its Members as their co-operative
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69selling organisation for Russia and the adjacent territories^ .
The delegation, whose purpose was to examine the "conditions in
Russia and the possibilities of business between Russia and Great Britain,
particularly as regards the Metal, Engineering and Hardware Trades", left
London on 9 August and arrived in Moscow on Ik August. It conducted discussions
with Krasin regarding Russiafe economic needs, and Marshall, in a further
interview on 15 August, considered a number of "concrete business proposals".
The delegation also met Ihicherin, Dzherzhinsky and the Soviet government’s
Concessions Committee. Kamenev discussed the reform of the currency with the
members of the delegation; and further more specific discussions took place
70with regard to possible orders and business proposals •
The delegation, the Manchester Guardian Commercial reported at the
71end of August, was "coming back disillusioned" • The report issued by the 
delegation on its return did, indeed, concede that definite contracts had not 
been signed. It considered, however, that their signature was probably and 
might be expected to lead fo "satisfactory business"; and its overall impress­
ions were generally favourable. The condition of the country, it was stated, 
"has been and is still being improved very rapidly, and every effort that is 
possible in this respect is being made by the Government". State control of 
industrial activity had been "considerably reduced and will rapidly disappear", 
although some factories would probably remain nationalized. They approved the 
government’s policy of balanced budgets, increased taxation and reduced 
government expenditure; and thought the currency reform so far successful*
There was, above all, "no question in our minds as to the enormous market 
offered by Russia for British goods of all classes", provided that the means 
of financing the trade could be found. This demand was "confined to no one 
industry"; and Russia offered "not only an outlet for the sale of British 
Manufacturers, but very considerable opportunities for the purchase, afc 
reasonably low prices, of raw materials from Russia required for this country’s 
industries". The development of Russian trade should be "extremely rapid and 
most advantageous in connection with the unemployment difficulties in this 
^btxktry*. THey themselves had discussed proposals of an important nature and 
involving large sums, whose adoption would "result in considerable benefits to 
i£d**fery in  this country** The dblegatlifc recoifcnended the conclusion of a 
*£nikeiaIagr«baehtbetWeeatfcetwocOuntries, and of a treaty which would 
ioQliA* ■ fa il ^ litfio rish ipa"72.
A Foreign Office official commented that the report had been "given a
great deal of publicity in the papers, and was brought personally to the Prime
Minister1s attention by his cousin Mr F.L. Baldwin". He now understood "how
it was", Curzon minuted, "that the Prime Minister made so enthusiastic a refer-
73ence to the future of trade with Russia in a recent speech" . The Foreign 
Office was not disposed to be impressed. Business opinion was receptive, however 
to the delegation's optimistic impressions, and to the news that an office 
staff had been left behind ig Moscow • Orders to a total value of £20 million 
had been received in Russia, it was later* learned, subject to the availability 
of credits •
Interviews with indivual members of the delegation reinforced this
favourable impression. Mr J.M. Denny, deputy chairman of Denny and Brothers,
Clydebank shipbuilders, expressed the view that the Soviet authorities had
bbfen " exceedingly anxious to do business with us". He had been "agreeably
surprised., to find that the churches all seemed to be well attended"; and
75generally he was "impressed with the great potentialities of Russia" • Mr J.J. 
Carter, the managing director of Crossley Brothers, told the Manchester 
Guardian Commercial that "business will be done shortly". If trade developed
with the Soviet authorities, they were moreover "confident af a straight deal**^.
i* nmressedves with the efforts to stabliize the
the Russian currency, and praised the organization of the State Bank and the
77efforts to balance the state budget • Baldwin, interviewed on the delegation.' s 
return, considered that "undoubtedly" there was a trade opening in Russia for 
agricultural machinery and for commodities connected with rail or road transp­
ort; and also for sawmill plant and mining equipment, and a "t&emendous demand" 
besides for the "ordinary necessities of life". The Russians were looking, he 
thought, "to this country for their trade necessities". The general impression 
they had brought back as to the recovery of Russia was "one of hope" •
Marshall told the Evening Standard that Russia was "proceeding along 
lines that indicate a steady return to prosperity commercial relations from 
which Britain may benefit greatly". The delegation had returned "unanimously 
OifrtiiAstic as reagrds the future"?^ He explained his views in more detail 
to the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce on 2h October. Speaking to a resolution 
Gelling upon the government to facHita&e the development of trade with Russiaf
hedeclared that the Russian government's political views "had been tried out
• * - '
end had failed". The Bolsheviks had "gradually had to abandon the political
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and social policies” adopted during the period of the revolution: "in other
words, Communism was no longer existing in Russia”. Concluding amid cheers, he
expressed the hope that ’’political matters would not be allowed to interfere
80with their interests as manufacturers and as traders” • He prepared a ’Memor­
andum regarding Unemployment and Russia* on 5 November of which he sent copies 
to the Prime Minister, LlQyd-Gfeame, Chapman and other government figures, and 
to the Foreign Office. The expressed purpose of the memorandum was to ”show 
that Russia at the present time, and the development of the Russian market, 
does offer a reasonable substitute” for Germany in foreign trade. The Russian 
trade could not be ’’classed as a mere palli&titw, but (was) actually in the 
nature of a remedy” for unemployment. No financial arrangement such as was
proposed in the memorandum, however, would be possible without the ’’full
8ldiplomatic recognition” of the Soviet government •
The delegation’s report, it was remarked by the Trade Delegation,
together with the ’’whole series of interviews” given by its members, had
aroused "exceptional interest in both business and political circles" in 
8 2Britain • The group’s reports on the economic position of Russia and on the 
possible acceptance in Russia of British capital produced a "great impression 
in English trading and manufacturing, and financial circles", reported the
O-z
NKID, and marked a "definite change in their attitudes towards the USSR” •
The delegation’s initial statement feported its members "completely convinced”
. Skthat "considerable opportunities" existed for British trade with Russia • This 
report and an interview with the members of the delegation wafee published by 
forty London and provincial newspapers, many of which commented upon the matter
85editorially and urged closer economic relations with Soviet Russia . The 
opinion of the responsible leaders of the business world, noted the Financial 
TimeS, could not but influence official circles. The Becos report might be 
expected significantly to stimulate British economic relations with Russia •
In the space of only four days in November, no fewer than enghty-five articles 
in the British press were devoted to the question of economic relations with 
Russia^.
The delegation’s formal•report was issued on 19 November 1923* In the 
snmmary of the Manchester Guardian« it indicated that the Soviet government 
was "not only accepted by the people bat meets with their approval”. Trade 
Inspects with Britain vb*e "extremely good”, since the foods required by the
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Soviet authorities were manufactured in Britain, Russia's "great difficulty",
88
the absence of credit, did not appear insoluble . Marshall returned to
Russia the following spring to continue discussions on behalf of Becos v/hich,
he pointed out, now embraced more than a hundred and twenty firms and more
than two hundred factories and workd in Britain, Their visit of the previous
year, he noted, they rightly considered to have "significantly influenced £he
89recognition of Soviet Russia by England" .
The Becos delegation was present on 19 August at the opening of the All-Union
Agricultural and Handicrafts Exhibition in Moscow, visited it, and concluded
90that if nothing else it showed a "very considerable amount of organization" «
The significance of the Exhibition, Marshall thought, was "very great". It
91"showed foreigners how enormous were the natural resources of Russia" • The
Exhibition's foreign section was opened on 26 August, in the delegation's
presence. Both Marshall and Baldwin dellared themselves "greatly impressed"
92by it • The fair itself was intended to review tha state of Soviet agriculture 
after the period of intervention and civil war had ended, fend to undertake the 
pedagogic and propagandist arole of promoting the best methods of cultivation 
and husbandry. In addition it was considered a "necessity" to have at the 
Exhibition a foreign section "in order to inform ourselves of the current 
state of their economy, and also to take account of their achievements in the 
field of agriculture". It offered equally the opportunity to foreign exhibit­
ors to "evaluate us as a market and as a field for capital investment, of
which we are in great need", and to display new types of seed and breeds of 
93animal • There was a need, wrote Kaufman, to raise agricultural productivity 
and exports above the levels of the previous year, and to import foreign 
agricultural machinery. The Exhibition, he thought, should play an "enormous 
role in the strengthening of economic links between the USSR and European 
countries"; and it might also impfess the major industrial groups of Europe 
and America with the economic potential of Russia, since they had not yet 
Hrealized that the Russian market is one of the most important factors in the
Qif
economic stability of Europe" •
The main and basic aim, according to the Exhibition catalogue, which 
had led the Central Exhibition Committee to set up a separate Foreign Section, 
*is  the Wish to show t o th #  broad strata of the peasantry the achievements of 
^-Wtitern European science and technology in perfecting the methods of cultivat­
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ion. This aim, it was thought, had been achieved completely: not only were
machines and equipment on view, but also the exhibitors had included scient-
95lfic institutions, universities and institutes . It was intended also to re­
establish an economic and scientific link between Russian agriculture and
96foreign agricultufal industry and technology • Agriculture was the basic
sector of the economy, accounting for up to 80% of the value of Russian
exports. The Exhibition demonstrated, it was claimed, the "re-establishment"
of Russian agriculture: it showed that the area of land under cultivation was
increasing, that the harvest was growing, and that not only the natural
resources, but the economic energies or "future economic possibilities" of the
country were very great. The "beginning of the propaganda of exports" was
97considered to have been achieved „
The decision to hold the Exhibition in August 1923 was taken by the
98Presidium of the Central Executive Committee on 20 October 1922 • At the
beginning of the following year regulations were approved for the participation 
of foreign exhibitors in the fair; and it was decided that they would be guar­
anteed all privileges accorded to Russian exhibitors, and transported ahead
of turn. Local bureaux were set up in eighteen foreign countries, carrying
99out their work under the guidance of the Exhibition Committee and of NKID •
The regulations for foreign exhibitors were printed in the journal of
the Trade Delegation in Britain in March^^# Manufacturers of agricultural
equipment were urged "not to miss the opportunity of getting into touch with
the Russian markets. There was an "immense and growing potential market fob
western manufactures" in Russian peasants'*'^*. An Exhibition Committee was
formed in London in the middle of March, consisting of Klyshko as chairman,
two associates and a secretary. Special cards were inserted in each letter
despatched from the Trade Delegation office, and details were provided for the
press. The project was regarded, however, without great enthusiasm, and the
102F.B.I. refused to organize a delegation • Attempts were made to get in touch 
with English firms which might be willing to exhibit, but in view of the crisis 
in relations between the two countries the response was "not very satisfactory^ 
In some places, the bulletin of the Central Exhibition noted, the work 
of the local committees had been "complicatAd and hindered due to difficulties 
in the international position of the USSR". This had particularly affected work
IQlfin  England, where orders h#ul begun to be received "only recently" • Following 
the4 easing of the diplomatic situation, however, the London committee renewed
its contacts with possible exhibitors, and made further approaches. Visits
were made to firms; an English edition of the Exhibition Almanac was published;
and Fridrikhson, the chairman of the Central Exhibition Committee, spent two
seeks in Britain at the beginning of July, and gave interviews to Reuter and
to the Press Association. Segal, a representative of the local committee, was
interviewed in a number of financial and radical papers, and information was
printed in others'*’^ .
"Some inquiries" had been received from British firms by the middle of 
106April . In July, it was announced that British firms intending to take part
included Saville and Company, makers of instruments, Turnicraft, and Scammell,
107manufacturers of lorries. The firms of Lowry and Holloway were later added • 
Reporting the opening of the Exhibition, Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn1 noted that the 
British firms represented included Vickers, Portland Cement and Ruston and 
Hornby, makers of agricultural machinery from Lincoln. British industry, it
10Sadded, had shown a "great interest in the Exhibition" • This was perhaps to 
exaggerate somewhat. A total of -^01 foreign firms participated in the Exhibit­
ion, from twenty foreign states; but of these 9^ were from Germany alone, and 
there were more exhibitors from France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, America and 
Italy than from Britain, which provided fourteen. British exhibitors were
not involved in the construction of the fourteen national or other pavilions
109m  the Foreign Section . Among the British firms represented, moreover,
were many which had already established a close connection with the Trade
Delegation in London, and had supplied orders for Arcos, as Vickers and Ruston
110and Hornby, for instance, had done • Frumkin, the Assistant Commissar for
Foreign Trade, told an interviewer that British (and American) firms would be
represented, "although not to the extent that could have been desired" •
The Exhibition was favourably commented upon, nevertheless, in July
112by at least twenty major British papers ; and there could be no doubt that 
fhe firms represented in Moscow, while many of them had already established 
a connection with the Russian market, were present for other than sentimental 
reasons. The position of the most significant of tfcem, for instance, Vickers 
Metropolitan, was reported to have been "very bad" in 1921, and an improvement 
in the company’s fortunes was declared by tifcs chairman to depend upon a reviv­
al of trade. In the following year the company’s trading profit was reduced;
not one of the’ company*s departments had a good year. At the shipbuilding 
;«ec$&otk in Bar^o# the commercial position was never worse than in 1922 and 1923
Profits dripped in 1923 by nearly a third compared with the previous year, and
113no dividend was paid .
The representative of one of the British exhibiting firms, quoted in 
the Manchester Guardian, expressed the view that life in Russia was ’’getting on 
to more normal lines”. As a businessman, he had become ’’convinced that an exten­
sion of trade with this country is now possible”«, His own firm had done a ’’very
Un­satisfactory amount of business” , A total of -^56 trade contracts were digned
in the Foreign Section in the course of the Exhibition and immediately after
its conclusion; and the Exhibition produced a favourable impression upon the
Becos delegation, upon the exhibitors themselves, and upon those who visited
115the Exhibition, a number of whom were British * Moscow had ben visited, the 
.journal of the Trade Delegation noted, by the Becos group, by several merchants 
and by Members of Parliament in the course of the latter part of July and 
August, Moscow might be said to have become the ’’centre of interest for Europ­
ean and American traders, and for politicians and journalists concerned with
ll6economic revival and the renewal of friendly relations between peoples” • As 
the Petrograd Chamber of Commerce’s ’Directory for Russian and Foreign Busine­
ssmen* commented, the mere fact alene of having attracted such a number of 
foreign firms to the All-Union Exhibition served as the ’’best evidence of a
near approaching intensive development of peaceful collaboration and intercourse
117between the Western Commercial and Industrial Circles and Soviet Russia” •
The Sovidt authorities were not unaware of what Krasin called the
Exhibition’s ’’moral effect” and the ’’great impression which the fact itself of
11§holding the Exhibition had on all its visitors” • In his speech at the opening 
of the Foreign Section, he expressed the hope that it might serve as the begin­
ning of ”yet further and closer economic relations” between Soviet Russia and
119those European countries whose tradesman were participating in the Exhibition , 
Speaking on the 'Importance of the Exhibition* three days before it opened, 
Chicherin declared that with every day the ’’colossal importance” for the whole 
international position of Soviet Russia was becoming clear, and the impression 
it was creating abroad was becoming deeper and more distinct* The Exhibition 
was a "revelation”* The main cuase of.the strained relations with western 
states which had recently existed was their "economic disenchantment”, the 
/" beetling, in* business circles that t&edevelepment of trading relations was
tawr slowly and waa Mot^providing them with the opportunity of "recei- 
what they wntitfrd’V: Tftrin rri timti on had now changed "radically”, to such an
extent, indeed, that it might not be too much to say that the Exhibition
i j 4-v, ti-u -p • i • international , , . #120 TTmarked the "beginning of a new period m  our economic relations • He
121re-emphasized the point in an interview after the Exhibition had closed •
One of the "external manifestations" of the change in Aaglo-Russian relations.
in the latter part of 1923, noted the Soviet Foreign Ministry's official
report for the year, was the formation of the Russo-British Grain Exporting
122Company on 15 October • The formation of the Company, Litvinov noted, creat­
ed a "great impression not only in trading circles in England, but far beyond 
12*
them" . Tv/o major British firms of stockbrokers and steamship companies 
and other enterprises subscribed £50,000, or half the share capital of the 
new body. The company had four English directors, and credit to the extent
12kof £1 million was extended to it by British banks • The announcement, it
was reported, created a "sensation not only in directly interested circles,
but throughout the English press". Approval of the venture was practically 
125unanimous , Enquiries made in the City by the Pall Mall Gazette reveiled 
"tremendous interest" in the announcement, which thus brought to an end a 
"long series of delicate and intricate negotiations". It was "confidently 
anticipated" that the agreement would have an "appreciable bearing upon the 
whole course of British traded26. It demonstrated, the Manchester Guardian 
commented, that the City was convinced of the possibility of doing trade 
with Russia^ '2'7,
This had more than commercial significance: in particular, as the 
Manchester Guardian. Commercial put it, the formation of the new company raised 
"in a practical form the question of the present diplomatic relations between
i p Q
Russia and this country" • The Herald quoted a "well-known exporter" to the 
effect that it was an "amazing thing that - while everybody is coming to
realize that Russia should be one of our most important markets t the Govern-
extend to
ment still obstinately refused to Russian trade the provisions of the Trade
Facilities Act',1 The new development, he hoped, would induce ministers to
"change their minds, for it is preposterous that their political dislike of
129the Soviet Government should be allowed to hamper British trade" 0 The
agreement, the Observer added, had "given a lead to the British Foreign Office,
Full commercial relations with the new Russia have now been established, but
130
■full political relations still await establishment" •
According to Krasin, the new company's formation was considered the
main event since the conclusion of the Trade Agreement. The quality of the
Russian bread and grain was excellent; and the company "aroused great interest
In European business circles"'^’. By the end of March 192*f over a million
pounds* worth of braad and grain had been sold on the British market; and by
the end of September a further million and a half pounds* v/orth had been sold*
Sales amounted to l^f.5% of the value of all sales in Britain in the 1923-^
132
trading year * The working masses, Krasin observed, saw before them the
133
fact that the Soviet Union was **becoming the feeder of Europe** • The 
business world and the shipping companies had equal reason for satisfaction* 
Business opinion had, in fact, already exerted its influence upon the 
government in this direction. Writing to Bonar Law on 22 December 1922 on 
behalf of the Industrial Group of the House of Commons, Sir Allen Smith, of 
the Engineering Employers* Federation, complained that the United States had 
”to our very great detriment succeeded in capturing a great deal of the 
Russian trade which should have come to us.. Whereas with the old diplomacy 
the pen was mightier than the sword, with the new diplomacy we have to recog­
nize that the treasury note is and must be maihatined of greater value than 
either the pen or the sword**. The possibility of trading, he added, depended 
tfin great measure on our national relations with Russia*. While we indulge in 
the old shibboleths of foreign diplomacy, other countries are reducing their 
unemployment and I am afraid for some months at least we will increase ours*** 
His objection was to this **out-of-date diplomacy'* through which *'we are cutting 
our own throats ih the matter of present and future trading”. He had "no doubt 
these considerations (would) appeal not in the least degree to the Foreign 
Office, but I am perfectly satisfied*, (that) there is no salvation for this 
country until the Foreign Office is thoroughly commercialised”* He concluded 
that, with Bonar Law's own knowlddge of affairs, he would "appreciate that
our diplomacy now must be made subservient to some extent to our commercial 
13*frequirement” *
Following a meeting of the Industrial Group of the House of Commons in 
July 1923* Sir Allen Smith returned to the subject* In a letter to Baldwin on 
behalf of the Group, he pointed out that he had heard of no case where the 
Soviet authorities had not met their trading obligations* Orders of between 
f two and three .million pounds in wfiHhf Were pending, he stated, if the Export 
' Credits Act were extended to trade with Russia. Failure to act, the Group 
jga&fcieTed* would harm to the 'moral' of the workers, and a
grave menace to the social and economic stability of the country". Their views,
he poiiited out in a further letter of 3 August, carried the "imprimatur of the
135leading industrial, financial and economic brains of the country" .
Baldwin probably needed little persuasion. Another 'man of affairs*,
he had drawn attention in a sppech at Glasgow the previous month to the fact
136that "in Russia, we have one of the largest potential markets in the world" • 
Curson, however, considerably his senior within the Cabinet, and others in the 
government, and the Foreign Office as a whole, stood for the maintenance of 
what was existing government policy on the question of relations with Soviet 
Russia; and many in financial circles, as well as the creditors as a whole, 
stood similarly for thi>rcessation of propaganda and the acknowldegement of 
debts and obligations before^iplomatic relations with the Soviet government 
were considered.
"A million tons of grain11, the Russian Information and Review commented,
was nevertheless a "powerful argument for converting stubbornly held political 
137convictions’* . Business opinion and the leading papers and journals had
generally accepted it by the end of the year. There was no sense, Garvin wrote
in the Observer on 7 October, in the present position. "We are sacrificing the
interests of the Empire to etiquette, and the etiquette is as obsolete as the
Bourbons.. Words cannot express the fantastic folly of allowing any removable
hinder^nces to stand any longet between our workless masses and the Russian
138
market. We ought to have given full recognition long ago" • On 17 December
the paper regretted that the Conservatives had missed a most appropriate
opportunity to further the restoration of Burope, having refused th recognize
Soviet Russia. This would be a sensible decision and would find "warm support
and approval in the country"; while the refusal to do so threatened the loss
139of major trading prospects •
There were regrets that the "concrete expression" by British business 
aircles of confidence in the Russian Soviet government had "not yet been accom­
panied by an increasinged cordiality in official political circles". While 
business people had shown that they recognized and meant to take advantage of 
the "gaping opportunities" in Russia, wrote the Observer, Cord Curzon preferred 
to snub the new official Russian representative, Rakovsky • A "new note of 
friendliness", according to the Trade Delegation*s journal, appeared in the 
ress. The Spectator, eflflteserTatiTg journal, found the grain agreement a 
f in ite  step foiwrftt" . The4jd*ernment, it thought, must "seriously consider
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putting the present rather anomalous state of half recognition of the Moscow
government on a more definite basis. After all, the Bolshevik administration
is now the senior Administration of Europe", and its hold on the country seemed
l4l
"as firm as ever" • It was time, wrote the Manchester Guardian, for British 
policy towards Russia to be "completely overhauled" if British traders were
14-2"not to come into the fidld too late" • Reporting the negotiations between
the Soviet and the Italian governments, the Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury
urged that other countries could not be allowed to "overtake us in the renewal
143
of trade with Russia" • During the latter half of December the British press 
was "almost unanimous", it was noted, "in urging the value of coming to an 
agreement". It was, "naturally enough, the plain feasibility of a rapid exten­
sion of Russo-British trade" which had "induced this more favourable disposition
144on the part of British writers" •
Indeed there was already evidence, the Trade Delegation journal
observed, that the expected acceleration in the development of Anglo-Russian
trade was taking place. The autumn of 1923 had seen the conclusion of contracts
on a scale which would be "incredible without the fullest confidence of each of
the contracting parties in the other". The formation of the Wheat Exporting
Company, which had caused "no little stir in business and political circles",
was followed by the conclusion of contracts with British firms for the supply
of timber to the value of £300,000 or more, and the conclusion of agreements
with British engineering firms for the supply of equipment for Soviet power 
145stations . Only now, for the first time, was it bbing realised what "huge
possibilities’* were latent in the development of trade between Britain and
Russia. Arcos sales and purchases increased greatly in September; and increased
146
again m  October to a value of over a million pounds •
In the previous two or three months, the Glasgow Herald reported on 
26 October, a "great change (hadfc come over the attitude of British traders 
towards Russia as the result of the reports of several missions made by English
147
and lcottish businessmen to that country recently" • The City and the Russian 
Trade delegation, the Observer added, had shown a "recognition of mutual inter­
est and a readiness to wipe the slate clean of all past grievances** in order
the more easily to reach an agreement. The City, impressed by the reports of
148observers (who were often quintessentially capitalist in their views ), now 
sfe*w#4 A "d is tin ct inclination to enlarge the scope of trade with Rhssia**^^.
| financial expert ,was reported by the Westminster Gazette to be of the opinion
5 ^
that British firms were extending their Russian trade, which offered, he
150believed, the "chief remedy for the present unemployment" •
The country’s "most prominent business men", it was suggested, were
indeed "wider than the government", and realised "both the opportunities and
151the importance of Russian trade" • They should get away from the diffidence
which had characterised their previous actions, wrote the Financial News,
otherwise traders might discover that they had been "ousted from a political
market of growing wealth". The possibilities of the Russian market were
enormous; and it was "certainly not in the national interests - financial,
152commercial or economic - that we should see it fall into other hands" • Even
the journal of the Westminster Bank expressed the hope that a "general settle-
155ment to the interest of both countries" would "not long be delayed" .
The arguments, and their dmpihoraatic implications, were summed up in 
the British Russian Ixx±m  Gazette and Trade Outlook, a journal which (perhaps 
not altogether fortuitously) made its first appearance at this time. The first 
issue, in October 1923* commented that "to the surprise, it must be admitted, 
of all British-Russian business men, the Soviet Government remains.in power, 
and, as cannot be denied, appears now to be displaying a real and not always 
unpractical desire to maintain order, and to re-establish Russia's economic 
strength and her crddit". The 'Die-hard' policy and views, it was felt, should 
accordingly be abandoned. Indeed the evidence was not lacking to suggest that 
the 'Die-hard' policy was "rapidly being compelled to yield to the policy of
15Zf
&he 'get a move on' party of British-Russian Traders" •
The following December the journal expressed itself "sick of the purpo­
seless, aimless policy of interminable indecision in the matter of Russia".
The British industrialist and trader was beginning to find himself "diametric­
ally at variance with the British politicians" on the Russian question. The 
wheat agreement, a recent Shipping Pact, and other understandings, negotiated 
and concluded with the Soviet government by some of the largest and most sign­
ificant British business interests, demonstrated "beyond all argument., that 
some of our ablest business men differ fundamentally in their views from those 
members of our recent Governments who have imposed upon us as a. nation the 
same old worn-out policy of "wait and see" in regard to Russia". The clearly 
gJ^wing determination of the leaders of British trade and industry to "shake 
^Bbflaselves free from the restraining shackles imposed upon them" by successive 
gftveriwents wonl^ it, was thought, "compel a complete change in the British
5b3
official attitude towards Russia"* The earlyx resumption was hoped for of
155"full normal relations with Russia" •
For it was clear that (as the Financial Times pointed out) the extension
156of trade with Russia was being "hindered by lack of official facilities".
The Russian market was a most important one for British industry, since its 
requirements were those which British industry was best placed to supply, while 
Russia could in turn provide commodities which were urgeahlly needed in Britain. 
Commercial relations between the two countires, however, could not develop 
normally in the absence of political agreement; and this explained the fact 
that the "question of recognition" had recently become one of "major iraportan-
157
ce" * It was impossible to hope, added the Manchester Guardiant that normal 
trade, even on a small scale, could be established between the two countries 
"so long as their political relations remain on the dxisting and highly prec­
arious footing". It was "time our Russian policy were completely overhauled,
158li our traders are not to come into the field too late" • J.D. Gregory, in 
a minute on the Foreign Office file which contained this article, complained 
of a "persistent campaign" against the Foreign Office on the question of
159
Russian trade • It v/as clear to both sides, evidently, that something more 
was at isjue than simply the extension of jcxxstz? commerce.
At the end of December a meeting of industrialists and merchants 
took place in the City of London. Marshall of Becos Traders was present. Memb­
ers of the Association of Engineering Factories, representing more than Z^ >00
enterprises, urged the necessity of developing trade with Russia; and they
l60were supported by Sir Allan Smith • The Russo-British Chamber of Commerce,
meeting at the beginning of January 192*f, adopted a resolution which "taking
into consideration certain evidences of improvement in the actual economic
conditions prevailing in Russia", urged upon the government the "advisability
of taking such steps as would enable trade between the two countries to be
developed and extended as rapidly as possible". It was in particular pointed
out that the absence of diplomatic relations and of consular services acted as
"serious deterrants to the extending of credit facilities failing which the
lSlgrowth of trade between the two countries must be slow* * The resolution was 
Subsequently endorsed by the council offthe British Association of Chambers of 
Commerce, and submitted bythentoihb£rimeMinister, the Foreign Secretary 
'iptttfc*'President - of the Board-offtrade, noting la conclusion the need for
The City, in fact, the acting head of the trade delegation told
546
Izvestiya, had ’’long ago recognized Soviet Russia”, and in England this meant 
163soraetnmg • But despite the "obvious change in English business circles”,
Vneshnyaya Torgovlya commented, the Foreign Office "continued its old policy
164of hostile relations with Soviet Russia” • Writing to Moscow at the end of 
November, however, Rakovsky explained that while the question of credits for 
the Soviet economy v/as being postponed until after the general election had 
taken place in Britain, there appeared good reason to believe that thereafter 
whether the Conservatives remained in power or the Liberals came to power in 
coalition with either the Conservatives or the Labour Party, the question of 
Anglo-Russian relations would be considered afresh, and in particular the
165question of the extension of the export credits legislation to Russian trade • 
The legislative programme with which the Conservatives met the House of Commons 
in January 1924, however, following their electoral defeat, made no mention of 
relations with Soviet Russia"*"^. ThfUefiS^le» ^^^liBour government, it appe­
ared, relatively less identified with imperial and financial interests which 
opposed the diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government, was required in 
order to implement the preferences of the manufacturers and traders^**7.
Following Baldwin*s surprise declaration in favour of protection, Parliament 
was dissolved on 16 November and a general election took place on 6 December 
1923. The results left the Conservatives with the greatest number of seats 
(238 as against 346 in the outgoing Parliament); the Liberals had 158 seats; 
while the Labour Party, with only a few more candidates and 100,000 more votes, 
increased its number of seats from 142 in the outgoing Parliament to 191 • Bald­
win decided not to resign but to face Parliament when it met on 8 January. A 
censure motion was moved by &he Labour Party on 17 January, and Asquith commi­
tted the Liberals to its support. The government was defeated on 21 January; 
and on the following day Baldwin resigned, and MacDonald formed his party's 
first government"^^.
The Labour Party*s manifesto in the general election had stated that 
the party would favour the "resumption of free economic and diplomatic relat­
ions with Russia"; and MacDonald assured the party*s victory rally at the 
Albert Hall on 8 January 1924 that the /pompous folly of standing aloof from 
the Russian Government" would be ended • Baldwin's government was subsequent­
ly taken to task in the Jfojise of Commons by Tom Shaw for the "very significant 
omission" from the King*s Speech of a proposal for the "proper recognition" of
547
. 170Russia • It was nevertheless rumoured, following the formation of the Labour
government, that recognition was to be delayed and the government's action was
to become "more circumspect", as a Daily Telegraph correspondent forecast^^.
A commission of inquiry, it emerged, might have to be sent to Russia before
recognition was granted; and Russia might first be required to enter the League
of Nations. H.N. Brailsford confessed that he was "anxious"; but he had been
172officially assured that recognition would be unconditional •
It has been suggested that MacDonald "by every kind of means obstructed
the official recognition of the Soviet government", and that he was ultimately
”compelled" to do do "only under the strongest pressure of the broad masses of
173the British proletariat" : that he "hesixtated" but that pressure from the
174masses was "too strong" . The implementation of the electoral commitment to
recognize the Soviet goverhment, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* maintained, "did not
175take place without hesixtation and delay" ' . The charge is difficult to sust­
ain. MacDonald had publicly committed the Labour government to recognition; and
in a letter transmitted to Rakovsky on 3 January he declared that this should 
be done immediately, and "without any conditions", while ha was at the same
time interested to learn the attitude of the Soviet government to the questions
176of private claims, concessions and capital investment in Russia . Talk of the
despatch of a commission of inquiry, wrote the Daily Herald's correspondent,
might be "dismissed as ridiculous". No such step was intended, or indeed nece-
177bsary: the question of recognition was "already decided" . The short delay
before the official announcement of the recognition of the Soviet government
appears to have been routine. Labour's supporters, Duff Cooper wrote in his
diary on 29 January, could "not understand why there should be an hour's dela^.
It is difficult, moreover, to identify the source of that working-class
pressure which is stated to have imposed recognition upon a reluctant govern- 
X W
ment . The National Council of the I.L.P. demanded the immediate and uncondit­
ional recognition of the Soviet government on 25 January, a step which a Soviet
179commentator declared at the time had enddd the government's hesistation • This 
could hardly be considered a body external to the government, however, and 0r 
distinctively working-class in composition. Beyond this, pressure appears to 
have been confined to a couple of letters in the Daily Herald. On 29 January 
Heil HcLean MP wrote toccomplaih at>out the"nonsense" which was circulating about 
being necessary cognition was granted to the Soviet government,
had not been k&dehbltry, he pointed out, in the case of the new Greek gov­
l3o
ernment . The following day Duncan Carmichael, the Secretary of the London 
Trades Council, wrote a further letter in which he declared that workers failed 
to understand why a delay should be necessary. If the Labour government were
to ’’adopt the quibbles of the Conservative Cabinet” in such matters, it would,
* 1 Pi
he thought, "disrupt the movement in the country for years” * The statement
that the Trades Council thereupon "began positive action” , however, stands in
need of correction: Carmichael had done no more, in fact, than provisionally
132to hook a hall in cantral London for a meeting • He was, moreover, in any 
Case already a Vice-President of the National ’Hands off Russia* Committee, a 
body whose dominant aim was to secure the recognition of the Soviet government,
• £10 C 0 3S3.X*d. lyand it is difficult, therefore, in this respect to consider hi»£ views repres-
1 8 3entative of working-class opinion as a whole * It seems unlikely, in any case, 
that either his action of McLean&s letter can significantly have affected the 
timing or nature of the formal act of recognition, which took place two days 
later1**?
More important, perhaps, is the objection that to attribute decisive 
importance to the intervention of the working-class movement is to obscure the 
extent to which the decision to recognize the Soviet government was one which 
commanded supporjr not only in the Labour Party, but in the Liberals (whose ele­
ction manifesto had advocated recognition), in business and newspaper circles, 
and beyond them. It was indeed opposition to recognition, and not its advocacy, 
which was the minority opinion. In recognizing Russia, the KKID report noted, 
MacDonald had the support not only of the Labour Party, but of the Liberals also
and "so popular" had the proposal become by the end of 1923 that "even several
igif
Conservative organs of the press/ had declared in its favour • Carmichael, 
in fact, drew attention to precisely this point in his letter: why should there 
be a delay, he wrote, when "both Liberal and Labour candidates were pledged to 
the policy of recognition" and there was "no danger of a defeat in the House 
of Commons"'*'^*
This fact was noted by the Cabinet on k February, when the decision to 
recognize the Soviet government was approved* He had acted immediately and 
i&tfcout calling & special meeting to consider the question, MacDonald stated,
”lii accordance with what he knew mas the general viewpoint of the Cabinet". If 
delayed the matter tat Consultation with other Powers it would take 
f p  rtflWllib*, where.* if thedeel'BdOB'Wert eVMmrankcated to the Soviet government 
*e*ofta©*n*r.»* %r- Sovie ts ended its meeting it would be possible to
secure its endorsement Mnot merely by M. Chicherin and the Foreign Office
officials in Moscow, but by representatives of the Soviets of all the Russias",
who had now, in fact, sent a "very cordial telegram of acceptance". The
Cabinet offered its congratulations on the promptitude with which the matter
l86had been accomplished • As a general rule, it was agreed, the government 
should submit large questions of foreign policy to Parliament before taking 
action. There were special grounds for speed, however; and in any case the 
matter was hardly one of party politics: "two political parties out of three 
-had included the de 3ure recognition of Russia in their programme of electoral 
policy"1^ .
The 3ritish note extended recognition to the Soviet government as the 
de .jure government "in the territories of the former Russian Empire which ack­
nowledge its authority". It remained necessary however to conclude a practical 
agreement concerning a series of related questions, such as the validity of 
existing treaties, the claims of the governments and nationals of either state 
against the other, and propaganda and subversion of institutions. The Soviet
government was requested to send representatives to London as soon as possible
l88to discuss these questions and reach a basis of agreement on them •
Recognition was acknowledged and the invitation to send a delegation to
189London was accepted by Rakovsky on 8 February • The Cabinet noted warily
that Rakovsky*s reply defined the territory over which the Soviet government
claimed to exercise authority in terms different from those in which it had
been recognized by the government; but it was agreed that "British recognition
was as stated in the British note of February 1st". MacDonald informed the
Cabinet that he intended to send Rakovsky a memorandum of the outstanding
questions to be resolved between the two governments, with suggestions as to
which should be dealt with by direct negotiation and which should be referred
190to the Joint Commission to meet in London e He wrote to Chicherin at the 
same time, expressing satisfaction that in so short a time the Labour govern­
ment had been able to take the first step towards a resolution of the differe­
nces between the two sides; but for the time being, he indicated, the two 
governments should be represented at the level of charge dSaffaires rather 
than ambassador'*'^’*’* Chicherin regretted this decision, pointing to the "moral 
significance” which would be attached to the appointment of ambassadors, but 
fee agreed with MacDonald that those subsequently appointed must be figures of 
influence who would be acceptable in the other country^^.
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Recognition, wrote Krasin, was "undoubtedly an event of the first
political importance"• It would serve as the signal for corresponding action
from a series of other states; the French government might be obliged to
alter its inflexible attitude; and the decision might be expected to have an
influence upon the American government. It would finally destroy the hopes of
the counter-revolutionaries in exile, who would now move off to America,
Brazil and elswwhere. Despite unemployment and a depressed foreign trade,
England remained economically the most important country in Europe, and from
,-the point of view of foreign trade the improvement of relations with that
country was of "major significance". Even in the unfavourable circumstances
which had existed since 1921, Britain had occupied the first place in Soviet 
193foreign trade • The de jure recognition of the Soviet government, however, 
he added later, could in itself "certainly not remove all those difficulties 
and obstacles which he have in our economic relations with the capitalist Wei 
This note of caution, as the course of the London negotiations soon made 
apparent, was a judicious one.
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Chapter Ten: Soviet Russia ahd Labourism
The most desirable outcome of the present situation, wrote the Economist
following the general election, was that the Labour Party should farm a
government which should stay in power for a time with Liberal support, which
would provide a guarantee against the introduction of revolutionary measures.
The majority of proposals in the Labour Party election manifesto were in any
case common to the Liberal manifesto. Business could contemplate such a prospect
’’without misgiving”; and there was, the journal considered, ” no ground for
panic” .^ Lloyd George wrote to C.P. Scott .to support the Manchester Guardian’s
view that the liberals should support a minority Labour government. ’’Quite a
number of the important and influential”, he wrote, Wdisliked this suggestion,
but the party as a whole might be expected to support MacDonald in the promotion
of an ’’advanced Radical programme”. As to policy, he saw no difficulty. There
was an ample field common to both parties; indeed the danger, to his mind, was
"not that Labour would go too fast and fan, but that it would not go fast and
2far enough and perish of inanition” • The National Review found the formation 
of the Labour government a "disagreeable, not to say painful” event, which 
would be the ’’cause of unholy joy to all our enemies from San Francisco to 
Moscow, from Berlin to Baghdad”. Nevertheless, it concluded, it was surely 
preferable that Labour should come in as a minority government, existing on 
sufferance and "impotent for the larger mischief”, than as a majority party.
To deny the ’Democracy* its rights, moreover, might "place the Clyde Soviet in 
Downing Street”^ .
It was nevertheless difficult, wrote Snowden, to convey an impression of 
the "sensation which was created in political circles, and indeed throughout
Zj.
the country, at the possibility of a Labour Government" • For the first tihne 
in the country^s history, commented the English Review, the party of revolution 
was approaching the helm of the state, "not only, as in the seventeenth century, 
Tor the purpose of overthrowing the Crown, or of altering the Constitution, 
but with the design of destroying the very basis of civilized life". The sun 
England seemed "menaced with final eclipse"^. The installation of a "moder­
ate subversive Government", warned the Patriot, had "always been the prelude 
revolution". A considerable" nttmber of "fierce Anarchist aliens" had
■v ' f _
' w t i v e  In the eieotlok-^f this ’Kerensky g^yernment*, a letter related,
wr
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and one canvasser forthe Conservative party had had a ,fdark-skinned fist” 
shaken in his face, accompanied by forecasts of the overthrow of the existing 
organization of society. Another letter foresaw the Red Flag as the national 
emblem, the Eondon Gazette suppressed and the Daily Herald made the Government 
organ in its place • Snowden was rung up by a Countess, who asked him "frantic­
ally” if it was true that the "firsis thing the Labour Party would do would be
to cut the throats of every aristocrat and steal all their property”. "Conste-
7rnation” reigned in aristocratic and financial circles . Bayswater was ”eagerly
debating what the nationalisation of women wouft^e^like”; and an old-establi^
shed Sussex faifaily, on receiving the news that Labour was to take office,
packed all its plate and valuables and headed for the coast, ”before &he
o
Bolsheviks closed the Channel ports” • The Duke of Northumberland announced
that the first duty and obligation of the Labour government would be to corrupt
the Army, the Navy and the police force. Marriage would undoubtedly be abolis-
9
hed and free love introduced • The church, public schools, even the Boy Scouts 
seemed threatened o
Lt.-Col. Courthorpe MP, the deputy chairman of Ind Coope, admitted that 
the prospect of a Labour government ”agitated” him. The Sunday Pictorial, 
indeed, predicted that within twenty-four hours of its formation there would 
take place a ”financial panic the like of which the world has never yet known^. 
The announcement that Labour was prepared to form a government if called upon
to do so did, in fact, lead to a bout of public selling, the Economist noted.
Business, it reported at the end of the yeaf, had fallen away to a ”very iow 
ebW". The stock market reported a ”very severe depression in prices”. The fear 
that the party might, as appeared possible, introduce its capital levy "influ­
enced everything. People who held perfectly sound stocks and. shares grew fidg-
12ety, and became increasingly nervous at the constant drop in prices” •
Political circles were not unaffected by the general dismay. Not all, 
admittedly, shared the view of Chhrchill that the "socialist party” constituted 
the most ”dark and formidable menace” with which British civilization was con­
fronted; hr his judgement that the formation by that party of a government 
Was a "national misfortune such as has usually befallen great states only on 
morrow hi defeat in war”*^. Asquith, howeverijt whose announcement in the
Commons that his par t^ f would support the Labour motion of censure on
heed led directly to its fall and its replacement by a
, conceded that this meant ”for the first time, Ihe inst-
allation of a Socialist Governaen’: in the seats of the nighty”. Fev/ people, he
added, who had had the "melancholy privilege” of reading his postbag for the
previous month could be unaware of what this proppect meant to a "large and by
no means negligible mass of our fellow subjects’1 • He had "never come across
more violent manifestations of an epidemic of political hysteria". He himself
had been "cajoled, wheedled, almost aaressed, taunted, threatened, brow-beaten,
and all but blackmailed to step in as the ’saviour of society”’. Both Liberals
and Conservatives, however, would repudiate an alliance of this nature; and in 
0
any case, it was idle to talk of the "imminent dangers of a Socialistic regime" 
under a minority government dependent upon Liberal support, pledged in turn to 
"give no more countenance to Socialistic experiments than to a Protecfionist 
experiment" 0
Sir F. Banbury, however, on his elevation to the House of Lords, drew
attention to the danger that MacDonald, if defeated in the House of Commons,
might refuse to resign. If MacDonald attempted "anything of that sort", he
assured his audience, he himself would have "great pleasure in leading the
15Coldstream Guards into the House of Commons" • The prospect of a Labour 
government, Davidson recorded, "threw many Conservatives (and probably the 
majority) into a panic’’^ .  The City of London Conservative and Unionist
Association wrote to Baldwin urging that the Conservatives support the Liberals
17m  order to exclude the Labour party from government • Baldwin was informed 
by important figures in the City of London that a Socialist government would 
be a financial disaster; and Balfour wrote to him urging that it would be a 
"serious danger if the Socialist Party is allowed to assume office at the
present time", "Every means", if necessary an arrangement with Asquith, should
18be considered in order to avoid Parliamentary defeat •
Baldwin remained unconvinced. This was not only, or even mainly, because 
the Conservative party was "largely composed of men brought up at public school 
-s" who were "unable to divest themselves from the idea that Parliament is a 
political cricket match in which one’s side comes in to bat and, being fairly 
bowled, goes out again to field with great good humour‘d .  It was the case, 
firstly, as Asquith had pointed out, that the Labour government would be a 
Minority oiie, dependent upon support. As the King put it to Davidson,
Sotfiallsts would ituW att of learning their administrative
conditions”. In the second place, 
;on arid Conservative parties , under whatever premier-
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ship, &o "deprive Labour of their constitutional rights" would be the "first 
step down the road to revolution"* The election, Davidson told the King, might 
even be considered a "bles.;ing in disguise", for had the Conservative govern­
ment continued for a further eighteen months, the Socialists "might have come
20m  with an overwhelming majority" * It would he "really dangerous", an * eminent 
Conservative* told the Manchester Guardian, for the Conservatives and the
21Liberals to combine and keep Labour out* That "would be the way to revolution" *
Beyond this, a backbencher wrote to Baldwin, the need was imperative
to avoid an amalgamated "bourgeois bloc" which would leave the Socialists as
the sole alternative. This had been Bonar Law’s "greatest fear". An anti-Labour
coalition, Baldwin rightly judged, could lead ultimately only to a major 
22Labour victory • For his government to be succeeded by a minority Labour admi­
nistration was, in a very real sense, the lesser evil.
That such a government should extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet 
government was not surprising. Indeed, on this estimate, nothing could be more 
appropriate than that the Socialists, in office, should express in this way 
their identity with the Socialists who held office in Soviet Russia. It has 
more recently been held that the party*s foreign policy represented a ''repudia­
tion of traditional British foreign policy", replacing that policy of anti­
internationalism and selfish defence of national interests with a "militant
23Socialist bias'* (on the outbreak of the world war) • The party’s policy, it 
has been represented, was characterised by "anti-imperialism", and by "ardent 
pro-Soviet sentiment". After 1913 the I.L.P.'s "systematic anti-capitalism., 
was incopporated wholesale into Labour's foreign policy pronouncements"; and 
the party - it has been arghed - had an "assumed identity of common status as 
Underdogs" with the Soviet government, and an "instinctive sympathy with a
2/f
workers' government" • It will be suggested below that this is fundamentally 
to misunderstand the nature of the Labour Party's foreign policy, and in part­
icular its policy with regard to Soviet Russia. It will first be necessary, 
however, to devote some attention to the nature of the Labour Party An this 
period, and to the political thinking which informed the party's foreign policy*
,.v -Inumber of timorous old ladie#, reported * commentator, sold all their govern- 
^#**t stedka whoa <the labour Partytoek^effice, only to repurchase them when
offtHtf fciBg la session with MacDonald2 .^ Of MacDonald, at 
J^their fears had little Justification. In the attempt to understand and
a p p r e c i a t e  h i m ,  w r o t e  h i s  c o n t e m p o r a r y  b i o g r a p h e r ,  o n e  w a s  " a g a i n  a n d  a g a i n
26c o m p e l l e d  t o  t h i n k  o f  G l a d s t o n e " '  .  M a c D o n a l d ,  i n d e e d ,  e n t e r e d  p o l i t i c s  a s  a  
L i b e r a l ,  a f g j e r  s e r v i n g  f o r  s o m e  t i m e  a s  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c r e t a r y  o f  T h o m a s  L o u g h ,
27
t h e  L i b e r a l  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e  f o r  W e s t  I s l i n g t o n  .  H e  l e f t  t h e  L i b e r a l s  
f o r  t h e  I . L . P .  i n  l 8 9 ^ »  a f t e r  h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  s e c u r e  a d o p t i o n  a s  t h e  L i b e r a l  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e  a t  S o u t h a m p t o n .  T h e r e  " n e v e r  w a s  a n y  d i s p u t e  a s  t o  
o b j e c t s "  b e t w e e n  h i m s e l f  a n d  t h e  L i b e r a l s ,  h e  w r o t e  t o  H a r d i e ;  b u t  t h e  f a i l u r e  
o f  t h e  l o c a l  L i b e r a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  a t  A t t e r c l i f f e  a t  a d o p t  a  w e l l - k n o w n  l o c a l  
W o r k i n g  m a n  a s  a  c a n d i d a t e  s h o w e d ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,  t h a t  L i b e r a l i s m  a n d  " m o r e  p a r t ­
i c u l a r l y  l o c a l  L i b e r a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s "  h a d  " d e f i n i t e l y  d e c l a r e d  a g a i n s t  L a b o u r ,
28a n d  s o  I  m u s t  a c c e p t t t h e  f a c t s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n " 1 -  «  " W e  d i d n ' t  l e a v e  t h e
L i b e r a l s " ,  h e  l a t e r  w r o t e  t o  H e r b e r t  S a m u e l ;  " t h e y  k i c k e d  u s  o u t  a n d  s l a m m e d
t h e  d o o r  i n  o u r  f a c e s " " ' ' .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  M a c d o n a l d  s t o o d  a s  a n  I . L . P .
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e ;  a n d  a  y e a r  l a t e r  h e  w a s  3.  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  I . L . P . ' s  
3 0N a t i o n a l  C o u n c i l  .
T h e  f a i l u r e  t o  s e c u r e  a d o p t i o n  a s  a  L i b e r a l  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e  w a s
c o m m o n  t o  K e i r  H a r d i e  a t  M i d - L a n a r k  i n  1 8 8 8  a n d  t o  A r t h u r  H e n d e r s o n  a t  N e w c a s -  
3 1t i e  i n  1 8 9 5 ^  •  H e n d e r s o n ,  w h o  h a d  e n t e r e d  p o l i t i c s  a s  a  L i b e r a l  a g e n t ,  b e c a m e  
a  L a b o u r  c a n d i d a t e ;  b u t  s o  f a r  f r o m  u n d e r g o i n g  a  s t a r t l i n g  c o n v e r s i o n ,  i t  h a s
b e e n  o b s e r v e d ,  t h e r e  w a s  " n o  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  h e  w a s  r u f f l e d  b y  t h e  s l i g h t e s t
.  .  3 2s p i r i t u a l  o r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c h a n g e " " '  .  O n  b e c o m i n g  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y
i n  1 9 1 2 ,  h e  j o i n e d  t h e  F a b i a n  S o c i e t y ,  a n d  m i g h t  a p p e a r  w i t h  t h i s  a c t  t o  h a v e
e s p o u s e d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  ( h o w e v e r  m o d e r a t e )  s o c i a l i s m .  I t  w a s  t h e  r e s u l t ,
h o w e v e r ,  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  w i t h  h i s  e l e c t i o n  a s  L a b o u r  P a r t y  S e c r e t a r y  h e  h a d
b e c o m e  e x  o f f i c i o  B r i t i s h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o n  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S o c i a l i s t  B u r e a u :
t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  w h i c h  w e r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  b e l o n ^ j  t o  o n e  o f  t h e i r  c o u n t r y ' s  s o c i a l i s t
s o c i e t i e s .  T o  w h a t  e x t e n t  h i s  a d h e s i o n  w a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  c o n v i c t i o n  h a s  b e e n
3 ^c o n s i d e r e d  " p e r h a p s  d o u b t f u l " " " .  H e  h a d  c o m e  i n t o  t h e  l a b o u r  m o v e m e n t  " l a r g e l y " ,
3h
l b  w a s  n o t e d ,  " t h r o u g h  h i s  w o r k  a s  a  l a y  p r e a c h e r " " I t  w a s  h i s  o b j e c t i o n  t o  
t h e  L i b e r a l  p a r t y ,  a n d  t h a t  o f  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  e a r l y  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  P a r t y ,  
t h a t  i t  h a d  f a i l e d  t o  a d o p t  t h e m  a s  L i b e r a l  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e s .  T h i s  
a p p e a r s  i n  t u r n  t o  h a v e  b e e n  l a r g e l y  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  d o m i n a n c e  i n  L i b e r a l  
c o n s t i t u e n c y  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  b u s i n e s s m e n ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  m e n  a n d  c l e r g y ,  w h o  w e r e  
r e l u c t a n t  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  a  w o r k i n g - c l a s s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  a n d  
w h o s e  i n t e r e s t s m i g h t  s u f f e r  f r o m  t o o  a c t i v e  a  p r o s e c u t i o n  o f  t h e  ’ l a b o u r  q u e s t ­
i o n " " - .
O r g a n i s a t i o n a l l y ,  t h e  p a r t y  o w e d  i t i  ' a t e n c c  l o s s  t o  t h e  p r o m p t i n g s
O x  s o c i a l i s m ,  f r o m  a n  o f f i c i a l  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h e  p a r t y  k e p t  a l b o f ,  t h a n
t o  t h e  u n w i l l i n g n e s  :  o f  t h e  L i b e r a l s  t o  d e v o t e  s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e
l ' i  l i t e d  r e f o r m s  r e q u i r e d  b y  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t o  t h e  s a f e g u a r d i n g
01 t h e i r  f u n d s  f r o m  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h e  T a f f  V a l e  " ' s p i e s .  T r a d e
u n i o n  a f f i l i a t i o n  t o  t h e  L a b o u r  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  C o m m i t t e e  (  t  . . . .  P  . .  r a s
t h e n  k n o w n ) m o r e  t h a n  d o u b l e d  i n  t h e  t w o  y e a r s  f o l l o w i n g ;  a n d  c o m p a r e d  w i t h
t h ' e  d e  u n i o n  m e m b e r s ,  t h o s e  f r o m ,  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  s o c i e t i e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  t i n y
f r a c t i o n " ' “ .  I n  a l l  b u t  t r a d e  u n i o n  q u e s t i o n s ,  t h e r e  w a s  l i t t l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h
t h e  L a b o u r  g r o u p  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  f r o m  t h e  Liberals* I t  n e e d e d  a l l  t h e  t a c t  a n d
p a t i e n t  p e r s u a s i o n  o f  t h e  l e a d e r s ,  w r o t e  t h e  W e b b s ,  t o  c o n v i n c e  t h e  S o c i a l i s t s
t h a t  t h e i r  i d e a l s  a n d  p r o j e c t s  w e r e  " n o t  b e i n g  s a c r i f i c e d * ,  ( t o )  t h e  p o l i t i c a l
3 7n e c e s s i t y  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  L i b e r a l  P a r t y "  .
S o c i a l i s m  MacDonald e x p l a i n e d ,  c o u l d  " n o t  c r e a t e  f o r  i t s e l f  a  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t y  founded on i t s  d o g m a s " ;  i t  s h o u l d  r a t h e r  a t t e m p t  t o  b e c o m e  t h e  " s p i r i t "  
o f  a n o t h e r .  I n  B r i t a i n  -  u n l i k e  t h e  C o n t i n e n t  w h e r e  " t h e o r i e s  and d o g m a s  r e g a ­
r d i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  p r o g r e s s "  d o m i n a t e d  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  -  p a r t i e s  d i d  n o t  " h o l d
t b  p r i n c i p l e s  a s  d o g m a s " ,  a  p r a c t i c e  h e '  d e s c r i b e d ,  c h a r i t a b l y ,  a s  " g e t  o p p o r t -
3 < tu n i o n ,  b u t  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  m e t h o d "  •  W h a t  t h i s  m i g h t  m e a n  i h  p r a c t i c e  w a s
e x e m p l i f i e d  b y  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p a c t  w h i c h  M a c D o n a l d ,  a s  s e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  L . H . C . ,
c o n c l u d e d  w i t h  H e r b e r t  G l a d s t o n e  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  L i b e r a l  P a r t y  i n  S e p t e m b e r
1 9 0 & 3 }  w h i c h  p r o v i d e d  f o r  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  L i b e r a l s
t o  p r e v e n t  l o c a l  L i b e r a l  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  a n y  L . H . C .  c a n d i d a t e  w h o  s u p p o r t e d  t h e
’ ' g e n e r a l  o b j e c t s  o f  t h e  L i b e r a l  P a r t y " ,  i n  r e t u f n  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  L . B . C .  w a s  t o
" d e m o n s t r a t e  f r i e n d l i n e s s "  t o w a r d s  t h e  L i b e r a l  c a n d i d a t e  i n  a n y  c o n s t i t u e n c y
i n  w h i c h  i t  h a d  i n f l u e n c e *  A l t h o u g h  a  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  d i d  n o t  t a k e  p l a c e  i n
t h a t  y e a r ,  a s  h a d  b e e n  e x p e c t e d  b y  t h o s e  w h o  h a d  f r a m e d  t h e  p a c t ,  i t  r e m a i n e d
i n  o p e r a t i o n  a t  t h e  1 9 0 6  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n .  I t s  e x i s t e n c e ,  a t  e i t h e r  t h e  l o c a l
o r  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  w a s  f i r m l y  d e n i e d  b y  M a c D o n a l d  a n d  b y  H a r d i e ,  w h o  w a s  p r o b -
3 9a b l y  t h e  o n l y  o t h e r  - ‘ - ' a b o u r  l e a d e r  t o  b e  a w a r e  o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  *  T h e  t w o  
g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  o f  1 9 1 0 ,  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  o f  w h i c h  n o  L a b o u r  c a n d i d a t e  h a d  b e e n  
s u c c e s s f u l  i n  a  t h r e e - c o r n e r e d  f i g h t  a n d  o n l y  o n e  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  a  L i b e r a l  
o p p o n e n t ,  l e d  t o  a  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h i c h  t h e  L i b e r a l s  r e q u i r e d  
L a b o u r  s u p p o r t  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e m a i n  i n  o f f i c e .  I t  w a s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g ,  p e r h a p s ,  
t h a t  d i s c o n t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p a r t y ’ s  p o s i t i o n  d e v e l o p e d  b o t h  w i t h i n  a n d  o u t s i d e  t h e  
P a r t y .  H a r d i e  h i m s e l f  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  h a d  " c e a s e d  t o  c o u n t " ,  a n d  j o i n e d
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kot h e  r a n k s  o f  t h e  e r r t i c s  o f  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  l e a d e r s h i p  •
S u c h  e q u i v o c a t i o n  a p p e a r e d  t o  h a v e  b e e n  e n d e d  w i t h  t h e  a d o p t i o n  a t  t h e
e n d  o f  t h e  w a r  o f  a  n e w  a n d  e x p l i c i t l y  s o c i a l i s t  p r o g r a m m e ,  " L a b o u r  a n d  t h e  N e w
S o c i a l  O r d e r " *  T h i s  w a s  m i s l e a d i n g .  T h e  p r o g r a m m e ,  t o  t h e  W e b b s  " f r o m  b e g i n n i n g
t o  e n d  e s s e n t i a l l y  s o c i a l i s t  i n  c h a r a c t e r " ,  w a s  e q u a t e d  b y  t h e  F r e n c h  l i b e r a l
h i s t o r i a n  a n d  c o n t e m p o r a r y  H a l e v y  w i t h  t h e  " o l d  p r o g r a m m e  t h a t  h a l f  a  c e n t u r y
a g o  h a d  b e e n  t h a t  o f  b o u r g e o i s l ^ i b e r a l i s m  i n  E n g l a n d ,  P e a c e  a n d  P l e n t y "  T h e
p r o g r a m m e  n o t e d  t h a t  " L a s t i n g  D e g r a d a t i o n  i n  t h e  S t a n d a r d  o f  L i f e "  w a s  t o  b e
a v o i d e d  o n l y  b y  " d e l i b e r a t e  N a t i o n a l  O r g a n i s a t i o n " .  A t t e m p t s  b y  e m p l o y e r s  t o
r e d u c e  w a g e s  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  " e m b i t t e r e d  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r i f e . ,  i n  t h e  h i g h e s t
d e g r e e  d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s " .  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h e  d a y
s h o u l d  t a k e  " a l l  n e c e s s a r y  s t e p s  t o  a v e r t  s u c h  a  c a l a m i t y " .  T h e  t a x  m e a s u r e s
w h i c h  w e r e  p r o p o s e d  w e r e ,  i t  w a s  c a r e f u l l y  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  n o t  " ' c l a s s '  m e a s u r e s " ,
b u t  o n e s  w h i c h  m i g h t  p r o m o t e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  " c l e r k ,  t h e  t e a c h e r ,  t h e
d o c t o r ,  t h e  m i n i s t d r  o f  r e l i g i o n ,  t h e  a v e r a g e  r e t a i l  s h o p k e e p e r  a n d  t r a d e r " .
T h e  " D e m o c r a t i c  C o n t r o l  o f  I n d u s t r y "  t o  w h i c h  t h e  d o c u m e n t  c o m m i t t e d  t h e
p a r t y  a m o u n t e d  t o  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  w a r t i m e  c o n t r o l s  o v e r  i n d u s t r y  i n t o
p e a c e t i m e .  E v e n  C h u r c h i l l  h a d  b e e n  p e r s u a d e d  o f  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  s o c i a l i s m  t h u s  
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d e f i n e d
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  c o a l m i n e s  a n d  t h e  r a i l w a y s ,  H e n d e r s o n  e x p l a i n e d ,  i t
h a d  b e e n  " a c c i d e n t a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a n d  n o t  a b s t r a c t  t h e o r y "  w h i c h  h a d  l e d  t h e
p a r t y  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e y  c o u l d  n o t  b e  o r g a .  i s a d  a s  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s
e x c e p t  u n d e r  n a t i o n a l  o w n e r s h i p  " .  C o m  i o n  o w n e r s h i p  o r  t h e  m e a n s  o r  p r o d u c t i o n ,
h e  w r o t e  i n  1 9 1 8 ,  m e a n t  n o  m o r e  t h a n  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  " e v e r y  p r o p o s a l  t o  h a n d
b a c k  t o  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l i s t s  t . h d  g r e a t  i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  s e r v i c e s "  t h a t  h a d  c o m e
Zf L±.
u n d e r  G o v e r n m e n t  c o n t r o l  d u r i n g  t h e  w a r  H i s  v i e w s  w e r e  e c h o e d  b y  t h e  P r e s ­
i d e n t  o f  t h e  N o t t i n g h a m  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e ,  W . F .  P u r d y .  I f  d u r i n g  t h e  w a r  i t  h a d  
b e e n  f o u n d  n e c e s s a r y  " i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t "  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  r a i l w a y s ,  c a n a l s ,  
m i n e s ,  s h i p p i n g  a n d  s h i p y a r d s ,  t h e n  a f t e r  t h e  w a r  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  s h o u l d  
■ ' i n s i s t  o n  t h e i r  b e i n g  o w n e d  a n d  c o n t r o l l e d  f o r  t h e  p e o p l e  a s  a  w h o l e " ,  t h e  
s t r a i n  o f  t h e  w a r ,  r e p o r t e d  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e  t o  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e ,  h a d  
" b r o k e n  d o w n  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  i n d u s t r i a l  s y s t e m "  a n d  l e d  t o  " n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z ­
a t i o n  t o  a  d e g r e e  t h a t  ( h a d )  a p p e a r e d  p r a c t i c a l l y  i m p o s s i o l e  i n  t h e  d a y s  o f  
p e a c e " .  T h e  " m o r e  t h o u g h t f u l  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y " ,  i t  c o n s i d e r e d ,  h a d  b e e n  l e d  t o
c o n s i d e r  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  n a t i o n a l  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o n  " l i n e s  w h i c h  w e r e  p o p u l a r
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° n l y  i n  L a b o u r  c i r c l e s  b e f o r e  t h e  w a r "  .  T h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  h a d ,  i n  f a c t ,  a l r e a d y
f o u n d  e x p r e s s i o n  i n  r e s o l u t i o n s  a d o p t e d ,  a t  p r e v i o u s  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e s ,  o f  w h i c h  
t h e  n e w  p r o g r a m m e  w a s ,  t o  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x t e n t ,  s i m p l y  a  c o d i f i c a t i o n .  T h e  
191 ^ +  c o n f e r e n c e  h a d  a o p t e d  a  r e s o l u t i o n  c a l l i n g  f o r  t h e  " a b o l i t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l ­
i s m " ;  a n a  i n  t h i s  a n d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  a  p r o p o s a l  h a d  b e e n  a d o p t e d  c a l l i n g  
f o r  a  m i n i m u m  w a g e .  T h e  1 9 1 7  c o n f e r e n c e  h a d  o p o o s e d  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  t h e  m i n e s
b6o r  t h e  r a i l w a y s  t o  p r i v a t e  h a n d s  a f t e r  t h e  w a r  ,  I t  W a s  a  q u e s t i o n  n o t  o f  t h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  b u t  o f  t h e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t y ’ s  p r o f e s s e d  p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s .
I f  t h e  1 9 1 3  c o n f e r e n c e  d i d ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  m a r k  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  t u r n  i n
t h e  p a r t y ’ s  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  t h i s  w a s  l e s s ,  p e r h a p s ,  i n  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  n e w
p r o g r a m m e  t h a n  i n  a u n u m b e r  o f  o t h e r  d e c i s i o n s  l e s s  o b v i o u s l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e
p r o m o t i o n  o f  s o c i a l i s m *  T h e s e  d e c i s i o n s ,  a n d  n o t a b l y  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a n g e
w h i c h  o p e n e d  t h e  p a r t y  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  m e m b e r s h i p  i n  p l a c e  o f  m e m b e r s h i p  t h r o u g h
a  t r a d e  u n i o n  o r  s o c i a l i s t  s o c i e t y ,  w e r e  d e s i g n e d ,  i n  H e n d e r s o n ' s  w o r d s ,  t o
" r e m o v e  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  ( p a r t y  ( w a s )  t h e  p a r t y  o f  t h e  m a n u a l  w a g e - e a r n e r s
m e r e l y " ,  a n d  t h a t  i t s  p o l i t i c s  w e r e ,  " t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  t r a d e - u n i o n s  -  a  p u r e l y
c l a s s - c o n s c i o u s  d e m a n d  f o r  s p e c i f i c  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  w a g e s ,  h o u r s ,  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
b7e m p l o y m e n t "  ,  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  a  p l a c e  m u s t  b e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  p a r t y ’ s  r a n k s ,  a n d  
e s p e c i a l l y  a m o n g  i t s  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e s ,  f o r  w o m e n ,  w h o  w o r t h e  f i r s t  
t i m e  w e r e  t o  r e c e i v e  v o t i n g  r i g h t s ,  a n d  f o r  t h e  m i d d l e c l a s s  i n  g e n e r a l .  T h e  
p a r t y ,  H e n d e r s o n  e x p l a i n e d ,  m u s t  t r a n s f o r m  i t s e l f  f r o m  a  f e d e r a t i o n  o f  s o c i e t ­
i e s  i n t o  a  " n a t i o n a l  p o p u l a r  p a r t y " .  I t  m u s t  b e  s o  c o n s t i t u t e d  a s  t o  b e  a b l e  
t o  i n c l u d e  w i t h i n  i t s  r a n k s  " u n a t t a c h e d  d e m o c r a t s  w i t h  n o  a c k n o w l d e g e d  a l l e g i ­
a n c e ,  t o  a n y  i n d u s t r i a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  m o v e m e n t " :  f o r  " r e a l  p o l i t i c a l  d e m o c r a c y "  
h e  h e l d ,  c o u l d  " h o t  b e  o r g a n i s e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  c l a s s  i n t e r e s t " f  H i s  a i m  w a s  
t o  c h a n g e  t h e  " o l d  c o n d i t i o n s "  i n  w h i c h  t h e  p a r t y  h a d  " s e e m e d  t o  b e ,  a l t h o u g h
; s r\
i t  n e v e r  a c t u a l l y  w a s ,  a  c l a s s  p a r t y " " ' .  P u r d y  t o l d  t h e  p a r t y ' s  c o n f e r e n c e  i n  
t h e  s u m m e r  o f  1918  t h a t  w i t h  t h e  n d w  p r o g r a m m e  t h e  p a r t y  h a d  a d o p t e d  a  " c l a i m  
t o  b e  a  N a t i o n a l  P a r t y  i n  i t s  b r o a d e s t  a n d  w i d e s t  s e n s e " .  T h e i r  a i m  s h o u l d  " B e  
" n o t  t o  s e r v e  s e c t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  a l o n e ,  o r  t o  s e t  c l a s s  a g a i n s t  c l a s s ,  b u t  
r a t h e r  t o  s e c u r e  t h a t  a l l  c l a s s e s ,  a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  " s h o u l d )  c o m e  t o g e t h e ! ^ " ^ *  
T h e  p a r t y ' s  n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  W e b b  w r o t e ,  m i g h t  w e l l  p r o v e  t o  b e  a n  " e v e n t  o f  
- L a r - r e a c h i n g  p o l i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e " *  I n s t e a d  o f  a .  " s e c t i o n a l  a n d  s o m e w h a t  n a r r o w  
g r o u p " ,  a  p a r t y  w a s  n e w  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n t o  w h i c h  i t  w a s  h o p e d  t o " a t t r a c t  m a n y  
m e n  a n d  w o m e n  o f  ' S 3  o p k e e p i n g ,  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n a l  c l a s s e s " ,  w h o  
w e r e  " d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h e  o l d  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s " ^ 0 *  T h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  m a n ,  t h e  
shhoolt e a c h e r ,  t h e  d o c t o r ,  t h e  t r a d e s r . a n ,  t h e  m i n i s t e r  a n d  t h e  c l e & r k ,  w r o t e
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H e n d e r s o n ,  w h o  e s t a b l i s h e d  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  r a n k  a n d  f i l e  o f  w o r k i n g - c l a s s  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  p a r t y ,  w o u l d  " d e r i v e  i m m e d i a t e  s p i r i t u a l  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e  
c o n t a c t " '  ' .
T h e r e  w a s  s o m e  c o n c e r n  a t  t h e  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e  t h a t  L a b o u r  s h o u l d
g r o w  " n o t  b y  a t t r a c t i n g  e v e r y  d i s g r u n t l e d  L i b e r a l  a n d  T o r y  t h e y  c o u l d  f i n d ,
b u t  b y  a t t r a c t i n g  :  1  w o m e n  w h o  r e a l l y  b e l i e v e d  i n  t h e  p a r t y " ^  *  H e n d e r s o n ' s
c r i t e r i a  w e r e  s . c  w h i  . o r e  a c c o r i  o d a t i n g .  T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h o s e  w h o
l i v e d  b y  w o r k i n g  a n d  t h o s e  w h o  l i v e d  u p o n  t h e  p r o c e e d s  o f  w o n c r c h i p ,  h e  w r o t e ,
d i d  " n o t  e x c l u d e  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  c a p i t a l i s t  f r o m  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  t h e  P a r t y " ^ .  T h e
n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n  d i d ,  i n d e e d ,  l a r g e l y  J u s t i f y  t h e  c  p e c t a t i o n s  of t h o s e  fho
h a d  f r a m e d  i t .  I t s  a d o p t i o n  w a s  f o l l o w e d ,  w r o t e  t h e  W e b b s ,  b y  a .  " c o n s i d e r a b l e
a c c e s s i o n  o f  m e m b e r s h i p ,  l a r g e l y  f r o m  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  m i d d l e  c l a s s e s " ,
w h i c h  " s t e a d i l y  i n c r e a s e d " .  T h e  n e w  m e m b e r s  i n c l u d e d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  " m a n y  t h o u -
5  bs a n d s  o f  c o n v e r t s  f r o m  t h e  L i b e r a l  a n d  C o n s e r v a t i v e  P a r t i e s " * '  ' .  O n e  o f  t h e
m o s t  r e m a r k a b l e  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  1 9 1 o  e l e c t i o n  ,  i n d e e d ,  w r o t e  a n  o b s e r v e r ,  h a d
b e e n  t h e  " e n t r y  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s e s . ,  i n t o  t h e  r a n k s  o f  L a b o u r "  •
T h e  c h a n g e  e x t e n d e d  t h e  £ h e  p a r t y ' s  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  C a n d i d a t e a *  S e v e r a l
L i b e r a l  I  I P s ,  H e n d e r s o n  n o t e d  i n  a  l e t t e r  t o  C . P .  S c o t t ,  h a d  g i v e r ,  n o t i c e  t o
t h e i r  c o n s t u e n t s  t h a t  t h e y  i n t e n d e d  t o  s t a n d  a s  i n d e p e n d e n t s  i n  t h e  f o r t h c o m i n g
e l e c t i o n s .  T h i s  m e a n t ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  j o i n  t h e  L a b o u r
P a r t y .  " H i s  p o l i c y  w a s  t o  e n l a r g e  t h e  b o u n d s  of t h e  Labour P a r t y  a n d  b r i n g  i n
5 ot h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  a s  c a n d i d a t e s "  •  I n  t h e  1 ~ I _  ^ e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ,  t h e  N e w
Statesman noted, "something like a fourth of the Labour candidates" had been
5 7" f r o m  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  p r o p e r t y - o w n i n g  c l a s s e s " ' ' .  T h e  L a b o u r  r e p r e s e n t a t ­
i v e s  o n  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  i t  a d d e d  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  4 - 9 2 0 ,  w e r e  a  " s u f f i c i e n t !  
i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  c h a n g e  w h i c h  i s  c o m i n g  a b o u t "  i n  t h e  p a r t y .  D o c t o r s ,  l a w y e r s ,  
a r c h i t e c t s ,  " p r o f e s s i o n a l  m e n  o f  e v e r y  t y p e " ,  h a d  b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l  a s  w e l l  a s  
t r a d e  u n i o n i s t s .  I n  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ,  i t  h o p e d ,  L a b o u r ' s  s u c c e s s f u l  
c a n d i d a t e s  w o u l d  i n c l u d e  ! 3 f e w e r  "  l i d d l e - a g e d  t r a d e  u n i o n i s e s  o f f i c i a l s "  a n d  m o r e  
" m e n  c a p a b l e  o f  e f f e c t i v e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  w o r k " ;  o r  i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  a  " r e s p e c t a b l e  
m u s t e r  o f  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n s  a n d  t h e  b u s i n e s s  m e n ,  w h o  h a v e  t h r o w n  i n  t h e i r  l o t  
t f i t h  L a b o u r " ^ 0 .
T h e  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  p a r t y ,  S n o w d e n  r e c a l l e d ,  h a d  h a d  t h e  " v e r y  d e s i r a b l e  
r e s u l t "  o f  s e c u r i n g  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  " d i f f e r e n t  c l a s s  o f  c a n d i d a t e " .  T h e  p a r t y * £  
c o n t i n g e n t  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  a f t e r  t h e  1 9 2 2  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  a  " l a r g e r  
e l e m e n t  o f  m i d d l e  c l a s s  p e o p l e  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n a l  m e n " ' ' ' .  T h e  o n l y  d i s t u r b i n g
f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  n e w  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  L a b o u r  p a r t y ,  i n d d d d ,  w a s  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  a  
n u m b e r  o f  r a d i c a l  I . L . P .  m e m b e r s ,  " m o s t l y  f r o m  t h e  s u b m e r g e d  r e g i o n s  o f  G l a s g o w "  
t h e  R e v i e w  o f  R e v i e w s  e x p l a i n e d ,  w h o  i n t e r j e c t e d  " g u t t u r a l  e x p l e t i v e s "  a n d  m a d e  
" e x p l o s i v e  s p e e c h e s  i n  l a n g u a g e  w h i c h  n o  m a n  c a n  u n d e r s t a n d " " " .
R e v o l u t i o n ,  H e n d e r s o n  d e c l a r e d ,  w a s  a  " w o r d  o f  e v i l  o m e n " .  N o  " r e s p o n ­
s i b l e  p e r s o n " ,  h o w e v e r  d e d i c a t e d  t o  t h d  c o m p l e t e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  s o c i e t y ,  
c o u l d  " c o n t e m p l a t e  s u c h  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  w i t h o u t  h o r r o r " ;  i §  w a s " e n o u g h  t o  a p p a l  
t h e  s t o u t e s t  h e a r t " .  R e v o l u t i o n  ,  m o r e o v e r  -  a t  l e a s t  r e v o l u t i o n  " i n  t h e  
c o n t i n e n t a l  s e n s e "  -  w a s  " a l i e n  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  c h a r a c t e r " .  T h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  
s o c i a l  c o n v u l s i o n  ,  h o w e v e r - ,  m i g h t  a t t r a c t  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  " m e n  o f  u n s t a b l e  
t e m p e r a m e n t " ,  a s  t h e  " f e v e r i s h  industrial u n r e s t "  o f  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  p o s t w a r  
p e r i o d  h a d  s h o w n .  T h e  p a r t y ' s  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  a v e r s i o n  o f  
t h i s  d a n g e r  m i g h t  b e  t o  " r e h a b i l i t a t e  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  t h e  e y e s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e " 0 ^ * .  
T h e  p a r t y ' s  m a n i f e s t o  i n  t h e  1 9 1 - 8  e l e c t i o n ,  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  w h i l e  d e c l a r i n g  b o l d l y  
t h a t  L a b o u r ' s  p r o g r a m m e  ® a s  t o  " b u i l d  a  N e w  W o r l d " ,  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  c o m : -  
i t t e d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  t o  b u i l d i n g  i t  " b y  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m e a n s " " " ’ .  T h e  p a r t y ' s  
a p p e a l  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  i n  1 9 2 2  w e n t  f u r t h e r .  D e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  m a n ­
i f e s t o  c l a i m e d ,  c o u l d  b e  m a d e  e f f e c t i v e  w i t h o u t  b l o o d s h e d  o r  v i o l e n c e .  T h e
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p a r t y  s  p r o p o s a l  t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  a  m o r e  e q u i t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  
w e a l t h  b y  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m e a n s  w a s  " n e i t h e r  B o l s h e v i s m  n o r  C o m m u n i s m ,  b u t  c o m m o n  
s e n s e  a n d  j u s t i c e " .  I t  f o r m e d  " L a b o u r ' s  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  R e a c t i o n  a n d  R e v o l u t i o n " .  
L a b o u r ' s  p r o g r a m m e ,  i n d e e d ,  t h e  m a n i f e s t o  c l a i m e d ,  w a s  t h e  " b e s t  b u l w a r k  
a g a i n s t  v i o l e n t  u p h e a v a l  a n d  c l a s s  w a r " " ' .
N o t  a l l  w e r e  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h i s  t r e n d  i n  t h e  p a r t y ' s  e v o l u t i o n .  F . W .  
J o w e - t t ^  h a d  a t t e n d e d  t h e  G e n e v a  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  s o c i a l i s t  p a r t i e s  i n  1 9 2 0 .  H e  
w a s  d r i v e n  t o  p u t  a  c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n  t o  t h e  o t h e r  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  o n  
s o c i a l i s a t i o n ,  o n  w h i c h  h e  s e r v e d :  w a s  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  " p r e p a r e d  t o  d e c l a r e  w a r  
h e r o  a n d  n o w  o n  t h e  p a r a s i t e s  w h o  r b & v y  o n  r e n t  a n d  i n t e r e s t " ,  o r  w a s  i t  c o n t e n t  
t h a t  s o c i a l i s m  s h o u l d  " a m b l e  o n  t h r o u g h  m a n y  w e a r y  y e a r s  d e b a t i n g  t h e  p r e c i s e  
m e t h o d  o f  s o c i a l i s a t i o n  w h i c h  w e  s h o u l d  r e c o m m e n d  w s t e p - b y - s t e p "  t o  a  p u z z l e d  
a n d  w e a r y  e l e c t o r a t e " .  T h e  a t t a c k s  o n  t h e  o l d  o r d e r ,  h e  w r o t e  i n  a n  a r t i c l e  o n  
h i s  r e t u r n ,  " m u s t  n o w  b e  o p e n  a n d  d i r e c t ,  a n d  t h e  p l a n  o f  i t  m u s t  b e  e a s y  f o r  
o r d i n a r y  p e o p l e  t o  u n d e r s t a n d " .  A s  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  1 9 2 2  L a b o u r  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e  
a t  E d i n b u r g h ,  h e  u s e d  h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  a t t a c k  i n t e r e s t  a n d  r e n t  i n c r e a s e s  
w h o s e  f u n c t i o n ,  h e  d e c l a r e d ,  w o u l d  b e  t o  " e n r i c h  m a i n l y  t h e  c l a s s  w h i c h  h a s  
a l r e a d y  m o r e  t o  s p e n d  t h a n  i t  c a n  u s e f u l l y  s p e n d " ;  w h i l e  f o r  t h e  m i n d e r ' s
w i f e ,  1 1  t r u d g i n g  t o  the g u a r d i a n s  f o r  r e l i e f ,  i t  i s  t e a r s  a l l  t l i e  w a y ” .  T h e
D a i l y  T e l e g r a p h  r e m a r k e d  t h a t  i t  h a d  " n e v e r  r e a d  a  s p e e c h  m o r e  s a t u r a t e d  w i t h
c l a s s  h a t r e d ” ;  a n d  L o r d  B i r k e n h e a d  i n  the H o u s e  o f  L o r d s  r e g r e t t e d  i t s
" i n f l a m m a t o r y "  c h a r a c t e r .  H e  a s s u r e d  h i s  a u d i e n c e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  i t  h a d  n o t
6^r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  d e l e g a t e s  a t  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  .  F r o m  t h e  o t h e r  e n d  o f  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  s p e c t r u m ,  w r i t e r s  i n  t h e  C o r n v . u n i s t  H e  v i e  r  a g r e e d  t h a t  f r o m  t h e  
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a b o u r  s t a n d p o i n t ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  m a s s e s  ( w e r e )  t h e  m o s t  a p a t h e t i c
a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  m o m e n t " .  I t  w a s  " n o  u s e  d i s g u i s i n g  t h e  m e l a n c h o l y  f a c t  t h a t
• • 65■ B r i t i s h  L a b o u r  t o d a y "  w a s  " i m p o t e n t  a n d  l e t h a r g i c "  .  F o u r  g e n e r a t i o n s  o f
i n d u s t r i a l  c a p i t a l i s m ,  W i l l i s  w r o t e  i n  t h e  C o m m u n i s t ,  h a d  b r e d  a  c l a s s
" p a t h e t i c a l l y  l o y a l  t o  e x i s t i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s " ,  w h o s e  " s t o l i d  c o n s e r v a t i s m "  m u s t
66a z e  e v e r y  t h i n k i n g  c a p i t a l i s t ,  h o w e v e r  m u c h  h e  m i g h t  s e c r e t l y  r e j o i c e  •  
E v e n t s  w e r e  t o  b e a r  o u t  L o r d  B i r k e n h e a d ' s  c o n f i d e n c e .  D e l i v e r i n g  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  a d d r e s s  a t  t h e  1 9 2 3  L a b o u r  c o n f e r e n c e ,  S i d n e y  W e b b  n o t e d  t h a t  
t h a  party h a d  " n o w  a t t a i n e d  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  O f f i c i a l  O p p o s i t i o n ,  h o l d i n g  
i t s e l f  o u t  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r s  a s  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t " .  T h e  p a r t y ,  h e  u r g e d ,  
" m u s t  r e m e m b e r  t h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  a n d  r i s e  t o  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s " .  T h e  c o n f e r e n c e  
e n d o r s e d  w i t h o u t  o p p o s i t i o n  a  r e s o l u t i o n  w h i c h  d e c l a r e d  t h e  p a r t y ' s  o b j e c t  t o  
b e  t h e  " s u p e r s e s s i o n  o f  C a p i t a l i s m  b y  t h e  C o - o p e r a t i v e  C o m m o n w e a l t h " ,  a n  o b j e c t  
w h i c h  w a s  h e l d  t o  " d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  f r o m  b o t h  t h e  
C o n s e r v a t i v e  a n d  L i b e r a l  P a r t i e s " .  A  d e l e g a t e  n e v e r t h e l e s s  f e l t  o b l i g e d  t o  
r e m a r k  u p o n  a  " c e r t  i :  m o u n t  o f  t i m i d i t y "  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  c a n d i d a t e s
a t  t h e  p r e v i o u s  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  i n  " s t a n d i n g  u p  f o r  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  s o c i a l -
67i s m "  .  M a c D o n a l d ,  i n d e e d ,  h a d  w r i t t e n  o f  h i s  c o n c e r n  t h a t  t h e  O b s e r v e r  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  l a b e l l e d  L a b o u r  " t h e  S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y " .  O n l y  b y  " p e r s i s t e n t  
e d u c a t i o n a l  p r o p a g a n d a  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y " ,  h e  w r o t e ,  a n d  b y  " g o o d  d e b t a i n g  i n  t h e
6 3H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s " ,  w e r e  t h e  " b o g e y  w o r d s  t o  b e  k i l l e d " ' ” ' .
O n  2 0  M a r c h  1 9 2 3 ,  S n o w d e n  i n t r o d u c e d  a  m o t i o n  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f
C o m m o n s  c a l l i n g  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  " i n d u s t r i a l  a n d  s o c i a l  o r d e r
b a s e d  o n  t h e  p u b l i c  o w n e r s h i p  a n d  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  o f
6 9p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n "  .  I t  w a s  a  p r i v a t e  m e m b e r ' s  m o t i o n ,  n o t  a  p a r t y
i n i t i a t i v e ,  a n d  o n  i t s  i n t r o d u c t i o n  " n o b o d y  w . a s  m o r e  a n n o y e d " ,  i t  w a s  r e p o r t e d ,  
M r  70" t h a n  M a c D o n a l d " 1  .  T h e  m o t i o n  w a s  d e c l a r e d  b y  S n o w d e n  t o  a m o u n t  t o  a  " d i r e c t  
c h a l l e n g e  t o  t h e  h o l d e r s  a n d  d e f e n d e r s  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  s y s t e m " .  H e  h a d ,  
h o w e v e r ,  a l w a y s  b e e n  a n  a d v o a a t e  o f  ' g r a d u a l i s m . '  i n  s o c i a , l  p r o g r e s s ,  h e  w r o t e  
m  h i s  a u t o b i o g r a p h y ,  a n d  h a d  " a l w a y s  o p p o s e d  a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p o l i c y " .  D e f o r m ,
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h e  n o t e d  a p p r o v i n g l y ,  w a s  t h e  " s u r e s t  p r e v e n t i v e  o f  r e v o l u t i o n "  •  I n  p r o p o s i n g
h i s  m o t i o n  h e  w a s ,  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  a t  p a i n s  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  h e  " p r o p o s e d  110
r e v o l u t i o n " ,  a n d  c o n t e m p l a t e d  n o  c o n f i s c a t i o n .  T h e r e  w a s  n o  a n a l o g y  b e t w e e n
606 i  i s  r n d  b o l s h e v i s m :  t h e y  w e r e  a n t i t h e s e s *  H i s  r e c o n  . . e n d a t i o n  w a s  s i m p l y
t h a t  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  a c t i o n  a n d  o f  m u n i c i p a l  e n t e r p r i s e ,  w h i c h
w a s  i n  a n y  c a s e  t a k i n g  p l a c e ,  s h o u l d  b e c o m e  t h e  " c o n s c i o u s  p o l i c y  o f  t h e
g t  v e  n  a n t " .  N q  f u r t h e r  s t e p  f o r w a r d  s h o u l d  b e  t a k e n  u n t i l  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s t e p
7 2h a d  b e e n  " j u s t i f i e d  b y  i t s  s u c c e s s "  .  A  ' c r i t i c i s m  a n d  r  s t a t e m e n t ?  o f  L a b o u r *  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  w r i t t e n  b y  s e v e n  p a r t y  m e m b e r s ,  a p p e a r e d  l a t e r  i n  t h e  y e a r .  I i i  
n o t e d  t h a t  S n o w d e n ' . s  s p e e c h  h a d  b e e n  a n  a t t a c k  u p o n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s y s t e m  w i t h o u t  
a d v o c a c y  o f  a n y  o t h e r ;  a n d  i t  a r g u e d  a  " g r a d u a l  w a t e r i n g  d o w n "  o f  L a b o u r  p o l i c y  
f r o m  s o c i a l i s m  t o  a  " f o r m  o f  B a d i c a l i s m "  ^ • S n o w d o n ,  t h e  E c o n o m i s t  r e m a r k e d ,
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l i a d  " m e l l o w e d  w i t h  t h e  p a s s i n g  y e a r s " '  ‘ « ,
I n  m o v i n g  f r o m  O f f i c i a l  O p p o s i t i o n  t o  G o v e r n m e n t ,  a  w r i t e r  i n  t h e  
l i  t  w . :  c a l c u l a t e d ,  t h e  p a r t y  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  c o n t e s t  a b o u t  a  h u n d r e d
m i d d l e  c l a s s  s e a t s ,  w h i c h ,  i f  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  c o n t e s t e d  a n d  w o n ,  w o u l d  f o r m  a  
" g r e a t  h a n d i c a p "  t o  t h e  a t t a i n i n g  o f  a  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  m a j o r i t y .  T h e r e  w a s  " n o  
r e a s o n ,  b e y o n d  p r e j u d i c e " ,  i t  w a . s  c l a i m e d  ( w i t h  s o m e  j u s t i c e ) ,  w h y  t h e  L a b o u r  
p r o g r a m m e  s h o u l d  n o t  g a i n  s u p p o r t  i n  t h e s e  s .  t h e .  p a r t y ' s  " m a i n  p r o p a g a n d a  
e f f o r t s "  s h o u l d  n o w  b e  " l a r g e l y  d i r e c t e d  t o  c r e a t i n g  a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
o u r  p o s i t i o n  i n  m i d d l e  c l a s s  m i n d s " .  T h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s  v o  f  -  h a d  s e n  l e d  t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y ' s  p o l i c y  w a s  i n i m i c a l  t o  h i s  i n t e r e s t s :  i n d e e d  o n  t h i s  
p o i n t  " o u r  o w n  p e o p l e " ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,  h a d  " s o m e t i m e s  g i v e n  t h e  w r o n g  i m p r e s s i o n " .  
I t  w a s  n o . ;  t h e  t i m e  f o r  a  " b o l d  a n d  c l e a r  l e a d "  t o  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s ,  a n d  f o r
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a n  a t t e m p t  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  p a r t y *  .  p o l i c y  " i n  t e r  h i  e h  . . i l l  a p p e a l  t o  t h e m "
T o  a  h o s t  o f  m i d d l e - c l a s s  m i n d s ,  i t  w a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  t h e  L a b o u r  M a g a z i n e ,
’ L a b o u r '  w a s  s y n o n y m o u s  w i t h  ' s t r i k e s ' ,  a n d  " w h i l e  t h i s  i m p r e s s i o n  r e m a i n s  t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  p r o g r e s s  i s  a n d  w i l l  b e  v e r y  l i m i t e d " .  " W i l d  s t a t e m e n t s "  d i d
g r e a t  a n d  d e f i n i t e  h a r m  t o  t h e  m o v e m e n t .  L a b o u r ' s  c a s e  f o r  s e e k i n g  m i d d l e  c l a s s
s u p p o r t ,  i t  w a s  c o n c l u d e d ,  w a s  " o v e r w h e l m i n g " ;  a n d  p r o v i d e d  i t  w a s  p r e s e n t e d
w i t h  " g r e a t e r  r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  i n s t i n c t s  a n d  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  t h o s e  c l a s s e s " ,  i t
7 6m i g h t  l o o k  f o r w a r d  t o  w i d e s p r e a d  s u p p o r t  f r o m  t h e m  •  I t  w a . s  t h e  w e a k n e s s  o f
t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y ,  M a c D o n a l d  a g r e e d ,  t h a t  i t  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  " ' L e d  T e r r o r '  t o  t h e
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m i n d s  o f  l a r g e  m a s s e s  o f  p e o p l e  w h o  k n o w  l i t t l e  a b o u t  i t " ' ' •
S i d n e y  Webb t o l d  t h e  1 9 2 3  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e  t h a t  i f  L h b o u r  c o n t i n u e d  t o  
G a t h e r  e l e c t o r a l  s u p p o r t  a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  r a t e ,  i t  n i g h t  e x p e c t  t o  form a g o v e r ­
nment w i t h i n  e i g h t  y e a r s .  Whatever d i s g g r e e m e n t  t h e r e  m i g h t  b e  w i t h  t h e  accurac
o f  h i s  f o r e c a s t  i n  d e t a i l ,  i t  w a s  n o t  a  m a t t e r  o f  d i s p u t e  t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
o f  t h e  p a r t y  m u s t  b e ,  t o  t h e  v i r t u a l  e x c l u s i o n  o f  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  e l e c t o r a l  s u p p o r t  a n d  u l t i m a t e l y ,  t h e  w i n n i n g  o f  
a  m a j o r i t y  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s .  T h i s  r e q u i r e d  i n  t u r n  o f  L a b o u r  M P s  t h a t  
t h e y  s h o u l d  o b s e r v e  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n s  a n d ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h a t  t h e y  s h o u l d  a c c e p t  
t h e  n o r m s  o f  t h a t  a s s e m b l y .  T h e s e  w e r e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s .  I n  t h e  s h e l t e r e d  
l i b r a r i e s ,  r e a d i n g  a n d  d i n i n g  r o o m  o f  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  L a n s b u r y  w r o t e ,  i t  
w a s  " a  l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e a l i s e  t h e  c l a s s  w a r  a n d  a l l  t h e s e  t w o  w o r d s  m e a n  
i n  m o r a l ,  m e n t a l  a n d  m a t e r i a l  d e g r a d a t i o n  t o  t h o s e  w h o  r e m a i n  i n  t h e  m e n t a l  
a n d  m a t e r i a l  a b y s s  f r o m  w h i c h  w e  h a v e ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  a  t i m e ,  e s c a p e d " .  T h e  I r i s h  
P a r n e l l i t e s  h a d  a c t e d  a s  " f o r e i g n e r s  a n d  s t r a n g e r s  i n  a n  a l i e n  l a n d " .  T h i s  w a s  
a  p o l i c y ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,  w h i c h  i t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  " w i s e  f o r  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  t o  
h a v e  a d o p t e d " .  S o c i a l i s t s  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  m u s t  a l w a y s  b e a r  i n  m i n d  t h a t  
t h e y  w e r e  " e n g a g e d  i n  a  w a r  a g a i n s t  a l l  t h e  m a n - m a d e  e v i l s  o f  t o d a y " ,  a n d  t h a t
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w h o e v e r  w a s  n o t  w i t h  t '  e m  w a s  a g a i n s t  t h e m ,  h o w e v e r  k i n d  a n d  g o o d  o f  h e a r t ' w .
A n e u r i n  B e v a n ,  s o m e w h a t  l a t e r ,  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  y o u n g  H P ’ s  f i r s t  i m p r e s s i o n
m i g h t  b e  t h a t  h e  w a s  i n  c h u r c h :  v a u l t e d  r o o f s  a n d  s t a i n e d  g l a s s  v / i n d o w s ,  r o w s
o f  s t a t u e s ,  s o f t - f o o t e d  a t t e n d a n t s  a n d  w h i s p e r e d  c o n v e r s a t i o n s  c o n t r a s t e d
" d e p r e s s i n g l y  w i t h  t h e  c r o w d e d  m e e t i n g s  a n d  t h e  c l a n g  a n d  c l a s h  o f  h o t  o p i n i o n s "
w h i c h  h e  h a d  l e f t  b e h i n d  i n  h i s  e l e c t i o n  c a m p a i g n .  I t  s e e m e d  t h a t  h a v i n g
h ea r r i v e d ,  a  t r i b u n e  o f  t h e  p e o p l e ,  w a s  " e x p e c t e d  t o  w o r s h i p ;  a n d  t h e  m o s t
7 9c o n s e r v a t i v e  o f  a l l  r e l i g i o n s  -  a n c e s t o r  w o r s h i p "  ' «  M e m b e r s  c a m e  t o  t h e  H o u s e ,
W e d g w o o d  t o l d  t h e  1 9 2 1  I . L . P .  c o n f e r e n c e ,  " f u l l  o f  e n t h u s i a s m ,  a n d  i t  w a s
o  0g r a d u a l l y  k i l l e d .  A n y  l i t t l e  i n i t i a t i v e  w a s  r e g a r d e d  a s  r e v o l u t i o n " ^  .
K i r k w o o d ,  u n d a u n t e d ,  t o l l  t h e  H o u s e  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  h i s  e l e c t i o n  t h a t  
h e  w o u l d  " c r e a t e  a  n e w  a t m o s p h e r e  i n  t h i s  b u i l d i n g " ,  a n d  " s m a s h "  t h a t  w h i c h  
p r e v a i l e d .  I f  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  o r  a n y o n e  e l s e  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  
" t r a n q u i l l i t y  i n  t h i s  H o u s e " ,  o r  t h a t  h e  w o u l d  " k o w - t o w  a n d  b o w  d o w n  t o  
a l l  t h e  s y m b o l s  o f  t h i s  a w f u l , a c c u r s e d  s y s t e m " ,  t h e y  h a d ,  h e  d e c l a r e d ,  " n e v e r
3lm a d e  a  b i g g e r  m i s t a k e  i n  t h e i r  l i v e s " ' " ’ '  •  T h e  m i s t a k e ,  i t  s t e a d i l y  b e c a m e  c l e a r ­
e r ,  w a s  Kirkwood' s .  W h e n  h e  a r r i v e d  t o  t h e .  H o u s e ,  h e  r e c a l l e d ,  h e  " h a t e d  t h e m  
a l l • . T h e y  r e p r e s e n t e d  a n  a u t h o r i t y  a g a i n s t  w h i c h  I  w a s  i n  r e v o l t . .  T h e y  a n d  
t h e  w o r l d  t h e y  r e p r e s e n t e d  w e r e  c r u s h i n g  m y  f e l l o w s  d o w n  i n t o  p o v e r t y ,  m i s e r y ,  
d e s p a i r  a n d  d e a t h " .  Y e t  h e  f o u n d  h e  h a d  t o  s h a k e  h i m s e l f  a s '  h e  f o u n d  h i m s e l f  
" m o v i n g  a b o u t  a n d  t a l k i n g  w i t h  m e n  w h o s e  n a m e s  w e r e  h o u s e h o l d  w o r d s " ;  a n d  i t  
w a s  " m o r e  s t r a n g e "  t o  " f i n d  t h e m  a l l  s o  s i m p l e  a n d  u n a f f e c t e d  a n d  f r i e n d l y " •
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H e  h a d  o f t e n  b e e n  w a r n e d  b y  h i s  s o c i a l i s t  f r i e n d s  a g a i n s t  t h e  " a i r "  o f  t h e  
H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ;  a n d  l i e  f o u n d  t h e  w a r n i n g  a  n e c e s s a r y  o n e .  H e  w a s  a p p r o a c h e d  
b y  m . ' ° .  O ’ C o n n o r ,  i n  h i s  t i m e  a  P a r n e l l i t e  b u t  n o w  t h e  " f a t h e r  o f  t h e  H o u s e " ,  
a b o u t  t h e  u n w r i t t e n  b y t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  f i r m  " c o d e "  w h i c h  g o v e r n e d  i t s  d e l i b e r a t ­
i o n s .  T h e  c o u n t e s y  a n d  i n t i m a c y  a m o n g  m e m b e r s ,  t h e  l a t e r  L o r d  K i r k w o o d  r e c a l l e d
3 2h e  " l e a r n e d  t o  u n d e r f e t a n d "  .  T h e  s h o p  s t e w a r d  t y p e ,  a  w r i t e r  i n  t h e  F o r t n i g h t  
l y  R e v i e w  r e m a r k e d  o f  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  w a s  " l i t t l e  t o  i t s  l i k i n g " .  H i l l s ,
~  '  o  -r
h o w e v e r ,  a  L a b o u r  M P ,  h q d  " t o n e d  d o w n  n o t  a  l i t t l e  s i n c e  h e  e n t e r e d  t h e  H o u s e " * 5 . 
T h e  1 W i l d  M e n 1  f r o m  t h e  n o r t h ,  e q u a l l y ,  w r o t e  t h e  N a t i o n a l  R e v i e w ,  w h o  h a d  
" l i t t l e  r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  g a m e  a s  u n d e r s t o o d  a n d  p l a y e d  b y  o l d e r  
P a r t i e s ' ?  a n d  n o n e  f o r  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e c o r u m " ,  w o u l d  a s s u r e d l y  " l e a r n  c o n d u c t
BA-b e f o r e  t h e y  c a n  h o p e  t o  s e r v e  t h e i r  c a u s e "  •
T h e  a d a p t a t i o n  t o  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  ’ g a m e ’  w a r s  a  g e n e i  
a n d  p o w e r f u l ,  b u t  n o t  a l w a y s  a  s m o o t h  p r o c e s s .  J a m e s  M a x t o n ,  a n o t h e r  C l y d e s i d e  
' r e b e l ' ,  a c c u s e d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  e c o n o m i s i n g  o n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  i n f a n t  
w e l f a r e  f a c i l i t i e s  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  t h e  l i v e s  o f  s o m e  o f  t h e  c h i l d r e n .  T h i s ,  
h e  c h a r g e d ,  w a s  " m u r d e r " ,  and a  " f e a r f u l  t h i n g  f o r  a n y  m a n  t o  h a v e  o n  h i s  s o u l  
a  c o l d ,  c a l l o u s ,  d e l i b e r a t e  o r i f f l e  t o  s a v e  m o n e y " .  M a x t o n  r e f u s e d  t o  w i t h d r a w ;
a n d  a c c o r d i n g l y  h e ,  a n d  t h r e e  c o l l e a g u e s  w h o  r e p r e a t s d  h i s  c h a r g e ,  w e r e  s u s p e n d
o f  c  6
e d  M a c D o n a l d ' s  r e a c t i o n  w a s  r e p i o r t e d l y  o n e  o f  d e s p a i r  •  F o r  p a r l i a m e n t  d r y
w o r k ,  M o  i n s i s t e d ,  m u s t  b e  " c o n d u c t e d  u n d e r  r e s t r a i n s t " •  S u c h  o u t b u r s t s  w e r e
" n o  i n d i c a t i o n  w h a t e v e r  o f  a .  m e n t a l  a t t i t u d e  w h i c h  m u s t  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  f r e q u e n t
r e p e t i t i o n  o f  s u c h  p r o c e e d i n g s " .  T h e i r  o n l y  r e d e e m i n g  f e a t u r e  w a s  t h a t  t h e y
h  I p  a  "  .  1  ' ■  f . i s e "  P a i r l i  t !  t  a r i d  t o  " s u w  i  t  . . .  3  .  i l y  S l s e ' p i n g
s i c k n e s s  a n d  t h e  c o u n t r y  f r o m  p o l i t i c a l  c h a o s  a n d  f u r o r . !  a  c o n d e m n a t i o n  o f  a l l
8 7p o l i t i c i a n s  w h i c h  h a s  e v e r  b e e n  t h e  o p e n i n g  c h a p t e r  o f  f r u i ' t l e s  . •  < r o l u t i o n s "  #
' d i d  a . , y  o f  t h e  ' r e b e l s '  a p p e a r  i n c l i n e d  t o  l a u n c h  a n  e x t r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
- i g i t & t i o n .
W i t h o u t  s u g g e s t i n g  a  n e c e s s a r y  c o n n e c t i o n ,  i t  w a s  a t  l e a s t  r  . '  b i o
t h a t  t h e  p a r t y ' s  g r o w i n g  m o d e r a t i o n  w a s  c l o s e l y  p a r a l l e l e d  b y  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t
o f  i t s  c e n t r a l  a p p a r a t u s .  T h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  s t a f f  b e f o r e  t h e  w a r  h a d b e e n
o  q
e l e v e n  ;  b y  1 9 1 9 1 t h i s  n u m b e r  h a d  i n c r e a s e d  b o  f o r t y - s e V e n 0 " .  T h e  w o r k  a t  h b a d -
q u a r t e r s  w a s  n o w  d i v i d e d  I n t o  d e p a r t m e n t s , ,  a n d  a n  O - r g s  L  i n g  S e c r e t a r y  f o r  t h e
S c o t t i s h  a r e a  h a d  b e e n  a p p o i n t e d *  A r r a n g e m e n t s  w e r e  b e i n g  m a d e  f o r  t h e  a p p o i n t -
o f  l o c a l  a g e n t s .  A n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  s u b s c r i p t i o n  w a s  s o u g h t ,  a n d  o b t a i n e d  
8 9c h e  following year y. In 1 9 2 0  t h e  c o n f  e r e  i  _  I t h a t  a  n e w  h e  a d  q u a r t ­
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e r s  b u i l d i n g  h a d  b e e n  p u r c h a s e d  a t  E c c l e c t o n  S q u a r e ;  a n d  t h a t  a  " b i g
i n c r e a s e "  w o u l d  b e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  p a r t y ’ s  a c c o u n t : .  .  l e r  :: h e  h e a d i n g  o f  s a l a r i e s
9 0a n d  w a g e s  •  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  a  " s t e a d y  u p b u i l d i n g  o f  c o n s t i t u e n c y  o r g a n x s -  
i > n  a l l  o v e r  t h e  c o u n t r y ”  w a s  r e p o r t e d .  T h e  c o u n t r y  h a d  b e e n  d i v i d e d  i n t o
n i n e  o r g a n i z i n g  d i s t r i c t s ,  e a c h  w i t h  i t s  o w n  D i s t r i c t  O r g a n i s e r  a n d  W o m a n
9 1O r g a n i s e r  ,  O r g a n i s a t i o n a l  e x p e n s e s ,  u n d e r s t a n d a b l y ,  h a d  ’ ’ v e r y  l a r g e l y
i n c r e a s e d ”  b y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r . L o c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  h a d  e x p a n d e d  a n d  d e v e l o p e d .
T h e  N a t i o n a l  A g e n t  d r e w  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  f a c t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  u n e m p l o y m e n t  h a d
b e c o m e  a  s o u r c e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  e m b a r r a s s m e n t  t o  t h e  l o c a l  p a r t i e s ;  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l
d i s p u t e s ,  h e  r e m a r k e d  s t e r n l y ,  h a d  l e d  t o  " s e r i o u s  i n t e r r u p t i o n s ”  i n  o r g a n i s ­
e sa t i o n a l  w o r k "  .
T h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y ,  t o  M a c D o n a l d ,  w a s  t h e  " h e r e d i t a r y  h e i r  o f  L i b e r a l i s m ” ;  a n d
9 3i t  r e t a i n e d  " e v e r y t h i n g  o f  p e r m a n e n t  v a l u e  t h a t  w a s  i n  L i b e r a l i s m "  .  L i b e r a l ­
i s m ,  i t  e m e r g e d ,  w a s  a  p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h y  w h o s e  p e r m a n e n t  v a l u e  h e  f o u n d  
v e r y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n d e e d .  B T h e  s a m e  c o u l d  n o t  b e  s a i d ,  h o w e v e r ,  o f  t h e  w o r k  
o f  M a r x ,  o r  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r  o f  H e g e l ,  w h o s e  d i a l e c t i c  M a c D o n a l d  p r o n o u n c e d  
" t o o  s h a l l o w  f o r  b i o l o g i c a l  e v o l u t i o n ” .  I t s  " c o n t o r t i n g  s p e c t a c l e s "  h a d ,  
m o r e o v e r ,  t h e  g r a v e  s h o r t c o m i n g  t h a t  t h e y  c o u l d  n o t  b e  " d i s s o c i a t e d  . . f r o m  t h e  
i d e a s  o f  c a t a s t r o p h e  a n d  r e v o l u t i o n ” .  V i e w s  o f  i n a i c i d u a l  a n d  s o c i a l  g r o w t h ,  
h e  w r o t e ,  h a d  b e e n  " p r o f o u n d l y  m o d i f i e d ”  s i n c e  M a r x  h a d  b e g u n  h i s  w o r k ;  a n d
h i s  v i e w s  -  t h e i r  l a r g e l y  E n g l i s h  s o u r c e  o f  r e f e r e n c e  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  -  h e
9kf o u n d  " u n f i t t e d  f o r  o u r  h i s t o r i c a l  s o i l " "  .
N o t  s i m p l y  M a r x  a n d  H e g e l ,  b u t  a  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  s o c i e t y  a n d  s o c i e t a l
c h a n g e  a s  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s  w a s  p r p u d i a t e d
b y  t h e  L a b o u r  l e a d e r s .  T h e  ” ’ c l a s s  w a r ’  i d e a ” ,  w r o t e  M a c d o n a l d ,  b e l o n g e d  t o
t h e  " p r e - s o c i a l i s t  a n d  p r e - s c i e n t i f i c  p h a s e  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  M o v d m e n t " .  S o c i a l i s m
c o u l d  t a k e  n o  p a r t  i n  a  " p u r e l y  h o r i z o n t a l  t u g - o f - w a r  b e t w e e n  t h e  w o r k i n g  a n d
t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  c l a s s " .  H e  r e j e c t e d  t h e  " c r u d e  n o t i o n  o f  a  c l a s s  w a r " .  A l l
" b a r r i e r  p h r a s e s  a n d  s e c t i o n a l  d o g m a s ”  m u s t  b e  r e m o v e d  f r o m  . s o c i a l i s m :  t o r
s o c i a l i s m  m a r k e d  t h e  " g r o w t h  o f  S o c i e t y ,  n o t  t h e  u p r i s i n g  o f  a  c l a s s ,  a n d  t h e
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  w h i c h  i t  s o u & J j t t t o  a r o u s e  w a s  W h o t  o n e  o f  e c o n o m i c  c l a s s  s o l i d a r -  1
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i t y ,  b u t  o n e  o f  s o c i a l  u n i t y  a n d  g r o w t h  t o w a r d s  o r g a n i c  w h o l e n e s s "  •  T h e  I . L . P .  
h a d  n e v e r  b e l o n g e d ,  h e  w r o t e ,  t o  a n y  " h a r d ,  d o g m a t i c  s c h o o l  l i k e  M a r x i s m ,  w i t h
h a r d  e x p l a n a t i o n s ,  e . g  c l a s s  w a r . . " .  I n d e e d  c l a s s  c o n f l i c t ,  h e  m a i n t a i n e d  i n  
h i s  " S o c i a l i s m  f o r  B u s i n e s s m e n " ,  w a s  t h e  " w o r s t  t h i n g  t h a t  c a n  o v e r t a k e  s o c i t t y ’. 1
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H e  p r e f e r r e d  t . i e  " w o n d e r f u l  t a l e 1 1  o f  b i o l o g i c a l  e v o l u t i o n i s m ,  f o r  b y  t h e  v e r y
n a t u r e  o x  i o s  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  i t  " h a d  t o  r e j e c t  e x p l a n a t i o n s  w h i c h  a s s u m e d
0 7
s u d d e n  c h a n g e s  o r  s p e c i a l  c r e a t i v e  f i a t s " " ' .  O r g a n i c c c h a n g e ,  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  
w a s  t n e  " o n l y  t r u e  m o v e m e n t  o x  c o n s e r v a t i o n " ;  a n d  i f  o f f e r e d  " i n c r e a s i n g
~ qO
s e c u r i t y  a g a i n s t  c a t a c l y s m i c  c h a n g e ,  a n d  a .  g r e a t e r  g u a r a n t e e  a g a i n s t  r e v o l u t i o n ! /  
T o  t a l k  01 r e v o l u t i o n  a s  a .  s o c i a l i s t  m e t h o d  w a s  i n  a n y  c a s e  w r o n g ,  i n  
M a c D o n a l d ’ s  v i e w .  I t  w a s  t o  b e  r e g r e t t e d  t h a t  i n  o r d e r  t o  k e e p  up a n  " h o n o u r e d  
b u t  a n t i q u a t e d  p h r a s e o l o g y ,  s o m e  S o c i a l i s t s  u s e  t h e  w o r d  r e v o l u t i o n  t o  i n d i c a t e
QQ
w h a t  t h e y  h a v e  i n  m i n d " "  •  T h e  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  B o l s h e v i k  r e v o l u t i o n  was, h e  
Admitted, " a l l u r i n g ” ;  b u t  t o  p l a n  a  r e v o l u t i o n  in order t o  impose a n e w  s y s t em
o n  s o c i e t y  w a s ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,  " f o l l y  o r  w o r s e "  ~  ~  •  S n o w d e n  s h a r e d  h i s  d i s t a b t e
f o r  " e x p e r i m e n t s  i n  t h e o r i e s  a n d  d o g m a s " " ' - ' " .  B r i t i s h  B o l s h e v i k s  w e r e ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,
i c w  i n  n u m b e r ;  b u t  t h i s  w a s  n o t  i n  i t s e l f  a n  " a s s u r a n c e  o f  i m m u n i t y  f r o m  t h e
d a n g e r  o f  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  G r e a t  B r i t a i n " ,  s i n c e  s u c h  e l e m e n t s  w e r e  " m o r e  d a n g e r o u s
t h a n  t h e i r  m e r e  n u m b e r s  w o u l d  s u g g e s t " .  T h e r e  h a d  b e e n  a  " r e a l  d a n g e r "  j u s t
b e f o r e  t h e  w o r l d  w a r  t h a t  " b l i n d  i g n o r a n c e "  a n d  " c l a s s  h a t r e d "  i  '  t  l e a d  t o
102c o m l i c t  a n d  " s o c i a l  c o n v u l s i o n "  .  T o , i m a g i n e ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h a t  i t  w a s  
p o s s i b l e  t o  o v e r t h r o w  a  c o m p l i c a t e d  s y s t e m  s u c h  a s  c a p i t a l i s m  b y  " s o m e  r e v o l u t ­
i o n a r y  a c t "  a n d  i n  i t s  p l a c e  i m m e d i a t e l y  t o  i n s t a l  t h e  S o c i a l i s t  C o m m o n w e a l t h  
w a d  t o  " r e p u d i a t e  t h e  w h o l e  o f  S o c i a l i s t  t e a c h i n g  u p o n  e c o n o m i c  a n d  s o c i a l  
e v o l u t i o n " ' " ' " '  .
H e  k n e w  p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  o f  t h e x  r a i l w a y  m a n a g e r s  p e r s o n a l l y ,  w r o t e  
J . H .  T h o m a s ;  a n d  h e  h a d  " n o  h e s i t a t i o n "  i n  s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  " g e n t l e m e n ,
.  n o t  o n l y  o f  a b i l i t y ,  b u t  o f s  c h a r a c t e r  a n d  c o u r a g e " .  T h e  s a m e  c o u l d  n o t  b e  
s a i d ,  h o w e v e r ,  o f  " e x t r e m i s t s  -  l i t t l e  b o d i e s  o f  m e n  w h o ,  i n  s o m e  p a r t  o r  o t h e r  
01 t h e  c o u n t r y ,  t a l k  b e h i n d  t h e i r  h a n d s  o n e  w i t h  a n o t h e r  a n d  c r e a t e  a  f a l s e  
s e n s e  o f  a n t a g o n i s m  a n d  e n m i t y  t o  t h e  r u l i n g  c l a s s e s " .  T h e y  d i d  n o t  w a n t  
" R u s s i a n  m e t h o d s "  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ;  a n d  c l a s s  w a r  w a d  " n o t  d e s i r a b l e " ,  s i n c e  i t  
w o u l d  l e a d  t o  a  " b l o o d y  u p h e a v a l " ' " ' 1 .  A  b u s i n e s s m a n  w a s  i n  a n y  c a s e  a  " d e s i r a ­
b l e  a n d  u s e f u l  c i t i z e n  r e n d e r i n g  a  g r e a t  s e r v i c e  t o  t h e  c o m m u n i t y " .  B y  a l l  m e a n s  
l e t  h i m  r e c e i v e  a  " r e a s o n a b l e  r e t u r n "  u p o n  h i s  c a p i t a l ' 1 '  ‘ " .  H e  u n d e r s t a n d a b l y  
w a s  i n  c o m m o n  w i t h  M a c D o n a l d  a n d  S n o w d e n  i n  o p p o s i n g  " a n y  t o o  f a i t h f u l  a d h e r e n c e  
t o  e c o n o m i c  d o g m a  o r  p o l i t i c a l  p r i n c i p l e "  '  ' " .
M a c D o n a l d  w a s  c o n c e r n e d  a t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  r o l e  o f  p a r l i a ­
m e n t ,  f o r  h e  r e g a r d e d  t h e  s t a t e  " n o t  a s  a n t a g o n i s t i c " ,  a n d  w a s  c o n v i n c e d  o f  t h e  
n e e d  t o  d e f e n d  i t  a g a i n s t  " d e m a g o g u e s ,  c h e a p  j a c k s  a n d  o t h e r  t y p e s  o f  p e r v e r t e r s "
Tl
u  W a s  p e o p l e  s u c h  Be   smerted  t h a t  s o c i a l !  who s t i l l  o c l i e v o d  i n
a c t i o n  w e r e ,  h e t l  . :
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c a p i t a l i s t  s y s t e m  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  p r o f e s s e d  o p i n i o n s " .  I t  v / a s ,  i n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n ­
c e s ,  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  h e  s h o u l d  f i n d  c o m m u n i s m  t o  h a v e  " p r e s e n t e d  v e r y
t r o u b l e s o m e  a n d  u n p l e a s a n t  p r o b l e m s  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  S o c i a l i s t  g o v e r n m e n t s
1 0 7e s t a b l i s h e d  s i n c e  t h e  w a r "  •  T o  M a c D o n a l d ,  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  
e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t  o f  t h e  w o r k i n g  c l a s see, t h e  s t a t e  h a d  b e c o m e  for t h e  s o c i a l i s t  
" h i s  a l l y ,  n o t  h i s  r i v a l " ;  a n d  t h e  a p p r o a c h  t o  s o c i a l i s m  m u s t  b e  " b y  t h e
“I qQ
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  m e t h o d " -  •  A  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  e l e c t i o n ,  h e  d e c l a r e d ,  w o u l d  g i v e  
t h e  L a b o u r  p a r t y  " a l l  t h e  p o w e r  t h a t .  L e n i n  h a d  t o  g e t  b y  a  r e v o l u t i o n "  *  T h i s  
v / a s  n o b  n e c e s s a r i l y  a  d e f e n c e  o f  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  i t s  e x i s t i n g  f o r m .  I n d e e d  i t s  
r e f o r m  v / a s  n e c e s s a r y  p r e c i s e l y  i n  o d d e r  t o  W h o l d  t h e  f i e l d  a g a i n s t  r e v o l u t i o n ­
a r y  m e t h o d s " .  I t  v / a s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  " a m e n d  a n d  r e c o n s t r u c t "  i n  o r d e r  t o  b r i n g  
P a r l i a m e n t  " a g a i n  i n t o  o r g a n i c  t o u c h  w i t h  n a t i o n a l  l i f e " “ ~  •  I t  v / a s ,  i n d e e d ,  t o  
L a b o u r  P a r t y  *  s  c r e d i t  t h a t  i t  n i g h t  c l a i m  t o  h a v e  " r e v i v e d  t h e  l i f e  o f  
P a r l i a m e n t "  •
M  . - ' a  I d  h a d  l i t t l x  S y m p a t h y  w i t h  u n o f f i c i a l  s t r i k e s  ( o r  e v e n  w i t h
o f f i c i a l  o n e s ) .  T h e  u n i o n ,  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e  " p r o p e r  v / a y "  f o r
p r o m o t i n g  a  v / a g e  c l a i m ;  a n d  t h o s e  w h o  e n c o u r a g e d  u n o f f i c i a l  a c t i o n  w e r e  " o n l y  
112m i s c h i e f - m a k e r s "  .  T h e y  m o u l d  n i t  a l l o w  " o u r  B r i t i s h  t r a d e  u n i o n  m o v e m e n t "
t o  b e  " d a m a g e d . ,  b y  h o t - h e a d e d  i n d u s t r i a l s " ^ " ^ .  T h e  r e s p o n s i b l e  t r a d e  u n i o n
l e a d e r  d i d  " n o t  l i k e  s t r i k e s " ,  w r o t e  S n o w d e n :  n o r  d i d  h e  h i m s e l f .  H e  u r g e d
o h o  m i n e r -  k .  d i e  s u m m e r  o f  1920  t o  a c c e p t  a  s e t t l e m e n t  " w i t h o u t  i n f l i c t i n g
l l A -u p o n  c h e  o o n  . . u n i t y  s u c h  a  c a l a m i t y  a s  a n  e n t i r e  s t o p p a g e  o f  w o r k "  •  C l y n e s
11 or m l y  o p p o s e d  s t r i k e s  " l i k e  w a r s "  T h o m a s  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  f o r  a s  l o n g  a s  h e
c o u l d  r e m e m b e r ,  h e  h a d  n o t  f a i l e d  t o  d i s g u i s e  h i s  a n t i p a t h y  t o  c l a s s  w a r f a r e .
" C o n s t a n b l y  I  u r g e d  t h e s e  v i e v / s  o n  t h e  r  i l v / a y m e n " ;  a n d  n o  d o u b t  i n  p a r t  a s  a
-  a l t  o f  h i s  l a b o u r s ,  t h e r e  v / a s ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,  n o  i n d u s t r y  i n  w h i c h  t h e  p e r s o n a l
r e l a t i o n s  o f  e m p l o y e r s  a n d  e m p l o y e d  w e r e  m o r e  f r i e n d l y  c h a n  i n  t h e  r a i l w a y
l " i  3s e r v i c e  ~  •  T h e  g o o d w i l l  o f  t h e  w o r k e r s ,  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  v / a s  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t
' t r e m e n d o u s  a s s e t s  i n  c o m m e r c e " .  T h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  u p o n  c o m p a n y  b o a r d s
I d * .  ]  .  . . . /  t h e f f l  t o  s e : :  m o r e  o f  b h e  e m p l o y e r ' s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,
"  j  .  i  e r . s e  w a y  t o w a r d s  o b l i t e r a t i n g  t h e  c h a n c e s  o f  f r i c t i o n " .  S p e c i a l
i n s  s h o u l d  e q u n l l y  b e  p r o v i d e d  t o  t a k e  t h e  v / o r j j e r s  a n d  t h e i r  f a m i l i e s  t o
t h e  s e a s i d e .  T h e  d i m i n u s t i o n  o f  u n r e s t  w o u l d  i n  t u r n  a l l o w  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s
t o  b e  g i v e n  " g r e a t e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . ,  t o  m a i n t a i n  d i s c i p l i n e " .  H e  f o r  o n e
1 1 7h  " h o t  f i t ]  r a n i  :  s i  i k e s "  .  E  . trace 1 1  j i i e r  . g r e e d
c h a t  t h e  s t r i k e  s h o u l d  b e  o n l y  a  " l a & t  r e s o u t c e " ,  s i n c e  i t  p u t  t h e  " w h o l e
j(y
c o m m u n i t y ,  . n f  c h i e f l y  L e  p o o r ,  u n d e r  p e n a l t y ” .  l i e  u r g e d  r a t h e r  a n  a p p e a l
t h r o u g h  t h e  b a l l o t - b o x  t o  t h e  ’ ’ i n h e r e n t  g o o d a e w i l l  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  o f  t h e  
118n a t i o n ”  •  T . .  e  p i  o y e r ,  i t  a p p e a r e d *  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  d e t e r m i n e d  a t t a c k  
M p c  ~  l i s t i n g  w a g e  l e v e l s  w h i c h  w a s  t a k i n g  p l a c e  a t  t h i s  t i m e ,  v / a s  b a s i c a l l y  
a  g o o d - h e a r t e d  f e l l o w ,  v / l i o  m i g h t  b e  p e r s u a d e d  t o  s e t  a s i d e  h i s  i n t e r e s t s  v / h e n  
i n f o r m e d  o f  t h e  s u f f e r i n g  a n d  m i s e r y  t o  w h i c h  t h e y  h a d  g i v e n  r i s e .  I t  w a s  n o t *
p e r h a p s ,  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  l a b o u r  s p o k e s m e n  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s
.  . a n d  t h e i r . a c h i e v e m e n t s  s c r u t i n i s e d .  . .  .  -.119m i g h t  b e  1 u l  11 l i e c i A o n l y  x n  a n o t h e r ,  s p i r i t u a l  w o r l d
’ C o n s t r u c t i v e  s o c i a l i s m ’ ,  i n  M a c D o n a l d ’ S  v i e w ,  s u g g e s t e d  a n  e x t e n s i o n
o f  s t a t e  o w n e r s h i p , ,  t o  b e  u n d e r t a k e n  b y  a  v a r i e t y  o f  m e t h o d s ;  b u t  n o n e  o f  t h e m ,
h e  t h o u g h t ,  c o u l d  ” b e  c a l l e d  c o n f i s c a t i o n  w i t h  a n y  j u s t i c e ” .  I n d e e d ,  s o  f a r
f r o m  m a n i f e s t i n g  a n  a n t i p a t h y  t o w a r d s  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  i t  v / a s  t o  h i m  p r e c i s e l y  g
” o n e  o f  t h e  g r a v e s t  c h a r g e s "  t o  b e  b r o u g h t  a g a i n s t  c a p i t a l i s m  t h a t  t h e  ’ ’ m a j o r i t y
120o f  p e o p l e  c a n  n e v e r  a c q u i r e  e n o u g h  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y ”  .  T h o m a s  d e d i c a t e d  h i s
b o o k  ’ V / h e n  L a b o u r  R u l e s '  t o  t h e  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  l a c k  o f  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r
t h e  " i n s t i n c t i v e  a n t a g o n i s m  o f  t h e  a v e r a g e  b u s i n e s s  m a n  t o  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  L a b o u r
b e i n g  i n  p o w e r ” .  H e  s o u g h t  f o r  w o r k i n g  p e o p l e  o n l y  a  m o r e  r e a s o n a b l e  s h a r e  o f
t h e  " d e c e n c i e s  a n d  c o m f o r t s  -  n o t  l u x u r i e s ,  n o t e  -  o f  l i f e " .  M o r e  t h a n  t h i s
w o u l d  b e  " a n a r c h y " .  T h e r e  w o u l d  b e  " n o  B o l s h e v i s m " ;  a n d  i n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  i n c o m e
t a x  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s  m a n  w o u l d ,  h e  p r e d i c t e d ,  " b e n e f i t  c o n s i d e r a b l y " .  K i n g ,
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  E m p i r e ,  a n d  p u b l i c  s c h o o l s  h a d  n o t h i n g  t o  f e a r ;  a n d  L a b o u r  r u l e
1w o u l d ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,  " l a r g e l y  o b l i t e r a t e  s t r i k e s " ,  a n d  p r o v i d e  i n d u s t r i a l  p e a c e ‘ “ 7  
S n o w d e n  o u t l i n e s  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  a  f u t u r e  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  a  s e r i e s  
o f  a r t i c l e s  i n  t h e  H o r n i n g  P o s t ,  r e p r i n t e d  i n  a  v o l u m e  m o r e  d i p l o m a t i c a l l y  
e n t i t l e d  R i f  L a b o u r  R u l e s " .  T h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r s  w o u l d  n e v e r  v o t e  f o r  
t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y ,  h e  b e l i e v e d ,  u n l e s s  a s s u r e d  c h a t  s u c h  a  g o v e r n m e n t  w o u l d  b e  
c o n t r o l l e d  b y  c o m m o n - s e n s e  a n d  m o d e r a t i o n .  S n o w d e n  l e f t  h i s  r e a d e r s  i n  l i t t l e  
d o u b t  t h a t  s u c h  w o u l d  b e  t h e  c a s e .  I t  w o u l d  n o t  b e  a  " c l a s s  g o v e r n m e n t " ;  i n d e e d ,  
i t  w o u l d  b e  l e s s  o f  a  c l a s s  g o v e r n m e n t  t h a n  a n y  o f  i t s  p r e d e c e s s o r s ,  a n d  m i g h t  
b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  b e  t h e " f i r s t  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  w h o l l y  t o  s u b o r d i n a t e  
c l a s s  i n t e r e s t s  t o  n a t i o n a l  w e l f a r e " .  I t  w o u l d  n o t  b e  c o m p o s e d  " m e r e l y  o f  t h e  
m a n u a l  l a b o u r  c l a s s " .  A  C o n s i d e r a b l e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t y ' s  m e m b e r s ,  i n  f a c t ,  
w e  r e  o f  m i d d l e  c l a s s  o r i g i n s ,  a n d  i t  h a d  a s  m e m b e r s  " m a n u f a c t u r e r s . ,  a n d  e v e n  
l a n d e d  p r o p r i e t o r s " .  A  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  w o u l d  " c e r t a i n l y  c o n t a i n  m a n y  m e n  o f  
t h i s  t y p e " .  I t  w o u l d  p u r s u e  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o u r s e ;  a n d  h e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  i t  
t o  " e r r  r a t h e r  o n  t h e  s i d e  o f  c o n s e r v a t i s m  t h a n  o f  ’ e x t r e m i s m ’ " .  T h e  " s o u n d
p r o g r e s s i v e  p o l i c y "  w h i c h  h e  h a d  o u t l i n e d  v / a s  n o t ,  h e  d e c l a r e d ,  e x t r e m i s m ;  o n  
‘ ' h e  c o n t r a r y ,  s u c h  a  p o l i c y  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  " b e s t  a n t i d o t e  t o  1  e x t r e m i s m *
T h e  p a r t y  c o u l d  n o t ,  m o r e o v e r ,  r e a s o n a b l y  b e  a c c u s e d  o f  i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o w a r d s  
t h e  B r i t i s h  E m p i r e ,  a n d  a c c o r d i n g l y  l i a b l e  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  l e f t - w i n g  m o v e m e n t s  
a n d  S o v i e t  p o l i c y  i n  B r i t i s h  p o s s e s s i o n s  i n  A s i a .  T h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  
h a d  " n o  s t r o n g  a f f e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  E m p i r e ,  w h i c h  i t  r e g a r d e d  a s  a n d  p r o d u c t  o f  
c o m m e r c i a l  g r e e d  a n d  I m p e r i a l i s t  a m b i t i o n s " ,  a n d  t h e  f e a r  t h a t  E m p i r e  a n d  
n a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  s a c r i f i c e d  i n  t h e  n a m e  o f  L a b o u r ' s  i d e a l  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,  
w e r e ,  S n o w d e n  d e c l a r e d ,  " q u i t e  w i t h o u t  s u b s t a n t i a l  f o u n d a t i o n " .  P a r t y  m e m b e r s  
h a d  b e e n  t h e  m o s t  p a t r i o t i c  o f  B r i t i s h  c i t i z e n s  d u r i n g  t h e  w o r l d  w a r ;  a n d  
S n o w d e n  h i m s e l f  p r o f e s s e d  a  " p r o f o u n d  f e e l i n g "  f o r  t h e  c l o s e n e s s  o f  t h e  t i e  
w h i c h  b o u n d  t h e  " a n g l o - S a x o n  D o m i n i o n s  t o  t h e  M o t h e r  L a n d " .  A  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
h e  v / a s  c e r t a i n ,  w o u l d  b e  " a s  j e a l o u s  o f  n a t i o n a l  h o n o u r ,  ( a n d )  a s  k e e n l y  a l i v e  
t o  t h e  g r e a t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  E m p i r e  D e v e l o p m e n t " ,  a s  a n y  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  
o f  t h e  p a s t “ ' " ^ .
I t  w a s  i n  a n y  c a s e  m i s l e a d i n g  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p a r t y ' s  t r a d i t i o n  t o
h a v e  b e e n  o n e  o f  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m .  H o b s o n ' s  s t u d y  o f  ' I m p e r i a l i s m ' ,  i t  h a s
b e e n  n o t e d ,  w a s  " n o t  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  L a b o u r  s e n t i m e n t " .  A s  l a t e  a s  1 9 4 3 j  t h e
L a b o u r  P a r t y  w a s  a b l e  t o  d e c l a r e  t h a t  " f o r  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  t i m e  t o  c o m e "  t h e
A f r i c a n  c o l o n i e s  w o u l d  " n o t  b e  r e a d y  f o r  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t " .  B e f o r e  1 9 1 4 ,  t h e
1 2 4p a r t y  " d a r e l y  e v e n  m e n t i o n e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y "  T h e  F a b i a n s '  m a n i f e s t o
" F a b i a n i s m  a n d  t h e  E m p i r e " ,  W h i c h  w a s  i s s u e d  i n  1 9 0 0  a s  a  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  v i e w  o n  t h e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  b y  t l i e  B o e r  W a r ,  b a l d l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
n o t i o n  t h a t  a  n a t i o n  h a d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  d o  w h a t  i t  p l e a s e d  w i t h  i t s  o w n  t e r r i t o r y ,  
w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  v / a s  " n o t  t e n a b l e  
i r o n  t h e  I n t e r n a t i c  l i s £  S o c i a l i s t  p o i n t  o f  v i e w " .  T h e  c o n d u c t  o f  t r a d e  d e m a ­
n d e d  a  s e t t l e d  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  p r e s e r v e  o r d e r ;  b u t  w h e n  a  n a t i v e  a d m i n i s t ­
r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  k i n d  v / a s  i m p o s s i b l e ,  " t h e  f o r e i g n  t r a d i n g  p o w e r  m u s t  s e t  o n e  
u p " .  T h i s  " i r r e s i s t i b l e  n a t u r a l  f o r c e "  w o u l d  l e a d  s o o n e r  o r  l a t e r  t o  t h e  
" i m p o s i t i o n  b y  t h e  P o w e r s  o f  c o m m e r c i a l  c i v i l i z a t i o n  o n  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  w h i c h  a r e  
s t i l l  r e f r a c t o r y  t o  u s " .  T h e  s t a t e  w h i c h  o b s t r u c t e d  " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c i v i l i s a t i o n "  
i n  s h o r t ,  w o u l d  " h a v e  t o  g o " .  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  t h e  n a t i v e  r a c e s
t h e  r e p o r t  c o n s i d e r e d  a  " d r e a m " :  t h e y  w e r e  " u s e l e s s "  t o  t h e  n a t i v e s ,  a n d  i n
1 2 5p a r t i c u l a r  " i m p r a c t i c a b l e  i n  I n d i a "  .  M a c D o n a l d ,  a n  e x e c u t i v e  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
S o c i e t y  f o r  m a n y  y e a r s ,  e x p r e s s  3  t h i s  p o i n t  o f  v i m . ;  f l  e t t  h e  w r o t e  o f  t h e
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• d u t y  o f  a  :  i i t y  t o  u ~ - d  t h e  b l e s s i n g s  o f  i  t s  c i v i l i z a t i o n  o v e r  t h e
e a r t h " *  T h e  " c o m p u l s i o n  t o  e x p a n d  a n d  t o  a s s u m e  w o r l d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " ,  h e
126w r o t e ,  w a s  " w o r t h y  a t  i t s  o r i g i n " - " -  .
K e i r  H a r d i e ,  w h o  v i s i t e d  I n d i a  i n  1 9 0 7 ,  f o u n d  a b u n d a n t  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  p e a s a n t  h a d  w o r s e n e d  u n d e r  B r i t i s h  r u l e -  H e  s u g g e s t e d  
a s  a  r e f o r m  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  a s  a  s e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  V i c e r o y  o f  a n  " e d u c a t e d  
I n d i a n  g e n t l e m a n " ;  a n d  u r g e d  a  s t a r t  t o w a r d s  " o p e n i n g  u p  t h e  \ y  f o r  t h e  
e d u c a t e d  I n d i a n  t o  f i l l  t h e  h i g h e r  a n d  b e t t e r  p a i d  p o s i t i o n s " .  T h i s  w a s  n e c c _ ~ ~  
a r y ,  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  i f  I n d i a  w a s  t o  b e  k e p t  " p
H a i t i  : h  “ c s j " :  t r  w a s  c e r t a i n l y " n o t  a r g u i n g  f o r  t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h
i r o n :  I n d i a " .  T f c e  C o n g r e s s  m o v e m e n t ,  h e  a r g u e d ,  w a s  " u l t r a - l o y a l " ;  b u t  t h e
i e  I  1 .  gx  t  :  - . t o  . a p  s i  r a t  i o n s  w o u l d  b r e e d  " f d i  s i  o  y  a l  t  y  \ a n d  d i s c  o n  t  e n g "
m i d  " i n  c c  t h e  s a f e t y  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  E m p i r e " *  R e p r e s s i o n  w o u l d  o n l y
i n t e n s i f y  t h e i r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  s e c u r e  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  m i g h t  l e a d  f i n a l l y
be t h e  " 1  3 f  vih i t  ’  V .  l a s  ; r i f e e d  •  . b r a  w t e s t  j e w e l  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h
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c r o v ; n " " ‘ " '  .  M a c d o n a l d ,  w r i t i n g  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  i d e n t i f i e d  a n o t h e r  ( a n d  e q u a l l y  
c o n t e m p o r a r y )  p r o b l e m *  " N a t i v e  b r e  i h r e n " ,  h e  u r f o d ^  u  : b e  c a r e d  f o r  s o  t h a t  
t h e y  m i g h t  " e n j o y  t h e  b l e s s i n g s  o f  t h e  m a t u r e d  c i v i l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  W e s t " .  I H  
E m p i r e  h a d  t o  f a c e ,  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n ,  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  t h e  ’ n a t i v e  q u e s t i o n ’
-  -  ’ o f  f c t t e  * i m m i g r a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  t h e n  w h i t e  r a c e s  i n t o  o u r  s e l f - g o v e r n i n g  
C o l o n i e s " *  " B r i t i s h  l i b e r t y " ,  h o w e v e r ,  h e  b e l i e v e d ,  h a d  " n e v e r  l a i d  d o w n  t h e  
d o c t r i n e  t h a t  f r e e  i m m i g r a t i o n  w a s  e s s e n t i a l " .  A  s t a t e  d e s i r i n g  t o  " p r o t e c t  
i t s  r a c i a l  p u r i t y "  m u s t  h a v e  t h e  " p o w e r  t o  e x c l u d e  u n d e s i r a b l e  i m m i g r a n t s "  a n d  
t o  " c l a s s i f y  w h o l e  r a c e s  a m o n g  t h e s e  u n d e s i r a b l e s " ,  w i t h o u t  " i n  a n y  w a y  v i o l a t -
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i n g "  t h e  I m p e r i a l  t r a d i t i o n s  w h i c h  d e m o c r a t s  w a u l ' d  sis' t i p  p  r e  e  h e
’ L a b o u r  a n d  t h e  N e w  S o c i a l  O r d e r 1  n o t e d  t h e s e  " m o r a l  c l a i m s  u p o n  u s  o f  
t h e  n o  ■ -  .  a i l r a c e s " .  T h e  L : u o u r  P a r t y  s t o o d ,  i t  s t a t e d ,  f o r  t h e  " m a i n t e n a n c e  
a n d * ,  p r o g r e s s i v e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  E m p i r e " ,  w i t h  a  v i e w  t o  f h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  
" B r i t a n n i c  A l l i a n c e ’ ’ ’ * ’ ^ .  T h e r e  w a s ,  S n o w d e n  i n s i s t e d ,  " a l l  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e "  
■ b e t w e e n  a  p o l i c y  o f  i m p e r i a l i s m ,  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  m e t h o d s  o f  c o n q u e s t  a n d  i n  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  c o m m e r c i a l i s m ,  m d  s i  " p o l i c y  o f  u n s e l f i s h  h e l p  t o  l e s s  a d v a n c e d  
p e o p l e s  t o  r a i s e  t h e m s e l v e s  i n  t h e  s c a l e  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n ” ' " ^ *  T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  
w a s  n o t  a l w a y s  s o  a p p a r e n t  t i b  t h e  c o l o n i a l  p e o p l e s  t h e m s e l v e s .
T h e  L a b o u r  £ a r t y  m a d e  n o  d e m a n d  f o r  I n d i a n  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  o r  e v e n  i m m e d ­
i a t e  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ,  b e f o r e  t h e  w a r  ^  .  T h e  1 9 1 8  g e n e r a l  . 1  3t i e  n i f e s t o ,  
h o w e v e r ,  c a l l e d  f o r  " f r e e d o m  f o r  Ireland and I n d i a " ,  a  s t a t u s  d e f i n e d  s o m e w h a t
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a r b i t r a r i l y  a s  s e l f - d e t c r : i i n a t i o n  w i t h i n  w h a t  w a s  n o v ;  t e r m e d  t h e  " B r i t i s h
1 3 2  ,C o m m o n w e a l t h  o f  F r e e  N a t i o n s "  ( E m p i r e ,  M a c D o n a l d  w r o t e ,  w a s  a n  " u n h a p p y
w o r d "  f o r  t h e  " f r e e s t  C o m m o n w e a l t h  i n  t h e  w o r l d " " ’ ' J ) .  T h e  r i g h t  o f  s e l f -
g o v e r n m e n t  f o r  I n d i a  w a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  1 9 2 1  e l e c t i o n  m a n i f e s t o ,  a l t h o u g h  i t
1 1 3 * fw a s  o m i t t e d  m  1 9  I t  "  •  B u t  r e f o r m ,  a s  t h e  L a b o u r  L e a d e r  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  w a s  t h e
" o n l y  p r e v e n t i v e  o f  r e v o l u t i o n " ;  a n d  t h a t  v / a s  w h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  p u b l i c  s h o u l d
r e m e m b e r  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a .  T h e y  h a d
a s  g r e a t  a  r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  B r i t i s h  E m p i r e  a s  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  l o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,
C l y n e s  i n s i s t e d ;  b u t  t h e y :  d i d  d i f f e r  a s  t o  t h e  m e t h o d s  w h i c h  m i g h t  e n s u r e  i t s
1 3 5p r e s e r v a t i o n  a n d  p r o s p e r i t y  a  #  L a b o u r *  s  m e t h o d s ,  t h o u g h t  C l y n e s ,  w e r e  m o r e  
l i k e l y  t o  k e e p  t h e  E m p i r e  t o g e t h e r ,  b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  e a c h  o f  
B r i t a i n *  s  o v e r s e a s  p o s s e s s i o n s  v / a s  " a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  i n  s p i r i t  a s  w e  a r e  o u r s e l v ­
e s " .  S o  f a r  f r o m  w i s h i n g  t o  l o s e  t h e  c o l o n i e s ,  t h e  p a r t y  v / a s  " t r y i n g  t o  k e e p  
t h e m " .  A s  S p o o r  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t h e  j u d i c i o u s  c o n c e s s i o n  o f  a  f o r m  o f  *  s e l f - d e t e r ­
m i n a t i o n 1  w i t h i n  t h e  E m p i r e  w o u l d  r e t a i n  a  c o l o n y  w i t h i n  t h e  E m p i r e ,  w h i l e  i t
w o u l d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  u n d e r m i n e  a n d  i s o l a t e  t h o s e  If e x t r e m i s t  s * ?  w h o  s o u g h t
136s e p a r a t i o n  x r o m  i t  *  A  p o l i c y  o f  r e p r e s s i o n  a n d  c o e r c i o n ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,
w a s  " t h e  d i r e c t i o n  i n  w h i c h  m a d n e s s  l i e s ,  a n d  u l t i m a t e l y  t h e  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n
1 3 7a n d  s m a s h - u p  o f  o u r  E m p i r e " " ' 1  «
A  r e s o l u t i o n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  h o m e  r u l e  f o r  I n d i a ,  a s  a  B r i t i s h  D o m i n i o n
w a s  c a r r i e d  a t  t h e  1 9 1 8  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e  a t  N o t t i n g h a m ;  b u t  i t  v / a s  c a r r i e d  a t
t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  m e e t i n g  w i t h o u t  d e b a t e ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  n u m b e r  o f  o t h e r  r e s o l u t -
1i o n s  f a v o u r i n g ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  E s p e r a n t o " - " ' .  T h e  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e  t w o  y e a r s  
l a t e r  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  a t  g r e a t e r  l e n g t h .  A  r e s o l u t i o n  w a s  a d & p t e d  
c a l l i n g  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  01 t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  " d e m o c r a t i c  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n "  
i n  I n d i a  i n  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  t o  s a t i s f y  a l l  t h e  " l e g i t i m a t e  a s p i r a t i o n s "  o f  t h e  
I n d i a n  p e o p l e .  I t s  p r o p o s e r ,  S p o o r ,  c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  a g i t a t i o n  
" a l o n g  s t r i c t l y  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i n e s " ;  a n d  c o n d e m n e d  t h e  " u n w i s e  a n d  m a d "  
p o l i c y  w h i c h  t h e  A m r i t s a r  s h o o t i n g  x e m p l i f i e d .  U n l e s s  d e v e l o p m e n t s  w e r e  " w i s e l y  
d e a l t  . 1 1  M ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  d a n g e r  o f  " p e r m a n e n t  s e p a r a t i o n " .  T h e y  w e r e  i n  " m u c h  
g r e a t e r  d a n g e r  o f  l o s i n g  I n d i a  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  E m p i r e  t h a n  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  p e o p l e  
^  v i c e r o y ,  L o r d  C h e l m s f o r d ,  v / a s  h e l d  u l t i m a t e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r
t h e  " t r a g i c  h a p p e n i n g s "  a t  A m r i t s a r ,  a n d  h i s  r e c a l l  v / a s  d e m a n d e d .  E v e r y  d a y
t h a t  h e  r e m a i n e d  i n  I n d i a ,  d e c l a r e d  M a c D o n a l d ,  v / a s  "  a  d i s g r a c e  t o  t h i s  c o u n t ^ - ’ . 1  
( I n d i a n  n a t i o n a l i s t s  w e r e  n a t u r a l l y  d i s m a y e d  w h e n  h e  w a s  i n c l u d e d  i n  M a c D o n a l d ' s  
C a b i n e t  i n  1 9 2 * 0 .  Spoor d r e w  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  t o  a  " w a v e
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o f  u n r e s t  t h a t  w a s  f u l l  o f  d a n g e r o u s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ’ '  i n  I n d i a .  S i r  M i c h a e l
0 ’ D w y e r ,  s h e  G o v e r n o r  o f  t h e  P u n j a b ,  a n d  h i s  t y p e  h e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  " g r e a t e s t
l A - 0d a n g e r  t o  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  E m p i r e "  .  A s  t h e  H e w  S t a t e s m a n  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  
r e p r e s  i o n  w o u l d  s p e l l  c a l a m i t y  n o t  o n l y  f o r  I n d i a ,  b u ;  f o r  B r i t a i n  a l s o .  U n l e s s  
t h e r e  w a s  a  " r a d i c a l  c h a n g e  i n  o u r  a t t i t u d e  a n d  p o l i c y " ,  t h e  ' L a b o u r  S p e a k e r ' s  
H a n d b o o k '  a d d e d ,  I n d i a  w o u l d  b e  " l o s t  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  C o m m o n w e a l t h "  ^  R e f o r m ,  
a n d  e v e n  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  w e r e  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  t h i s .
L a b o u r ' s  c o n c e r n  f o r  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  e x t e n d e d  t o  t h e  c o l o -  -  
n i a l  w o r l d ;  a n d  p a r t y  s p o k e s m a n  w e r e  p  . r t i c u l a r l y  d i s t r e s s e d  b y  t h e  a c c u m u l a t ­
i n g  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e i r  v i e w s  w e r e  n o t  a l w a y s  s h a r e d  b y  t h e  c o l o n i a l  p e o p l e s .
T h e  1 9 1 9  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a  A c t ,  W e d g w o o d  t o l d  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  o p e n e d  a  
" b r i g h t e r  f u t u r e  f o r  t h e  B r i t i s h  E m p i r e  e v e n  t h a n  o u r  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  p a s t  h a s  
d i s c l o s e d " .  " V e r y  u n f o r t u n a t e l y " ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  n o n - c o - o p e r a t i o n  m o v e m e n t  w a s  
s p r e a d i n g  i n  I n d i a .  T h e  E m p i r e ,  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  c p u l d  b e  p r e s e r v e d  o n l y  w i t h  
t h e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  I n d i a n s  t h e m s e l v e s .  I f  t h e y  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  
t a k e  n o  . p a r t  i n  t h e  n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and b o y c o t t  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  t h e n  i t
w a s  " a l l  u p  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  E m p i r e  i n  I n d i a " .  H e  s p o k e ,  h e  -  e d  ’ w i t h  j u s t i c e ,
l A pn o r  o n l y  t o r  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  b u t  f o r  " t h o u s a n d s  o f  L i b e r a l s "  '  •  T h e  N a t i o n a l  
J o i n t  C o u n c i l  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  a n d  t h e  T . U . C .  a d o p t e d  a  r e s o l u t i o n  o n  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  I n d i a  i n  F e b r u a r y  1 9 2 2 ,  w h i c h  d e p l o r e d  t h e  b o y c o t t  i n  I n d i a  o f
" t h o s e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  r e c e n t l y  c o n f e r r e d  u p o n  I n d i a ,  b y  m e a n s  o f
,• , . 1^ 3w m c n  g r i e v a n c e s  s h o u l d  b e  v e n t i l a t e d  a n d  w r o n g s  r e d r e s s e d "  " .  T h e  I n d i a n
N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s ,  W e d g w o o d  t h o u g h t ,  s h o u l d  f o r m  a  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  o p p o s i t i o n  
a s  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  h a d  d o n e ,  a n d  s e r v e  i t s  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  a p p r e n t i c e s h i p  i n  
t h i s  w a y .  H e  r e j o i c e d  t h a t  t h e  C o n g r e s s  | i a d t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  1 9 2 3  e l e c t i o n s * E  
L e t  t h e  C h i e f  S e c r e t a r y  m e e t  b u s i n e s s m e n  i n  I n d i a ,  h e  u r g e d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  
w h o  w e r e  p r o m o t i n g  I n d i a n s  t o  t h e  b o a r d s  a n d  t o  r e s p o n s i b l e  p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e i r  
g a n i e s .  I f  t h e  n o n - c o - o p e r a t o r s  w e r e  i n d u c e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  e l e c t i o n s ,  
a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  p e o p l e  . c l a s s e d  a s  ' e x t r e m i s t s '  w o u l d  b e  e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  
C o u n c i l :  a n d  t h i s  o f f e r e d  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  " t u r n  y o u r  p o a c h e r s  i n t o  g a m e k e e p ­
e r s " '  '  .
T h e r e  w a s  a  s i m i l a r  c o n c e r n  t o  e x t e n d  t r a d e  u n i o n i s m  o n  t h e  B r i t i s h  m o d e l  
t o  I n d i a .  J o h n  S c u r r  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  T . U . C .  s h o u l d  d e s p a t c h  o r g a n i s e r s  t o  
I n d i a ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  m i n i m i s e  " r a s h  a c t i o n s "  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  I n d i a n  t r a d e  i n i o n s .
T  -  •  l h 6J - n a i a n  w o r k e r s  w e r e  t o  b e  e n c o u r a g e d  t o  d i s c o u n t e n a n c e  c o m m u n i s m  a n d  s t r i k e s
| t a i  s m  m  r  g o d  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  I n d i a n  t r a d e  u n i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  e x t o n -
;3'i-
d e d ,  p r o v i d e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e y  w e  r e  n o t  ’ ’ p e r v e r t e d  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  s e d i t -
i o U s  o b j e c t s " ,  I t  v / a s ,  i t  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  n o t  o n l y  o f  I n d i a n
w a g e - e a r n e r s ,  b u t  o f  t h e m s e l v e s ,  t h a t  a  f u l l y - o r g a n i s e d  a n d  ’ ’ r e s p o n s i b l e ”
1 4 7t r a d e  u n i o n  m o v e m e n t  b e  s e t  u p  t h e r e  ” a s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e "  .  T h e  r e a l  
a a s v ; e r  t o  S e d i t i o n ,  i t  a d d e d ,  v / a s  p o p u l a r  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  ’ ’ t r a d e  u n i o n  o r g a n i z ­
a t i o n ” ,  w h i c h  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  s h o u l d  e n c o u r a g e .  L a b o u r  o p p o s e d  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v ­
i t y  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  I n d i a : !  u n i o n s 0  T h e  A l l - I n d i a  T r a d e s  U n i o n  C o n g r e s s ,  h e  / e v e  .  
r e s o l v e d  t h a t  w o r k e r s  a n d  t r a d e  u n i o n s  f o r m e d  a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n -
- .  *  ,  1 4 8 'a l i s t  m o v e m e n t  ,
’ - h o  e x a c e r b a t i o n  o f  B r i  t i s h - I n d i a n  r e l a t i o n s ,  W e d g v / o o d  f o l d  t  
S o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s - J  u o u l d  m e a n  n o t  m e r e l y  a  d i s a s t e r  t o  a m i c a b l e  r e l a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t * . ; o  p e o p l e s :  i t  w o u l d  b e  ’ ’ d i s a s t r o u s  t o  B r i t i s h  f i n a n c e  a s  w e l l " .  
A b o u t  f i v e  h u n d r e d  m i l l i o n  p o u n d s ,  a n d  p e r h a p s  t w i c e  a s  m u c h ,  o f  B r i t i s h  c a p i t ­
a l  w a s  i n v e s t e d  i n  I n d i a ,  I t s  s e c u r i t y  d e p e n d e d  u p o n  a n  e v e n t u a l  s e p a r a t i o n  -  
i f  £ t i  t o o k  p l a c e  a t  a l l  -  t a k i n g  p l a c e  u p o n  a m i c a b l e  t e r m s ,  b e t w e e n  t w o  " f r i e ­
n d l y  p e o p l e ”  w h o  c o u l d  ’ ’ s t i l l  c o - o p e r a t e  t o g e t h e r  i n  b u s i n e s s ” .  I t  w a s  f o r  
t h i s  r e a s o n ,  h e  s t a t e d ,  t h a t  t h o s e  o n  t h e  L a b o u r  b e n c h e s  w e r e  " p a r t i c u l a r l y
a n x i o u s "  t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e s e n t  c r i t i c a l  y e a r s  f r i c t i o n  b e t v / e e n  t h e  t w o
1 4 - 9p e  _ L e s  s h o u l d  b o  m i n i m i s e d  •  C . H .  B u x t o n  u r g e d  h i s  C o n s t i t u e n t s  t o  r e g a r d  
I n d i a  a s  a  " p a r t  o f  o u r  E m p i r e ,  i n  v / h i c h .  w e  o u g h t  t o  s h o w  a  d e e p  e n d  s y m p a t h e -
. . .  150t i c  i n t e r e s t s " :  n o t  a s  s i m p l y  a  " p l a c e  b o  e x p l o i t  i n  o u r  o w n  i n t e r e s t s "  ,  J i s  
i n j u n c t i o n  w a s  n o t  a l w a y s  h o o d e d  b y  p a r t y  s p o k e s m e n ,  w h o  d r e w  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
t h e  B r i t i s h  s t a k e  i n  t h e  I n d i a n  e c o n o m y ,  a n d  u r g e d  t h a t ,  w h i l e  s e l f - g o v . . .
m u s t  b e  c o n c e d e d ,  i t  m u s t  b e  c o n f e r r e d  " s t e p  b y  s t e p ,  g r a d u a l l y " ,  w i t h o u t
• 1 5 1r i s k ,  r e a c t i o n ,  o r  a b o v e  a l l  ’ ’ s o c i a l  d i s t u r b ; s i c e ’ r "  ,  E i g h t y  p e r  c e n t  o f
B r i t i s h  c o t t o n  p r o d u c t s ,  S h a w  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  h a d  b e e n  e x p o r t e d  t o  I n d i  .  b  c f o r e
t h e  w a r •  T h a t  t r a d e  w a s  n o w  b _ . i r g  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  " e x t r e m e l y  g r a v e "  s t a t e  o f  
1 5 2a f f a i r s  t h e r e  •  T h e  q u e s t i o n ,  W e d g w o o d  d e c l a r e d ,  w a s  t h a t  o f  " s e c u r i t y  f o r  
' w  g r e a t  a m o u n t  o f  B r i t i s h  c a p i t a l " .  H o  t h o u g h t  t h a t  B r i t i s h  c a p i t a l i s t s  
t h e m s e l v e s  w o u l d  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e i r  c a p i t a l -  w o u l d  b e  s a f e r  i n  a  s e l f - g o v e r n i n g  
( a n d  c o n t e n t )  I n d i a  t h a n  i n  o n e  i n  w h i c h  r a c e  h a t r e d  a n d  a n t i - E n g l i s h  s e n t i m e n t  
w e r e  g e n e r a l " ^ ' " ' ’ .
T h e  v a l u e  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e d  c o t t o n  g o o d s  s e n t  t o  I n d i a  f r o m  B r i t a i n ,  
M a c D o n a l d  c a l c u l a t e d ,  h a d  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  £ 2 4  m i l l i o n  t o  £ 4 0  m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  
p r e - w a r  d e c a d e .  T h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  c o u l d  " n o t ,  i n  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s ,
a f f o r d  t o  n e g l e c t  a  s t a k e  s u c h  a s  t h a t  w h i c h  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  i n d i c a t e " .  H e ' w a s
c o n c e r n e d  t o  d e n y  t h e  " u n g e n e r o u s  e x p l a n a t i o n "  s o m e t i m e s  o f f e r e d  o f  t h e  e c o n o ­
m i c  t h i n k i n g  r e f l e c t e d  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c y :  i t  " h a p p e n e d  t o  b e l i e v e " ,  h e  
w r o t e ,  i n  " p r i n c i p l e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  w h i c h  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h .  L a n c a c h i r e S s  
i n t e r e s t s " ,  l i e  d i d  n o b  c o n s i d e r ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  a  p r o t e c t i v e  t a r i f f  w o u l d  b e  i n  
t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  o f  I n d i a ,  a l t h o u g h  h e  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  I n d i a n  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  
f o u n d  i t  " d i f f i c u l t "  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  t h i s  p o i n t ,  A  t a r i f f ,  h e  a r g u e d ,  w o u l d  b e  
a  l e v y  " i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  c a p i t a l " ;  a n d  i t  w o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h a  a l r e a d y  
" e x c e s s i v e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  r i c h  c l a s s e s  o f  I n d i a n . d k  e n g a g e d  i n  c o m m e r c e " .  T h e  
I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s ,  e q u a l l y ,  w a s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  r i c h  m i d d l e  c l a s s  a n d  
p r i v i l e g e d  g r o u p s .  I t  w a s  a c c o r d i n g l y  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  B r i t i s h  c o n t r o l  s h o u l d
r e m a i n  d o m i n a n t  i n  a t  l e a s t  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e s  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a n g e ,  i n  t h e
l 5 4 -p r o f  c s s e d  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  m a s s e s  ' '  I t  w a s  n o t e d  e v e n  b y  L a b o u r
s p o k e s m e n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  w a s  m a n i f e s t l y  f a i l i n g  t o  d e f e n d  t h e  
•  •  1 5 5i n t e r e s t s  o f  s h e  p o o r  a g a i n s t  t h o s e  o f  t h e  r i c h  i n  I n d i a  .  I t  v / a s ,  m o r e o v e r ,
a  " c u r i o u s  c o n t r a d i c t i o n "  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y ' s  g r a d u a l i s t  a n d  c o n s t i f u t i o n a l i s t
p o l i c y  l e d  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  " d e f i n i t e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d  c o m m u n i t y  o f
v i e w s "  b e t v / e e n  L a b o u r  a n d  I n d i a n  m i d d l e  c l a s s  m o d e r a t e s ,  T k  ' . ' w i s h  C o m m i t t e e
o n  I n d i a n  A f f a . i r s ,  i n d e e d ,  a  p r e d o m i n a h i i l y  L a b o u r  b o d y  v / h i c h  v / a s  r e c o n s t i t u t e d
i n  1 9 2 4  u n d e r  L a n s b u r y ' s  c h a i r m a n s h i p ,  a n d  v / h i c h  t e n d e d  t o  s u p p o r t  m o d e r a t e
e l e m e n t s ,  a p p e a r s  t o  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  t h e  b i l k  o f  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o r t  f r o m
156I n d i a n  t r a d i n g  a n d  m o n e y e d  i n t e r e s t s  "
P a r t y  s p o k e s m e n  w e r e  n o t  u n a w a r e  o f  t h e  t h r e a t  w h i c h  S o v i e t  p o l i c y ,  
a n d  r a d i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  m o v e m e n t s  i n  g e n e r a l ,  o f f e r e d  t o  B r i t i s h  p o s s e s s i o n s  i n  
A s i a .  T h e  " g r e a t  S o c i a l i s t  R u s s i a n  S t a t e " ,  w r o t e  M o r e l ,  " h a l f  E u r o p e a n ,  h a l f  
A s i a t i c ,  t h e  f o c u s  o f  a  t h o u g h t  r e v o l u t i o n ” ,  w a s  a  " d e a d l y  f o e  t o  t h e  c o n t i n -
1 5 7
u a n c e  o f  a  B r i t i s h  E m p i r e  i n  t h e  E a r  E a s t  a n d  t h e  M i d d l e  B a s t "  ,  I t  m a d e
g o o d  s e n s e ,  t h o u g h t  S h a w ,  t o  e i n c l u d e  a  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  R u s s i a ;  f o r
R u s s i a  i s o l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  w o u l d  b e  a  " d a n g e r  s p o t ,  a n d  i n  n o
p l a c e  o n  t h e  g l o b e  q u i t e  t h e  s a m e  d a n g e r  a s  s h e  i s  i n  t h e  E a s t " .  I t  w o u l d  b e
g o o d  p o l i c y ,  a n d  c o m m o n  s e n s e ,  f o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  c a r r y  t h e  a g r e e m e n t
f u r t h e r  a n d  c o n c l u d e  a  d e f i n i t e  p e a c e  w i t h  R u s s i a ,  " n o t  o n l y  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s
158o x  E u r o p e ,  b u t  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  o u r  E m p i r e  i n  t h e  E a s t " - ^  „
V / h i l e  t h e  p a r t y  v / a s  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  b r e a k - o f f  i n  r e l a t i o n s  v / h i c h  
a p p e a r e d  t o  b o  i m m i n e n t  f o l l o w i n g  C u r a o n 1 s  u l t i m a t u m ,  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  
R u s s i a n  c o n s u l  a t  K a b u l ,  w r o t e  M a c D o n a l d ,  e v i d e n t l y  " c o n c e a l e d  a c t s  o f  w a d  
d o n e  a g a i n s t  u s " ,  a n d  w e r e  " d e s i g n e d  t o  promote c i v i l  w a r  i n  I n d i a " .  A  Labour
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F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r ,  h e  a f f i r m e d ,  w o u l d  o b j e c t  t o  h o s t i l e  p r o p a g a n d a  f r o m  K a b u l
1 5 9" j u s t  a s  m u c h  a s  L o r d  C u r s o n "  '  " •  I f  t h e  e v i d e n c e  o f  p l o t t i n g  i n  t h e  E a s t  
w e r e  t r u e ,  B r a i l s f o r d  a d d e d ,  i d e m a n d e d  a n  a p o l o g y  a n d  t h e  d i s m i s s a l  o f  a l l  
t h e  g u i l t y  a g e n t s .  I t  d i d  s e e m  c l e a r ,  a t  l e a s t ,  t h a t  R u s s i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
13 oi n  A f g h a n i s t a n  w e r e  " p l o t t i n g  a g a i n s t  u s "  .  T h e  e n d i n g  o f  t h e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t ,
a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  w a s  n o  a n s w e r :  w e r e  i t  d e n o u n c e d ,  " a l l  r e s t r a i n t "  w o u l d  b e  
l 6 lr e m o v e d  •  T h e  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  d i d ,  n o w e v e r ,  a u t n o r i - e  t h e  v r i a l  o f  s i x
I n d i a n  c o m m u n i s t s  a t  C a w n p o r e  o n  t h e  c h a r g e  o f  " c o n s p i r a c y  t o  d e p r i v e  t h e
K i n g  o f  t h e  s o v e r e i g n t y  o f  B r i t i s h  I n d i a " .  T h e  a c c u s e d ,  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s
v / a s  t o l d ,  v / e r e  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  s e c u r e  t h e  " c o m p l e t e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  I n d i a  f r o  I
I m p e r i a l i s t  B r i t a i n " ,  t o w a r d s  w h i c h  e n d  t h e y  h a d  f o r m e d  a n d  a t  t e m p t e d  t o  u s e
162a  W o r k e r s *  a n d  P e a s a n t s '  A s s o c i a t i o n  T o  e s t a b l i s h  a n  a s s o c i a t i o n  u n d e r
t h e  a u s p i c e s  o f  t h e  T h i r d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  v / a s  n o t  i l l e g a l  i n  t h e  w e s t ,  t h e  h e w
L e a d e r  p r o t e s t e d  v a l i a n t l y .  W h i l e  t h i s  " E m p i r e  o f  o u r s "  c l a i m e d  t o  b e  f r e e ,
t h e  p r e a c h i n g  o f  c o m m u n i s m  a n d  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  a  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  m u s t  b e
163a s  l a w f u l  i n  I n d i a  a s  i n  B r i t a i n  .  F o u r  o f  t h e  a c c u s e d  v / e r e  s e n t e n c e d  t o
f o u r  y e a r s '  r i g o r o u s  i m p r i s o n m e n t ,  a  v e r d i c t  t h e  p a p e r  f o u n d  " s h o c k i n g " .  I t  v / a s
i m p o r t a n t ,  i t  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t o  p r e v e n t  " r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t y r a n n y "  b e c o m i n g  l i n k e d
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w i t h  " n a t i o n a l i s t  f a l l a c i e s "  ’ .
I n d i a ,  w r o t e  L a j p a . t  R a y ,  w o u l d  b e  t h e  " a c i d  t e s t "  o f  t h e  c l a i m  o f  t h e
L a b o u r  P a r t y  t o  s t a n d  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  g o o d w i l l .  T i l a k ,  s p e a k i n g  a t  G l a s g o w i j t
h a d  d e c l a r e d  h i s  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  L a b o u r  P a r t y  v / a s  " o u t  i n  t h e
i n t e r e s t  n o t  o n l y  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  l a b o u r e r  b u t  o f  a l l  t h e  l a b o u r e r s  t h r o u g h o u t
t h e  w o r l d " ,  a n d  t h a t  * 7  w i t h  i t s  h e l p  t h e  I n d i a n  p e o p l e  c o u l d ,  a n d  w o u l d ,  w i n  
1 6 5f r e e d o m "  ^  •  T h e  v i e w s  o f  J . H .  T h o m a s ,  w h o  v / a s  t o  b e c o m e  C o l o n i a l  S e c r e t a f y
i n  t h e  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t ,  p r o v i d e d  l i t t l e  e n c o u r a g e m e n t .  T h e  A m r i t s a r  s h o o t i n g s
h e  c o n s i d e r e d  e v i d e n c e  o f  a  " v e r y  g e n u i n e  f a i l u r e  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  g o v e r n o r s " ,
i n  n e e d i n g  " s u c h  a  s h o w  o f  f o r e e "  t o  i m p r e s s  t h e i r  j u d g e m e n t s  u p o n  t h o s e  w h o m
t h e y  r u l e d .  I n d i a ,  h e  b e l i e v e d ,  s h o u l d  e v e n t u a l l y  b e c o m e  a  s e l f - g o v e r n i n g
■ d o m i n i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  C o m m o n w e a l t h ;  b u t  t h i s  " c o u l d  n o t  h a p p e n  q u i c k l y " .  T h e
p a r t y  a i m e d ,  h e  s u g g e s t e d ,  n o t  t o  d e h t r o y  t h e  E m p i r e ,  b u t  t o  " c h a n g e  i t s
g o v e r n m e n t  s o  t h a t  t h e r e  s h a l l  b e  n o  c h a n c e  o f  u p r i s i n g " .  R e s p o n s i b l e  g o v e r n m e n t
166’ ’ c o u l d  n o t l * ,  h o w e v e r ,  " b e  a r r a n g e d  j u s t  n o w " "
M a c D o n a l d  i s s u e d  a  s t e r n  w a r n i n g  t o  I n d i a n  o p i n i o n  o n  6  January 1 9 2 4 ,  
d e m a n d i n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a c t i o n  a n d  m a k i n g  c l e a r  t h a t  L a b o u r  w o u l d  n o t  b e  
m o v e d  b y  t h r e a t s  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t s .  O l i v i e r ,  t h e  I n d i a n  S e c r e t a r y ,
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m a d e  a n  u n f o r t h c o r a i n g  s t a t e m e n t  o f  p o l i c y  t o  t h e  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s  o n  2 6  F e b r u a r y ,  
w h i c h  " f e l l  u p o n  I n d i a " ,  a  p r o m i n e n t  n a t i o n a l i s t  t o l d  F o r w a r d ,  " l i k e  a  v / e t  
b l a n k e t .  I t  c o n t a i n e d  n o t  a  s i n g l e  p r o n o u n c e m e n t  t h a t  a  m o d e r a t e  L i b e r a l  c o u l d  
n o t  h a v e  m a d e " .  T h e  l o n g e r  t h e  g r a n t i n g  o f  h o m e  r u l e  w a s  d e l a y e d ,  t h e  p a p e r  
w a r n e d ,  t h e  m o r e  r a d i c a l  w o u l d  b e  t h e  I n d i a n  d e m a n d s ;  " c o m p l e t e  r u p t u r e  w i t h
i go
t h e  E m p i r e "  w o u l d  " p r o b a b l y  b e  t h e  o u t c r b m e  o f  f u r t h e r  d e l a y "  ' ‘ .
T h e  C a b i n e t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t ,  w h i l e  c o m m i t t e d  t o  t h e
( u l t i m a t e )  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  D o m i n i o n  H o m e  R u l e  i n  I n d i a ,  t h e  " w h o l e  s i t u a t i o n
s h o u l d  b e  t h o r o u g h l y  e x p l o r e d " ,  a n d  I n d i a n  n a t i o n a l i s t s  s h o u l d  b e  u r g e d  n o t  t o
a t t e m p t  t o  p u t  p r e s s u r e  u p o n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  t a k e  " i l l - c o n s i d e r e d  o r  p r e m a t -
u r e  a c t i o n ”  b e  I t h e  q u e s t i o n  h a d  b e e n  c  i  o d  i n  1 1  a l l  i i  l e t  i%LMn °*
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  C l y n e s  a n n o u n c e d ,  v / a s  " n o t  a t  p r e s e n t  p r e p a r e d  t o  m a k e  a n y
p r o p o s a l s  f o r  a c t i o n  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  h o n e  r u l e  i n  I n d i a '
T h e  C a b i n e t  f o u n d  l e s s  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  a u t h o r i s i n g  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  c o e r c i v e
l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  d e a l  w i t h  c o n s p i r a c i e s  i n  B e n g a l ,  a n d  i n  a u t h o r i s i n g  t h e
1 7 0S t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  p o l i c e  a n d  s e c u r i t y  f o r c e s  .  L a b o u r  g o v e r n e d n t  I n d i a ,  w r o t e
t h e  N e w  L e a d e r ,  " a s  T o r i e s  o r  L i b e r a l s  m i g h t  h a v e  g o v e r n e d  i t " .  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t
h a d  d o n e  n o t h i n g  e f f e c t i v e  f o r  I n d i a n  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ;  o r  e v e n  f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t -
171 _i o n  o f  I n d i a n  w o r k e r s  *  T o  t h e  I n d i a n s ,  i t  w a s  n o t e d ,  L a b o u r  r u l e  h a d  m e a n t  
n o  c h a n g e ;  t h e  d i f  f i c u ? -  k i e s  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  h a d  n o w  b e e n  i n c r e a s e d  b y  t h e i r
1 op
c o n s e q u e n t  ( a n d  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e )  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  0
T h i s  w a s  n o t  t o  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  n o t  d e v o t e d  a  g r e a t  d e a l
O f  a t t e n t i o n  t o  i m p e r i a l  m a t t e r s .  I t  h a d  s u c c e e d e d ,  i n d e e d ,  C l y n e s  d e c l a r e d ,
i n  s e c u r i n g  a  g r e a t e r  d e g r e e  o f  i m p e r i a l  u n i t y  t h a n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  v / h i c h  h a d
p r e c e d e d  i t  A  n u m b e r  o f  p r o j e c t s  w e r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  T h o m a s '  t m u r e  o f
t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e ,  a m o n g  t h e m  t h e  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  o f  c o t t o n  g r o w i n g  i n  K e n y a
a n d  U g a n d a  ( i t  v / a s ,  h e  n o t e d ,  " p e c u l i a r l y  s u i t e d  t o  t h e  L a n c a s h i r e  t r a d e " )
a n d  o f  r a i l w a y  c o n s t r u c i i  i  ( d e s i g n e d ,  h e  t o l d  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  t o  l e a d
1  7 4 -t o  " i m m e d i a t e  o r d e r s a t  h o m e "  ) .  A n  E m p i r e  L a b o u r  C o n f e r e n c e  w a s  h e l d  i n  
L o n d o n  i n  A u g u s t ,  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  i t  v / a s  h o p e d  t o  " c e m e n t  t h e  b o n d s  o f  m u t u a l  s  
s e r v i c e  a n d  k i n d l y  c o m r a d e s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  m o t h e r  c o u n t r y ,  a n d  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f
~j rp
t h e  E m p i r e "  *  A  L a b o u r  C o m m o n w e a l t h  G r o u p  h a d  b e e n  f o r m e d  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  
C o m m o n s  a f t e r  t h e  1 9 2 3  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ,  u n d e r  t h e  c h a i r m a n s h i p  o f  M . S .  E o y c e  
h n d  s u b s e q u e n t l y  o f  L n n s b u r y .  " W i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  e m p o r i u m s i t  h a s  b e e n  n o t e d ,  
" t h e r e  g r e w  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  a  g r e a t e r  s e n s e  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o w a r d s  t h e  E m p i r e "  
T h o  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  e v e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  w a s  t h e  h o l d i n g  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h
E m p i r e  E x h i b i t i o n  i n  t h e  s h m r a e r  o f  1 9 2 4 ,  i n t o  w h i c h  T h o m a s  t h r e w  a  " w h o l e -
c t e d  e n t h u s i a s m "  w h i c h  w a s  h e l d  t o  h a v e  b e e n  " w i t h o u t  p r e c e d e n t  i n  t h e
1 7 7a n n a l s  o r  t h o s e  w h o  h a v e  h e l d  s i m i l a r  o f f i c e " '  •  C o n s i d e r a b l e  $ u  i t s  , ; s r e
p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e ;  a n d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a g r e e d  t o
1 7 8x g -  f o r  a  Pageant o f  E m p i r e  t o  t a k e  p l a c e  '  *  T h e  C a b i n e t  d e c i d e d  t o  b
r e p r e s e n t e d  " a s  f u l l y  a s  p o s s i b l e "  a t  t h e  E m p i r e  T h a n k s g i v i n g  S e r v i c e  h e l d  i n
1 7 °c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  E x h i b i t i o n ,  and =  ‘  _  f  V i e w i n g  w a s  a r r a n g e d  .  T h e  K i n g
r t e d  t o  h L V e  " s e t  h i s  h e a r t  o n  t h e  E x h i b i t i o n  b e i n g  a  s u c c e s s " ,  a n d  h i s  
S u g g e s t i o ]  h : -  i t s  0 “ g  x x a a h i o n  c e r e  o f t e n  a c c e p t e d .  N o - o n e  m a d e  a  b i g g e r  
p e r s o n a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t h a n  T h o m a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  w h o  s e c u r e d  t h e  c e s s a t i o n  o f  • 
s t r i k e  o n  t h e  s i t e  i n  A p r i l  b y  i n f o r m i n g  t h e m  w h E k m e n  t h a t  t h e i r  a c t i o n  h a d
l 3 o
m u c h  d i s t r e s s e d  t h e  K i n g  •  A n  I . L . P .  p a m p h l e t ,  i s s u e d  d u r i n g  l f _ ' : -  .  h  i  s i g n e d
t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  *  s  s u c c e s s f u l  i  r p l c m c n t a b i o n  o f  p a r t y  p o l i c y  o n
the colonial question, could find nothing more to v/hich to refer than a
l 8 lc o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  i n  - J a m a i c a .
N o t  a l l  v / e r e  c o n v i n c e d .  T h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y ,  a s s e r t e d  t h e  D u k e  o f  N o r t h u m b e r l a n d ,  
c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  " c a t s * - p a w s  o f  G e r m a n y ,  R u s s i a  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  J e w r y " ,  e n g a ­
g e d  i n  a  " g r o a t  c o n s p i r a c y  f o r  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  E m p i r e " .  T h e i r  
f  ,  - I d ,  v . w  '  " i n  r e a l i t y  t h e  s k m e  a t  t h o s e  o f  t h e  T h i r d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l " 0 !
A  l e s s  e x t r a v a g a n t  m o d e r n  v e r d i c t  h a s  b e e n  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  w a s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
b y  " a r d e n t  p r o - S o v i e t  s e n t i m e n t " ,  a n d  t h a t  a  " s e n s e  o f  c l a s s  g r i e v a n c e  a n d
s o l i d a r i t y " ,  a n d  " h e r i d  c l a s s  a n i m u s " ,  u n d e r l a y  L a b o u r  p o l i c y  i n  f o r e i g n
l 8 o' a i r s ,  a l i g n i n g  i t  b e s i d e  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  .  B r a i l s : : o r a  w r o t e  i n  t h e  
N e w  L e a d e r  t h a t  t h e  n e w  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  w o u l d  " s t a n d  b e s i d e  t h e  S o v i e t ’ s
7 " " "  "  134-E x e c u t i v e  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  o n l y  t w o  S o c i a l i s t  G o v e r n m e n t s  i n  t h e  w o r l d "  •  I t
h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  a b o v e  s o  f a r  t h a t  L a b o u r  p o l i c y  c a n n o t  a d e q u a t e l y  b e  d e s c r ­
i b e d  a s  s o c i a l i s t  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  i n  a n y  s e n s e ,  a t  l e a s t ,  i n  w h i c h  t h i s  d e s c r -  
itpien m i g h t  have applied a l s o  t o  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t .  I n d e e d  
20 f a r  f r o m  s h a r i n g  p o l i t i c a l  a s s u m p t i o n s ,  M a c D o n a l d  a s s e r t e d  a t  a  m e e t i n g  a t  
t h e  A l d w y c h  C l u b  ( p r e s i d e d  o v e r  b y  a  m a j o r  S o u t h  W a l e s  c o a l o w n e r )  t h a t  t h e r e  
w a s  n o t  i n  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  a  t h o u s a n d - m i l l i o n t h  p a r t  o f  s y m p a t h y  w i t h  C o m m u n -
qOrr
i s m  o r  B o l s h e v i s m - '  I t  i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  p a r a d o x  w i t h  w h i c h  w e  s h a l l  n o w  
c o n c e r n  o u r s e l v e s  t h a t  t h e s e  y e a r s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  c a m e  w i t h  
i n c r e a s i n g  v i g o u r  t o  c h a m p i o n  t h e  d i p l o m a t i c  r e c o g n i t i o n 0 a n d  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
c l o s e  c o m m e r c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  w i t ]  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  v / e r e  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  y e a r s
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t h e  p a r t y  c o n d u c t e d  a  m i l i t a n t  a n d  l a r g e l y  s u c c e s s f u l  c a m p a i g n  a g a i n s t  t h e
c o r p o r a t e  a n d  i n d i d u h i ’  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  C o m m u n i s t ' s ,  a n d  a g a i n s t  r e v o l u t i o n a r y
s o c i a l i s m  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i e l d *
I n  t h i s  s t r u g g l e  M a c D o n a l d  w a s ,  h i s  b i o g r a p h e r  n o t e d ,  " i n  t h e  t h i c k  o f  
186t h e  f i g h t  a l l  t h e  t i m e "  •  I t  b e g a n ,  i n d e e d ,  w i t h i n  t h a t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e
s o c i a l i s t  m o v e m e n t  o f  w h i c h  h e  w a s  a  l e a d i n g  m e m b e r ,  t h e  I . L . P .  A t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g
o f  1 9 2 0  t h e  I L P ' s  S c o t t i s h  C o n f e r e n c e  v o t e d  f o r  a f f i l i a t i o n  t o  t h e  T h i r d
I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  a  d e c i s i o n  r e a c h e d  W a m i d  a r t  l o u d  a p p l a u s e " ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e
l 8 ?r e p o r t  i n  F o r w a r d  ,  a n d  m a t c h e d  b y  t h e  p a r t y ' s  W e l s h  s e c t i o n ,  M  I d
c o n f e s s e d  h i m s e l f  " d i s a p p o i n t e d " .  P i e  w a s ,  h e  m a d e  c l e a r ,  a n  " o p p o n e n t  o f  t h e
188T h i r d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l "  •  " L e t  u s  s t o p  a l l  t h i s  r o m a n t i c  t a l k  a b o u t  r e v o l u t i o n " ,  
189h e  u r g e d  •  T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  S c o t t i s h  s e c t i o n  r e m a i n e d
u n c l e a r :  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  G l a s g o w  I . L . P .  F e d e r a t i o n ,  P J .  D o l l a n ,  f e l t  t h a t
t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a f f i l i a t i o n  n i g h t  b e  " a s  m u c h  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  s y m p a t h y
f o r  t h e  S o c i a l i s t s  i n  R u s s i a  a s  b y  p r i n c i p l e " .  T h e  p a r t y ' s  a n n u a l  c o n f e r e n c e
l a t e r  i n  t h e  y e a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  w h i l e  i t  d e c l i n e d  t o  a f f i l i a t e  t o  t h e  T h i r d
I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  d e c i d e d  b y  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  n e a r l y  f o u r  t o  o n e  t o  d i s a f f i l i a t e
1Q0f r o m  t h e  S e c o n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  ^  .  T h e  C o m m u n i s t  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E x e c t u i v e
C o m m i t t e e ' s  r e p l y  t o  t h e  I L P ' s  q u e s t i o n s ,  f o r m u l a t e d  a f t e r  d i s c u s s i o n s  ’ w i t h
B e n i n ,  R a d c k  a n d  o t h e r s  i n  M a y  1 9 2 0 ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s  l e f t  110 r o o m  f o r  s e n t i m e n t a l
s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  c a u s e ;  a n d  t h e  I . L . P .  C o u n c i l  c o n d e m n e d  t h e i r  " d c g . .  1 '  a " *
T h e  2 1  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  a d m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  a l s o  c a u s e d
c o n c e r n .  S o m e  l o c a l  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  p a r t y  w e r e  e v o l v i n g  a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y
s o c i a l i s t  p o s i t i o n ,  a n d  a d v o c a t i n g  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a .  S o c i a l i s t  S o v i e t
R e p u b l i c ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  p a f t y ' s  e x i s t i n g  o b j e c t i v e  o f  a  S o c i a l i s t  C o m m o n -  
3 9 2w e a l t h  .  T h e  f l i r t a t i o n w i t h  r e v o l u t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  w e n t  n o  f u r t h e r .  T h e  S c o t t i s h  
I L P  C o n f e :  : e n c e  r e v e r s e d  i t s  d e v i s i o n  t o  a f f i l i a t e  t o  t h e  T h i r d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  1 9 2 1 ;  a n d  t h e  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e  a t  S o u t h p o r t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
E a s t e r  r e a f f i r m e d  t h e  d e c i s i o n  n o t  t o  a f f i l i n ' ' c .  n d .  r e j e c t e d  t h e  2 1  c o n d i t i o n s  
b y  a n  o v e r w h e l m i n g  m a j o r i t y " ' " .  T h e  I L P  ' L e f t  W i n g '  t h e r e u p o n  s e c e d e d ,  a n d  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  c o m m i t e d  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y .  T h e y  h a d  t a l k e d  i n  t e r m s  
o f  t h o u s a n d s ,  i t  w a s  r e c o r d e d ;  b u t  " i n  p o i n t  o f  f a c t  t h e y . ,  o n l y  a d d e d  o n e  o r  
t w o  h u n d r e d s " " ' ' " ' .
A n  e  a i d e d  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  t o o k  p l a c e  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  1 9 2 0  
f o l l o w i n g  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  t o  a p p l y  f o r  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  t h e  
l a b o u r  P a r t y .  A t  t h e  1 9 2 1  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e  a  r e s o l u t i o n  w a s  m o v e d  i n  f a v o u r
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t h e i r  a d m i s s i o n #  T h e  s o o n e r ,  d e c l a r e d  D u n c a n  C a r m i c h a e l ,  i t s  s e c o n d e r ,  t h e y  
" g o t  r i d  o f  t h e  e x t r e m e  R i g h t  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  a n d  h a d  a  g o o d  f i g h t i n g  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p a r t y # ,  t h e  b e t t e r  f o r  t h e  m o v e m e n t " .  R o b e r t  W i l l i a m s  a d d e d  t h a t  
h e  w o u l d  " i n f i n i t e l y  p r e f e r "  t h e  d i c t a t o r s h i p  o f  t h e  M i n e r s '  F e d e r a t i o n  t o  t h a t
o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  m i n e o w n e r s #  M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  h a d  t a k e n
t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  o a t h ,  w h i c h  m i g h t  b e  " m o r e  d a m a g i n g  t o  t h e  w o r k i n g - c l a s s  
m o v e m e n t  e v e n  t h a n  t h e  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  t h e  R e d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l " *  T h e  r e s o l u t i o n
1 9  s
w a s ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  r e j e c t e d  b y  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  " ' ,
T h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  w a s  r e p e a t e d  l a t e r  t h e  s a m e  m o n t h ;  b j i t  t h e  L a b o u r  e x e c u t i v e
a c C ^  *pr e f u s e d  t o  e e n s i d e r  i t ,  a n d  a d v i s e d  l o c a l  L a b o u r  p a r t i e s  n o t  t o  a c c e p t  a p p l i c ­
a t i o n s  a t  t h a t  l e v e l .  A  m e e t i n g  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  b o t h  b o d i e s  t o o k  p l a c e  
i n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 1 1 ,  M l  .  r i  g  a '  i c l  _  e s t i  w a s  s u b m i t t e d  t o ,  a n d  a n s u -
-  e d  \  t h e  C o  m u n i  t s .  T h e  1 9 2 2  L a b o u r  c o n f e r e n c e ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a d o p t e d  a  
n e w  r u l e ,  p r o p o s e d  b y  H e n d e r s o n ,  e x c l u & d  > <  t m u  i l  t s  i s  d e l  g  t s  t o  n  d  -  1
o r  l o c a l  L a b o u r  e c u .  b  ^  : e s ;  d  t h e  e x e c u t i v e ' s  r e f u  C L  -  s ~  i t s  f .  ; i  i o n
o n  a f f i l i a t i o n ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  a t t r a c t i v e  a r g u m e n t  o f  o n e  d e l e g a t e  t h a t  f  
C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  s h o u l d  b e  " b r o u g h t  u n d e r  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  o f  o r g a n i s e d  - a  t r o l  
r a t h e r  t h a n  l e f t  t o  i t s e l f " ,  w a s  o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  e n d o r s e d .  C o m m u n i s t s ,  F r a n k
l o d g e s  l e c l a r e d ,  w e r e  ’ S h e  " i n t e l l e c t u a l  s l a v e s  o f  l e a  a m ; . .  ' -  . k i n g  o r d e r s  f r o m
■ i . . , , , 1 9 6m e  A s i a t i c  m i n c i "  .
A  f u r t h e r  a p p l i c a t i o n  w a s  r e f u s e d  a g a i n  t h e  f o i l . .  . 1 . y  a r ;  n d  J . T .
W a l t o n  N e v / b o l d ,  e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  f o r  M o t h e r w e l l  a s  a -  C o m m u n i s t ,
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a p p l i e d  f o r  t h e  L a b o u r  w h i p  a n d  w a s  r e f u s e d  i t  “ '  #  H c w b o l d  h a d  r e c e i v e d  l o c a l
, a  .  c o n s i d e r a b l e  ,  „L a b o u r  s u p p o r t ,  a n d  i n  s o m e  c a s e s  m e  l o c a l  l e v e l  m e r e  x x x u  s u p p o r t  l o r
1 9 8C o m m u n i s t  a f f i l i a t i o n  #  T h e  L a b o u r  l e a d e r s h i p ,  n o  d o u b t ,  w a s  o f t e n  m o r e  
v e h e m e n t  i n  i t s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  C o m m u n i s t  a f f i l i a t i o n  t h a n  s e c t i o n s  o f  t l  L k
a n d  f i l e .  Y e t  t h e  m a j o r i t i e s  a g a i n s t  a f f i l i  i t i o n  i n  c o n f e r e n c e  w e r e  f a r  g r e a t e r  
t h a n  e x e c u i  r e  i  f l u e n c e  c o u l d  c o  1 n d ;  m &  o f  u n a b a s h e d  x e n o p h o b i a  w a s
r a r e l y  a b s e n t  f r o m  e v e n  t h e  s p e e c h e s  o f  m i l i t a n t  l a b o u r  l e a d e r s  l i k e  H o d g e s ,  
w h o  w e r e  i n  o t h e r  r e s p e c t s  t h e  e x e c u t i v e ' s  m a j o r  o p p o n e n t s .  T h e  1 9 2 k  p a r t y  
c o n f e r e n c e  a g a i n  r e j e c t e d  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  b y  a  m a j o r i t y  t h i s  t i m e  o f  
o v e r  s i x t e e n  t o  o n e .  T h e y  w e r e  o p p o s e d ,  J o n e s  d e c l a r e d ,  t o  a  " c e r t a i n  n u m b e r  o f  
g e n t l e m e n  i n  M o s c o w  w i t h  u n p r o n o u n c e a b l e  n a m e s  a n d  o f  v e r y  d o u b t f u l  n a t i o n a l i t y " ,  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  d i c t a t e  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y .  R e s o l u t i o n s  w e r e  a l s o  a d o p t e d ,  w i t h  s m a l l e ^  
m a j o r i t i e s ,  p r o h i b i t i n g  u ^ C o m u u S i s c  a s  a  L a b o u r  c a n d i d a t e  f o r  p a r l i a m  r o r
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  e l e c t i o n s ,  a n d  p r o h i b i t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  C o m m u n i  ; t  m e m b e r s h i p  o f
19Qt h e  p a r t y  '  "  .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  i t  w a s  r e s o l v e d  t h a t  n o  C o m m u n i s t  c o u l d
OQOb e c o m e  o r  r e m a i n  a  m e m b e r  o f  a n y  a f f i l i a t e d  s e c t i o n  o f  a n y  l o c a l  L a b o u r  p a r t y  .  
T h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  r e g i m e  w a s  b a s e d  u p o n  p o l i t i c a l  
i t y  i s  inconsistent w i t h  this r e c o r d  o f  d e t e r m i n e d ,  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  a n d  
s u c c e s s f u l  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  w i t h i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  l a b o u r  m o v e m e n t  
T h e  p o l i c y ,  m o r e o v e r ,  w a s  r e p r o d u c e d  a b r o a d ,  i n  t h e  w o r l d  o f  i n t e r n a t ­
i o n a l  s o c i a l i s t  a f f a i r s .  I n d e e d ,  British L a b o u r  w a s ,  o n  i t s  o w n  a d m i s s i o n ,  
" l a r e g l y  r e s p o n s i b l e "  f o r  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f t e r  
t h e  w a r ,  a n d  i t  c o n s t i t u t e d ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Z i n o v i e v ,  t h a t  b o d y ' s  " m a i n  r e a l  
s t r e n g t h " - ' " .  I t  w a s  t h e  m e r i t  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  M a c D o n a l d  w r o t e ,
t h a t  i t  w a s  w h o l l y  " a n t i - B o l s h e v i s t " .  H e  t h o u g h t  i t ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  " o n l y  r e a l
202b u l w a r k  a g a i n s t  B o l s h e v i s m  s h o r t  o f  m i l i t a r y  e x e c u t i o n s "  .  A r t h u r  H e n d e r s o n  
w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  t h r e e  s p o n s o r s  o f  t h e  B e r n e  C o n f e r e n c e  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 1 9 »  w h e r e  
t h e  p a r t y ' s  d e l e g a t e s  f o t e d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  n i i & i - 3 o l s h e v i k  m o t i o n  o f i  ' d e m o c r a c  
a n d  d i c t a t o r s h i p ' ,  a n d  h e  w a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  t h r e e - m a n  e x e c u t i v e  w h i c h  w a s
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e l e c t e d  b y  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e * " ^ .  T h e  B e r n e  m e e t i n g  w a s  f o l l o w e d  b y  c o n f e r e n c e s  a t
A m s t e r d a m  ( A p r i l  1 9 1 9 ) i  L u c e r n e  ( A u g u s t  1 9 1 9 )  a n d  G e n e v a  ( J u l y  1 9 2 0 ) .  P o s t g a t e
d e s c r i b e d  t h e  L a b o u r  d e l e g a t i o n  a t  G e n e v a  " p e r o r a t i n g  o n  t h e  e v i l  o f  B o l s h e v i s m
b e f o r e  t h e  a w e - s t r u c k  a n d  s l i g h t l y  r i d i c u l o u s  t a i l  o f  d e l e g a t e s  f r o m  S o u t h
A m e r i c a ,  t h e  B a l k a n s  s e n d  I n d o - C h i n a ,  w h o  a r c  i n e v i t a b l y  I n c l u d e d  i n  a n y  l i s t
2 0  ko f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n t s  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l "
H u y s m a n s ,  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  a d d r e s s e d  t h e  1 9 2 0
-  j u r  c o n f e r e n c e ,  a n d  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  i t s  s e c r e t a r i a t  b e  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  L o n d o n .
T h e  B r i t i s h  s e c t i o n  w a s  a t  t h a t  t i m e ,  h e  d e c l a r e d ,  t h e  " o n l y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s e c t i o n "  w h i c h  w a s  " w o r t h y  t o  b e  e n t r u s t e d  w i t h  t h e  h o n o u r  a n d  f i t  t o  d i s c h a r g e '  
20 5t h i s  d u t y  T h e  G e n e v a  c o n f e r e n c e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m o n t h  r e s o l v e d  a c c o r d i n g l y ,
a n d  t h e  d e c i s i o n  w a s  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  a c c e p t e d  b y  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  e x e c u t i v e  i n
S e p t e m b e r .  T h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  w a s  t o  b e  c o m p o s e d  o f  t h r e e  m e m b e r s ,  t w o  o f  t h e m
British .  H e n d e r s o n  w a s  c h a i r m a n  o f  i t s  e x e c u t i v e ,  a n d  i t s  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e
C o m m i t t e e  w a s  e n t i r e l y  c o m p o s e d  o f  p a r t y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  w i t h  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f
°07a  f o r e i g n  J o i n t  S e c r e t a r y  .  M a c D o n a l d  s u b m i t t e d  t h e  S e c o n d ;  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ' s
.! j 208s t a t e m e n t  a t  t h e  t r i l a t e r a l  m e e t i n g  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l s  i n  B e r l i n  i n  M a y  1 9 2 2  ;
a n d  t h e  a m b i v a l e n c e  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n  -  s i n c e  h e  r e m a i n e d  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  I . L . P . ,  
w h i c h  h a d  b e c o m e  p a r t  o f  t h e  ' V i e n n a  U n i o n '  o r  ' T w o  a n d  a  h a l f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l '  
F a t h e r  t h a n  j o i n  e i t h e r  t h e  S e c o n d  o r  t h e  T h i r d  -  w a s  e n d d d  w h e n  t h e  U n i o n  
° p t e d  t o  m e r g e  w i t h  t h e  S e c o n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  a  y e a r  l a t e r .
The party's association with the International excited sono alarm
in Parliament. The International, Glarry declared, was a "conglomeration of
Socialists and poli ;iSa.l fanatics"; and they were the Labour government's 
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taskmasters 1  The situation was if anything the reverse. The Hamburg
conference, at which the adhesion of the Vienna Union was formalised, roundly
condemned hie "terroristic party dictatosship” in Russia, and offered support
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to the Bolsheviks* socialis op oncnts"- . British labour, the least affected 
, probably, by pro-Soviet and revolutionary sentiment within its ranks of any 
major European label try, was precisely the lost vigorous'.and organisationally 
effective opponent of Communism in internaticnal’''a¥fairs•
The strategy of the new government was settled at a private meeting at Sidney 
Webb's house on the evening before the party's national executive was to n e e k Q 
It was agreed that the party would take office if called upon to do so; but 
that rather than introduce 'bold Socialist measures' which, some had urged, 
might lead to an election b j i t  also to re-election with a bigger majority, It 
should propose only tho, r.sures which were sure of a parliamentary majority 
They lust "show the country", Snowden h Id, that they were "not under the 
domination of the wild men". MacDonald expressed the view that they would have 
a "good deal of trouble with the extreme section", who would expect the gover-
P1 p
nment to "do all kinds of impossible things"1- . In the circumstances, Wickham 
Steed suggested, MacDonald would "welcome the enforced moderation entailed by
i • . 213the position of Labour as a minority government""- ^ .
The King, entrusting him with the task of forming a government on 
22 January, . niioned an "unfortunate incident" at the recent meeting at the 
Albert Hall, over which MacDonald had presided. He had in mind the singing of 
the 'Red Flag* and the * Marseillais^".. MacDonald asked the King to bear in 
mind the "very difficult position he was in vis a vis his own extremists". Had 
he attempted to prevent the singing of the *PLed Flag' at that meeting, a riot, 
he thought, would certainly have taken place (Another observer, no more favour
a b l e  t o  the s o c i a l i s t  c a u s e ,  f o u n d  t h e  m e e t i n g  r a t h e r  a  " v e r y  t a m e  s h o w . .  T h e y
- nlk. . .  a d m e n  t h e  s p e e c h e s ,  w h i c h  w e r e  a l l  a b o u t  G o d " 1 -  ) .  T h e  ' R e d  F l a g 1
r a i g h t  e v e n ,  M a c D o n a l d  t h o u g h t ,  b e  s u n g  i n  ; h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s .  T h e y  h a d  " g o t
i n t o  t h e  w a y  o f  s i n g i n g  t h i s  s o n g " ,  h e  e x p l a i n e d ,  a n d  i t  w o u l d  b y  o n l y  " b y
21 9a e g r e . e s  t h a t  h e  ( h o p e d )  t o  b r e a k  d o w n  t h i s  h a b i t "  '  •
I n t o  D o w n i n g  S t r e e t ,  wrote Forward*s editorialist, would go men whose
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ideas of politics were "fundamentally different from those who (had) gone there
in the past". It was a change noL merely in personnel: it was the succession
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of a "new social order" ■ . It was, Kirkwood, declared, the ^beginning 01 the
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" for the ruling classes ‘ 0 It wastherefore with some relief that "business 
and Conservative figures foudd that the Cabinet included, in fact, a coocidcr­
ib - represen tatlor from precisely those classes whose doom Kirkwood had pred­
icted.
At the meeting in Web" ’s house it had been agreed to leave the decision
regarding ministerial appointments to II .cDonrld ’# At Loss! mouth he drew up
a list, in consultation with Lord Haldane, who joined the Cabinet himself as
pi q
Lord Chancellor, on the acceptahce by MacDonald of "nertai . 11 L n " 0
had in fact written to Baldwin immediately after the election, urging that
only he had the possibility of carrying on government successfully, but he had
been ashed by Baldwin to "join the Labour government and help them out". E: had
)een ’ is h bour, h pe - 11 A  fcl st idealisiie of id tl ree
parties, but he "had not embraced and never did adopt" the party* . j>. .-iff s
pr 1 1 . he wa >,.. ...... , .bl.e to td i ;e Cabins : on ...... I r ... mat %
gUQ
and he "always had a S| Vyr" for J.II. T o  #
It wa.d generally felt, wrote Kirkwood, chat Haldane had had "rather
too much say" in the government’s formation;"and there was strong resentment
in trade union circles, recalled Snowden, at the inclusion of "so r:-y m n who 
1 - ’-’Ihad had 210 record of service in the Labour movement11, * MacDonald had, however, 
already d a". Led to expose what he thought to be a popular fflisconcepi . of 
the "hobnails and big vulgar teeth gripping the dagger" of a L hour front bench# 
Accordingly Major C.3. Thompson, MacDonald’s golfing companion at Lossiemouth,
-; Air Secretary; Lo.rd Parme .r, rly Conserv . l i v e ,  he L o r d  P r e s i ­
dent o f  the C o u n c i l ;  and II.P. Hacmiliar., a p r o m i n e n t  T o r y  ba r r i s t e r ,  b e b a m e  
L o r d  A d v o c a t e *  T h e r e  was the " g r e a t e s t  s u r p r i s e ”  a t  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  L o r d  
Chelmsford, a l i f e - l o n g  T o r y  and the lorn o r  V i c e r o y  o f  I n d i a ,  t o  the A d m i r a l t y ,  
•he had n e v e r ,  w r o t e  S n o w d e n ,  b e e n  a s s o c i a t e d  i n  the " s l i g h t e s t  d e g r e e "  with 
t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  i n  a n y  w a y ;  n o r ,  i t  a p p e a r s ,  d i d  h e  e v e n  t r o u b l e  t o  b e c o m e  a
O 95 ~7
- e r  w h i l e  i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' 1 - " - - ' ' ' ' #  H i s  a p p o i n t m e n t  s u g g e s t e d  t o  Amery, . . h o r n  h e
22L-
t o  s u c c e d d ,  t h a t  t h e r e  w o u l d ,  b e  " n o  v i o l e n t  c h a n g e  o f  p o l i c y " 1 -  #  L a b o u r  
• • ■ e m b e r s  w h o  w e r e  f o r m e r  L i b e r ' , / p e a r e d  t o  h a v e  b e e n  b e t t e r  s e r v e d  . t h a n  t h e  
I . L . P .  w i n g  o f  t h e  p a r t y .  L a n s b u r y  a n d  M o r e l  w e r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  
i L c v ;  L e a d e r  d e c l a r e d  i t s e l f  " p a r t i c u l a r l y  p l e a s e d 1 ’* ;  b y  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  W h e a t l e y
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as Minister of Housing* '. Sidney Olivier, who became Secretary for India,
h •- served pi . 1 tffe govcrnr.ients as Governor o f  Jamaica, to their conolcte
satisfaction, it appeared, in all but his failure regularly to attend churcS2^.
While a member of the Fabian Society, he had not taken any part in the Society':
2 2 7
activities since its early lays 0 Stephen Balsh, appointed to the War Office,
m s  "very popular" with the Army. lie addressed the first meeting of the A:
Council which he attended (according to Dalton) with the injunction: "Gentlemen,
always remember that we must all be loyal to the K i n g " -  " ,
If there was a doubt about the Cabinet, the Review of Reviews commented,
it was less about its acceptability to its Conservative and Liberal opponents
than to some of its ovm supporters. 3y Liberals and Conservatives alike, i t
2 2 9was noted, the Cabinet was well received . The more timid Conservatives,
Snowden recalled, and the more frightened capitalists "took heart in the 
presence in the Cabinet of men like Lord Parmoor, Lord Chelmsford and Lord 
Haldane". They - rightly - could "not believe that these men would be the 
instruments for carrying out the Socialist Revolution"1--'*2. The City in partic­
ular was "visibly impressed" by the Cabinet*s composition. The Stock Exchange 
enjoyed a "sustained rally". "Sweeping rises" occurred in practically -all the
0"Z~]
m a r k e t s  o n  t h e  d a y  t h e  n e w  C a b i n e t  w a s  a n n o u n c e d
O n e  m u s t  p r o c e e d ,  c l e a r l y ,  b e y o n d  a  p u t a t i v e  ' s o c i a l i s m 1  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  L a b o u r ' s  
a d v o c a c y  o f  c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h ,  a n d  t h e  d i p l o m a t i c  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  
g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e  p a r t y ' s  a t t i t u d e  -  s o  f a r ,  a t  l e a s t ,  a s  t h i s  c a n  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
-  - ■ ' o m  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e b a t e s ,  p a r t y  s t a t e m e n t s ,  c o n f e r e n c e ,  t h e  l a b o u r  p r e s s  a n d  
l o c a l  L a b o u r  P a r t y  r e c o r d s  -  w a s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y  b y  a  m i l i t a n t  
a n d  u n y i e l d i n g  h o s t i l i t y  t o  S o v i e t  c o m m u n i s m  a n d  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  m o v e m e n t s  i n  
g a n e r a l :  a n  h o s t i l i t y  t o  w h i c h  t h e r e  w e r e  a o i f i e x  e x c e p t i o n s  i n  1 9 2 0 ,  b u t  v e r y  
l e w  b ^ i r e e  o r  f o u r  y e a r s  l a t e f ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  a s  a  
w h o l e  h a d  b e c o m e  e v e n  m o r e  f i r m l y  c o m m i t t e d  t o  r e c o g n i t i o n  o x  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n ­
m e n t .  I t  w a s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d ,  a l s o ,  b y  a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  s o l i c i t u d e  f o r  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  r u l i n g  c l a s s  p o w e r  f r o m  t h e  m o n a r c h y  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  s c h o o l s ,  
a n d  f o r  t h e  E m p i r e .  T h i s  w a s  a p p r e c i a t e d  i n  M o s c o w ,  i f  n o t  a l w a y s  o n  t h e  
-  a e r v a t i v e  b a b f e  l o a c h e s .  T h e  L a b o u r  t h e  C o m i n t e r n  e x e c u t i v e  d e c l ­
a r e d  i n  a  r e s o l u t i o n  o n  t h e  ' L a b o u r  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  C . P . G . B . ' ,  • ’ r e s e m b l e d  
o o r e  a  " b o u r g e o i s  g r o u p i n g  t h a n  a  p a r t y  o f  p r o l e t a t i a n  c l a s s  s t r u g g l e " ;  a n d  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  w h i c h  i t  h a d  f o r m e d  w a s  d e s i g n e d  t o  " s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  b o u r g e o i s  s t a t e
6oh
b y  m e a n s  o f  r e f o r m s  a n d  c l a s s  h a r m o n y  r a t h e r  t h a n  c l a s s  s t r u g g l e "  " • ' A  I t  w a s ,
a c c o r d i n g  t o  R a d e k ,  a  " c o a l i t i o n  g o v e r n m e n t  f r o m  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e
u r s  b  u c  r s . c  yL a b o u r  P a r t y  a n d  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  i  p e r i a l i s t  b e H ^ g e e i s l i  ,  r e p r e s ­
e n t i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  f i n a n c e  C a p i t a l " .  I t s  f o r  ' . a  . . i t  " n o t  m  t h e  
c o m i n g  t o  p o w e r  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  w o r k i n g  c l a s s " .  T h e  p a r t y ,  R a d e k  n o t e d ,  d i d n ’ t  
e v e n  c a l l  i t s e l f  s o c i a l i s t ;  a n d  i t s  l e a d e r s  w e r e  " v e r y  c a r e f u l  e v e n  i n  t h e i r
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p h r a s e o l o g y "  •  T h e  B n i t i s h  w o r k i n g  c l a s s ,  T r o t s k y  c o m p l a i n e d ,  h a d  b o o n
" k e p t  i n  t e r r i b l e  i d e o l o g i c a l  b a c k w a r d n e d d  b y  t h e  b o u r g e o i s i e  a n d  i t s  F a b i a n
a g e n t s " .  T h e  m o s t  r a d i c a l  e l e m e n t s  w e r e  I f c i s h  o r  S c o t t i s h :  w i t h  t h e  n o t a b l e
23ke x c e p t i o n  o f  M a c D o n a l d  -  •
L a b o u r ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o u l d  n o t  r e m a i n  i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h e  r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  i n
u n e m p l o y m e n t  a f t e r  1920 ,  a n d  t o  t h e  h i g h  l e v e l  o f  u n e r r n o l o y m e n t  w h i c h  p e r s i s t e d
t h e r e a f t e r .  T h e  b e l i e f  w a s  w i d e s p r e a d  i n  L i b e r a l  a n d  b a n k i n g  a n d  t r a d i n g
c i r c l e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  w i t h i n  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y ,  t h a f a  : •  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  u n e n ^ l o y . . . . a n i
l a y i n  t h e  d e c l i n a  o f  B r i t a i n ’ s  f o r e i g n  t r a d e ;  b u t  t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  c o n s i d e r a b l e
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  t h a t  t r a d e  w i t h  S o v i e t  R u s s i a ,  w h o s e  n e e d s  w e r e
i t t e d  t o  b e  e n o r m o u s ,  a n d  o f  a  n a t u r e  f o r  w h i c h  B r i t i s h  i n d u s t r y  a p p e a r e d
w e l l  e q u i p p e d  t o  c a t e r .  T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t r a d i n g  r e l a t i o n s  o n  a  m a j o r  s c a l e ,
h o w e v e f ,  a p p e a r e d  t o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  b e  p l a c e d
o n  a  ’ n o r m a l ’  a n d  m o r e  s t a b l e  f o o t i n g *  " R u s s i a n  t r e a t i e s "  m e a n t  " B r i t i s h  o r d e r s ! .
T h e  p a r t y ' s  s p o k e s m e n  d i d  n o t  a b a n d o n  t h e i r  i d e o l o g i c a l  h o s t i l i t y  i n  s e e k i n g
c l o s e r  t r a d i n g  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  S o v i e t  R u s s i a .  N . E . P . ,  M a c D o n a l d  w r o t e ,  w a s  t h e
r e t r e a t  o f  B o l s h e v i s m  " b a c k  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  b a s i s  o f  a  c a p i t a l i s t ^ p r i v a t e
p r o p e r t y - S o c i a l i s t  c o m p r o m i s e " ;  a n d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t r a d e  w i t h  S o v i e t
R u s s i a ,  S n o w d e n  t o l d  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  m i g h t  c o m p e l  t h e  " t h r o w i n g  s t w a y  o f
t h e  l a s t  s h r e a d s  o f  B o l s h e v i s m  a n d  C o m m u n i s m  b y  w h i c h  ( t h a t  c o u n t r y  w a s )
p r e s e n t l y  f e t b o r e d " .  T h e  c l o s e r  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  B r i t a i n  a n d
S o v i e t  R u s s i a ,  t h e  " m o r e  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s y s t e m  o f  R u s s i a  ( w o u l d )  a p p r o x i m a t e  t o
t h e  e c o n o m i c  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  w h i c h  s h e  i s  i n  
2 3 5r e l a t i o n "  T h e  L a b o u r  e x e c u t i v e ,  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  " m a n y  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s "  o n
t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  " p o l i t i c a l  p e r s e c u t i o n  i n  R u s s i a " ,  h a d  a p p r o a c h e d  t h e  T r a d e
D e l e g a t i o n  a n d  e x p r e s s e d  i t s  h o p e  t h a t  " v e r y  s o o n "  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s
f o r  t h e  " f r e e  a n d  u n f e t t e r e d  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  m i n o r i t y  t h o u g h t "  ( i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,
2 3 6o x  a n t i * B o l s h e v i k  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y )  .  T h e  r e l i e f  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  
m u s t  c o n e  f i r s t ;  a n d  i f  r e c o g n i t i o n  d o  j u r e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  t h e  
p r i c e ,  i t  m u s t  b e  p a i d .
S e r i o u s  t h o u g h ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  u n e m p l o y m e n t  w a s ,  t h e  3 - e o n o n i s  :  d e c l a r e d
a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o x  1 9 2 1 ,  t h e  " s u d d e n  c o n t r a s t "  w i t h  t h e  b o o m  c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h
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p r e c e d e d  i t  h a d  p e r h a p s  l e d  t o  a  t c a d e n c e  t o  r e g a r d  i t  " t o o  g l o o m i l y " ' - - '  •  
U n o n p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  m o n t h ,  D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 0 ,  h a d  r e a c h e d  a  l e v e l  o f  
7.&%  o f  t h e  i n s u r e d  p o p u l a t i o n ,  a  v e r y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n c r e a s e  i n  a  m a t t e r  o f  
m o n t h s .  T h e  o p t i m i s m  o f  t h e  E c o n o m i s t ,  m o r e o v e r ,  p r o v e d  m i  1  . c o d .  T h e  n u m b e r  
o f  p e o p l e  o u t  o f  w o r k  i n c r e a s e d  r a p i d l y ,  a n d  b y  M a y  1 9 2 1  n e a r l y  o n e  i n  f o u r  
w a s  u n e m p l o y e d .  T h r o u g h o u t  1 9 2 1 ,  1 9 2 2  a n d  1 9 2 3  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  t h o s e  o u t  o f  w o r k  
‘ e l l  1  s i c  1 0 #  o f  t h e  i n s u r e d  p o p u l a t i o n ,  a n d  i t  w a s  o f t e n  s u b  s  b  a n t i  a l l y  
h i g h e r  ■  „  T h e  a s t e r  o f  a p p l i c a n t s  f o r  e m p l o y m e n t  a t  l a b o u r  e x c h a n g e s  i n
 n i i s d  K i :  o x c o . d e d  a  m i l l i o n  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 1 ,  a n d  i n  t h e  p e r i o d
t o  t h e  e n d  o f  1 9 2 3  t h e  n u m b e r  w a s  n e v e r  l o w e r  t h a n  1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  
p e r s o n s  o n  p o o r  r e l i e f  r e a c h e d  a b o u t  a  m i l l i o n  u  i  h  I f . ;  h d  . . .  •  o f
1 7 0  p e r s o n s  p e r  1 0 , 0 0 0  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  w e r e  o n  r e l i e f  i n  1 9 2 1 *  T h e  f t  f t  . 1  
i n  1 9 2 2  w a s  m o r e  t h a n  t w i c e  a s  g r e a t ,  d  '  a t  f i g u  . a  w a . _  i n  t u r n  e x c e e d e d  i n  
$ 1 U n e m p l o y m e n t  w a s  c o n s i d o r a t l y  h i g h e r  ^ h a n  e v e  h e s e  u  p i  . e n t e d
l e v e l s  i n  c e r t  1  i n d u s t r i e s ,  s u c h  a s  s h i p b u i l d i n g ,  e n g  i n  e e :  g ,  i n i n g  a n d  
m e t  1 - w  r l  i  i g ,  w h i c l  .  f t e n  p r e c i s e l y  t h o s e  w h i c h  a p p e a r e d  m o s t  l i k e l y
f t o  g a i n  f r o m  R u s s i a  o d o r s .  T h e  p o r e  e r f ;  g e  o f  a l l  u n i o n  m e m b e r s  i n c l u d e d  i n  
g o v e r n m e n t  r e t u r n s  a s  u n e m p l o y e d  w a s  I f .  2 #  i n  1 9 2 2  a n d  1 1 * 3 #  i n  1 9 - 5 *  ! &  t h e  
e  g i r . e e r i n g ,  s h i p b u i l d i n g  a n d  m e t a l  i n d u s t r i e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g
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f i g u    w a x #  2 7 %  k  2 0 * 6 #  • '  *  S ]  i  L e d  w  k e  s  L  ; ]  i  e s e  i  i d u  L a s ,  t g  i n .
w e r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  u n e m p l o y e d  t h a n  t h e  u n s k i l l e d  o r  s e m i - s k i l l e d  m e n  •
T h i s  c o u l d  n o t  b u t  b e  a  s e r i o u s  m a t t e r  f o r  L a b o u r ,  s o  m a n y  o f  w h o s e  
r  I f  n t a r y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  c o m e  f r o m  t h e  r a n k s  o f  t h e  u n i o n s  
t h e m s e l v e s  I t  w a s  a  s e r i o u s  m a t t e r  i n  o t h e r  w a y s  a l s o *  A s  M a c D o n a l d  n o t e d ,  
t h e  u n e m p l o y e d  m a n ’ s  " m e m b e r s h i p  o f  t h r i f t  c l u b s  1  . . p s c s ,  h e  a c q u i r e s  b a d  
h a b i t s . . "  H e  m i g h t  e v e n  f o l l o w  t h e  " a l l u r e m e n t s  o f  i n t e m p e r a n c e  o r * ,  t f  b e  p i c
oZfg
o f  F o r t u n e "  *  G a m b l i n g  i n  i t s  t u r n  1  d  t o  " m o r a l  a n d  i n t e l l e c t u a l  u n s & t i l c  m ~  . 
* • "  a n d  a n  " i m p a t i e n c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  s l o w  p r o c e s s e s  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  a c c u m u l a t i o n "  «  
" O n e  c  r  t h  m o s t  a . r v c l l o u  d  L a g s  i n  t h e  w o r l d " ,  M a c D o n a l d  w r o t e j
oij.C *
w a s  t h o " d o c i l l t y "  o f  t h e  u n e m p l o y e d ^  •  G a p i t a l i s m ,  h e  c o n d e d e d ,  w a s  u l t i m a t e l y  
i ' o  b l a m e ;  b u t  u n l i k e  G . D . I I .  C o l e ,  w h o  s a w  n o  s o l u t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  b o u n d s  o f  
t h a t  s y s t e m ,  M a c D o n a l d  u r g e d  t h a t  t h e  " o n l y  w a y  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m  a t
• .  _ 2h-6i t s  r o o t s "  w a s  t o  " b a c k  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  w o r k "  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  .  h e  
d e p l o r e d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  " v a i n  a n d  f u t i l e  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s " ;  a n d  w a r n e d  t h a t  t h e
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l . L . P ,  s h o u l d  n o t  a l l o w  t h e  u n e m p l o y e d  a g i t a t i o n  t o  p a s s  o u t  o f  i t s  h a n d s ,
a n d  t h a t  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  " s t a m p e d e d  i n t o  k n v t s  w k i o ' -  h . / r e
2 4 7n o  r e l a t i o n  t o  s o u n d  p o l i c y "  .  T h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  s p e a k i n g  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e
u n e m p l o y e d ,  t h e  N e w  S t a t e s ™  .  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  h a d  i n  c o n s e q u c c n e  b e e n  " a l l o w e d  t o
2 4 8f a l l  i n t o  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  C o r n : r u n i s t s "  .  T o  r e d u c e  u n e m p l o y m e n t  w a s  t o  
d i m i n i s h  t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  a n d  t h a t  o f  t h e  r a d i c a l  u  s  i p l o y e d  m o v e m e n t  a s  a  
w h o l e •
U n e m p l o y m e n t ,  a g a i n ,  w a s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  f a l l  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f
t r a d e  u n i o n s  a n d  i n  t o t a l  t r a d e  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p *  I n  1 9 2 1  2 1 3  u n i o n s  w e r e
a f f i l i a t e d  t o  t h e  T . U . C . ;  b u t  b y  1 9 2 3  t h e  n u m b e r  h a d  d r o p p e d  t o  1 9 4 .  T h e
t o t a l ,  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  a f f i l i a t e d  u n i o n s  d f o p p e d  i n  t h e  s a m e  p e r i o d  f r o m  n e a r l y
2 4 9s i x  a n d  a  h a l f  m i l l i o n  t o  l e s s  t h a n  f o u r  a n d  a  h a l f  m i l l i o n  ■ ' ©  T h e  t o t a l
m e m b e r s h i p  o f  a l l  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  d r o p p e d  f r o m  o v e r  e i g h t  m i l l i o n
2 5 0t o  o v e r  f i v e  m i l l i o n  ©  I n  1 9 2 0  1 2 2  u n i o n s  w i t h  a  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  r a t h e r  m o r e
t h a n  f o u r  m i l l i o n  w e r e  a f f i l i a t e d  t o  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y ;  b u t  b y  1 9 2 3  b o t h  f i g u r e s
2  5 1h a d  f a l l e n ^  t h e  l a t t e r  b y  m o r e  t h a n  a  q u a r t e r  ©  P h i  w a g  a  m a t t e r  o f  r a t h e r
m o r e  t h a n  s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  L a b o u r ' s  i n c o m e  d e r i v e d  o v e r w h e l m i n g l y
f r o m  t h e  u n i o n s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  f r o m  m a j o r  b o d i e s  o u c h  a s  t h e  m i n e r s * ,  e n g i n e e r s '
2^2i r o n  a n d  s t e e l  w o r k e r s *  a n d  t e x t i l e  w o r k e r s *  u n i o n s  •  ©  T h e  u n i o n s  *  f u n d s ,
h o w e v e r ,  f e l l  s h a r p l y *  i n  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e i r  d e c l i n i n g  m e m b e r s h i p  e n d  t h e
d o r  n e e d  t o  f i n d  s t r i k e  p a y .  '  e i r  ' m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  o t h e r  e x p e n s e s '  d r o p p e d
2 5 3D y  o .  q u a r t e r  b e t w e e n  1 9 2 1  a n d  1 9 2 3  •  U n i o n  o f f i c i a l s  a n d  t h e  L a b o u r  o r g a n i s ­
a t i o n  w e r e  b o t h  a f f e c t e d .  G r a n t s  t o  l o c a l  a g e n t s ,  i t  w a s  a n n o u n c e d ,  w e r e  t o  b e  
e n d e d .  T h e  G l a s g o w  I . L . P .  F e d e r a t i o n  n o t e d  i n  i t s  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  t h a t  t h e
e c o n o m i c  d e p r e s s i o n  h a d  r e d u c e d  t h e  p a r t y * . - s  p a y i n g  m e m b e r s h i p ©  T h e  d e c l i n e  i n
2 5 4  . ., .i n c o m e  w a s  " d u e  t o  u n e m p l o y m e n t "  ^  ©  T h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r ,  :; h e  I L P ' s  n a t i o n a l
C o u n c i l  r  t e d  t o  t h e  1922  c o n f e r e n c e ,  h a d  b e e n  o n e  o f  " e x c e p t i o n a l  i n d u s t r ­
i a l  d e p r e s s i o n ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  o f  g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y  f o r  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s ­
a t i o n s . . "  U n e m p l o y m e n t  h  t d  f  k e t e d  i n c o m e  " s e r i o u s l y " .  T h e  p a r t y ' s  R e s e r v e
F u n d s  h a d  t o  b e  d r a w n  u p o n ;  a f f i l i a t i  m  f e e s  w e r e  r e d u c e d  b y  a  p u a r t e r ;  a n d  a s
2 5 5m a n y  a s  one-third o f  t h e  p a r t y ' s  m e m b e r s  h a d  b e e n  u n e m p l o y e d  a t  o n e  t i m e  ©
R e a c t i o n a r y  a t t i t u d e s  m i g h t ,  w i t h  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s  o f  v a l i d i t y ,  b e  a s c r i b e d  t o
u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p
p a r t y  a d  u n i o n  l e a d e r s .  Y e t  o n c e  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  
f o r e i g n  t r a d e  w a s  e s t a b l d  . ,  i t  w a s ,  c l e a r l y ,  i n  t h e i r  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  i n h e r e s  
t h a t  t r a d i n g  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  S o v i e t  R u s s i a  s h o u l d  b e  d e v e l o p e d ,  . d  t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  s h o u l d ,  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  b e  f o r m a l l y  r e c o g n i z e d ©
607
C o n c e r n  w i t h  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  w h i c h  t r a d e  w i t h  R u s s i a  c o u l d  m a k e  t o  t h e  r e l i e f
o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  b e c a m e  m a n i f e s t  f r o m  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  1920 :  a l t h o u g h  a s  e a r l y
1X 3 ,  ' - o ^  m  1  .  p r e  ‘  t e d  :1 s  t h e  w u x c s t i o n  w o u l d  " v e r y
s o o n  b e c o m e  a c u t e  •  A s  u n e m p l o y m e n t  i n c r e a s e d  i n  B r i t a i n ,  f t  w a s  n o t e d  i n
t h e  L a b o u r  L e a d e r ,  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  B r i t i s h  w o r k e r s  o f  r e - o p e n i n g  t r a d e  w i t h
R u s s i a  b e c a m e  m o r e  u r g e n t .  P e a c e  w i t h  R u s s i a  w a s  " n o w  c l e a r l y  a n  i n d u s t r i a l
2 - 7a n d  n o t  m e r e l y  a  p o l i t i c a l  q u e s t i o n " ' - ' "  .  T h e  o p e n i n g  u p  o f  t r a d e  w i t h  R u s s i a  
w o u l d  d o  m o r e  t h a n  a n y t h i n g  e l s e ,  t h o u g h t  S n o w d e n ,  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  s t a t e  o f  
- B r i t i s h  t r a d e .  I t  w a s  a l s o  t h e  " b e s t  w a y  t o  k i l l  B o l s h e v i s m " :  e v e n  i f  s o m e  o f  
t h e  i n  p o w e r  s u r v i v e d ,  t h e i r  '  o d s  w o u l d  n o t  o u t l a s t  t h e  " o p e n i n g  u p  o f
O ^ P
i n t e r c o u r s e  w i t h  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d " - ' " ' "  „  N o t  o n l y ,  d e c l a r e d  E . D .  M o r e l ,  w e r e
t h e y  h e l p i n g  t o  " d e s t r o y  t h e  b o d y  a n d  s o u l  o f  t h e  R u s s i a n  p e o p l e " :  t h e y  w e r e
p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  R u s s i a n s  s e n d i n g  g o o d s  t o  B r i t a i n  o f  w h i c h  t h e i r  o w n  p e o p l e  w e r e
i n  n e e d .  I f  a  m a r k e t  w a s  c l o s e d  w h i c h  c o n t a i n e d  1 5 0  m i l l i o n  p e o p l e  w h o  w i s h e d
t o  b u y  B r i t i s h  g o o d s ,  t h e n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  w a s  " g o i n g  t o  c o m e " ,  m i d  t h e  p r i c e  o f
2 5 Qf o o d  s u p p l i e s  ,  e q u a l l y ,  w o u l d  i n c r e a s e  « >
I n  v i e w  o f  t h e  s t e a d i l y  r i s i n g  n u m b e r  o f  w o r k l e s s ,  t h e  L a b o u r  e x e c u t i v e  
a l l o w e d  a n  e m e r g e n c y . n r e s o l u t i o n  t o  g o  f o r w a r d  a t  t h e  s p e c i a l  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e  
011 I r e l a n d  o n  2 9  D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 0 .  T h e  r e s o l u t i o n ,  w h i c h  w a s  c a r r i e d  u n a n i m o u s l y ,  
n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  g r o w i n g  v o l u m e  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t  i n  B r i t a i n  
w a s  " " d u e  i n  l a r g o  m e a s u r e  t o  t h e  i n t e r r u p t i o n  i n  w o r l d  t r a d i n g  f o l l o w i n g  o n  
t h e  w a r  a n d  d e f e c t i v e  p e a c e  t r e a t i e s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  f o l l y  o f  B r i t i s h  
a n d  A l l i e d  p o l i c y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n  2n t  o f  R u e  i n " .  I t  c o n d e m n e d  
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  f o r  t h e  " u n w a r r a n t a b l e  d e l a y  i n  s e c u r i n g  p e a c e  a n d  o p e n i n g  
t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  R u s s i a n  g o v e r n m e n t " .  T h e r e  w a s ,  i t  c o n c l u d e d ,  a n  
p e r a t i v e  n e e d  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  c a u s e s  a n d  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
u n e m p l o y m e n t " 2 0 '0 .
T h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  e x e c u t i v e  a n d  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  T . t T . C .
f o r m e d  a  J o i n t  C o m m i t t e e  o f  I n q u i r y  i n t o  U n e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  p r e p a r e d  a  r e p o r t ,
• ’ U n e m p l o y m e n t  -  a  L a b o u r  P o l i c y " ,  w h i c h  w a s  p r e s e n t e d  t o  a  S p e c i a l  N a t i o n a l  
J o i n t  C o n f e r e n c e  i n  L o n d o n  o n  2 7  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 1 .  T h e  c o n f e r e n c e  a d o p t e d  t h e  
report a n d  r e a f f i r m e d  t h e  27 D e c e m b e r  r e s o l u t i o n ,  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  t h e  g r o w i n g  
v o l u m e  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  w a s  " l a r g e l y  d u e  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t o
secure the r e s u m p t i o n  o f  t r a d e  w i t h  R u s s i a  a n d  C e n t r a l  E u r o p e " ;  a n d  d e c l a r e d
l n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  " i m m e d i a t e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  u n o b s t r u c t e d  t r a d e  w i t h
R u s s i a " ,  a n d  f o r  a  p r o g r a m : :  j  p  b l i  w  r i a '  “ •  A  s p e c i a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  
S c o t t i s h  T . U . C .  o n  l g  J a n u a r y ,  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s  o f  w h i c h  w e r e  c o m m u n i c a t e d  t o  
t h e  T . U . C . ,  a d o p t e d  a  r e s o l u t i o n  s i m i l a r l y  v i e w !  /  " w i t h .  a l a r m "  e x i s t i n g  l e v e l s  
o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  r i n g  ”  f  t h e  o n l y  i m m e d i a t e  r e m e d y  w a s  t h e  e n d i n g
o f  m i l i t a r y  i n v o l v e m e n t s  o n  t h e  C o n t i n e n t  a n d  i n  I r e l a n d ,  a n d  a  d e c i s i o n  t o  
" o p e n  u p  t r a d e  w i t h  C e n t r a l  E u r o p e  a n d  R u s s i a . " .  A  j o i n t  L a h o u r - T . U . C .  
m a n i f e s t o  w a s  i s s u e d  o n  1 7  F e b r u a r y ,  w h i c h  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  c a u s e s  o f  t h e  i n ' . - - /  t -  
r i a l  c r i s i s  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  B r i t a i n  w v .  . . .  i  g  "  ,  ® * x c  p  .  - 1 ,  t .  d " ,
a n d  t h a t  u n e m p l o y m e n t  w a s  t h e  " d i r e c t  o u t c o m e  o f  a  s u i c i d a l  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y " ;  
a n d  c a l l e d  f o r  a  " r e v e r s a l  o f  t h e  w h o l e  l i n e  o f  t h e  A l l i e s 1 c o n d u c t  t o w a r d s  
C e n t r a l  E u r o p e  n  R u s s i a " ,  a n d  f o b  t h e  " c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a  s i n c e r e  p e a . e e  W i t h  
R u s s i a "  .
T h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  h i g h  l e v e l  o x  u n e m p l o y m e n t  w  a s  n o t  u n c h a l l e n g e d  
W i t h i n  t h e  l a b o u r  m o v e m e n t :  a n  ' u n d e r c o m s u m p t i o n i s t 1 v i e w  h a d  s o m e  i n f l u e n c e ,  
r d i n g  t o  w h i c h  t h e -  s o l u t i o n  l a y  n o t  i n  i t  : •  e r a  t S i  : - f  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  b u t  
r a t h e r  i n  • e x p a n s i o n !  ' d o m e s t i c  p o l i c i e s ,  a n d  i t  h  i  .  . .  i n  . t l e y *
Y e t  i t  w a s  a  m i n o r i t y  v i e w ;  a n d  i : i  a n y  c a s e  i t  w a x  n o t  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  
- t o .  . 7 . -  p i  g  o f  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s ,  b u t  S i m p l y  i n  t  p i  t  h  g r  .  t  - . .  t  
e m p h a s i  ~  -  t h e  p r o b l e m .  I t  d i d  n o t  s e r i o u s l y  d i s t u r b  t h e
a j o r i t y  i r i e w  w b i c 3  th o L a b o u r  c o n f e r e n c e s  h a d  c l e a r l y  o u t l i n e d .  A s  a  p a r t y
p u b l i c a t i o n ,  *  i   p i  ,  ,  i * e  f c h  I  t o y ’ ,  p u t  i t ,  i t  w a s  c l e a r
t h a t  " n o  i n t e r n a !  r e m e d i e s  ( c o u l d )  d o  m u c h  t o  c o p e  w i t h  t h e  p r e s e n !  c r i s i s  o f  
y m i t " .  R u s s i a ,  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n ,  w a s  t h e  " c l e a r e s t  i l l  u s  e r a  t i e r ,  o f  
t h e  w a n t o n  l o s s  a n d  s u f f e r i n g  w h i c h  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  o u r  r u l e r s  h a s  c u a s e d ,  b o t h  
t o  .  . . .  i w o r k i n g  c l a s s  a n d  t o  o u r  o w n " .  T h e  o f  f o e ’ ;  o f  t l  d  s i  . . .  o f
t r a d i n g  w i t h  f o v i e t  R u s s i a  u p o n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  i n  B r i t a i n  w o u l d ,  i t  c o n s i d e r e d ,
” b e  i n s t r a n t a n c o u s " “ °  •  T h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  A n g l o - S o v i e t  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  v / a s  
w e l c o m e d ;  a n d  t h e  p a r t y ’ s  A d v i s o r y  C o m m i t t e e  o n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Q u e s t i o n s  r e c o m m ­
e n d e d  t h a t  t r a d e  s h o u l d  b e  e n c o u r a g e d  t t i . r o u g h  ^ h e  I  3 i o n  t o  S o v i e t  R u s s i a
265o f  e x p o r t  c r e d i t  X a g r n L  . i i o n ,  a n d  t h e  f u l l  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  
T h i s  i m p l i e d  n o  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  u p o n  w h i c h  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t  
w a s  b a s e d .  G i v e n  p e a c e  a n d  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  r e b u i l d  t h e i r  o w n  e c o n o m y ,  t h e  
p a r t y ' s  ' A p p e a l  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  N a t i o n *  s u g g e s t e d ,  w i t h o u t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  f r o m  
outside-, t h e  R u s s i a n  p e o p l e  w o u l d  " s p e e d i l y  c o m e  t o  t e r m s  w i t h  i t s  o w n  
g o v e r n m e n t " .  I f  t h e  S o v i e t  s y s t e m ,  w e r e  i n d e e d  t h e  t y r a n n y  i t  v / a s  r e p u t e d  t o  b e ,
T h e  f a m i n e  i n  t h e  V o l g a  a r e a ,  C .  R .  B u x t o n  d e c l a r e d ,  h a d  " d e e p l y
m o v e d  t h e  B r i t i s h  p e o p l e " ,  m d  " ,  i r t i c u l a r  t h e  L a b o u r  m o v e m e n t " .  L a b o u r
h a d  " n e v e r  y e t  b e e n  l e a f  t o  t h e  c r y  o f  s t a r v i n g  c h i l d r e n " ,  J o v x e t t  t o l d  t h e
^  o  73 - 9 2 2  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e  .  T h e  L a b o u r  e x e c u t i v e  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  " m o s t  a p p r o p ­
r i a t e  a n d  e f  h  s t i v e  a c t i o n "  i  e s j  . . . . . .  t o  a  r e q u e s t  t o  c o - o p e r a t e  i n  s e c u r i  0
r e l i e f  f o r  t h e  Russian p e a s a n t s  i n  t h e  famine a r e a ,  w o u l d  b e  t o  " u r g e  t h e  
B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  g r a n t  r e l i e f  c r e d i t s  o n  a  m o r e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s c a l e " .  T h e  
P r i m e  M i n i s t e r ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e f u s e d  t o  m e e t  a  d e p u t a t i o n ;  a n d  " u n f o r t u n a t e l y * ,  
t h e  e x e c u t i v e  r e p o r t e d ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  " f a i l e d  t o  p u t  f o r w a r d  a n y  p r o p o s a l  
c a l c u l a t e d  t o  m i n i m i s e  t o  a n y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x t e n t "  t h e  m i s e r y  a n d  s t a r v a t i o n  
i n  1  l a  .  T h e  I . L . P  w a s  s o m e w h a t  m o r e  f o r t h c o m i n g :  a l t h i b u g h .  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  
B r i t a i n  w e r e  a d m i t t e d  t o  b e  b a d  s o m e  s u p p o r t  c a m e  f r o m  l o c a l  b r a n c h e s  ( a l t h o u g h  
t h e r e  w e r e  o b j e c t i o n s  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  d i s t r e s s  n e a r e r  h o m e ,  a n d  t h a t  110 g r a n t
O o
s h p u l d  b e  m a d e  ) ;  a n d  t o w a r d s  t h e  e n d  o f  A u g u s t  1 9 2 1  t h e  I . L . P .  e x e c u t i v e
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  s o m e  £ 2 0 0  p o u n d s  h a d  b e e n  r e c e i v e d  b y  H e a d  O f f i c e , - ,  T h e  m o n e y
2 7 0w a s  c o m m u n i c a t e d  t o  t h e  F r i e n d s '  R e l i e f  C o m m i t t e e  . ,  w h i c h  w a s  t h e  f i r s t
i s h  r e l i e f  b o d y  i n  t h e  f i e l d .  A  R u s s i a n  F a m i n e  A p p e a l  l a u n c h e d  b y  t h e  I . L . P
i n  G l a s g o w ,  h o w e v e r ,  g d e w  v e r y  s l o w l y ;  a n d  a n  a p p e a l  f u n d  a n n o u n c e d  b y  t h e
L a b o u r  L e a d e r  w a s  q u i e t l y  f o r g o t t e n *  T h e  7  l i s t  P a r t y  d i r e c t e d  a n  a p p e a l  t o
B r i t i s h  w o r k e r s  ,  a n d  c a r r i e d  t h e  a p p e a l  o f  t h e  C o m i n t e r n  e x e c u t i v e  i n  t h e  
2 7 1C o m m u n i s t ’ '  .  T h e  R u s s i a n  F a m i n e  F u n d  w h i c h  i t  l a u n c h e d  r e a c h e d  £ - 2 , 9 0 0  b y  l a t e
2 7 2N o v e m b e r ,  a n d  . e x c e e d e d  £ 5 * 0 0 0  i n  M a r c h  1 9 2 2  •  I t  e v e n t u a l l y  m e r g e d  i n t o  t h e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F a m i n e  R e l i e f  C o m m i t t e e .  I t s  B r i t i s h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  h o w e v e r ,
E d g a r  W h i t e h e a d ,  w a s  c a l l i n g  f o r  g r e a t e r  e f f o r t s  i n  A p r i l  1 9 2 2 ,  t o  m a t c h  t h e
2 7 3c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  a n d  A m e r i c a n  w o r k i n g  c l a s s
T h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  m a i n  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  l a b o u r  m o v e m e n t s ,
h o w e v e r ,  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ,  w a s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  o f  t h e  g r e a t e s t  i m p & r t *  O n  1 k
A u g u s t  1 9 2 1  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  T r a d e  U n i o n s  d e c i d e d  t h a t  a  f u n d  
i 2 7 ^s h o u l d  b e  r a i s e d  f o r  t h e  r e l i e f  o f  t h e  R u s s i a n  f a m i n e 1 - 1  ‘ .  O n  2 9  A u g u s t  t h e
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  T . U . C .  a g r e e d  t o  o p e n  a  f u n d  011 b e h a l f  o f  B r i t i s h
u n i o n i s t s ,  a n d  c o n t r i b u t e d  £ 1 0 0 0  a s  a n  i n i t i a l  d o n a t i o n .  T h e  m o n e y  w o u l d  b e
s e n t  t o  R u s s i a  t h r o u g h  t h e  A m s t e r d a m  T r a d e  U n i o n  F e d e r a t i o n .  W h i l e  t h i s  w a s
2 7 ^n n  a n t i - B o l s h e v i k  b o d y ,  t h e  gestmre w a s  a  m a g n a n i m o u s  o n e  - 0
O n  I f  S e p t e m b e r  t h e  T . U . C .  d e c i s i o n  w a s  e m b o d i e d  i n  a  c i r c u l a r  t o
276m e m b e r  b o d i e s .  T h e  r e s p o n s o ,  h o w e v e r ,  w a s  l e s s  t h a n  g r a t i f y i n g .  L i v e r p o o l
T r a d e s  C o u n c i l  s e n t  a  " s t r o n g  r e s o l u t i o n "  t o  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  i n  F e b r u a r y
1922  011 t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  b u t  a p p e a r s  t o  h a v e  d e c l i n e d  t o  m a k e  a  m o r e  t a n g i b l e
2 7 7c o n t r i b u t i o n  b o  R u s s i a n  f a m i n e  r e l i e f  .  G l a s g o w  T r a d e s  C o u n c i l  r e s o l v e d
t h a t  i n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  B r i t a i n ,  i t  w a s  " n o t
p r a c t i c a b l e  t o  r e n d e r  s u p p o r t " a n d  r e c o n  . e n d e d  t h a t  a n  a p p e a l  b e  m a d e  t o  t h e  
.  2 7 8B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  .  B y  3  N o v e m b e r ,  j u s t  o v e r  £ 2 3 0 0  h a d  b e e n  r e c e i v e d  i n
r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  T . U . C .  i n i t i a t i v e ,  a n d  t h i s  i n c l u d e d  t h e  £ 1 0 0 0  f r o m  t h e  T . U . C . ' s
o w n  f u n d s .  T h e  C o n g r e s s  w a s  " c o n v i n c e d "  t h a t  t h i s  d i d  " n o t  f a i r l y  r e p r e s e n t
t h e  d e g r e e  o f  g o o d w i l l  t o v / a r d s  R u s s i a  e x i s t i n g  i n  t r a d e  u n i o n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s " .
A  " l i t t l e  s a c r i f i c e " ,  i t  t h o u g h t ,  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  r a n k  a n d  f i l e  o f  t h e
2 7 9t r a d e  u n i o n  m o v e m e n t ,  c o u l d  " s a f e l y  b e  m a d e "  0
O n  8 N o v e m b e r  1 9 2 1  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  C o m m i t t e e  s e n t  a  f u r t h e r  c i r c u l a r  
t o  m e m b e r  b o d i e s  e n q u i r i h g  w h e t h e r  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  A c t i o n  l e v y  
r a i s e d  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  m i g h t  b e  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  f u n d  f o r  R u s s i a n  r e l i e f .
T h e  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  T U . C .  a p p e a l ,  i t  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  h a d  " u n f o r t u n a t e l y "  b e e n  
" f a r  f r o m  g e n e r a l " .  T h e  e x e c u t i v e  o f  t h e  M i n e r s *  F e d e r a t i o n  r e s o l v e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  
t h a t  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  A c t i o n  l e v y  b a l a n c e  s h o u l d  b e  r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  u n i o n s  i n  
. . .  p o r t i o n  t o  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  i f  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e y  m i g h t  i n d i v i d u a l l y  
d e c i d e  u p o n  i t s  d i s p o s a l .  T h e  M i n e r s '  b a l a n c e  o f  £ 7 3 0  w a s  i n  f a c t  t r a n s f e r r e d
p Q  Q
t o  t h e  r e l i e f  f u n d ;  b u t  t h i s  w a s  b y  n o  m e a n s  a l w a y s  t h e  c a s e  •  A  t o t a l  o f
£ 1 0 , 0 8 l / l 0 / l l  w a s  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F e d e r a t i o n
o f  T r a d e  U n i o n s ,  t h e  1 9 2 2  T . U . C .  w a s  t o l d ,  a  f i g u r e  w h i c h  i n c l u d e d  t h e  b a l a n c e
p a i d  f r o m  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  A c t i o n  l e v y  .  T h e  r e _  _ ,  i t  w a s  s t a t e d ,  h a d
p  Q  p
" n o t  b e e n  s a t i s f a c t o r y " 1 -  .
S p e a k i n g  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  J . H .  T h o m a s  d e n i e d  t h a t  t h e
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  d e b t s ,  o r  p o l i t i c a l  o r  o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s h o u l d  " e n t e r  i n
2 ' 0 , 3a - n y  w a y  i n f o  t h e  g r a v e  h u m a n  a p p e a l  t h a t  i t  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e . * ,  f a m i n e " - " ' .  T h e
d i s t i n c t i o n  w a s  n o t  a l w a y s  s c r u p u l o u s l y  o b s e r v e d .  I f  t h e  f a m i n e  c o n t i n u e d ,
C l y n e s  t o l d  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  i t  - w o u l d  h a v e  a n  a d v e r s e  e f f e c t  u p o n  t h e
B r i t i s h  e c o n o m y  a n d .  ' w o u l d  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  f u r  t h e : /  u  & w j l o y m e n t .  H e  u r g e d  r e l i e f
° a  t h e  g r o u n d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  i t  m i g h t  n o t  " c o m p l e t e l y  c u r e  o u r  u n e m p l o y m e n t
234p r o b l e m " ,  t o  - w i t h h o l d  r e l i e f  w o u l d  c e r t a i n l y  m a k e  i t  w o r s e  .  B u x t o n  d r e w  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  c r e d i t s  t o  R u s s i a ,  w h i c h  l i e  u r g e d  t h e  
government t o  g r a n t  o n  a  " s u b s t a n t i a l  s c a l e . ,  f o r  t h e  r e l i e f  o f  t h e  f a m i n e  
a r e a " ,  ahdk t h e  " r e l i e f  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a t  h o m e " .  I t  w a s  n o t  o n l y  " o u r  d u t y " ,
611
w r o t e  a n o t h e r  c o m m e n t a t o r ,  b u t  " a l s o  t o  o u r  i n t e r e s t  t o  g i v e  R u s s i a  t h e  h e l p  
285s h e  n e e d s "  „  A  g e n e r o u s  r  _  o ,  B o b  W i l l i a m s  a r g u e d ,  w o u l d  p r o v e  " n o t
o n l y  • '  ■  b  l e s t  o f  a l t r u i s m ,  0 i t  i n  t h e  l o n g  r u n .  •  t o  b e  e n l i g h t e n e d  s c l f -
.  .  .  t ,  28  6i n t e r e s t "
T h e r e  w a s  a n o t h e r  a r g u m e n t .  A s  t h e  D a i l y  H e r a l d  d e c l a r e d ,  t h e  t i m e
h a d  c o m e  t o  " s h o w  t o  w h o m  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  w o r k i  n g -  c l a s s  s o l i d a r i t y  i s  a  m e r e
p h r a s e  a n d  t o  v / h o m t  i s  d e e d  a n d  t r u t h " .  T h e  a p p e a l  s h o u l d  b e  a n s w e r e d  " p r o
287l y  a n d  g e n e r o u s l y "  .  T h e  r e s u l t s  w e r e  d i s c u s s e d  f c h e  f o l l o w i n g  s p r i n g  b y
E d g a r  W h i t e h e a d ,  B r i t i s h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o n  t h e  C e n t r a l  W e  f
R e l i e f  C o m m i t t e e .  W r i t i n g  i n  t h e  W o r k e r ,  h e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  r e l i e f
h a d  a m o u n t e d  i n  v a l u e  t o  a  f a r t h i n g  p e r  e r g "  i  e 3  r k e r  p e r  s i ; :  m o n t h s ,  a  m
r e s u l t  w h i c h  i n  h i s  v i e w  i n d i c a t e d  a n  " a p a t h y "  a n d  " t o t a l  i n d i f f e r e n c e "  w h i c h
w a s  " d a m n i n g  a l i k e  e q u a l l y  t o  l e a ' _ _ _ o f  v a r i o u s  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  w o  '  i n g  :1 _ s
o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y  a s  t o  t h e  r a n k  a n d  f i l e " .  B r i t i s h  u o k k e r s  h a d  c o n t r i b u t e d  n o t
t h e  s e c o n d - l a r g e s t  t o t a l  o f  a s s i s t a n c e ,  a s  t h e i r  n u m b e r s  w o u l d  h a v e  s u g g e s t e d ,
b y t  t h e  n i n t h - l a r g e s t ,  a  f i g u r e  w h i c h  f e l l  b e l o w  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  t h e
o r g a n i s e d  w o r k e r s  i n  H o l l a n d ,  S w  '  n .  C z e e l  0 l o v  k i  . ,  a n d  S w i t z e r l a n d .  D u t c h
w o r k e r s  a l o n e  h a d  c o n t r i b u t e d  t h r e e  t i m e s  a s  m u c h  a s  B r i t i s h  w o r k e r s .  T h i s ,
1  .  w i t h  s o  J u s t i c e ,  w a s  " n o b  a n  e n v i a b l e  r e s u l t  f o x  f c i
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o f  b h e  p r o u d e s t  a n d  " ' i c h e s t  c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  w o r l d "
I t  i  i p l i a  1 ,  l e a o v c r ,  n o  c l a n g . ;  i n  L . h o u r ' s  R u s s i a n  p o l i c y ,  w h i c h  c o n t i n u e d
t o  s t r e s s  t h e  i m p o r t a :  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t r a d e  w i t h  S o v i e t  R u s s i a  f o r
t h e  r e l i e f  o f  f .  f .  f e i  s h  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  e x t e n d i n g  i f  ; e S  a r y  t o  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  
o f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t .  A  N a t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  U n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  t h e  
I n t e r n - f i > n  .1 S i t u a t i o n  w a s  h e l d  u n d e r  t h e  a u s p i c e s  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  J o i n t
C o u n c i l  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  a n d  t h e  T . U . C .  o n  3  D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 1 .  A  r e s o l u t i o n
. . .  . . .  i n d u s t r i a l ,  nw a s  a d o p t e d  w h a c u  m a m  t a m e  a  t h a t  " o u r  p r e s e n t  m i s f o r t u n e s "  w o r e  l a r g e l y
o q u e n - c e  o f  f e h  g  e r n m  t ' s  i  t o r : . : ,  i t i o n a l  p o l i c y ,  " p a r t i c u l a r l y  a s  r e g a r d s
R u s s i a  a n d  C e n t r a l  E u r o p e " ,  a n d  d e m a n d e d  a  " r e v e r s a l  o f  t h a t  p o l i c y ,  s o  a s
t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  R u s  I a n  G o v e r n m e n t , . ,  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f
t h e  w a g e  e a r n e r s  o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y " .  A s s i s t a n c e  f o r  t h e  r e l i e f  o f  t h e  R u s s i a n
f a m i n e  a n d  t h e  r e - o p e n i n g  o f  B r i t i s h  e x p o r t  t r a d e  w e r e  c a l l e d  f o r ,  a s  " p a r t  o f
p o q
a  p o l i c y  t o  r e l i e v e  o u r  o w n  e m p l o y e d  . . n d  r e s t a r t  i n d u s t r y " '  'J» N
T h e  r e s o l u t i o n  w a s  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  o n  I p  D e c e m b e r ;
i d  o n  h i s  r e  p i e s t  i t  w a s  f o l l o w e d  b y  t h e  s u b m i s s i o n  o f  a  m o r e  e x t e n d e d
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d " dealing with *Unemployment and the International Situation, 
Reparations and Russia * •  The memorandum referred, with r - . p . :  a t  fee 'a *. ,  to 
two basic facts: Russia, it declared, was "potentially Eurcg e.*s largest 
g r i .eg- i the greatest market .in Europe for the purchase of manufactured 
abides"; an sides, -11 the European countries w ere economically inter­
dependent. Germany could make no substantial payment pf reparations until 
her trade v/ith Russia had beeb •--- St 111 3 ad; and tl . enanc
regular and sufficient food supply to the United Kingdom would "depend more 
and more upon the prosperity of Russian agriculture". Since the Soviet 
gove . nt itself play eel the central role in commercial relations v/ith the 
outside world, trade wit- Ruse in depended upon the "credit of the Bus ian 
government, and therefore upon recognition of the Russian government by 
other Governments and upon free and unrestricted co-operation and consultation 
with it". It v/as "essential" in the interests of British trade that normal 
rel M  -as shouli be "fully restored, both diplomatic and otherwise". Such 
risk as was involved in the extension of credit to the Soviet government must 
be taken in the interests of the development of traden Thi; action should be 
taken "immediately" ince the p r e s  cure o ? unenploy cent was "dangerously
insistent": credits, indeed, might prove the "cheapest form of unemployment
, . ,^.290 r e l i e f "  '  »
They need not for the purpose^ of trade, Clyncc observed, approve
governance of Soviet Russia, nor "excuse any of thi evil occurrences which
stand to the credit of Russia.* s governors". But this whole question was one for
the Russia.ii people to decide, he told the House of Commons; and it must be
their task singly to "neglect no opportunity of doing business v/ith the
Russian people". Russian agriculture offered "great possibilities", h e  t h o u g h t ,
f o r  the manufacturers of .agricultural implements* This kind of t r a d e ,  h o w e v e r ,
was "impossible without ’credit arrangements and without recognition of, .lid
291c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h ,  the R u s s i a n  G o v e r n m e n t "  ■“* S h i p p i n g  o r d e r s  t o  t h e  v a l u e  
° f  f l y  m i l l i o n ,  a d d e d  H a y d a y ,  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  g i v e n  t o  S r i t i c k s  s h i p b u i l d e r s  
h a d  c r e d i t  b e e n  a v a i l a b l e ;  a n d  t h a t  m o u l d  h a v e  a b s o r b e d  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a m o u n t  
0 i  u n e m p l o y m e n t  A  t e l e g r a m  d e s p a t c h e d  t o  . L l o y d  G e o r g e  a t  C a n n e s  i n  J a n u a r y
1 9 2 2  b y  t h i r t y - s e v e n  l a b o u r  . p o k e s m e n  n o s e d  t h e  " c l o s e  c o n n e c t i o n "  b e t w e e n  
t h e  d e c a y  o f  B r i t i s h  t r a d e ,  a n d  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t  d a n g e r o u s  g r o w t h  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  
£ u a 4  R u s s i a *  s  e x c l u s i o n  f r o m  t h e  c o m i t y  o f  n a t i o n s ;  a n d  u r g e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h . . .  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  b y  the B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  a n a  t h e  A l l i e s .
I t s  s i g n a t o r i e s  r a n g e d  f r o m  d y n e s ,  a s  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  L a b o u r
P a r t y ,  B e r t r a n d  R u s s e l l  a n d  B e n  S p o o r  t o  B r a i l s f o r d ,  L a u s b u r y ,  M a l o n e ,  M a c l e a n ,
R o b e r t  W i l l i a m s ,  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  T r a n s p o r t  W o r k e r s '  F e d e r a t i o n ,  a n d  M c M a n u s ,
2 ^ 3t h e  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  1  a d e r  ■  •  T h e  L a b o u r  L e a d e r  r e m a r k e d  t h a t  l a b o u r  o p i n i o n
h a d  c o n e  t o  a t t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  p e a c e  t r e a t i e s  a n d  t h e  " R u s s i a n  m u d d l e "  t h e
2 9 4" e c o n o m i c  e v i l s  b e s e t t i n g  t h e  n a t i o n "  .  T h e  1 9 2 2  L a b o u r  c o n f e r e n c e  a c c o r d i n g ­
l y  d e c l a r e & k f | i e  b l o c k a d e  o f  R u s s i a ,  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  g i v e n  t o  t h e  a t t a c k s  u p o n  
t h a t  c o u n t r y ’ s  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  r e f u s a l  t o  a c c o r d  p o l i t i c a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  
i t  h a d  b e e n  a n d  w e r e  " d i s a s t r o u s ,  n o t  m e r e l y  t o  t h e  R u s s i a n s ,  b u t  t o  t h e  
p e o p l e s  o f  a l l  c o u n t r i e s " .  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  u r g e d  t o  " a c c o r L  i i a t e
p o l i t i c a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  R u s s i a n  G o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  ( t o )  t a k e  p o s i t i v e  a c t i o n  
t o  p r o m o t e  t r a d e  w i t h  R u s s i a  a . . d  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  E a s t e r n  a n d  C e n t r a l  
E u r o p e " - " ' ' .
R u s s i a i s *  e c o n o m i c  n e e d s  w e r e  u r g e n t ,  C l y n e s  a r g u e d  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  
C o m m o n s ;  e q u a l l y ,  u n e m p l o y m e n t  i n  B r i t a i n  m a d e  " u r g e n t  f o r  u s  a  s e t t l e s e n t  
i n  R u s s i a n  r e l a t i o n s " .  T h e  a s s i s t a n c e  w h i c h  B r i t a i n  c o u l d  g i v e  t h  t h e  r e s t ­
o r a t i o n  o f  R u s s i a n  a g r i c u l t u r e  w o u l d  b e  a  " s o u r c e  o f  g r e a t  t r a d e  a n d  p r o f i t  
t o  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  i f  i t  w e r e  g i v e n  S p e e d i l y  a n d  i n  t h e  r i g h t  d e g r e e " ;  a n d  i t  
w o u l d ,  h e  b e l i e v e d ,  b e  o f  " i m m e d i a t e  a n d * ,  s u s t a i n e d  b e n e f i t  t o  u s  i n  t h e  
i m p r o v e m e n t  g e n e r a l l y  o f  o u r  t r a d e  i n t e r e s t s " .  T o  w a i t  u n t i l  t h e  R u s s i a n
g o v e r n m e n t  a p o l o g i s e d ,  W e d g w o o d  a d d e d ,  m e a n t  t o  " w a i t  u n t i l  m o r e  a n d  m o r e
296p e o p l e  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  a r e  o n  t h e  b r i n k  o f  s t a r v a t i o n "  •  L a b o u r  _  l a i i  o d f  
i a i d  R h y s  D a v i e s ,  t h a t  p e o p l e  b e  e m p l o y e d  u n d e r  g o o d  c o n d i t i o n s  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
g o o d s  r e q u i r e d  b y  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s :  " t h a t  i n  t h e  m a i n  i s  o u r  i h l e r s s t  i n  R u s s i ­
a n  a f f a i r s " .  T r a d e  w i t h  R u s s i a  m m g M  n o t  c u r e  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  M a c l e a n  a d d e d ;  
b u t  t r a d e  a n d  t h e  " c o m p l e t e  r e c o g n i t i o n "  o f  R u s s i a  w o u l d  " a l l e v i a t e  t h e  d i s t r ­
e s s  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y "  a n d  w o u l d  " l a r g e l y  r e d u c e  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t
1 .  2 9 7w h i c h  e x i s t s  t o d a y "  .  U n e m p l o y m e n t ,  H e n d e r s o n  w r o t e ,  w a s  " p r i m a r i l y  t h e
r e s u l t  o f  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  b l i n d  t o  e c o n o m i c  r e a l i t i e s " .  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t
h a d  " a c h i e v e d ,  t h e  m i r a c l e  o f  s e p a r a t i n g  t h e  h u n g r y  b u y e r  a b r o a d  f r o m  t h e
2 9 8n e e d y  w o r k e r  a t  h o m e "  .  I t  w o u l d  b e  w i s e r  a n d  c h e a p e r  a n d  b e t t e r  f o r  B r i t a i n  
a n d  t h e  w o r l d ,  B r a i l s f o r d  w r o t e  i n  r e g a r d  t o  c r e d i t s ,  t o  " u s e  o u r  r e s o u r c e s  
i n  p a y i n g  m e n  t o  m a k e  p l o u g h s  a n d  l o c o m o t i v e s  f o r  R u s s i a ,  I n s t e a d  o f  k e e p i n g  
t h e m  i d l e  a n d .  h a l f  a l i v e  o n  d o l e s " .  T h e  e c o n o m i c  c a s e  f o r  t h e  f u l l  r e c o g n i t i o n
I i 299a n d  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  R u s s i a  w a s  " o v e r w h e l m i n g "  •
T h e  c o m m o n  s e n s e  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  M a c D o n a l d  t o l d  t h e  H o u s e  o f
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C o m m o n s ,  ' w o u l d  c o m p e l  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  e v e n t u a l l y  t o  r e c o g n i s e  R u s s i a ,  a s  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  h a d  b e e n  r e c o g n i s e d ,  " w i t h o u t  i n  a n y  w a y  m a k i n g  o u r s e l v e s  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  w h a t  h a p p e n s  i n  t h o s e  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s " " 0 0 0 *  T h e  H e w  E c o n o m i c  P o l i c y  
-  " e r t h e l e s s  g a v e  L a b o u r  l e a d e r s  s o m e  g r o u n d s  f o r  o p t i m i s m  i n  t h i s  .  c f e *
w a s  r e q u i r e d  i n  B u s  i a ,  C l y n c s  b e l i e v e d ,  w a s  a  " c o m p l e t e  d e p a r t u r e
f r o m  t h e  m e t h o d s  w h i c h  f o r  l o n g  s h e  f o l l o w e d " ,  a n d  a  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  
"  i t h o d  b y  w h i c h  t h e  w o r l d  i s  g o v e r n e d " .  T h e r e  w a s  e v i d e n c e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  
t h e  S o v i e t  p o s i t i o n  w a s  c h a n g i n g ;  B o l s h e v i k  p r i n c i p l e s  h a d  b e e n  " c n o r m s " .  1 y  
m o d i f i e d " ;  a n d  t h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  a n  e f f o r t  t o  " e n c o u r a g e  a n d  n u r s e  t o w a r d s  
p e r f e c t i o n  t e n d e n c i e s  o f  t h a t  k i n d " ° 0 “ .  T h u s  w a s  c l e a r l y  d e s i r a b l e :  t h u s  i t  
w a s  " i n t o l e r a b l e " ,  t h o u g h t  M a c D o n a l d ,  t h a t  r e l i g i o n  c o u l d  n o t  b e  t a u g h t  i n
S o v i e t  s c h o o l s .  A  p o l i c y  s h o u l d  b e  a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a s  b y  L a b o u r ,
w h i c h  w o u l d  " l e t  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  G o v e r n m e n t  s l i p  a w a y  o u t  o f  i t s  r e v o l u t i o n ­
a r y  f r o n e  o f  m i n d  i n t o  i t s  o r d i n a r y  c o n s t i t u t i o n  ,1 f r a n  o f  m i n d ,  a n d  t h e n  g o  
o n  i n  i t s  n o r  s a l  a n d  p r o p e r  w a y " ' " " ' - .
T h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  a  b r e a k - o f f  i n  r e l a t i o n s  f o l l o w i n g  C u r s o n *  s  u l  t i m a t u m  
i n  H a y  I f 2 3  a r o u s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c o n c e r n .  M a c D o n a l d  u r g e d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  
" d c  n c  i i i n g  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h i n  c o n t r o v e r s y  w h i c h  w o u l d  p r e c i p i t a t e  a  
p o s i t i o n  w h i c h  w o u l d  m a k e  c o n t i n u e d  g  i  t i a  i  p  s  L b - l e " .  R e l  t i  . .  with 
R u s s i a  s h o u l d  b e  c o n t i n u e d  a n u  e x p a n d e d ;  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  h o s t i l i t y  t o w a r d s  
t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d ,  h o  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  b e e n  a n  " u n m i t i g a t e d  f a i l u r e " .  T h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  m u s t  a c c e p t  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  " a s  a n  o b j e c t i v e  f a c t ,  w i t h  
w h i c h  t h e y  h a v e  t o  c o m e  i n t o  r e l a t i o n ,  w h e t h e r  t h e y  l i k e  i t  o r  n o t " .  I f
m m m m m m
nip?. 1 r f e e g h i t f  : k :! be g iv e n  and p ro p e r i i p f . ’..........se: t ; i  cn
© s , t  i b l i  7 .  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  i  i  p u  w o u l d  h a v e  b e  7  i l l  w i t h  I n  t h e
o r d i n a r y  w a y  a n d  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  a c c u m u l a t e d .  T h e  m a t t e r  o f  p r o p a g a n d a  c o u l d
n o t  b e  d i s m i s s e d :  i f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  b y  m e a n s  o f  a g e n t s  o r  m o n e y  h a d
been " a i d i n g  a n d  a b e t t i n g  r e v o l u t i o n ,  d i s t u r b a n c e  a n d  v i o l e n c e  i n  t h e  E a s t ,
in India, in Afghanistan, or in Persia", t h i s  v/as v / ; a i t  a*a _• "a .. _..u ' el]
-  § 0$  i b i e  f o r  u s  ' a :  :  - , h .  a .  n o t i c e " .  T h e  e v i d o  U p  -  w h i c h  f c & B  g o v e r n m e n t
w a s  relying, however, did n o t  appear to be unassa.il ole. To tear up the crude
g -'cement, moreover, would leaf to a "state o f  incipient war", which would
not contribute to a solution of the matters at issue, while it would rouse up
the "old revolufdenary animus" in Soviet Prussia which would in turn react upon
gO-
B r i t i s h  trade, and upon the British position in other countries
T h e  p c i : . '  w  -  f  ^  i  u p  by o t h e r  Labour a n d  Liberal : c r s ,  y  f
w h o m  r e p r e s e n t e d  o o n s t i t u e n c i  > s  1  .  I  . 1  d r ' b n  '  i c E
m i g h t  h e  e x p e c t e d  d i  -  a  e  f l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  t o  s e c u r e  s o m e  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  R u s s i a n  t r a d e .  C a p t a i n  0  *  G r a d y  t o l l  t h e  H o u s e  c ? f  C 6 i  b u s  t h a t
he had seen Krupgs locomotives in Russih, and Krupj 5 h noted* w . • "net a
s y  i p  i t ]  e t i c  o r  p h l l  f i t h r & p i G  association". 1 :  w a n t e d  f c h i  k i n d  o f  w o r k  - h r
h i s  L e e d s  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  S k i l l e d  f i t t e r s  a n d  e n g i n e e r s  i : . i  L e e d s ,  m e n  a n d  w o m e n ,
~.04w e r e  l a n g u i s h i n g  f o r  o r d e r s ' "  •  K e n w o r t h y  d e f e n d e d  f i e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  h i s  h u l l
f i s h e r m a n  a n d  s h i p p i n g  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  S i r  E .  G r i g g ,  d e s p i t e  h i s  " l o a t h i n g  a n d
c o n t e m p t "  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t ,  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t  w a s  " n o t
s .  s r . :  . 1 1  i s s u e " .  T h e  a r e a  h e  r e p r e s e n t e d ,  O l d h a m ,  w a s  " d e e p l y  c o n c e r n e d  i n  t h e
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  r e v i v i n g  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  E a s t  a n d  H e a r  E a s t " .  T h e r e  was  m u c h
505d i s c u s s i o n  i n  Lancashire on this S u b j e c t  „
T h e  G e n e r a l  C o u n c i l  o f  t h e  T . U . C . ,  " i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  a b n o r m a l  u n e m p l o y m e n t  
p r e v a i l i n g  f o r  a  l o n g  p e r i o d " ,  o p p o s e d  a n y  d i s r u p t i o n  o f  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s ,  a n d  
c a l l e d  rather f  t h e i r  e x t e n s i o n  a n d  f o r  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n ­
m e n t .  T h e  t h e m e  w a s  r e p e a t e d  i n  a  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  S c o t t i s h  T . U . C .  t o  
a l l  S c o t t i s h  M P s  o n  1 2  J u n e ^ 0 ^ .  T h e  M i n e r s *  F e d e r a t i o n  e x e c u t i v e  a d o p t e d  a  
r e s o l u t i o n  o n  2 9  M a y ,  w h i c h  w a s  u n a n i m o u s l y  o n d o r x s e d  a t  a  s p e c i a l  c o n f e r e n c e  
f o l l o w i n g  d a y ,  w h i c h  c a l l e d  u p o n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  m a i n t a i n  f u l l  t r a d i n g  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  R u s s i a .  T h e  c o a l  t r a d e  i n  B r i t a i n ,  i t  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  w a s  " d i r e c t l y
a f f e c t e d  b y  R u s s i a n  c o m m e r c e ,  a n d  a n y  i n t e r f e r e n c e  W i t h  e x i s t i n g  r e l a t i o n s
3 0 7w o u l d  i n v o l v e  t h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  i n  s t i l l  f u r t h e r  p o v e r t y "  *
T h e  N a t i o n a l  C o u n c i l  o f  t h e  I L P  a d o p t e d  a  s t a t e m e n t  o n  l o  M a y ,
d e p l o r i n g  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  u r g i n g  t h a t  a  c o n f e r e n c e  t o  s e t t l e  
t h e  p o i n t s  a t  i s s u e  s h o u l d  b e  h e l d ,  a s  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  s u g g e s t e d *
A  r u p t u r e  o f  r e l a t i o n s  w o u l d  " a r o u s e  t h e  m o s t  v i g o r o u s  r e s i s t a n c e  o n  t h e  p a r t  
o f  o r g a n i z e d  L a b o u r " .  B r a n c h e s  w e r e  u r g e d  t o  p r e p a r e  t o  l a k e  a  " v i g o r o u s  
p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d i s r e g a r d  61 P a r l i a m e n t  f o r e s h a d o w e d  b y  
t h e  U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y " .  A n  I L P  M a n i f e s t o  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  d i d  n o t  c o n c e a l  
i t s  " d i s a p p r o v a l  o f  m u c h  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  d o n e " ,  b u t  c a l l e d  u p o n  
t h e  w o r k e r s  t o  " r e s i s t  t h i s  a t t a c k  b y  t h e  c o m m o n  e n e m i e s  o f  L a b o u r  a t  h o m e  
a n d  a b r o a d .  I n  o u r  own  i n t e r e s t s  a n d  i n  t h o s e  o f  t h e  R u s s i a n  p e o p l e " ,  i t  
c o n c l u d e d ,  " w e  a r e  n o t  c o n t e n t  w i t h  t h i s  r e s i s t a  i c e :  w e  d e m a n d  a  f u l l  r o c o g n i t -
• 7 f ) 0
i o n .  J T h e  p a r t y  h e l d  a  p r o t e s t  m e e t i n g  i n  T r a f a l g a r  S q u a r e  o n  1 3  M a y ;  a n d
a  n u m b e r  o f  b r a n c h e s  w r o t e  t o  t h e  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  u r g i n g  t h a t  t h e  t h r e a t e n e d
r u p t u r e  o f  r e l a t i o n s  b e  a v o i d e d .  O f  s o m e  t w o  h u n d r e d  r e s o l u t i o n s  w h i c h  h a d
6lr
b e e n  r e c e i v e d  b y  t h e  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  b y  2 4  M a y ,  S t r a n g  n o t e d  i n  a  m i n u t e ,  m o r e
t h a n  h a l f  h a d  c o m e  f r o m  l o c a l  b r a n c h e s  o f  t h e  I L P *  T h e  b u l k  o f  t h e  r e e a n i d e r
3 0 9h a d  c o m e  f r o m  b r a n c h e s  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  o r  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ' "
T h e  L a b o u r - T . U . C .  N a t i  n a i  J o i n t  C o u n c i l  r e s p o n d e d  t o  N  . .  c r i s i s  011 
1 1  M a y  v / i t h  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  s t a t e m e n t  w h i c h  e x p r e s s e d  t h e  " s t r o n g e s t  
d i s a p p r o v a l "  o f  t h e  t e r m s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  * s  n o t e ,  a n d  c a l l e d  f o r  a  c o n f e r e n c e  
o r  a r b i t r a t i o n  t o  s e t t l e  t h e  m u t t e r s  i n  d i s p u t e *  A  r u p t u r e  o f  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  R u s s i a  w o u l d  " r e s u l t  n o t  o n l y  i n  i n c r e a s e d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  w f e i e h  h e r e ,  b u t  
a l s o  i n  p o l i t i c a l  u n s e t t l o m e n t "  w h i c h  w o u l d  " a d d  t o  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  w a r 1 *  m 
L a b o u r 1 o p p o s i t i o n ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  c l a i m  I ,  so > t r o n g  t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t
7*1 “|
h a d  t o  b a c k  d o w n  ;  a n d  t h e  I L P  c o n f e r e n c e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  w a s  t o l d  t h a t  
t h e  " f u l l  s t r e n g t h "  o f  t h e  p a r t y  h a d  b e e n  "  m o b i l i s e d  i n  p r o t e s t 1 1 .  N o  m o r e  
s u b s t a n t i a l  o p p o s i t i o n  w a s  i n d i c a t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a n  h i e  h o l d i n g  o f  d e m o n s t r ­
a t i o n s  a n d  t h e  m a k i n g  o f  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  t h e  i s s u i n g  o f  a .  c i r c u l a r  t o  M P s  a n d  
" i n f l u e n t i a l  p e r s o n s "-0 h *  T h e  N a t i o n a l  J o i n t  C o u n c i l  s t a t e m e n t ,  e q u a l l y ,  s a w  
n o  n e e d  t o  e x t e n d  i t s  a c t i o n  b e y o n d  t h e  b o u n d s  o f  N o  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  L a b o u r  
P a r t y ,  w h o s e  " p r o m p t  i n t e r v e n t i o n "  w a s .  a p p l a u d e d ,  a n d  w h i c h  w a s  h e l d  t o  b e
c a p a b l e  i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  o f  d e f e n d i n g  t h e  " i n t e r e s t s  o f  o u r  c o u n t r y  a n d  t h e
m l  3
n e e d s  o f  t h e  w o r k i n g  c l a s s e s " ' "  •  T h e r e  w a s  110 s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  a  C o u n c i l  o f  
A c t i o n  m i g h t  b e  f o r m e d ;  _  o n l y  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  p l a n s
w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  o f f e r e d ,  n o t e d  t h e  C o m . n u n i s t  R e v i e w ,  w a s  a  " s e r i e s  o f  r e s o l u t ­
i o n s " .  O f f i c i a l  L a b o u r ,  i t  c o n s i d e r e d ,  h a d  r e a c t e d  i n  a  " m o s t  d i s g r a c e f u l  m a n -  
314a e r " * "  .  H a d  t h e  D o n a l d s  a n d  S n o w d e n s  d i r e c t e d  t h e i r  " m a t c h l e s s  g i f t  x f o r
v i t r i o l i c  i n v e c t i v e "  a g a i n s t  t h e  e n e m i e s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  w o r k e r s  a n d  n o t  a g a i n s t
t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t ,  C u r z o n  " m i g h t  h a v e  p a u s e d  b e f o r e  t h r u s t p
i n g  a  w a r  u p o n  t h e  S o v i e t  R e p u b l i c " .  T h e  u l t i m a t u m  h a d  " r e v e a l e d  t h e  i m p o t e n c e
3 1 3o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  L a b o u r  m o v e m e n t " ' " •  W h e n  g o v e r n m e n t  a c t i o n  a p p e a r e d  c a l c u l a t e d  
t o  d i s r u p t  t r a d i n g  r e l a t i o n  w i t h  S o v i e t  R u s s i a ,  a n d  t h u s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  w o r k l e s s ,  L a b o u r  o f f e r e d  f i r m ,  i f  c o n s t i t u t i o n . : , !  r e s i s t a n c e .  T h e r e  
w a s  n o  s u g g e s t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  m o v e m e n t  s h o u l d  g o  f u r t h e r  i n  e x p l i c i t  
d e i e n c e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  r e g i m e ,  a n d  i n  f o r c i n g  t h e  r e c o g n i t i  n  o f  i t s  g o v e r n m e n t *  
T h e  p a r t y  d i d  a t  l e a s t  r e h e a r s e  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  
a c t i o n .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  a s  t h e  S o c i a l  I N ;  R e v i e w  n o t e d ,  n e i t h e r  t h e  i n t e r e -  
S-S o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  n o r  t h e  p e a c e  o f  E u r o p e  w o u l d  b e  s e c u r e  u n t i l  p e a c e  w a s  
m a d e  w i t h  R u s s i a  a n d  h e r  g o v e r n m e n t  r e c o g n i s e d .  W e r e  t h e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  
■ r e v o k e d ,  M a c D o n a l d  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  i t  w o u l d  " o p e n  t h e  i l o o c l g a t e s  zo p r o p a g a n d a
W  ; ..., ~
—f 6i n  t h e  N e a r  a n d .  F a r  E a s t ’ ’ ^ ~  .  I t  w o u l d  a d d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  u n s e t  t l e m e n t ,  t h e
N a t i o n a l  J o i n t  C o u n c i l ’ s  s t a t e m e n t  m a i n t a i n e d ,  a n d  a d d  t o  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  m  r  '  *
P e a c e  w i t h  R y . s s i a ,  t h e  U n i o n  f o r  D o m b c r a t i o  C o n t r o l  b e l i e v e d ,  w a s  t h e  o n l y
r o a d  t o  a  s e c u r e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  ’ ’ t h o s e  E a s t e r n  q u e s t i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  e s s e n t i a l
t o  u s  h e r e ” .  B r a i l s f o r d  t h o u g h t  t h a t  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  f a l l  o f  L l o y d  G e o r g e  t h e y
m i g h t  b e  ” o n  t h e  e v e  o f  a  l a p s e  i n t o  t h e  C h u r c h i l l i a n  p e r i o d  o n c e  m o r e ” .  T h i s
3 1 8t h r e a t e n e d  a  ” n c w  p e r i o d  o f  c i v i l  a n d  j  s t r i f e ” " ' " " *  L a b o u r ’ s  o b j e c t i o n
h e r e  w a s  n e t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t o  t h e  f i r m  d e f e n c e  o f  B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  b u t
t o  t h e  f o r m  w h i c h  t h a t  d e f e n c e  h  d  t a k e n *
T h e  e c o n o m i c  a r g u m e n t  a p p e a r e d  m o r e  c o m p e l l i n g *  T h e r e  w a s
’ ’ e n o r m o u s  f i e l d  f o r  B r i t i s h  t r a d e  a n d  e ; . h  N  ’ ’  1  B u s  i . . ,  E . D .  M o r e l  t
t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  p r o  i  ‘  .  . 7  1  7 . 7 .  . i s  w e r e  e s t a b l i s h e d .  M i l l i o n s
p l o u g h s ,  h a r r o w s ,  a x e s ,  c p a d e s ,  a s  k  s  i n d  e v e r y  k i n d  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  i m p l e m e n t
W e r e  n e e d e d .  T h e  L i v e r p o o l  C o r n  E x c h a n g e  h a d  p r e s s e d  t h e  i m p o r t - n e e  o f  t h e
- , 1 9
R u s s i a n  t r a d e  u p o n  h  . e  lent 9 7  7 7  . 7 .  . p o u n d s  a  w e e k  w a s  s j  n t
o n  t h e  r e l i e f  o f  t h e  u n e m p l o y e d ,  a n d  o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  w o r k f o r c e  i n  B r i t a i n
o r d i n a r i l y  e n g a g e d  i n  w o r k  f o r  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s .  T h e  c o u n t r y  c o u l d  ’ ’ n o t
e x i s t ,  a s  w e  k n o w  i t ” ,  w i t h o u t  a c c e s s  t o  f o r e i g n ,  n o  d  ’ .  _  p p l y  o f  r a w
t e  7  I s *  T h e r e  v ; a s  a n  "  o v e r w h e l m i n g  c a s e ”  f  t t e  p  7  w  t o  r e c o v e r  t h e  ■
c o u n t r y ’ s  n o r  " c !  i  w .  _  r s e  w i t h  o n e  o f  t h e  l a r g e s t  p o t e n t i a l  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  
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w o r l d *
I t  W S t i i  _  - n r  a  ’ ’ c o m p l e t e  f a l l a c y ”  t h a t  n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n  w o u l d
hot inhibit trade. Any businessman, Morel 'w.-li cvcd, w- 7N confirm his statement
that the absence of normal diplomatic red a  7 _ ”gr . t stumbling block
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fch 0r- ti ig of trade f acilities”"?; . Merchants, he wr • t „, we s * 7. 7 .
t o  r i s k  7 .  7  g e e ' s ;  s ’  i .  . .  . o r s  -  -  r e l u c t a . e t  _  h  7  e i r  S h i p  t o  a
p o r t s ;  c r i p p l i n g  r a t  © S i  o f  d  '  -0 ? e  s  r r t c d ;  b a h k s f r S  w e r e  u n w i l l i n g  t o
s slv m  or. 7.7 7 faedllti 4 ii i trans N;i saw l:n :pored; t! e "\s
-10 E  "  - , s e y  o r  c o n s u l  . d e e  t o  p r o t e c t  n a t i  n a l  i n t e  - s t o ;  ” i . u  i r o n t ,  t h e  . . h o l e
32iMachinery of commerce is scmi-pmmuiysod" . Some business could t plaO©
'  . s i  d  h  r t ^ t a r m  c r e d i t s ,  b u t  n o t  t h e  " v e r y  m u c l  1 L g g e  i  g
•7 great capital works", Which Ware urg& thy eed#d in Russia, such as
Lways,  7 i 0 . e r  1, 1 powe tic , 7 . si ing tl us tnds of
M i l l i o n s  o f ' p o u n d s ,  i n  w h i c h  B r i t a i n  c o p l d  h a v e  a " v e r y  large s h a r e  i f  only 
t h e r e  w e r e  n o r m a l  dip! 7 7 .  r  7 .  7 on. 3 e s t a b l i s h e d "  bo two on the two Countries •  
M o r e l  a r g u e d  t h e s e  v i e w s  in a personal correspondence with McNeill
"  .  e  e :  1 9 2 2  a n d  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 3  •  T h e  0.0 s c : .  •  1 1  d i p l o m a  t i c  r e l a t i o n s ,
l i e  w r o t e  011 6 D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 2 ,  w a r  " i n  i t s e l f  p  1 ;  . '  1  ,  t £  -1 e i  ? .  a i t ” *  ;  1 .  
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  c o n t i n u e d  r e f u s a l  t o  e x t e n d  d e  j u r e  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t i e  S o v i e t  
g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t o  r e - e s t a b l i s h  n o r m a l  r e l a t i c  s  f i t ]  t i  i t  c o u n t r y  l i e  t h o u g h t  
a  " s e r i o u s  i m p e d i m e n t  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  c o m m e r c i a l  r e l a t i o n s "  n d  a
--L
d e c i s i o n  c a l c u l a t e d  t o  " a g g r a v a t e  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y ” .
I n  a  l e t t e r  t o  F . V 7 .  G a l t o n  o f  t h e  F a b i a n  S o c i e t y  o n  g l  J a n u a r y ,  e n c l o s i n g
t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  M o r e l  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  the " r e a l  g i s t  o f  t - h
m a t t e r  v i z . :  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w h i c h  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  n o r m a l  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l u t i  e n s
i r f i i  p  L t s  i n  t h €  w a y  o f  a  f u l l  r e s u & p t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l  A n g l o - R u s s i a n
335t r a d e "  h a d  n o . ;  b e e n  d e a l t  w i t h  b y  t h e  U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e
L a b o u r  p l a c e d  t h i s  v i e w  b e f o r e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a n  o f f i c i a l
l e t t e r  f r o m  H e n d e r s o n  t o  B o n a r  L a w ,  w h i c h  s t a t e d  t h a  p a r t y ’ s  o p i n i o n  t o  b e
t h a t  t h e  a n n u l m e n t  o f  t h e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t  w o u l d  " l o s t  s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t  t r a d e
b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  c o u r . t r i o s ,  i f  i t  w o u l d  n o t  c o m p l e t e l y  e n d  i t ,  a n d  t h a t  B r i t i s h
i n t e r e s t s  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  s e r i o u s l y  i n j u r e d  f c h a i i  S o v i e t  t h e r e b y .  T h e  b r e a k i n g -
o f f  o f  t r a d i n g  r e l a t i o n s  v / i t h  R u s s i a  w o u l d  " i m p e d e  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  B r i t i s h
3 3 op r o s p e r i t y " ;  a n d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  i t  w a s  h o p e d ,  w o u l d  o p p o s e  t h i s  s t e p  *
' T l i  e  1923  p a r t y  c o  l  f e  a / . / . . ,  g u d o r s e d  t h i s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  
a  r u p t u r e  i n  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  S o v i e t  R u s s i a .  T h e  p r e s e n t  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  
C l y n e s  d e c l a r e d  i n  p r o p o s i n g  a  r e s o l u t i o n  o n  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  w a s  t h e  " l a r g e s t  
a n d  t h e  m a i n  c a u s e  o f  t h i s  g r e a t  a r m y  o f  w o r l d ,  e s s  m e n  a n i  w o m e n  i n  t h e  l a n d " .  
T h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  R e p o r t  r e c o r d e d  a  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  m a i n t a i n ­
i n g  a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  S o v i e t  R u s s i a ;  a n d  t h i s  v i e w ,  i t  w a s  
s t a t e d ,  w o u l d  b e  p r e s s e d  " o n  e v e r y  o c c a s i o n  w h e n  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  a r i s e s " .  A  
r e s o l u t i o n  o n  R u s s i a ,  p r o p o s e d  b y  M a c D o n a l d ,  r e c o r d e d  t h e  p a r t y ’  a t i  f a c t i o n
t h a t  L a b o u r ’ s  p o l i c y  o n  R u s s i a  h a d  b e e n  " a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t "  s o  f a r ,
a t  l e a s t ,  a s  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  t h e  T r a d e  A g r e e m e n t  w a s  c o n c e r n e d ,  a n d  c a l l e d  
f o r  a  j o i n t  m e e t i n g  t o  s e t t l e  O u t s t a n d i n g  p o i n t s  o f  d i f f e r e n c e .  T h e r e  c o u l d  
D e  " n o  c o m p l e t e  a g r e e m e n t  u p o n  B r i t i s h  a n d  R u s s i a n  i n t e r n a t i e n v . 1  p o l i c i e s " ,  i t  
. . . .  ,  " u n  1 1  t h i s  c o u n t r y  a c c o r d s  f u l l  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  R u s s i a n  G o v e r n ­
m e n t "  .  B r o w n l i e ,  w h o  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  A . E . U .  ,  v o i c e d  t h e  u n i o n ’ s  c o n c e r n  v / i t h  
t h e  n u m b e r  o f  u n e  / p l o y e d  i n  t h e  m e t a l  i n d u s t r y .  T h e r e  w o u l d  b e  n o  r e v i v a l  o f  
t r a d e ,  h e  b e l i e v e d ,  u n t i l  t h e  R u h r  a n d  R u s s i a n  q u e s t i o n s  w e r e  s o l v e d ;  a n d  
D i e  a  t i c  _  1  i d  s h o u l d  b e  r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f
t h e  d e v e l  . .  t  o f  t r a d e " ^ .  I n d e e d  R u s s i a  w a s  a n  i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  H e n d e r s o n  w r o t e
— —
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o f -  h o w  " p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a n d  p r e j u d i c e "  c o u l d  b l i n d  t h e  e y e s  o f  
A l l i e d  d i p l o m a t i s t s  t o  " e c o n o m i c  r e a l i t i e s "  '  .  L a b o u r  d i f f e r e d  f r o m  t h e m  n o t
i n  i t s  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  r e g i m e ,  b u t  i n  a  w i l l i n g n e s s
.  , ,  .  ,  ,  .  .  n. . .  ,  .  t h e ,  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  o f  .  , ,  _t o  s e p a r a t e  u n i s  a t t i t u  \ j s t i o n  o f ^ t r a d i n g  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  R u s s i a ,
w h i c h  o t h d r  f a c t o r s ,  a b o v e  a l l  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  m a d e  i m p e r a t i v e .
T h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  i n  f a c t ,  f o u n d  i t s e l f  a  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  
s p o k e s m a n  o f  b u s i n e s s  o p i n i o n  t h a n  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e s ,  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  c u s t o d ­
i a n s  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h a t  g r o u p .  T h o s e  w h o  c o u l d  n o t  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  m o r a l  
a p p e a l ,  kx B o n s o n b y  w r o t e ,  t h a t  R u s s i a  s h o u l d  b e  a l l o w e d  w i t h o u t  o u t s i d e  
i n t e r f e r e n c e  t o  " w o r k  o u t  h e r  s a l v a t i o n  f o r  h e r s e l f  i n  h e r  o w n  w a y " ,  c o u l d  
n o w  b e  " r a l l i e d  b y  t h e  p r a c t i c a l ,  t h o u g h  m o r e  s o r d i d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  t h a t  t r a d ­
i n g  w i t h  R u s s i a  i s  g o o d  b u s i n  s s . "  I n  t h e  b u s i n e s s  w o r l d ,  h o  n o t e d ,  t h e r e  w a s
" a  c h a n g e  o f  o p i n i o n ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  a  s t e p  i n  t h e  r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n  b e c o "  s  
~  a  a
p o s s i b l e "  «  L a b o u r  a r t i c u l a t e d  t h i s  v i e w  i n  p o l i t i c a l  c i r c l e s .  T h e  i m m e n s e  
R u s s i a n  p o p u l a t i o n ,  C l y n e s  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  o f f e r e d  a  " f i n e  f i e l d  f o r  B r i t i s h
gZfQ
t r a d e  i f  b u r  c o  m . i e r c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  f a c e  t h e  p r o b l e m  w i t h  c o u r a g e .
B u s i n e s s  r e p o r t s  o f  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  o f  R u s s i a n  t r a d e ,  M a c D o n a l d  t o l d  t h e  H o u s e
o f  C o m m o n s ,  w e r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  f a v o u r a b l e ,  a s  t h e  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  B e c o s  D e l e g a t i o n
f o r  i n s t a n c e , ,  h a d  i n d i c a t e d .  A t  a n y  t i m e  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  t w e l v e  m o n t h s ,  h e
b e l i e v e d ,  " a n y  b u s i n e s s m a n  w h o  k n e w  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  o f  R u s s i a  f r o m  t h e  i n s i d e "
w o u l d  h a v e  f a v o u r e d  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  E x p o r t  f r o ' . i t s  A c t  t o  t h e  R u s s i a n  
4  ,  3 4 lt r a d e  .  T n e  r e v o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a  " s e r i o u s  
h a n d i c a p  t o  B r i t i s h  t r a d e r s ;  a n d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  b u s i n e s s m e n  i n t e r e s t c - d i n
vlj.2
R u s s i a n  t r a d e ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,  k n e w  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a  " b a d  b l u n d e r " " '  *
M a c D o n a l d  q u o t e d  t o  t h e  H o u s e  f r o m  a  l e t t e r  w r i t t e n  t o  h i m  b y  B u s t o n
a n d  H o r n s b y  L t d . ,  m a k e r s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  i m p l e m e n t s  a n d  o i l  a n d  g a s  g i n e s .
I n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  t h e  f i r m  h a d  d o n e  £ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  w o r t h  o f  b u s i n e s s  w i t h  t h e
l e t  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  a n d  i t  w a s  h o p e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h i s  t r a d e  " g r e a t l y "  i n
t h e  c u r r e n t  y e a r .  I n  g e n e r a l  t h e '  b u s i n e s s  o u t l o o k  w a s  " d i s t i n c t l y  h o p e f u l " .
E v e r y  f i r m ,  h o  t h o u g h t ,  w h i c h  c o u l d  d o  b u s i n e s s  w i t h  R u s s i  "  j h t  t o  b e
343e n c o u r a g e d  t o  d o  b u s i n e s s  w i t h  R u s s i a "  .  D e f e n d i n g  r e c o g n i t i o n  m  t h e  H o u s e  
o f  C o m m o n s ,  C l y n e s  q u o t e d  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  b u s i n e s s  o p i n i o n  b o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  
n o t  a  s i n g l e  i n s t a n c e  h a d  o c c u r r e d  i n  w h i c h  t h e  R u s s i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  f a i l e d  
t o  h o n o u r  a n y  a r r a n g e m e n t  o f  a  c o m m e r c i a l  o r  : i n <  a c i a l  n a t u r e .  T h e  r e p u t a t i o n  
t h e  S o v i e t  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  w a s  " w i t h o u t  r e p r o a c h " .  T h e  L a b o u r  
g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  " i n  n o  s e n s e "  i n  r e l a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  S o v i o g o v e r n m e n t  i n  r e s p e c t
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o f  p o l i t i c a l  o u t l o o k ,  n c t h o 7 7  o r  p r i n c i p l e ,  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t .  I n d e . d ,  t h e  
* D i e - h a r d s ’  c o u l d  h a r d l y  s  l y  t h i n g s  m o r e  e x t r e m e  o r  m o r e  h o s t i l e  a g a i n s t  t h e  
L a b o u r  p a r t y  t h a n  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h a t  p a r t y  e x p r e s s e d  d a i l y  a g a i n s t  t h e  
S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t .  B u t  " s o  f a r  a s  B r i t i s h  e m p l o y e r s ,  B r i t i s h  t r a d i n g  c o o p  a l l i e s  
a n d  B r i t i s h  c o m m e r c i a l  m e n "  c o u l d  b e  " a s s i s t e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  a g e n c y  o f  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  i n  r e l a t i o n s  v / i t h  R u s s i a ’ ’ ,  h a t  s u p p o r t  " s h o u l d
n o t  b e  w i t h h e l d  f r o m  - a n y  w h o  a r c  a n x i o u s  o r  w i l l i n g  t o  d e a l  e i t h e r  w i t h  t h e
3 4 4R u s s i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  o r  w i t h  R u s s i a n  e m p l o y e r s  o f  l a b o u r "  •
W h i l e  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  R u s s i a  v / a s  r i g h t ,  H e n d e r s o n  d e c l a r e d  i n  a  
S f  3 s h  s h  r  ; l y  f f c e a  ‘  .  > 1  d o n  1  1 - 1  o r .  c e m m u n i c a t e d  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n ­
m e n t  ,  i t  " w a r  a l s o  e x p e d i e n t " .  H o  h o p e d  f o r  a  d i m i n u t i o n  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  
t l  =  " r  v i v a l . .  o f  o u r  t r a d e  a n d  c o m m e r c e " .  T h e r e  w e r e  " v e r y  i n f l u e n t i a l
p i e " ,  h e  n o t e d ,  " a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t r a d e  a n d  c o m m e r c e  w h o  w e r e  e x c e e d i n g l y
3 4 . 5a n x i o u s  t h a t  R u s s i a  s h o u l d  b e  r e c o g n i s e d " " '  R .  c o g :  . i t i o n ,  a c b o r d i h g l y ,  f c h
1 T i e  t r _ .  a r k  i ,  ti . 7  " h -  _  1 ©  a _ . p r o v r ! "  e v e n  i n  c i r c l e s
w h i c h  h a d  n o  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y .  T h e  c o m m e r c i a l  a s p e c t  i f
. 7  7  .  . .  H 7 1 r ~  7  - 8 . . ' a  1  a "  ' 0 .  T l  .  c i s i o n  v / a s  w e l c o m e d  b y  t h e
3 4 7’ r e s i d e  -  > f  t l  7 . - . .  e i a t i  t  ‘ © f . B  i t i s h  ' 7 .  1  e  s  :  w  j  .  b y
J h  1  - t .  T l  g  , w  n t ,  t l  7  s i d e r e d ,  s o  t e d  "  h a  s t  t e d
*7 340
i n  t h e  r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n " ' '  ' 1  .
N o t  7 .  t g  i n  L  7 s j u r ’ s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  i t  h a s  s o  f a r  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d ,  n e e d  b e
t  i d  p e  r u l i  r l y  7 . ■ .  T h e  p r i i i c i p l - e s ,  i n d e e d ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  n o t e d ,  w e r e
3 4 8S s h  , r  - 7  b y  - i o : t  L i b e r a l s " ' "  "  .  B e  f o r -  ’  v / o r l d  w a r ,  A t t l e e  n o  :  -  . ,  t h e  p  r t y
u x  h  s s e w t r u e  t i v i  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  b u t  s h  • r e e d  t h e  v i e w s  w h i  t  w e r e
3 4 9t r a d i t i o n a l  i n  r a d i c a l  c i r c l e s "  '  ;  a n d  h  7  t h  . . . . - e  * p  - . . . . . S t  ’
g r o u p  w a s  n u m e r i c a l l y  L i b e r a l  r a i l 1 ,  o r  h e  a n  L a b o u r .  I f  a n y  o f  t h e  ’ p a c i f i s t  *
1 i b e r  t l  ,  ’  .  r e  o r ,  o u l  [ u  i t l ]  j o i n e d  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y ,  b r i n g i n g  _  m . _  ;  :  . .
l e i  ©  p e  i  . .  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  e x p e r t i s e ;  a n d  a  s e r i e s  o f  e l a b o r a t e d
I s  / i t h  .  7  > r e i g n  a f f a i r s  w h i c h  c a m e  t o  f o r m  t h e  c o r e  o f
’ L a b o u r ’  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  A  s e c o n d  d e t e r m i n i n g  f a c t o r ,  t h e n ,  i n  t h e  m a k i n g  
o f  L a b o u r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  v / a s  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  p r S g i  w i e  
7  r  1  t e d  b y  r  " 7 .  ;  I s  7  7 '  L i b e t  1  F  , ,  ,  a n d  b f  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h  L  0 r  u p
J .  7  1  L  7  .  F  g  r  i  7 i a t e l y  a f t e r  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  w o r l d
w a r .
A n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  w  p i  y e d  b y  t h e  b o d i e s  w h i c h  u n i t e d  L a b o u r  a n d
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I d  e r a l  o p p o s i t i o n  to t h :  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  . /  o s  u  t i c  o f  11 w a r s  i  . .
' v tl Union for Democratic Control. Too Radical MPs together with
MacDc . 11 and Jowett of the I.L.P. were associated with its foundation;
E.D. orel lecame its Secretary. All of the ILP’s pamphlets 02: foreign affairs,
it ' as 1 e suggested, bore the sta ap of .7 7___ i__ 7 “ f  ib u P rty
’’turned to Morel when It began to have doubts about the war. In fact no
itb ■ of t; “ tb our . . it ' ubled t . . 7: . at ' 77 7 | .7 policy•*
3 ^ 0
so long as Morel v/as "live”"" .
77:: UDC was not the only body which during the w ■ 7 rough! tc jethei*
Labour and Liberal pacifist sentiment. This function Was performed also by
the No Conner! tpion Fellowship, the Bryce Gro$p, the League of I7 at tons
Society, the Peace Eegotintions Condtfoe, th© Lansdownc Committee and the
Ifl? Club""- . The fact that the leaders of the ILP were the leaders also of
the TJDC,it was remarked, was ''said to be merely a coincidence’’; but it v/as a
coincidence which had been stretched to embrace also the ‘To Conscritpion
Fellowship, the National Council for Civil Liberties, the Women’s Infemational
3 5 2
League and the Peace Negotiations Committee . The TJDC was, however, the
most Important of these bodies and the most influential* Its objects were
Itemed up by Morel in the first pamphlet which it issued, ’The Morrow of the 
War’ (1914): no territorial changes without tl aj tl of the local populat­
ion I tl democratic control of foreign policy, and parliamentary approval- of 
peace treaties; a British foreign policy aimed not at a balance of power but
at a Concert of Powers; and a reduction in armaments, combined with the nation-
3 5 3
alisation of the manufacture and the control of their export:""'. These four 
points, together with cdt fifth which was added in Ifl?, represented, according 
to C.P. Trevelyan MP, a UDC founder and subsequent Labour minister, the
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leading factors of the policy eventually adopted by the British Labour Party’’.
T h e  conversion o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  v / a s  f a c i l i t a t e d  b y  t h e  e f f o r t  w h i c h  
t h e  UDC m a d e  t o  - s e c u r e  t h e  a d h e s i o n  o f  a s  m a n y  L a b o u r  b o d i e s  a s  p o s s i b l e .  I f
w a s  ” t o  t h e  p e r m e a t i o n  o f  T r a d e s  C o u n c i l s  a n d  l o c a l  L a b o u r  P a r t i e s " ,  r e c a l l e d .
M r s  S w a n w i c k ,  " t h a t  t h e  U n i o n  t u r n e d  I t s  c h i e f  e f f o r t s ,  k n o w i n g  t h a t  t h e  
L a b o u r  P a r t y  a s  a  w h o l e  m u s t  b e  w o n  " o r  a  d i s t i n c t i v e l y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a b o u r  
f o r e i g  p o l i c y ” .  T h r o c l a b o u r  o g g a n i s e r s  w e r e  a p p o i n t e d ;  and an a p p e a l  w a s
by Labour l e a d e r s  t o  t r a d e  u n i o n i s t s  t o  j o i n  t h e  U n i o n .  T h e  m e m b e r s h i p
° A  L a b o u r  b o d i e s  u f  C i l i a t e d  t h e  t h e  U D C  i n  O c t o b e r  l f l 3  w a s  e s t i m a t e d  ’g o  b e
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a s  g r e a t  . s  65 c ,  j O O .  h u r t y  I L P  b r a . 1c h . c 3 a l o n e  j o i n e d  i n  S e p t e m b e r  a n d
3 5 qO c t o b e r  o f  t h a t  y e a r  " •  B y  1 9 2 1  t h e  a d h e s i o n  o f  6 5 0  l a b o u r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s
5 - 6v / i ' C i :  a  n o n o c r s h i p  o f  a  m i l l i o n  w a s  r e p o r t e d  •
I t  w o u l d  b e  t o o  m u c h ,  n o  d o u b t ,  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  p r o c e s s  a s  o n e -  o f  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  c o n v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  b y  t h e  U D C  g r o u p .  L a b o u r
r i r s d s o c t o d  t h e i r  c r i t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n  a t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  s e c r e t  
d i p l o m a c y  b e f o r e  t h e  o u t b r e a k  o f  t h e  w a r  a n d  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  o f  t h e  U D C .  I n  
s e e k i n g  s i  i n d e p e n d e n t  p o l i t i c : !  c o u r s e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  A u g u s t  1 9 1 ? ,  n e v e r ­
t h e l e s s ,  B r i t i s h  L a b o u r  d i d  t u r n  t o  t h e  U D C  f o r  a t  l e a s t  a n  " a r t i c u l a t i o n  o f  
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i ^ s  v i e w s  a w  E o r e i g  p o l i c y " .  T h e  W a r  A i m s  M e m o r a n d u m  o f  D e c e m b e r  I f ! ? ,  w h i c h
m a r k e d  t h e  p a r t y ’ s  b i d  f o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  f o l l o w e d
U D C  p r o p o s a l s  c l o s e l y .  A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e  w o u l d  b e  r e t u r n e d  t o  F r a n c e  o n l y  a f t e r
a  p l e b i s c i t e  h a d  b e e n  h e l d ,  a s  t h e  U D C  u r g e d ;  a n d  t h e  s e c t i o n  o n  t h e  B a l k a n s
a n d  I t a l y  c a m e  t o  t h e  s a m e  c o n c l u s i o n  a s  t w o  L i b e r a l  p a c i f i s t s ,  M o o I  a n d  C . f .
B u x t o n ,  h a d  d o n e  i n  t j  l a r  w o r k  o n  ’ T h e  W a r  a n d  t h e  B a l k a n s ’  i n  1 9 1 %  M o r e l ’ s
p l a n  f o r  C e n t r a l  A f r i c a  v / a s  a d o p t e d ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  w h i c h  t h e  E u r o p e a n  c o l o n i e s
3 5 8s c o u l ; ,  b e  a d m i n i s t e r e d  a s  o n e  u n i t  b y  t h e  L e a g u e  o f  N a t i o n s "  *  T h e  s t a t e m e n t
a s  a  w h o l e  w a s  " i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e " ,  a p a r t  f r o m  a  " f e w  c h a n g e s  o f  p h r a s e " ,  f r o m
3 5 9p r o p o  a l s  w h i c h  t h e  U D C  h a d  m a d e  i n  J u l y  •  I t s  a d o p t i o n  w a s  h e l d  t o  m a r k  a n
" u n d o u b t e d  t r i u m p h  f o r  t h e  I L P ,  U D C ,  N C C L  g r o u p " " 0 0 .
T h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  w a s  n o t  a l w a y s  a  w e l c o m e  o n e .  G i l m o u r ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e
M i n e r s ,  s p o k e  o u t  a g a i n s t  a  m o t i o n  o n  U D C  l i n e s  w h i c h  J o w e t t  p r o p o s e d  a t  t h e
1 9 1 6  L a b o u r  c o n f e r e n c e .  I t  " s a v o u r e d  t o  h i m  s o m e w h a t  o f  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e
I L P  a n d  t h e  n e w  U n i o n  o f  D e m o c r a t i c  C o n t r o l ,  a  b o d y  w h i c h  s o  f a r  a s  h e  k n e w
n a d - u p  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  n o t  r e c e i v e d  t h e  s a n c t i o n  o f  L a b o u r " ,  a n d  w h o s e  o b j e c t
a p p e a r e d  t o  b e  t o  f i g h t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  w a r .  T h e  r e s o l u -  
•  •  5 6 " *t l o n  w a s  d e f e a t e d " - - .  T h e  U D C  g r o u p ,  B r o c k w a y  r e c a l l e d ,  - - / a r e  " b o u r g e o i s  t o  
t h e i r  f i n g e r - t i p s .  T h e y  w e r e  s u a v e ,  g r a c i o u s ,  c u l t u r e d .  T h e y  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  
l i f t e d  o u t  o f  a n y  g a t h e r i n g  o f  t h e  g e n t l e m e n  o f  E n g l a n d " .  T h e y  h a d ,  m o r e o v e r ,  
m  h i s  o p i n i o n  g i v e n  a  " w r o n g  t w i s t  t o  t h e  I L P  i n  E n g l a n d  i n  w a r - t i m e .  W e  w e r e  
n o t  R e v o l u t i  w i a r y  S o c i a l i s t s ,  W e  w e r e  d e m o c r a t i c  p a c i f i s t s ""0 „
I t  v / a s ,  p e r h a p s ,  p r e c i s e l y  f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  o n  W a r  A i m s  
U o n  w i d e  m e a s u r e  o f  s u p p o r t ,  a n d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w o n  t h e  f a t o o u r  o f  m a n y  
L i b e r a l s "  T h e  e n d o r s e m e n t  o f  U D C  v i e w s  w h i c h  i t  r e p r e s e n t e d  m a d e  p o s  d o l e  
t h e  a d h e s i o n  t o  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  o f  m a n y  w h o  f o u n d  i f  n o  l o n g e r  g  a b l e  t o  
s u p p o r t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  hx . . . -  '  .  . . s o c i a t e d  i n  t h e  U D C  w i t h  t h o s e  w h o
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n o w  s t o o d  a t  t h e  h o a d  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y :  M a c D o n a l d ,  S n o w d o n ,  T h o m a s ,  S e n d e r —  
i 36 ^s o n  c x d  o t h e r s ' "  •  A s  T r e v e l y a n ,  w h o  w a s  o n e  o f  t h i s  g r o u p ,  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t h e
U D C  t h u s  ’ ’ w a s  i n  e f f e c t  a  l i n k  b e t w e e n  t h e  l a r g o  v o l u e m  o f  R a d i c a l  o p i n i o n
w h i c h  n o  l o n g e r  f o u n d  g u i d a n c e  f r o m  t h e  L i b e r a l  l e a d e r s ,  a n d  t h e  I L P . .  H e r e
w a s  l a i d  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  b e t w e e n  R a d i c a l i s m  a n d  L a b o u r ”  w h i c h
w a s  " n o w ” ,  i n  h i s  o p i n i o n ,  " b e c o m i n g  a  c o m p l e t e  a m a l g a m a t i o n 1 ^  •
I t  w a s  n o t  t h e  c a s e  o f  a n y  o f  t h e s e  m e n ,  h o w e v e r ,  o f  a  c o n v e r s i o n  t o  
366s o c i a l i s m  •  K . B .  L e e s - S m i t h  e x p l a i n e d  i n  a n  a r t i c l e  o n  ’ W h y  I  h a v e  j o i n e d  
t h e  I L P ’ t h a t  t h e  l e s r o n  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  f i v e  y e a r s  h a d  b e e n  t h a t  t h e  v i c t o r y  
o f  s o c i a l  j u  b i c e  a t  h o m e  w o u l d  b e  b a r r e n  u n l e s s  i t  w a s  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  t h e  
v i c t o r y  01 i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m  a b r o a d .  H e  a t t a c k e d  t h e  " B l i n d  v i n d i c t i v e n e s s "  o f  
t h e  p e a c e  t e r m s  i m p o s e d  u p o n  G e t  a  u y *  T h e  " o n l y  h o p e  o f  s a v i n g  c i v i l i s a t i o n "  
h e  s a w  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t s  c o m m i t t e d  t o  t h e  r e v i s i o n  o f  t h e  V e r s a i ­
l l e s  s e t t l e m e n t #  T h e r e  w a s  " n o  h o p e "  i n  t h e  L i b e r a l s ;  h e  p r e f e r r e d  t h e  I L P ,  
t h e  " s o u l  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  m o v e m e n t " ,  i n  v i e w  o f  i t s  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  w a r ,  t h e
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b l o c k a d e ,  t h e  t e r m s  o f  p e  ; e ,    t! " c r y  o f  t h e  w e  a l e e  r  p e o p l e s  e v e r y w h e r e "  ,
A  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  a d v a n c e d  R a d i c a l s ,  h e  t l  o u g h t ,  w e r e  f a k i n g  t h e  s a n e  s t e p ,
m a d e  i t  c l e a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  h i s  p r i n c i p l e s  h a d  " i n  n o  w a y  c h a n g e d " :  h e  h a d
r a t h e r  b e e n  " f o r c e d  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  1  c a n n o t  l o o k  t o  a n y  s e c t i o n  o f
x&p.
t h e  L i b e r a l  p a r t y  t o  c a r r y  t h e m  i n t o  e f f e c t "
C h a r l e s  R o d e n  B u x t o n  w a s  e l e c t e d  a s  a  L i b e r a l  U P  i n  1 9 1 0 ,  a n d  w a s  r e p o r ­
t e d  t o  h a v e  h e e n  t h e  " r i s i n g  h o p e  o f  L i b e r a l i s m "  i n  p a r l i  . . .  f  t h a t
y e a r - "  m j n  1 9 1 3  h o  b e c a m e 7 a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  c f  t h e  U D C ,  a n d  i n  I J ' l o  
h e  w a s  d i s o w n e d  b y  t h e  C e n t r a l  H a c k n e y  L i b e r  1 _  o c i  t o n  f o r  h i s  a d o p t i o n
o f  L a b o u r  v i e w s  o n  t h e  w a r .  A s  t h e  w a r  a d v  .  c e d ,  h o  " t u r n e d  m o r e  a n d  m o r e
- o w  t r d s  p  e i . f i   1  I  h o u r  v i x : s " .  '0 j o i  .  ’ I L P  i n  1 9 1 ? ?  x d  c o n t e s t e d
370t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  _  L  0 .  m d i d a  2 ~  -  ' 1 .  0 i n
r e a s o n  h e  g a v e  f o r  s e v e r i n g  h i s  L i b e r a l  c o n n e c t i o n  a n d  j o i n i n g  t h e  I L P ,  h i e
g . i  e  r  r d s ,  w a s  t h  i t  h o  w a s  n o  l o n g e r  i n  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  L i b e r a l s
O v e r  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s .  H O  "  .  '  w  r  j e  ' a  ~  t h e  L i b e  . 1  i  o f
f r e e d o m " ,  h o w e v e r ;  a n d  i f  w a s  " a  i o  t i c  i t f i  h i m  - h a ' ;  p o l l  t i c s  c o u l d  . n d  b b O ~ -  
u l a  b e  i n f o r m e d  b y  t l : . . -  C h r i s t i a n  .  s p i r i t " - " '
C h a r l e s  T r e v o l y a n  - w a s  a t  c h o o l  w i t h  b o t h  C . R .  B u x t o n  a n d  P o o l  B u x t o n
( t h e  b r o  e  o f  h .  c i  : s  R o d e  0 t ,  1  . I s o  a  f o r m e r  L i b e r a l  U P  w h o  '  x .
. i d :  L i b e r a l s ’  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  a n d  j o i n  1  t h e  I L P  i n  1 9 1 §  7 .
r s l y  s e r v e d  . P  L  f f e  Be r o i  1 t o  f  T  -  r d  L i e u t  n  i t  o f  I r e l a n d ,  a n d
w a s  e l e c t e d  a s  a .  L i b e r a l  M P  i n  1 / 3 9 9 »  b o  c o n i n g  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  S e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  
B o a r  I  o f  E d u c a t i o n  i n  l y O D .  d o  o p p o s e d  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  w a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  a n d  
r  -  1 _ ,  S ' d  h i  o  C f i c o .  d o  R e n t  " o u :  i n f o  t h e  w i l d e r n e s s " ,  h e  v r r  t  - ,  " w i t h  B  a y  
M a c D o n a l d  a n d  a  f e w  o t h e r s ” ;  a n d  w a s  a  f o a n d e r - n c m b e r  o f  t h e  U D C ,  a n d  a  m e m b e r  
o f  -  t i v f e  o f  b o d j  '  1 " ( T h  ' '  . f  t :  i n d e e d ,  t o o k
$ 1  c e  i  -  h i  h p n  c ) .  A  1  t - t e a t  i n  1  d g g i n  - d d  I  i  b i o h
o f  t h e  U D C  a p p e a r e d  u n d e r  h i s  s i 0  _  j | < § i ]  I t ]  t h o s e  o f  M o r e l ,  A n g e l l
i c D ' C  1 & 7 . H  j o i n e  t l  I L P  £  ,  .  $  •  . . k .  ' d  : d  ■ . . .  _  d ;
y . a r  i n  t h e  L a b o u r  i n t e r e s t " ' " .
1 .  d   L g n  ,  h e  t o l d  a  m e e t i n g  i n  M a r c h  1 Q 1 ?  a t  t h e  L a b o u r  C l u b
i n  " r i g h o u s e ,  b e c a u s e  h o  h a d  h e  3  t o  e x p r e s s  h i s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  a  p o l i c y
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- . b e e n  " c a r r i e d  o n  i n  s e c r e t  f o r  s i x  y e a r s  b y  a  L i b e r a l  G o v e r n m e n t "  • *
d  .  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  . w a s  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  d o m e s t i c  
p o l i c y ;  a n d  t h a t  i  t  w a s  e n t i r e l y  r e m o v e d  f r o m  t h e  s p h e r e  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
i o n ,  " a n d  e v e n  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  i n f l u e n c e " .  N e i t h e r  b r f o r e ,  d u r i n g  11c
,  a  w r o t e ,  w h i c h  h a d  c o n d e m n e d  t h e  w o r l d  t o  a  n e w  e r a  o f  n a t i o n a l  
h a t r e d s  a n d  a r m a m e n t s ,  h a d  t h e  L i b e r a l  l o a d e r s  o f f e r e d  " o n e  b l e a t  o f  o p p o s i t i o n  
t h  t h e  : o r c t S  f  r e  . c t i o n " ;  t h e i r  p o l i c y  a n d  a c t i o n  h a d  b e e n  " i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
a  p e r i  l i s t s  a n d  r e a c t i o n a r i e s " .  T h e  t r u t h  w a s  t h a t  b y  t h
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c a m  o f  t h e  w a r ,  " L i b e r a l i s m  a s  a  p o l i t i c a l  . o r c c  h a d  c e a s e d  t o  f u n c t i o n " " ' ! . ' "
W h i l e  i f  h a d  b e e n  a  r u l e r s ’  w a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  " o u g h t  a t  a l l  e v e n t s  t o
b e  a  p e o p l e ’ s  p e a c e " ,  d l l  . .  3 : q r  1 . ' .  i  1  i  t h
j- 3 7 6t h e  U D C  1 .  I n  t h e  I L P ,  m o r e o v e r ,  h e  f o u n d  t h e  " o n e  o r g a n i s e d  p o l i t i c a l  b o d y
' . . . ' . o '  ( h e )  c o u l d  c o - o p  e r a ;  .  i n  t h e '  s t r a g g l e  a g a i n  1  t d c  d i  £ 1  a & d  d i s a s t -
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r e u s  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  ’ k n o c k - o u t  b l o w ” '  .  T h e  u n i o n  G e n r e  o f  t h e  f u t u r e ,  h e  t o l d
u  N a t i o n a l  P e a c e  C o n g r e s s  i n  1 3 1 0 ,  v a c  t h a t  o f  t h e  w o r k e r s ,  a n d  l i e  u r g e d  p e a c e
s o c i e t i e s  t o  r a n g e  t h e m s e l v e s  a l o n g s i d e  t h e  L a b o u r  m o v e m e n t .  T h e  w o r k e r s  w e r e ,  
l  ” 7 8
n o  t h o u g h t ,  t h e  " g r e a t e s t  m o t i v e  p o w e r  o f  p e a c e " " ‘  H e  h a d  b e e n  " r e a l l y  a  
S o c i a l i s t " ,  a  L a b o u r  p u b l i c a t i o n  i n s i s t e d ,  o v e n  b e f o r e  h i e  f o r m a l  a d h e s i o n  t o ^
"579 ~ jrf n e  m o v e m e n t " '  .  B e a t r i c e  W e b b  h a d m o r e  a c c u r a t e l y  i d e n t i f i e d  h i m  w i t h  t h e  
" s e n t i m e t a l  W h i g s " w T h o  w e r e  n o w  c o m i n g  i n t o  " c l o s e  c o m m u n i e r i ’  w i t h  t h e  I I P .
A n o t h e r  m e m b e r  o f  t h i s  g r o u p ,  a n d  a n o t h e r  t o  h a v e  h e l d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
p o s i t i o n  i n  L i b e r a l  c i r c l e s ,  w a s  A r t h u r  P o n s o n b y " 1 ^  •  P o n s o n b y  h a d  n e o n  P r i v a t e  
S e c : . '  y  t o  C o .  . . p b e l l - B u n n o r m a n  i n  1 9 0 6 - 0 ,  a n d  a  L i b e r a l  M P  f r  . m  t h a t  t i m e  
u n t i l  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  w a r .  H e  s p e n t  n i n e  y e a r s  i n  t h e  D i p l o r  t i c  S e r v i c e ,  t h r e e  
i n  t h e  L i b e r a l  C e n t r a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  a n d  f i v e  a s  P a g e  o f  d > b u r  t o  Q u e e n  V i c t o r -
B
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[ e  r a s  a s s o c  l a  t e d  w i t h  T O C  a  d  o p p o s e d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t 1 s  w a r  p o l i c y .
In I j l G  h e  w a v  r© j  c  c t  c d  b y  t h ©  l o c a l  L i b e r a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  a n d  s t o o d  a s  a n  i n d o p -
'  ■  o  2,B e m o o r a t .  f o l l o w i n g  b c i s  d e f e a t  l i e  j o i n e d  t h e  I L P  »
w e r e  . a .  - j p i  I  w o i f i ©  o f  i n f l n e n c  . ' ,
a s  S n o w d e n  p u n  i t ,  " w h o s e  f a i t h  i n  t h e  o l d  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  h a d  b e e n  d e s t r o y e d
b y  t h e  W a r " ,  a n d  w h o  s a w  i n  m e m b e r s '  . i  . .  1 /  t h  I ' L P  a  o f  i ' .  l  £ g  L t h
a  m o v e m e n t  w h i c h  , f .  _  s s e d  t h ©  e  •  i c ,  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i d e a s . .7Q7
o f  t h e  age” *  J o s e p h  K i n g ^  0.  b a r r i s t e r  o f  p u b l i c  school a n d  O x f o r d  origin, 
w a s  a  L i b e r a l  I I P  f r o m  1 9 1 0  u n t i l  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  w a r ,  w h e n  h e  j o i n e d  t h e  I L P ,
534s .  p a r t y  w h i c h  h e  d e c l a r e d  h a d  b e e n  h i s  " s p i r i t u a l  h o m e  f o r  a  v e r y  l o n g  t i m e * *  ,
w h o  s o  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  R u s s i a n  R e v o l u t i o n  a n d  t h e  L e a g u e  o f  N a t i o n s  h e  f o u n d
c o n g e n i a l  ^ «  H i s  " b i g g e s t  m i s t a k e " ,  h o  t h o u g h t ,  w a s  t o  h a v e  " t h o u g h t  t h e  m e n
w e r e  s i n c e r e  w h o  t o l d  u s  M i  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  w a r  t h a t  i t  w a s  t o  e n d  t h e  r u l e
o f  m i l i t a r i s m  a n d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  f r e e d o m  i n  t h e  w o r l d " .  H i s  r o e . o n s  f o r  j o i n i n g
L  h o u r  P  r i y  w e  .  '  a l l  h e  " i n s i n c e r i t y  a n d  e v e n  t r e a c h e r y  t o w a r d s
L i b e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  L i b e r a l  l o a d e r s " ,  a n d  t h e  " c h a n g e  i n  L i b e r a l  p o l i c y  f r o m
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e f u l  a i m s  o f  h .  f  C o b d e n ,  G l a d s t o n e  a n d  C a m p b e l l -
B a n n e r m a n ,  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  i m p e r i a l i s m  o f  A s q u i t h ,  L l o y d - G e o r g e ,  C h u c r h i l l
^  86a n d  t h e  C o a l i t i o n i s t s "  .  H i s  v i e w s ,  e v i d e n t l y ,  w e r e  c l o s e  t o  t h o s e  o f  H o c l  
B u x t o n ,  w h o  h a d  s i m i l a r l y  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  r a d i c a l  L i b e r a l  v i e w s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
o n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  m a t t e r s ,  w e r e  b e t t e r  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  t h a n  
b y  t h e  o f f i c i a l  L i b e r a l o .  T h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y ,  t o  u s e  a n  . e x p r e s s i o n  w h i c h  a r o s e  
i n  a n o t h e r  c o n t e n t ,  w e r e  ' n o r e  L i b e r a l  t h a n  t h e  L i b e r a l s  t h e m s e l v e s ’ .
J . C .  W e d g w o o d  w a s  e l e c t e d  a s  a  L i b e r a l  H P  i n  1 9 0 6 ,  a n d  i n  1 9 1 3  w a s  
t o  t u r n e d  a s  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  R a d i c a l .  I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  h e  j o i n e d  t h e  I L P  
a n d  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s .  I f  t h e  p a r t y ' s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
h a d  b e e n  r i g h t  i n  t h e  p o s t - w a r  y e a r s ,  t h e  L a b o u r  L o a d e r  c o m m e n t e d ,  m u c h  ‘ w a s
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d u e  t o  h i s  " f i r s t - h a n d  k n o w l e d g e " " ' 0 0 „  i f .  - '  a n g e  o f  p a r t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  h e  m a d e
c l e a r  i n  a  l e t t e r  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  I L P ,  w o u l d  i n v o l v e  " n o  c h a n g e  i n  r . y
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s ,  n o r  e v e n  i n  t h o  : : e  c o l l e a g u e s  w i t h  whom I  W o r k  an
5 8 9H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s "  n  P e t h w i c k - L  w r e n c  " H .  . . . .  b  s r s  y
m o v e d  f r o m  t h e  L i b e r a l s  t o  t h e  I L P  v i a  t h e  U D C 5 .  —  -  *
T h e  m a j o r  f i g u r e  i n  t h e  g r o u p ,  h o w e v e r ,  w a s  u n d o u b t e d l y  M o r e l ,  v t  . o j p S j f  
f i r s t  ’ - j o n  a  r e p u t a t i o n  i n  h i s  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  s l a v e r y  i n  t h e  C o n g a  t h r o  
t h e  C p n g o  R e f o r m  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  '  -  ' r y  a n d  p r i m e  a ^ r e r
o f  t h e  T O C ,  a n d  i ; s  n o s  I e f f e c t i v e  p u b l i c i s t .  I n  1 9 1 8  h e  l e f  ;  t h e  L ^ e c r a a
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Party, whose parliamentary candidate at Birkenhead he had been, and joined 
391
ythe ILP • He had never been a socialist, Snowden noted, nor had he taken
392any part la die . Lvely ■ ■ p# dar v He had found, however, he
that at UPC meetings the bulk of his audiences had been members of the 
ILP, and that their enthusiasm a ' t had made the meetings possible©
b- v s i sd - - 1^1 d h he H I  s h "© .3..al-pe£i5±ea¥ force"• V/here
in the world, he declared, other than in intemational labour, could one 
perceive "any organised force-making for inter : ' L al rightcousnecs and
•3q3peace" '" • His adhesion was, like that of the other members o '" the group, the
product of disillusion lent with the Liberal Party, which, h be to P
he had thought a "force, a real tangible force making for righteousness in
public affairs". He had subsequently discovered that "it was a fraud.. . :f ing
would induce me", he declared, "to stand in with any members ;£
39^ -wnicn have oroug.it ;ke country to its present passsien"''> ©
The day that British Labour, he wrote, "renli.B:. • th i : u i | its
pcwer .._ . fch# gre.f;:ios: of its opportunity, foci./.-:7 unequivocally for a policy 
of national disinterestedness; the day that British labour tak.es that stand, 
it r 111 !'S rc it B suffering mas sews in every European country - allied,
-  t  n f  .  e emy -  i . B iStent clamour and demand for peace". British Labour
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was "master of the situation" • Labour, he believed, was "more than a more 
political party - driving it onwards is a groat inspiring force of human
* T . aQQ
idealism. If it were not so, I for one would not be in it"-"  « His election 
address in 1922, in which he defeated Churchill'at Dundee, announced him to 
"no'; primarily., a. 'Party1 man, but., one who believed that certain funda- 
.tnl j" g©s in ©ur f tdn i 1 3 rg d w d r, tnd in th 3 ntrol nd . t
foreign .policy", wore necessary, and that the Lab . .. pasfct-3
"political instrument througr. hie'- these necessary and inevitable changes can
be brought about safely and off- • i By". To effect a "real national c
~cy
ever f.ordign policy" v/as, ho though:, the "most vital of all national issues" -.
B. 1 s pamphlet 'Borccco in Diplom.cy', l_..tor is ued ... 'T £L y .. rs
01 Secret Diplomacy', made a strong impression upon MacDonald, which he well
- . © r  ' y e  .  l a t e r *  He "did n o t  w a n e  t o  b e l i e v e  i t " ,  h e  w r o t e ,  y e
i t s  " f a c t s  w o r e  s o  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  a n d  i t s  c o n c l u s i o n s  s o  l o g i c a l  t h  . t  I  h a d
s l i a v e  i t " .  T h  :1 f  B  L k i  1  y  h  L c  p a r i  I t s  l a t i o n "  w a s  i n
-,.•1 i  a  t h  d .  B  t l  i g r e e  . t s  p u l  l i c l y  c o n c l u d e d  " w e r r  g  d  .  d
f o r  p a  c j " ,  h u l l ©  t h  ^  •  s  o p e t l y  " t y e r e  t h e  c a u s e  o f  t r o u b l e ,  i l l -
go S
f e  -  . . .  . . " " ' ’ I  F h o m  t h {  t  t i m e ,  f f h c D o h a l d  d e c l a r e d ,  h e  " s u s p e c t  : - d
o u r  d i p l o m a c y , ,  n d ” c 6a # e - d i b e l i e v e  1  . . .  g s  g i  1  3 l i  l i s t e r s  I  : :
VQQ
p a r l i a m e n t  o r  o u :  o f  i t *1 *  S n o w d e n  . a l s o  a c k n o w l e d g e d  M o r e l ' s  " g r e a t  k n o w l e d g e
/qOOa  . . . . . .  .  y  . .  .  -  e  t t i  1  _ u  s t i o h s ”  .  M o r e l ' s  ' e x p o  . 3  i b e r  . . .
p o l i o s  .  ' ,  s p e a k e r  r e m a r k e d  a t  t h e  1923  L a b o u r  c o n f e r e n c e ,  h a d
L01
" p l a c e d  t h e  w h o l e  o f  h u m a n i t y  i n  h i s  d e b t "  ‘  •  I f  t h e  W o r l d ’ s  p r o b l e m s  w e r e  t o
s o l v e d  i t h  S o  ,  M  '  .  I f  a  a e e t i h g  i n  1 9 2 2 ,  t h e  p  l e  o f  B r i i  i n
LlQ?" m u s t  a p p l y  t o  t h e m  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  ;  e  .  . a  I t e d  b y  t h e  U D C "  ‘  •
. .  e r  L i l  .  1  ,  h a s  b e e n  n o t e s ,  w e r e  n o t  a l w a y s ,  w e l c o m e  *  A  
-  —  . . .  . . .  * i s t  ,  S  :  . t .  n  a t e d  s o u r l y ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e i r  d e f e a t  a t
■ h  . 191  g e n a r  1  - 1  s t l  L i l  e i  J L  ,  h  1  e l u d e d  t h  t l  e r e  "  i d  p  pA
ZlQ3e o t  o f  a  p o l i t i c a l  c a r e e r  i n  t h e  L i b e r a l  p a r t y , * *  a n d  h a d  j o i n e d  L a b o u r '  .  d u e  
p a  I. .  - -  l i k e !  " f e w  ic ' a L e s i r  b i o  p e  . . . .  i g  i t s  c n d i d  t e £
a t  t h e  I f f ?  e l e c t i o n ,  S o : : c o n  w . . r r  i  f  _  _ ' g  ’  „  _ _ •  £  t h e  s u m  e r  _  t l  i t
y e a r ,  " T h e y  h a d  O u t h w a i t . e s ,  P o n s o n b y s  a n d  M o r e l s  t o  w h o m  h o  d e c i d e d l y  o b j e c t  e  i ” .  
B u t ,  t h o u g h t  P o n s o n b y ,  I n f  o p  o n  f o n t  I  a .  e r  . 1  w e r e  "  a  I  i g  . a w  b y  '  _  s o r e ,  U d
t h e y  m  t  b o  e n c o u r a g e d  a n d  w e l c o m e d " .  T h o  t r a n s i t i o n  w a s ,  h e  b o l i o r o d ,  a
I I  l o s t  n  a t u r a l  p h e n o m e n o n " ,  : i r . e e  K e i r  1  . r ' i  0 . n d  H e n d e r s o n  a n d  o t h e r  L a b o u r
hO^ r1  c o d e r s  h a d  b e g u n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c a r e e r  a s  L i b e r a l s  ‘  ' T .  I f  L  . . .  u r  s t  a c ,
—  : : s t a t o r  i n  t h e  L a b o u r  L o a d e r ,  i t  w o u l d  a c c e p t  t h e  n e w  r i d d l e -  f .
r e c r u i t s  a n d  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e i r  m o n e y  -  " M o t  u n n e e d e d "  -  a n d  f r o m  t h e i r
" d i f f e r e  b  a n d  w i d e  e  p e r i e  : e  o f  l i f e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r e i g n  o f f  i r s
- i n v o i c e " ’ " -  .  M a n y  o f  t h e  n e w  r e c r u i t s ,  i n d e e d ,  h a d  l i v e d  f o r  l e n g t h y  p e r i o d s
b r c  ' ,  t n d  h a d  f c r  l i e d  w i d e l y .  M o s t  o f  t h o u  w o u l d  h a v e  s h a r e d  "  1 1 ' s
v i e w  t h a t ,  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  L i b e r a l s  a n d  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  w i t h  p r e -
' '  s e c r e t  d i p l o r .  a c y ,  f c j  s o  i u b i  o f  t h e  - w a r  a n d  t h e  i l l i b e r a l  p g  s e t  t l e m e n t ,
L a D o u r  w a s  t h e  " o n e  r e m a i n i n g  i n s t r u m e n t "  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  t h e  " r e - c a s t i n g  o f
l o r e i g n  p o l i c y "  c o u l d  b e  a c c o m p l i  d i e d  I t  w a s  n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  s u r p r i s i n g
■ - • h a t  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  o x - L i b o r a l 3 t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y ' s
i o r o i g n  p o l i c y  .  I t c g a t h e r  d i s p r o p o r t i o n  h e  o r .  .
T h i s  w a s  i n  p a r t  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  l a c k  o f  e x p e r t i s e  i n  t h i s  f i e l d
0 1  t h e  e x i s t i n g  L a b o u r  m e m b e r s ,  a  s h o r t c o m i n g  c h e e r f u l l y  a d  L t i  *  b y  J . I .
if07I I I  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  '  •  T h e  i g n o r a n t  a n d  o f t e n  u n s e l f c O n & c i o u s l y  c h a u v i n i s t  
- c c - c i t u d o s  o f  t h e  - B r i t i s h  w o r k i n g  m a n  i n  r e g a r d  t o  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  w e r e  t h e
ko8s a t i s f a c t i o n  f o r  h o s t i l e  c o m m e n t a t o r s  *  L a n s b u r y  r e  •  1 1  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  " m a n y  L a b o u r  l e a d e r s  w h o ,  t o t a l  a b s t a i n e r s  i n  E n g l a n d ,  d r a n k
r h 
0.2.0
Wine and liqueurs on the Continent because they are a Trail to drink the bad
Zf09
Continental v:r.ter"
This insularity became less general after the war, partly -as a 
result of international t rade-Uni bn. cennec tions (Robert Williams and levin, 
for instance, were involved in' the work of the International Transport Workers’
4 " !  0 r\ •
Federation r“~) ; • "...I partly also throuj’s the work of such bodies as the Workerso j
ill
Travel s Associate oil, founded in 1922 • The Association was set up by men ana
i, |ive in the labour movement, who believed in th .= "os’ i hme t
. d te of _ er ti . .1 peace’1 and saw the "best means for achieving
this In the growth of mutual understanding between the workers of all oouxtriatt.
Such an understandin , it was thought, was "only possible ay actual centre t,
by interchange of visits, by the stiidy of languages, and by an interest m  the
history, literature, art and social movements a£ 3 ©r ferl Sw » .1. .c-
iation provided facilities for foreign travel, and organised lectures, study
groups and language classes in the winter months. Tours .am erg ai -d -
in Eu c an triesr, ... a e anises by seven hundred workers in I;heir
y a . o eg er I , ri ...id is. . a s :  of two thousand in 1924© A
Russian tour was organised in 1924, with twenty p irticipants* ' k g a ^ a d ^  k.
"first org L ' _ ■ • L L R L d . . . ,uti ‘a d . , '  d
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eraole ucccc --..i farther grasps wer ■ expects. zo :r rci :hero an n>-25
A fab tor of greater import m c c *  however, i . stianl .ting an interns j in foreign
:.ffair: in labour circles was an spgreci tion of arst fact that, as Morel put
io, ?oreign sad domestic . .fairs wort "inextricably ixtertwinedTT '*“* « The
d ti a ,  it a 1,  1 y ,d '  ri : f ' prices .. . ployme-
nt in Britain. Irenes by 1122 and after, Lansbury recalled, insul ,’ity of
outlook had "largely vanished". Instead the keenness with which Lac our nudion- .
cos listened to discussions of foreign affairs became notable, and their
4 i 4
degree of knowledge ixcreason in proportion «
A good many people, however, common ted the Real a: of tk 1 .a,
believed, that this "recently - c-paired -and fragmentary iaf a:-.:ati en" could
'’hardly take the place of a coaorehaisive grasp of foreign policy", .1 it
. 4lr
1 L f 1 Lght-, fc Labour mo ve men ia - : *
The "in - teen th Century and After agre :-d tha t the Labour Party would >3 "at"    . - . r . r ’ “J ^
.a ':quu'kly to fill tie Foreign Secretaryship"a © C.P. Scott took up 
the matter of Labour’s competence to mas: an administration, and particularly 
the Foreign Of .'ice, in correspondence wiki Monde .’son early in lg22. ho skier son
629
replied that the party's resources were " iuc greater than was com :only suppos­
ed". His confidence was based upon the expertise of the ex-Liberals, few of
417
who ware . i u G m s  ©
For most of the Liberal Pacifists had been defeated in the 1913
general election. This, conmcntod the Workers' Dreadnought, was on the whole
as it should be: for ulthough some of these candidates had a. higher staaadard
of morality than many of those who have never belonged to a party other than
Labe . 5 i , x  r i l i  el ess, •not the raissic .. boar P ty to "pi
a refuge for men who are neither workers nor Socialists, but who happen to
have disagreed with the majority of the capitalist party to which th,ey have
kj §
hitherto been content to belong" : • Their impact upon Labour’s foreign policy 
statements was nevertheless considerable© A speaker who proposed (unsuccessfu­
lly) the establishment of a Labour diplomatic service at the 1921 party conf­
erence noted that at that tine the party was "confined practically to two or 
three people who were in the nature of advisers to the Labour Party, people
lilf© Roden Buxton or Brailsford, who contributed tremendously to their knowled
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ge oi foreign affairs" . Beatrice Webb observed that the party outside
Parliament was "quietly asserting itself as having a right to settle imperial.
H 20
z ?i Lffairs” . There was no party in the country, 8 . ion wrote,
which was so well informed on foreign affairs; and especially since thB ©nd o£
the war, thought Clynes, there was no party wiicb had interested itself more
4 21
in foreign affairs than the Labour party " ©
T#e British people, th Nati mw h hevie r assured its readers, would 
"never swallow the Buxtons, the Trevelyans, the Ponsohbys, the Morels and the
if
rose of the anti-national gang". Who wer# "__ _ r i arc as ’Laoour* members
All were, however, successfully elected. As Kenworthy recalled, the Labour
Intellectuals "returned in force"; pacifists and ex-Liberals "nearly all
425
regained their seats" . A "striking transformation” , it was remarked,
overtook the party * s p ......a'. .. nta.'ry _• a... ration, with the arrival of a
"highly cultivated intcllige"tsia", of whom there had been only one or two
representatives in the previou P mil ment,* I . . :  particular, .. . by ':ld
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now claim three or four specialists in foreign policy f . The party’r if ss- 
of *ei •. f ' i ’s in f a- 19_2-p Parliament was accordingly dominated by 
- "’I  .. . up, and within them by th sx—L i b e r a l s I t  p sible be ilaim
did fp ton-, that Lab . !..... rial- i . t confinec
5-Gfairs or to immediate natters of wag s, nd f 7 p .ty ir 1 , ir. fact,
n tl g is] 2 ■ d er pe. tl s -fey 3 ’ V L g it p i ' ' 1 iich
4 2 5ter stall . . . . ty c reigi ju st.i-s " ".
M ,...y d - 1. had a a C.y been active in the tJDC reached prominent
i ions wit] i fc] I» bo . ' y, Ege 'r ~ x, ihsl x , wh8 was rue of
4 2 6h wai Lppointe , . pgr y' .. go it an 1519 • So far as foreign
affairs were concerned, d' r is y Go Itrte i Intfc..... to . d. u  i
pi , 3 . p l :± 1 t; 1 iport nt pari i . £ . ul ' p H e y  st . nts* x '
lid. 3 1 191811 C 3 • ...ittee was, with its companion committees, called upon
1. x . tiia fci x furni f. in d_ xi 1 ' rliumeiitary Party, and its
initiatives gave rise pa L aeni y . d  feus. The committees also on
. oCG Si {ga; e dvic InfOr ailoh to the party executive, a"
. li hid a e .. . .. ... - Xi the ietff of th party / ..r-
4 2 7e, .... c - x  s wer .. I "a sly 0 .. .. . rk" • Th ' lost active"
0 ' d ] ittees . .d x  ' L Cf irs, Li 3 . . be H i d  uj
Ivis d. ©acee&tiv© "in connection with H I  the variou. . .xl 1 i & d '.- 
ng ord: of Tie Peace Treaties, tie Pur si an war a i oihcr natters connected with
4 2 8the re-settlement of Europe" *
ittees tere reorganised in 1 9 2 1 t©"bring i t .  .. .. r .1 .x:-
ionc with the F li .. . ty". L bou MPa were ppbi Ltid is G.h .d ©h,
Labour MPs each selected a commit tee to which he should belong* It ‘nr _ p :. t
tie .. ’ j 0 ... d y T  \ had
been "actively employed in following the international situation", and had
4 2 9pa ty exicu Lve fr i . d. x  1 H  The Conrxttees war© recast
oil urged after the 1 9 2 2 election, and they were now .attached jointly to 
- " .... . d ty and the TUG* Tom Shaw remained Chairman of the International 
Committee, hows x  g .d. d Drailsford as Vice-Chairman and I ' Wool
r» 0  *sectary f * From the following year Charlce ho hen 5 a:: her, act. a a a the 3
t t e e ’ s  c h a i r m a n ,  a n d  a s  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  A d v i s e r  t o  t h e  L  ' x  rty  .  d :  . x t g n
A f f a i r s  and I m p e r i a l  O n e  :  e n c ,  f o r  w h i c h  p u r p o s e  h e  v a  g r a n t e d  a  p r i v a t e
4 5 1r o o m  i n  t h e  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s
L i t e  P . .  o r  a n d  a  w e r e  o f t e n  p u b l i s h e d  a s  r e p o r t s ,  a n d  u n d e r l a y
p r o b  . b l y  ‘  . y o r i t y  o f  t h e  p a r t y ’ s  s t a t e m e n t s  o n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y * . A m o n g  t h e
C o m m i t t e e ' s  m o s t  n o t a b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  w a s  t h e  v e r y  h i g h  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e
L a p
e x - L i b e r a l  g r o u p  w h o  s e r v e d  u p o n  i t  .  T h e  C o m m i t t e e  i n d e e d  s e e m e d  " a l m o s t  a
4 5 5c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  U D C "  .  A m o n g  t h e  r e c r u i t s  w h o  served u p o n  i t  w e r e  t h e
;  . . - 1 1 ,  D a l t o n ,  G . L .  D i c k i n s o n ,  T r  c  v o l y a n ,  P c r n s o n b y ,  D u s  s e l l ,  H o b  .  n ,
&E1O ol
"... 3 frs ' k. If spokesmen for pa y ... £ d. s
Ltinuod fcc sstabl Ee leaders, the former Liberal-UDC group "vcry
m u c h  d o m i n a t e d  ' s h e  p o s i t i o n s  o f  s e c o n d  r a n k *1 .  J o  w h e r e  d i  L  ; h e  p r e s e n t  u . r  i
leadership show suck "i.nt  1 si very middle class views’*, commented
 _ _ _ _ 1 |  i  .1 g u  ' • ,  i n  i  i t s  ' n a t i q n a l  a f f a i r s *  L a b o u r  h a d  " n o  p o l i c y
o f  i t s  o w n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s ” ,  w h i c h  w e r e  ’ ’ a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  l o f t  i n  t h e
i s  c  * p  o f  L i b e r a l - m i  l e d  f  f c  e  1 1  e  c  t  u a l  s  ” «  " D r a w n  u p  b y  L i b e r
c a s e d  u p o n  L i b e r a l - C a p i t a l i  i d e a  " ,  c u r ' s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  w a s  a  " m i d d l e
^35c l a s s  L i b e r a l  a n d  n o t  a  w o r k i n g  c l a s s  S o c i a l i s t  p o l i c y ”  .
T h e  L i b e r a l s 1 i n f l u e n c e  u p o n  t h e  p a r t y ’ s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
w a s  s o o n  e v i d e n t .  L a b o u r  a n d  t h e  U D C  c o n d e m n e d  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  t r e a t y  i n  h a y  
1 9 1 9  i n  " e x a c t l y  »  s a n e  t e r m s ” :  t h e  h a n d  w a s  t h e  h a n d  o f  H e n d e r s o n ,  b u t  t h e
5^6v o i c e  t h a t  o f  E . D .  M o r e l  •  T h e  p e a c e  t e r m s  w e r e  c o n d e m n e d  f o r  a  v a r i e t y  o f
r e a s o n s :  o n e  s p e a k e r  a t  t h e  1920  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  o b j e c t e d  t o
t h e  u s e  o f  b l a c k  t r o o p s  t o  o c c u p y  t h e  R h i n e l a n d ,  m a n y  o f  w h o m ,  h e  b e l i e v e d ,
w e r e  " p r i m i t i v e  s a v a g e s " ,  - . / h e  w e r e  b e i n g  u s e d  f o r  t h e  " d e l i b e r a t e  p u r p o s e  o f
437h u m i l i a t i n g  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  t h e  R h i n e l a n d "  *  P a r  ; y  s p c  a e s m e n  w e r  _ — n  i c u l a r l y  
d i s i l l u s i o n e d  w i t h  P r e s i d e n t  W i l s o n ,  f o r m e r l y  a c c a l i m  b  ' i n d u s t r i o u s  l e a d e r  
of W o r l d  d e m o c r a c y " ,  w h o s o  p r i n c i p l e s . ,  t h e  M a t i o n a l  J o i n .  C o u n c i l  h a d  d e c l a r e d ,  
c o m m a n d e d  t h e i r  " w h o l e - h e a r t e d  a s s e n t " ,  a n d  h a d  l a i d  a t  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  I n t e r -  
A l l i e d  L a b o u r  a n d  S o c i a l i s t  C . j . n f o r o n c e s  ( B u x t  n  a c k n o l w  d g e d  '  ! h h ’  . .  m i u c o  
of a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h i c h  s o c i a l i s t s  a n d  L e . f e e u *  • .  a r e  f o u n d  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  h e a d  
o f  a  c a p i t a l i s t  g o v e r n m e n t " ,  I  l a c l e a n  b l u n t l y  t e r m e d  W i l s o n  a  " c o m m e r c i a l  
. a b l e r  f o r  A m e r i c a n  c a p i t a l i s m " ,  a n d  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  s o c i a l i s t s  w e r e  i n
Zty3
j a i l  i n  t h e  U . S .  ) .  T h e  t r e a t y ,  d  p  i r t y  *  s  m a n i f e s t o ,  w a s  a
" r e p u d i a t i o n  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  a n d  l e t t e r "  o f  h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n s  a n d  o f  t h o s e  o f  
Zfg 9L l o y d  G e o r g e  ,  T h e  p a r t y  b e c a m e  c o m m i t t e d  t o  t h e  U D C  t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  w a s  t o o
h a r s h  a n d  a n t i - G e r m a n  i n  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s ;  a n d  t h e  1 9 1 9  c o n f e r e n c e  d e c l a r e d  i n
f a v o u r  o f  t h e  a d m i s s i o n  o f  G e r m a n y  t o  t h e  L e a g u e  o f  N a t i o n s ,  w h i c h  b o d y
s h o u l d  u n d e r t a k e  t h e  " i m m d d i a t o  r e v i s i o n "  o f  t h e  t  e m t y ’ c  " h a r s h  p r o v i s i o n s "
4 4 0o n  g r o u n d s  a l i k e  o f  h o n o u r  a n d  e x p e d i e n c y  •
T h e  p a r t y  a d o p t e d  o t h e r  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  U D C  c a s e .  A  r e s o l u t i o n  w a s  
a d o p t e d  a t  t h e  1921  p a r t y  c o n f d r e n . e e  c o m . l i f t i n g  t h e  p a r t y  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
r f f c m ' u I & L o S a c y ,  •  -  d i  o s  0 d a t i n g  i t  f r o m  a g r e e m e n t s  a n d  c o n v e n t i o n s  w i t h  
o t h e r  s t a t e s  w h i c h  h a d  n o t  b e e n  s u b m i t t e d  t o  a n d  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  H o u s e  o f  
C o m m o n s .  I t s  p r o p o s e r  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  t h e y  " o w e d  a  g r e a t  d e a l  t o  m e n  l i k e  
M o r e l !  ( s i c )  a n d  B r a i l s f o r d ,  w h o  h a d  s h e w n  t h e m  t h a t  w h a t  t h e y  w e r e  s u f f e r i n g
t o d a y  w a s  d u e  t o  a  s r . a l l  c l i q u e  o f  p e o p l e  w h o  h a d  t h e  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  o f
44lt h i s  c o d  E u  :  w  i l l y  i h  t  L e i r  h a n d s "  •  C o - o p e r a t i o n  ; : a :
s u g g e s t e d  t h r o u g h  a  ’ L e a g u e  o f  P e o p l e s 1 i n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e . .  & £  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s t a n d a r d s  o f  l a b o u r  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  f r e e  t r a d e ,  u n i  i n  r e a c h i n g  a n  a g r e e m e n t
4 4 2f o r  t h e  " l i  „  - a t i o n  o f  a r m a m e n t s ,  w i t h  g e n e r a l  d i  h r m a a e n t  a s  t h e  g o a l "  .
. c l y a n  p u t  f o r w a r d  a n  e i g h t - p o i n t  p r o g r a m m e  f o r  p o s s i b l e  a d o p t i o n  
o u r  P a r t y  i  ; h e  s u  . .  o f  1 9 2 2 .  I f  f o l l o w e d  1  s i  p i  f .  . . . .  . a p ­
p o i n t  p r o g r a m m e  a t  t h e  1 9 2 2  I I P  c o n f e r e n c e ,  w h i c h  s h o u d l  f o r m  t h e  p r o g r a m m e  
o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  w e r o  i t  e l e c t e d  . .  ‘ f i c e  a t  t h e  n e x t  e l e c t i o n ,  a n d  t h e
f i r s t  p o i n t  o f  w h i c h  p r o v i d e d  f o r  t h e  " i m m e d i a t e  r e c o g n t i o n  o f  t h e  R u s s i a n
» 443l O v e r i  l e n t  w i t h o u t  a s k i n g  t h e  l e a v e  o f  F r q n c e "  0 T h e  m o r e  e x t e n d e d  v e r s i o n ,
l i  e d  i  o - i ■  7 . 1  t j l e  1 . w  i n  d u l y ,  s i m i l a r l y  1 s  a .  i t !
" i m  d d i  t e  f  g  f .  ' .  ■ .  t l  3 c  .  l e t  g  v e r n  f c  c  ' s s i  .  g  L a g
444o i  c r e d i t s  t o  i t "  „
i x - L i o e r a l  g r o u p ,  i n  f a c t ,  p r o v i d e d  a m o n g  t h e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  
a d v o c a t e s  o f  t h e  r  c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t *  T r e v e l y a n 1 s  g v  p b s a l
C o m  w  i  t  R e v i  w  w i t  l i  n i  @  h i c k
a  ‘ W h e l m  K i r  J . R .  M a c D o n a l d  w h e n  B o l s h e v i s m  i s  m e n t i o n e d " *  I t  w a s  i n d e e d  o n e  
o f  t h e  m o r e  i r o n i c  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  I L P  a t  t h i s  t i m e  t h a t  i t s  " m o s t  c o u r a g e o u s  
e x p o u n d e r s  o f  r e a l  i  n  t  c  r n  a t  i  o  n a l  i  s m "  t h e  " s i n c e r e  m i  d a l e - c l  . . . .  p  f t  I  1
w l  i  r e c e n t l y  l e f t  t h e  L i b e r a l  p a r t y "  •  d y n e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  w i t h  a l l  h i s  
f a u l t s ,  h a d  b e e n  " n o  h y p o c r i t e  i n  h i s  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  R u s s i a " ,  o f  w h o & e  
g o v e r n m e n t  h e  h a d  a l w a y s  b e e n  a  " s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ,  h o n e s t  a n d  c o n s i s t e n t  
o p p o n e n t " .  W e r e  i t  n o t  f o r  " o n e  o r  t w o  h o n e s t  L i b e r a l s  i n  t h e  I L P " ,  i  t  w a s  
' . . .  i ,  l i t  T r d v e l y a n ,  B u x t o n ,  P o n s o h b y  a n d  B r a i l s f o r d ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  "  l i f . f i  c u l t  
t o  c o n v i n c e  m a n y  p e o p l e  t h a t  t h e  o l d  I L P  l e a d e r s ,  l i k e  S n o w d e n  a n d  K n c D o S i a l d ,  
w e r e  n o t  m e r e  p e d l a r s  o f  t h e  a n t i - B o l s h e v i k  d o p e  t h a t  : w  a  a x  f o r n i n g
w o s f l
T h e  p o i n t  w a s  n o t  l o s t  o n  T h e o d o r e  R o t h s t e i n ,  w h o  a p p e a r s  t o  h a v e
~ vis . re I the Foreign Secretary of a post-revolutienary Britain,
447a s  h e  w a s  " b e t t e r  t h a n  a l l  t h e  S o c i a l i s t s "  *  M o r e l  w a s  i n  f a c t  p a s s e d  o v e r  
f o r  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  f i r s t  L a b o u r  c a b i n e t ,  p e r h a p s  t o  a v o i d  o f f e n d i n g  
F r e n c h  s u s c o n t i b i l i t i e s ;  b u t  t h e  B B C  a s  a  w h o l e  c o n t r i b u t e d  n o  f e w e r  t h a n
448 . . -n i n e  m i n i s t e r s  t o  f c l  :  g  t&t  t  •  T h e  d i p l o  i  : i c  r e c o g n i t i o n  o i  t h e  S o v i e t  
g o v e  n n e n t  w  s  C o  f  x .  w i t 3  t h i s  r e p r . G . - f -  '  i .  P o n s o n b y ,  w h o  w r o t e  
p e n s  x  l l y  t   h i  7o h y  t :  *T ' " h i  l ,  a  x  '  e < 3  &  r e p l y  h e  f o i l  w i n g
d a y  w h i c h  d r e w  ' ' .  . 7 .  o  f e l  " p r  i  i « n t  p h r t "  . .  E  -  i s o h b y  h  3  " p e r s  n  l l y i
p i  y  "  i n  p i  p i  3  s  t i e  '  s e t  e a t  o f  t ]  .  f  '  7
i o n " n  ' h  V  a h k «  '  P o  .Jo h y  " p e r s o n a l l y  a i  1  l a  t h e  n i  i e  o f  t h e  w o r k e r s  o f  t - i i r
. „ „ 44-9U n k o n ,  f o r  y o u r  s y m p a t h y  a  y  e f  ’  _  b s "  '  f t *  L  t  a r ’ s  c  s y
I  .  g n i t i o s  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n ' .  r t ,  © r i  d © n  t l y ,  m o o  1  h  «  '  ”  '  w i t h
s o c i a l i s m *
!  '  -  ' u |  p h  p  f . i  « c  * $ i g  i f  f  L x ®  i  - w o r l  . *  ? e i
l i o g  T .  b  u r  P a r t y  * ,  w h i c h  a p p e a r e d  s h o r t l y  h e  t h e  p  •  f c  h
-  h ' i  e .  A  f  t h  a . -  g  m r . .  ■  i t ,  h e  e o a h ,  a  . r a - 7.  3 . .  r i t s ;  w a  #  a : l i  p o  H e y
1 1 - a  L u l l y  a 1 : ' ,  i  7 .  t h e  s j f i  i t  .  s s  o f  A  -  t e a " ;  a  i  s u  I  h  e m i t
t l d  p u r s u e  a  p o l i c y  o f  t e a t  a ' .  c d ' S h i p  . "  1  .  p e x  '  i  w i t )  h e  p h  -
p l i   " . e r i c a " .  T h e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  U D C  a n d  o f  t h e  L i b e r a l  r e c r u i t o  a  .  ©  r i d e  . t
-  t  t h a t  t h  L a a g u ©  i t i  . g  . . .  "
i t s  < i t }  .  p  "  '  t l  i t  t l  g  t  w o  i f  f u p p ' Q  t  t l  . . . '  '  f  „  ;
t r  . . .  :  f  t t  i t  af. a d i  ’  r  i t s  d i p l e  . t i e  . f  _  a d  t h  t  i '  f o u l d  h  i r
450m  u n . :  ’ ’ o u r  r e s g o n s i b r l i t y  t o  G e r m a n y "  -  .
M a c D o n a l d  l e f t  n o  d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  B o l s h e v i s t  : . i e t h o a  w a s  " n o t  o u r s ” .  T h e y
•  •  i g r e  ~  p r  i  i d l y  W i l l  B o i s l i  s v i s i  t h o d s j  a n d  h e  e x p r e s s e d  .  d i s t a s t e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  B r i t i s h  L a b o u r i s m  f o r  t h e  B o l s h e v i k s *  a d h e i  .  ” 7 :  i s t r  t
3  o k  t h  o r i e s  a a . f  d o g m a s " ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  a n d  
i n v e s t  ' a .  . 7  7  r e i g n  A  L a h p u  g o v e r n m e n t - ,  . .  @2 a .  ,  w o u l d
r e c o g n i s e  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  " w i l l  o  u d e l  a y "  .  l i e  n o t e d  t h a t  w h e n  t h e  . .  . 
t o  5 ? o c o g n i s e  a  p e o p l e  c a r r i e d  w i t h  i t  a  r e f u s a l  t o  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e n ,  1 1  f l y  
-  "  - 1 1  t h e  m o r  . .  [ p e n s i v e " ,  n f .  i n  t h e  e n d  " p u n i  h  s  ' n .  s  w h o  -  i l d  i n f l i c t  
L s e m e n t  m o r e  t h a n  t h e  p e o p l e  c h a s t i s e d " .  O n e  r c a r o a  f o r  a  c h a n g e  i n  g o v e r ­
n m e n t  p o l i c y ,  t h e n ,  a n a s  t h a t  i t  w a s  " f o r e d o o m e d  t o  f a i l r .  g "  .  7  h a d  b e e n  " v e r y
d a m a g i n g  t o  o u r  i n t e r e s t s " .  O n l y  i n  A u g u s t  l $ 2 g  a  " r e  _ _ 1  1  a  o f  t r  J e d  "
( B c c o . : )  h u d  b e e n  c o m p e l l e d  t o  g o  ' t o  M o s c o w  t o  r a k e  t h e i r  . . . .  IgQ n t s .  A
L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t ,  M a c D o n a l d  p r o m i s e d ,  w o u l d  t a k e  " i r a m e d i  . t o  s t e p s "  t o  d e v e l o p
f i t !  " '  . a  - f  .  b y  7 .  a .  • 7  b e  1 . . .  i  n  w i t h  M o  z m  a „ l  b y  g  i  a .  g  r h  ’ . . .  i -
s t a n c e  w a s  l e g i t i m e . t o ,  i .  i  '  7  . .  r a n t e  .j .  T h i  ,  7 .  - ,
. , 451
• H a s t e n  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a n  a g r e e m e n t  d o : . l i n g  w i t h  c o n f i s c a t e d  p r o p e r t y  .
I n  t h e  s o c o n c l  p l  . e e ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  n e e d  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h  i t  
S u e d : - .  m i g h t  u n i t e  w i t h  G e r m a n y  t o  s u b v e r t  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  s e t t l e m e n t .  T h e  
•r i c t o r s  i n  t h e  w o r l d  w a r  h a d  f a i l e d  t o  a l e e  a  " r e a l  p e a c e ” ;  v n d  R u s s i a  w a s  t h e
p o v / e  t  l1  .  " i n  t i  p  e l  i  " ,  ' o r  l ' t  h a d  e a  .  > u  r e s e r v e s  o f  p o w e r
a n d  c  u l d  u p s e t  t r e a t i e s  n d  ;  * k i  L g  a n r  : n g  o m e n t s  t o  w h i c h  i t  h a d  n o t  a s s e n t ­
e d .  “ N o b o d y  b u t  a  m a d m a n 1 1 ,  w r o t e  M a c D o n a l d ,  c o u l d  " c o n t e m p l a t e  w i t h o u t  
h o r r o r  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  r  v e n g e f u l  G e r  . . .  e c c  .  p o w e r  a n d  h o s t i l e  R u s s i a n  
m a t e r i a l  a n d  h u m a n  r e s o u r c e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  r e s t  o f  E u r o p e ” .
i r d l y ,  n d  . 5  , d y ,  t h e  L a b o u r  p o l i c y  o f  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s
w i t h  R u s s i a  w a s  -  i t  w a s  s u g g e  t e d  -  a  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  a n t i - B o l  h e l f i k  p o l i c y  
t h a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  a n d  p r e v i o u s  g o v e r n m e n t s „  Boycott, forgery n d  f a k e  
h a d  . - m o d  n i n o - t c n t h s  o f  t h e  a n  t i  - b o l s h e v i k  p r o p a g a n d a  i n  b o t h  B r i t a i n  a n d  
A m e r i c a ;  b u t  t h i s  w a s ;  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  " v e r y  w o r s t  d e f e n c e " .  I n c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  
" f i r m  a n d  w e l l  i n g a r d e d  o p p o s i t i o n "  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  b e t w e e n  1 9 1 9  
a n d  1 9 2 2 ,  i n s p i r e d  m a i n l y  b y  B r i t i s h  L a b o u r  a n d  b y  i t s  c o l l  a g u e s  i n  G e r m  m y  
a n d  S c a n d a n i v i a ,  h a d  " b o r n e  t h e  b r u n t  o f  t h e  f i g h t  a g a i n s t  B o l s h e v i s m  i n  i t s
y o u n g  v i g o r o u s  l a y s " „  I t  w a s ,  h e  b e l i e v e d ,  " o n l y  b y  a  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  s a m e
h52p o l i c y  t h a t  t h e  n o x i o u s  w e e d  i s  t o  b e  c l e a n e d  o u t "  *
R e c o g n i t i o n  " i n  n o  w a y  m e a n t  t h a t  o u r  L a b o u r  m o v e m e n t  a g r e  1  v i ' '  
t h a t  G o v e r n m e n t " •  D i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w e r e  " i n  n o  s e n s e  a  p a r t n e r s h i p " ,  b u t  
r a t ]  " c l  i © i  h  o f f i c i a l  c o n n u n i c c i i i o n s " ,  w h i c h  w e r e  s u r e l y  a  n e c e s s i t y .
A  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t ,  '  e r , .  w o u l d  " s t a n d  n o  n o n s e n s e  a n d  n o  m o n k e y  t r i c k s
f r o m  R u s s i a n  d i p l o m a t i c  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s " ,  w h o  w o u l d  b e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  o b s e r v e  
t h e  " m o s t  s c r u p u l o u s l y  c o r r e c t  b e h a v i o u r "  *  " W c  S o c i a l i s t s " ,  h e  h a d  e a r l i e r  
w r i t t e n ,  w h e n  I n  o f f i c e  w o u l d  i n d e e d  " h a v e  s o m e  r e c k o n i n g s  t o  m a k e  w i t h  t h e  
L a n  g o v e r n m e n t " .  R e c o g n i t i o n  m e a n t  n o t h i n g  b e y o n d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  c e r t a i n
-  l m e n t  e x i s t e d ;  w h i l e  " S o c i a l i s t  c o - o p c r n t i  ”  u  . . i  .  J .  L g  L h b e d . . . .
i t ,  i m p l y i  ;  3 i d i d  a  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s h a r e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a n d  a  " c o n s i d e r a t e —
i s  a m o u n t  o f  a g r e e m e n t  i n  m e t h o d  a n d  a i m s "  *  T h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  b e e n  
r e c o g n i z e d ,  h , .  t o l d  t h e  192 b  p a r t y  c o n f e r e n c e ,  " f o r  e x a c t l y  t h e  s a n e  r e a s o n  
t h a t  C h r i s t i a n  F o r e i g n  S e c r e t a r i e s  h a v e  r e c o g n i z e d  M o h a m m e d a n s  a n d  p e o p l e
r e l i g l o u  p e r s u a M o n s  w e r e  o f  s o m e w h a t  m o r e  d o u b t f u l  l i t y  than
t h a t " 4 5 5 .
W h e n  B a l d w i n *  s  g o v e r n m e n t  m e t  P a r l i a m e n t  o n  I p  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 t - ,  T o r n  
l w  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  p o i n t e d  t o  a  " v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  o m i s s i o n "  
f r o m  t h e  K i n g f s  s p e e c h ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  R u s s i a .  R u s s i a  w a s  c a p a b l e  o f  p r o d u c i n g  
" e x a c t l y  t h e  t h i n g s  w e  n e e d  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y " ,  h e  d e c l a r e d ,  a n d  c a p a b l e  o f  t a k i n  
i n  r e t u r n  S h e  " m a c h i n e s  a n d  g o o d s  t h a t  o u r  u n e m p l o y e d  w o r k e r s  m i g h t  b e  m a k i n g ” * ,  
B e t t e r  r e l a t i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  s o u g h t  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t :  a l t h o u g h  h e
co
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A-56l i a s  t o  n o d  t o  m a k e  c l e a r  t h a t  h e  m o l d  " n o  b r i e f "  f o r  i t s  m e t h o d  o x  r u l e  *
.  I '  f  ’  1 i  1 L p l  l  r e l a t i  i  f  .  L g l  t
e n c o u r a g e ,  a r g u e d  d y n e s  i n  p r o p o s i n g  L a b o u r ’ s  v o t e  o f  c e n s u r e .  T h e i r  d i f f ­
i c u l t i e s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  e c o n o m i c  a n d  t r a d i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  w e r e  s u c h  t h a t  t h e y
-^57c o u l d  n o t  " a i d c a  .  e v e n  w i  w e  . e n e m y "  .  T h e  r e p o r t s  o f
t h  p r e v i o u s  a u t u m n ' s  t r a d i n g  d e l e g a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e d ,  H a d e n  . .  s t  s u g g e s t e d ,  
t h a t  i f  w o u l d  b o  " n o t  o n l y  p o s s i b l e  b u t  h i g h l y  d e s i r a b l e  t o  c o n c l u d e  a n  
i m m e d i a t e  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  R u s s i a " .  L a b o u r ,  h e  f e l t  s u r e ,  w o u l d  " g e t  -  a  l i n g  
d o n e "  ' d ,
B y  t h e  t i m e  t h e  n e w  g o v e r n m e n t  n e t  P a r l i a m e n t  o n  1 2  F e b r u a r y ,  s o m e t h i i
h a d -  i n d e e d  b e e n  d o n e .  T h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  b e e n  r e c o g n i s e d ,  H a c D o n s l d
t o l d  t h e .  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  " w i t h o u t  d e l a y ,  a n d  w i t h  t h e  f u l l  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e
G o v e r n m e n t " ^  A  n u m b e r  o f  q u e s t i o n s  r e m a i n e d  t o  b e  s e t t l e d  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o
g c  i r e  . .  t s ,  L n g  i e b t h ^  ,  -  ■ i h d  t r e a t !  3 .  ’  e  p r e l i m i n a r y  t o  t h e i r
s a t i s f  t  . .  L o n  w a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  d i p l o m a t i c  r e g o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t
J59
r e  '  *  *  •  R e c o g n i t i o n  w a s  n o t  t h e  l a s t  a c t  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e
S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t ,  C I y v . e s  a d d e d ,  b y t  " r e a l l y  i r s t  m a n y  t h a t  h  y e t
-i off 'O0v o  b e  t a k e n ! "  •
T h e  a n n o u n c e m e n t  w a s  g r e e t e d  w i t h  " m u c h  s a t i s f a c t i o n "  b y  A s q u i t h ,  a s  
" f i r s t  s t e p "  w h i c h  h e  w a s  " v e r y  g l a d  h a d  b e e n  e v e n  t a r d i l y  t a k e n " .  A n o  t i i e r  
L i b e r a l  s p  : ' w . s m a n ,  S t r a n g e r ,  w e l c o m e d  r e c o g n i t i o n  a s  a  " s t e j  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
o f  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  g o o d  t r a d e " .  I t  w a s  a  " v i s e  a n d  s e n s i b l e  s t e p  o n  t h e  p a r t  
o f  t h e  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y " ,  h e  t h o u g h t ,  " t o  r e c o g n i s e  R u s s i a ,
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f r o m  t h e  m e r c h a n t s ’  p o i n t  o f  v i e w " ‘  .  B a l d w i n ,  S n o w d e n  r e c a l l e d ,  w a s  o b l i g e d
L e a d e r  o f  t h e  O p p o s i t i o n  t o  d e p l o r e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n ;  b u t  
h e  w a s  " v e r y  l u k e w a r m  i n  h i s  o b j e c t i o n " .  A l l  d e s i r e d  p e a c e f u l  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
R u s s i a ,  h e  d e c l a r e d ,  a n d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t r a d e .  H i s  c r i t i c i s m  w a s  s i m p l y
J+62t i m e  h a d  n o t  y e t  c o m e  w h e n  t h i s  o b j e c t  c o u l d  b e  a c h i e v e d  •
T h e  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  d e c i s i o n  g n i  t h  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t ,
h e n ,  t l  p a r t y ’ s  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  t h e  S o v i e t  r e g i m e  g e n e r a l l y ,  h a d  l i t t l e
a b o u t  t h e n  w h i c h  c o u l d  b o  t e r m e d  p r o - S o v i e t  o r  s o c i a l i s t  i n  c h a r a c t e r .  I t  w h s ,  
i n d e e d ,  n o r . .  o f t e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t e c o g  \ t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  i  f .  ,  
w o u l d  m o r e  o f f  i v e l y  u n d e r m i n e  B o l s h e v i s m  t h a n  C o n s e r v a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t
l i c y ,  , f  L  . . .  h a   y  i . .  . .  .. 1  e d  i t .  R e c o g n i t i o n  m i g h t ,  m o r e o v e r ,
l e a d  t o  a  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  f c  * a d e  w l  i c l  w o u l d  r e l i e v e  u n e m p l o y m e n t  i n  B r i t a i n ,  o f
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: i , c u l  i  : o  : e  m  t o  b e  If c o m p o s e d  l a r g e l y  o f  t r a d e - u n i o n  m e m b e r s .  I t  w a s  
a  p o l i c y ,  m o r e o v e r ,  w b i c l  i i g l  f c  L n e s  t r a d i n g  c i r c l e s ,
i  . t e r e s t s  w e r e  .  . '  . e x p l i c i t l y  1  i p i o n e d  b y  M a c D o n a l d  a n d  o t h e r
L  b o i  - s p o k e s m e n *  I t  a c c o r d e d  c l o s e l y  w i t h ,  t h e  v i e w s  o f  t h e  c : : - L I b c r r I  g r o u p ,  
p r o  '  a  ‘  t l  f o r m a l  t i  | , a  y  p  l i c y  ’  £ i  - ;
a n d  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n  E u r o p e .  I n d e e d  i t  c o e r n e d  t o  b e  o n l y  t h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e
p a r t y ,  .  t h  * 1    3 e  f ,  . 1  f a  t l  g n i t i o h .  o f  t h e  S f e v i e t
g o v e r n m e n t  o h  I t s  o w n  m e r i t s *  r a t h e r  t h a n  a s  t h e  n e e  e s s  a  * y  1  u t  a  .  r t u  , t . t e  
p :  l i  i  ? y  t c  ih s o l u t i o n  o f  d o  s t i c  . . . .  o b i  ,  T h i s  L l l u m i n  t e d  t l  . .
I r i t i  1 L  d  " . . .  L  i ;  . a d  h e l p e d  t c  ■ u  i t  f o  *  t h  I d  : f i  ’ a t  s  I  e  t  , . r r -  
a s c a e n t s  w i  1 w h i c h  t h e  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m  f  u  I i t s e l f  c o n f r o n t e d  t  ; h e  
c . o u i a . .  :  f  t h e  . . d . .  d  ti b i t H  t h e  .  i  . .  . .  g  l e g  t e s  t  d  .  .  e i  . . .  .  d .
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1  E c o n o  : i  , t  I f  D e c e m b e r *  1 9 2 3  p l 0 4 0
2  T h e  P o l i t i c a l  D i a r i s e  o f  C . P .  S c o t t  1 9 1 1 - 1 9 2 8  ( L o n d o n  1 9 7 0 )  p p  4 4 9 ,  2 7
D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 5 j  a n d  p  2 3 2
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5  q u o t e d  i n  : s t e r ,  L .  e t . a l . i  T h e  Z i n o v i e v  L e t t e r  ( L o n d o n  1367 )  p l 8
6  T h e  P a t r i o t  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 4  p p 3 4 l , 3 4 9
7  Snowden: Autobiography ii 607-3
£ Scanlon, J .  : T h e  D e c l i n e  a 1  i d  F a l l  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  ( L o n d o n  n . d . ( 1 9 5 2 ) )
p 6 2 ;  C h e s t e r  e t . a l . :  T h e  Z i n o v i e v  L e t t e r  p i 7
9 quoted in Parli::anontany P0babes Vol lo9 'col 425, 16 January 1924
10  11_ y  ' 7 1  - ,  q ,  q  F o r w  1
1 1  h c o  L e  a d  e r  _  u e  b e r  1 9 2 3  j  c t e d  b y  a  3 1 2  J  m u  r y  1 9 2 4 ,  w h i c h
c o m m e n t e d  e d i t o r i a l l y  t h a t  i f  t h e  a d v e n t  o f  a  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  d i d  n o t
1  4-trcause a panic among armament manufacturers, slum landlords and royal;
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Conclusion
The Labour government differed from its predecessor in regarding 
diplomatic recognition as preliminary to the attempt to reach an 
agreement with the Soviet government, rather than as a step to be 
taken only after the settlement of outstanding differences. These 
remained considerable: indeed, as the negotiations extended into 
the summer, they appeared At times insurmountable. The agreement 
which was eventually concluded on 6 August failed to secure Liberal 
support, and would not have been accepted by the House of Commons 
even had the Labour government survived to urge its endorsement. Yet 
formidable as the obstacles to an agreement remained, the government's 
lack of political will to remove them was hardly less striking. Its 
attitude, indeed, was, by design, one of uncompromising firmness 
throughout. Only the intervention of a number of Labour and Liberal 
backbenchers, when the negotiations appeared irreparably to have 
broken down, allowed an agreement to be made at all. That a 'communist 
scare' should have contributed to the government's downfall was 
indeed ironic.
The de .jure recognition of the Soviet government, E.F. Wise 
wrote in the Socialist Review, was only a "first step", and "much 
more" remained to be done. At least three questions would need to be 
considered by the Anglo-Russian Conference. In the first place, a 
considerable number of political questions awaited discussion - none 
of outstanding importance - which had accumulated in past years, such 
as the validity of existing treaties between the two countries^, 
territorial waters and so on. In the second place were matters arising 
from the war, the revolution and the peace treaties, such as the 
Russian war debts, the Russian counter-claims, and the Russian attitude 
to the League of Nations. Russian debts to the British government 
amounted, according to the Board of Trade, to some £656 million • The 
restoration of diplomatic property (even, it appeared, the silver 
plate from the British Embassy in Petrograd^) came into this category, 
and would be included on the agenda of the Conference.
The most intractable problem, however, was that of private 
claims. The failure to achieve a settlement on this point, Wise
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considered, would significantly inhibit the further development of 
trade, and would make the raising of loans in the City of London
L
or elsewhere f,if not absolutely impossible, •• extremely difficult'1 •
The general principle of responsibility for the claims of
British nationals, Ponsohby told the House of Commons, the government
considered to have been established with the signature of the Trade 
5
Agreement • Claims had been registered with the Russian Claims Depart­
ment of the Board of Trade for death, personal injury and imprisonment 
in Russia on behalf of 2^9 persons^. This was only a small proportion, 
however, of all private claims. A British claims register was opened 
in 1918. The original notice, made public on 5 September 1918, brought
in about 20,000 claims, and a further notice on 1 June 1922 increased
7
this figure appreciably • Claims were examined when received to ascertain 
whether the claimant was a British subject, and whether, as presented, 
a prima facie claim against the Russian government appeared to exist.
They were not investigated, however, to determine whether the amount
g
of the claim had been correctly determined •
Taken at their face value, however, claims against the 
Russian government in respect of pre-war bonds issued under its 
guarantee (State Loans and Guaranteed Bailway Loans) amounted to over 
£25 million in sterling, and to further millions in roubles and other 
currencies, taking capital amounts, but not interest, into account.
Claims registered with the Russian Claims Department expressed in 
sterling amounted to £56 million in bonds, in addition to £23 million 
in respect of claims for the restitution of industrial and commercial 
property. The value of property whose restoration was being claimed was
Q
estimated by the claimants to amount to £180 million *
These were considerable sums fcn respect of claimants who, 
although not very numerous, had many influential connections in financial 
and Conservative circles; and the government treated them from the 
outset with great deference. No representatives of "private bodies", 
Ponsonby told the House of Commons, would take part in the negotiations, 
but he would be "glad to give careful consideration to any expression 
of views on the part of such bodies which they may be good enough to 
offer in the meantime". Sidney Vebb added that he was in touch with the
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representatives of firms and companies which had formerly been operating 
in Russia, and that any views which they put forward would "certainly 
be considered" •
MacDonald told the House of Commons that he was in "close 
touch with persons having claims against the Soviet Government". He 
saw no reason, however, to investigate further the question of the 
British role in Allied intervention in Russia and the consequent 
damage caused in Russia^. Other interests impressed their views upon 
him: the Association of British Creditors of Russia and the Federation 
of British Industries, which urged the importance of the Russian recog­
nition of existing debts with interest, and sought representation at the 
12Conference • A still more weightly document, the Bankers' Memorandum, 
was issued as the negotiations opened on l*f April. It called for the 
recognition of state and private (iebts, the restoration of the private 
property of foreigners, the introduction of a 'normal* civil code, 
guarantees against confiscation and the freedom to make business arrange­
ment* directly with Soviet enterprises rather than under governmental
13auspices •
Rakovsky described the memorandum as an attempt to secure 
the rupture of the negotiations, and as an interference in the "very
l*f
bases of the Soviet socialist state" • MacDonald's speech at the opening
15of the Conference was, nevertheless, regarded in Moscow as "expressing 
in a modified form the same demands as the bankers' memorandum". The 
memorandum was considered unrepresentative in its demadds of the British 
people as a whole, and even of British capitalism as a whole1^. By the 
end of May, nonetheless, the Conference appeared to have reached a 
stalemate.
Rakovsky, writing to Ponsonby (who, in MacDonald's habitual 
absence, effectively headed the British delegation) on 31 May, expressed 
his dismay when the latest British offer reached him. No Soviet 
proposal had, he considered, been accepted; while the British position 
largely recapitulated that of the Allies at Genoa and the Hague, which 
even at that time had not been acceptable to the Soviet delegates. The 
whole amount of pre-war debts was sought; the bondholders' claims were 
to be satisfied up to February 192*f, not just until 1917? and there was 
no reference to a loan, but only to the possibility of a moratorium.
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On private property, the full value of all calims was demanded, with
damages, and cases in dhspute were to be referred to arbitration,
thus removing them from the scope of Soviet legislation* The Russian
delegates could not return with obligations alone, he insisted* The
British position reflected less the merits of the case than "political
17pressure" from City banks and figures holding Russian securities • 
Ponsonby, in a note he made of a conversation with Rakovsky at this 
point, recorddd that he was at first "inclined to reject almost without 
discussion the articles we had sent him"* The question of a loan must 
be re-considered, and property calims must depend upon its successful 
resolution* The Conference, Ponsonby observed, was in an "uncertain 
state"^*
The negotiations were suspended at this point to allow the
Russian delegation to confer directly with the representatives of
claimants and bondholders and with the City* Speaking in the House
of Commons on 5 June, Ponsonby reported that it was "impossible"
for him to indicate a date by which the work of the Conference was
19likely to be concluded • It was difficult for anyone who had closely
followed recent developments, wrote W*P. Coates, to "feel very hopeful
at the moment"* Brailsford described the atmosphere as "hopeful", but
condeeded that the difficulties in the way of a settlement remained
"formidable"* The negotiations, thought the Economist, were "doomed to 
20be abortive" •
The Cabinet considered the state of the negotiations at the 
end of July. Ponsonby, in a note dated 18 July, urged that the govern­
ment should guarantee a loan of perhaps £30 millions to Soviet Russia 
"in order to avoid an inevitable breakdown of the negotiations and the 
serious political consequences involved therein". Apart from drafting 
changes and one or two claumes of the treaty, he wrote, "substantial 
agreement" was in sight. Rakovsky*s acceptance of the treaty had, 
however, been throughout dependent upon the raising of a loan* There 
was no doubt that a loan, without a government guarantee, would not be 
forthcoming in the City, or that without a loan the Soviet delegation 
would not conclude an agreement, and the negotiations would thus break 
down* This would have "serious political consequences": the chance of 
a general recovery in Europe would be lost, Russia might become the
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”focus of dangerous activities in Eastern Europe”, the failure would
be ftresented very bitterly by the Party, not only in the House of
Commons but in the country”, and a chance of obtaining work for the
unemployed would have been lost. The guarantee by the government of a
loan of perhaps £30 million could, he thought, be justified in Parliament
and in the country. The Soviet delegation would be prepared to commit
itself to spending not less than two-thirds of the money raised in
Britain. Neither Conservative nor Liberal official opposition, he
understood, was to be expected; and the Soviet delegation would in
21return concede the outstanding points of difference • Legislation
to provide for the guarantee of a loan would be introduced when the
Soviet authorities had reached agreement with private claimants, and
22this settlement had been embodied in a subsequent treaty •
Snowden circulated a memorandum objecting to the proposal to
23guarantee a loan on financial grounds ; and discussion in the Cabinet
centred mainly upon this point, and upon those articles which related
to the calims of bondholders and property owners. It was made clear
fchat the guarantee of a loan to the Soviet government would not be
forthcoming unless and until an agreement had been reached in reagrd
to the settlement of claims and compensation. By a majority vote, the
ZkCabinet approved the proposal •
On 5 August, however, the Cabinet was informed that the
negotiations had broken down on the question of compensation for
23nationalized property • The difficulty was swiftly resolved when - 
as Ponsonby put it - "certain members of Parliament•• offered their
26services as intermediaries”, and a suitable form of words was found •
The following day, 6 August, the House of Commons was informed that an 
agreement had been reached.
Tb9| treaties, a commercial and a general treaty, had been
27signed • The former, Ponsonby explained to the House of Commons, 
followed thd ”usual lines of commercial treaties”. 1Host-favoured-nation' 
treatment was reciprocally extended to goods and coastal trade. The 
extension to a small number of members of the Russian Trade Delegation 
of diplomatic immunity for themselves and for their existing omffice 
was admittedly a ”new departure” which might provoke discussion, but it 
appeared justified, and had already been conceded by the Qerman and
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Italian governments in similar agreements. The general treaty reviewed
existing treaties between the two countries, and provided for an
agreement on fisheries. Debts and claims, naturally the main focus of
attention, could be divided into the claims of the bondholders,
miscellaneous claims, amd property claims. There had been some difficulty
in finding a body to represent all the bondholders. The treaty contained
an admission of liability from the Soviet government, together with an
assurance that negotiations with the bondholders would subsequently
take place. Miscellaneous claims would be investigated and a lump
sum agreed upon in payment. Property claims, in respect of which the
,(greatest difficulty” had been experienced, would be investigated by a
joint committee which would resolve the question of compensation.
The principle had been ”not to attempt to reach a settlement in
figures on these classes of claims but, rather, to get a decision in
principle and to get machinery set up with a view to reaching the
necessary settlement”. When agreement had been reached in sill these
categories, the decisions arrived at would be embodied in a subsequent
treaty, and the government would ask Parliament to guarsintee a loan to
the Soviet government, the amount and conditions of which could then be
decided. Governmental debts and the Russian calim for daunages from
intervention were to be set asidd for the time being. A clause on
propaganda had, however, been aigreed upon which was ”even more severe”
28than that embodied in the Trade Agreement •
The agreement found little favour in the House of Commons. McNeill
thought the possible guarantee of a loan to the Soviet government the
”most complete violation” of a Parliamentary pledge by MacDonadd. He
expressed ”very great disappointment” that the result was so ”indidious,
and that it (was) so vague amd uncertain in its manner and procedure”.
The circumstances in which the treaty had been signed argued ”pamic”;
while thd agreement as a whole was an ”utter farce”, amd the proposail
of a loam was a ”scandal”. On British debts, Lloyd George added, the
agreement was ”a fadce. It is a contract in which the space for every
29essential figure is left blank” •
The treaties which, MacDonald indicated, would be submitted 
to the House of Commons for amendment, acceptance or rejection, appeared
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most unlikely to survive, at least in the form in which they had been
submitted, when Parliament was dissolved following the defeat of the
government ever the 'Campbell case1, in which a prosecution had heen
withdrawn against J.R. Campbell, the editor of the Workers* Weekly*,
for allegedly seditious articles on *The Army and Industrial Disputes'
which had appeared in that journal^*
Even allowing for electoral preoccupations, the treaties were
badly received by most of the press and large sections of the public.
The treaties were attacked by the Daily News, by Lloyd George, and by
the Liberal Publications Department in a pamphlet entitled 'A Sham
Treaty', although the Manchester Guardian thought that it was not clear
that the agreement was opposed by the Liberal MPs as a whole^*. The
Economist declared against a "hasty and ill-considered agreement",
concluded as a result of "backstairs diplomacy", and expressed the opinion
that the House of Commons would not sanction a loan which would enable
Russia to avoid abandoning socialism. There was "no real understanding
or agreement, no single concrete fact on which the two Governments
32(could) honestly claim to be at one" • The treaties were a 'face-saving'
arrangement, the Revidw of Reviews considered, whose "worst feature"
was that they had been "concluded under secret pressure"^. The National
Revldw thought that there was "small prospect of 'the Great Russian Fake*
------ 3 if
being swallowed, even by the present House of Commons" •
Labour spokesmen argued in reply that 'the Russian Loan means
British Vork*^. An article in the Socialist Review reported the reply
of Jean Berzin, the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, to an inquiry from
the I.L.P. as to the orders which the Soviet authorities might place in
Britain were the agreement concluded. Major orders in shipbuilding,
36engineering, agricultural machinery and electrical goods were forecast •
Marshall, the chairman of Becos Traders, argued for the "strongest
possible economic links between the two countries" in the New Leader.
Merchants disliked the Soviet foreign trade monopoly, but he thought it
would not survive the increase of trade. "As a merchant and manufacturer"
he supported the treaty, and believed that it would help to reduce
37unemployment i n industry and transport •
Labour candidates on thv whole, the Economist noted, did not 
make the Russian agreement "as important a plank in their platform as
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might have been expected11 • The treaties, however, and especially the
manner of their conclusion, provided the essential background for the
publication of the Zinoviev letter, which purported to indicate, among
other things, that the Communist Party in Britain was actively forming
39cells within the armed forces • MacDonald's hesixtaacy in denouncing 
whqt was generally regarded asp. clumsy forgery suggested that the 
letter should be taken more seriously than at first appeared appropriate. 
This impression was strengthened was the despatch of a sharp reprimand 
from the Foreign Office - whose role in the affair is unclear in detail 
but appears at the very least to have been indiscreet - to Rakovsky for
l±Q
this apparent "interference in the internal affairs of Great Britain" • 
The publication was widely regarded in Labour circles as 
having been a decisive factor in the party's electoral defeat. If this 
had indeed been the case, it was more as a result of having increased 
the Conservative vote, Snowden thought, than of having increased Labour 
defections* Labour in fact lost relatively few seats, and less than 
3# of its share of the total poll, while the Liberals were the real 
losers with a dramatic reduction in the number of their Parliamentary
2j_l
representatives from 15$ to *f0
There were, besides, more straightforward reasons for 
Labour's loss of seats. The government, Kirkwood recalled, "accomplished
kznothing and had challenged nothing" • This estimate overlooks, notably, 
the Housing Act, which was the achievement of Wheatley, the Cabinet's 
lone radical. Yet there was little in the government's record to support 
the charge - which Labour's opponents hoped the Xinoviev letter would 
confirm - that Labour was prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice imperial 
and capitalist interests to radical and working-class demands. The 
contrary might have been a closer approximation. The government's foreign 
and imperial policies have been considered above, and there was 
certainly little about them that "could be termed specifically 
'socialist' ..or that marked a sharp break with the policy of the 
Conservative government which preceded it"1*5. MacDonald, indeed, 
was a professed advocate of 'continuity' in the country's foreign
-.4 V*policy •
In domestic policy, the Cabinet dealt firmly with 
threatened strikes, deciding to call upon naval rating if required to
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manage power stations , and refusing to reinstate the policemen who
had taken strike action in 1919» despite the decision to this effect
k6by the party*s conference in 1922 • It was considered "inexpedient
for the government to commit themselves at the present stage definitely
k7to the policy of nationalisation" of the coal industry •
Regarding the unions generally it was decided to deal "with 
accredited representatives of the Unions as a whole, rather than with
kSShop Stewards" • Communists, it was thought, might be at the bottom
of many of the threatened or existing industrial disputes, (a view
4-9which even the Economist found improbably ); and a Cabinet Committee
was appointed to examine the question^. The converse of this policy
was the proposal to establish an Inquiry into Industry and Trade, under
the chairmanship of a business magnate with a membership drawn from
banking, shipbuilding, engineering and merchant interests as well as
from the trade unions, charged with an examination of "methods of
industrial remuneration, the main causes of unrest and disputes, and
51the methods of avoidance or settlement of disputes" • Henderson,
according to Sidney Vebb, had declared that the epidemic of labour
revolts reminded him of "what was happening in Russia in 1917 against
the Kerensky Government. Those little bands of wrecking Communists are
52undoubtedly at wor^" •
The more he heard the Prime Minister speak and the more he read of 
what he said, Lansbury wrote in a letter to Morel, "the more confused 
and stupid to me he appears". He was compelled to conclude that neither 
Gregory or Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office might be responsible for 
the Zinoviev letter affair, but MacDonald himself. He could "not explain 
the business in any other way". It appeared to him that MacDonald 
wished the "British public to think that he was a strong man putting 
down Communism"^. Viewed beside the government’s record, it may appear 
improbable that confusion could be thought to exist between Labour policy 
and Communism. Considered together with Beatrice Vebb's observations, 
however, it can be seen as part, at least, of an adequate explanation 
of MacDonald's behaviour, and of Labourism as a whole. MacDonald, she 
recorded, was "playing-up - without any kind of consultation with the 
majority of hie colleagues or scruple or squeamishness about first
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pronouncements -  towards the formation of a Centre Party -  far less 
defin ite ly  Socialist in home a ffa irs , har less d is tinctly  pacifist in  
foreign a f fa irs .• MacDonald wants eight m illion votes behind him and 
means to get them even i f  this entails shedding the I.L P ., the id e a lis t­
ic a lly  revolutionary section who pushed him into power"• His aim was
to form a "revised version of reformist Conservatism embodied in the
5*fLabour Party machine" • I f  challenged, she thought, he would "drop
the I.L .P . and rely on the ordinary citizen who seeks an alternative
to a Conservative Government, just a shade more hardxworking, publicspir-
ited and progressive, and professing a more philanthropic and democratic
55creed than the old Liberal Party" •
This, certainly, would have been an adequate description
of the f ir s t  Labour government. Nor was i t  by any means clear that such
a course would have caused widespread disaffection within the Party, or
altered, other than superfic ia lly , the nature of Labourism. Four
generations of industrial capitalism, commented a writer in the Communist,
had bred a class "so pathetically loyal to existing institutions that
almost any crime is  regarded with less abhorrence than attacks upon the
framework of society. Every thinking cap ita lis t is  amazdd at this stolid
Conservatism, however much he secretly rejoices. I t  is  worth battalions
of riflemen and parks of a r t il le ry  to a governing class otherwise very
shaky about i ts  future proppects". The Labour Party was the "character-
56is tic  p o litic a l expression of such a phase of workingclass thought" •
I t  was a judgement which recalled that of Engels many
years previously. Writing to Marx on 7 October 1858, he commented that
the English pro letariat was "becoming more and more bourgeois, so that
this most bourgeois of a l l  nations is  apparently aiming ultimately at
the possession of a bourgeois* aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat
alongside the bourgeoisie". This, for a "nation which exploits the
whole world", was "to a certain extent ju s tifia b le " . On colonial policy,
he told Kautsky on 12 September 1882, the English workers thought
"exactly the same as they think about po litics  in general: the same as
57the bourgeois think" • The examination of Labour attitutdes and policy 
towards Soviet Russia which has been presented above tends, while not 
denying a certain amorphous sympathy and instances of passionate support
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for the new regime, on the whole to confirm this analysis.
I t  is  supported, also, by the fate of the Labour govern­
ment's Russian settlement at the hands of its  Conservative successor.
The new government decided that before considering relations with the 
Soviet government, the authenticity of the Zinoviev le tte r  should f irs t  
be investigated. A committee was accordingly established under the 
chairmanship of Austen Chamberlain, the new Foreign Secretary. A week
la te r the committee unanimously pronounced the le tte r  genuine, and the
58Cabinet endorsed its  conclusion • A note to Rakovsky was approved at
a meeting the following day, which informed the Soviet government that
59the ra tific a tio n  of the treaties would not be recommended •
The diplomatic recognition of the Soviet governmenty 
however, was not revoked. Churchill urged this course of action in a
60le t te r  to Baldwin a fte r the new government had been formed • The
traditional representatives of Conservatism, moreover, had rarely
favoured dealings of any sort, s t i l l  less diplomatic decognition, of
the Soviet regime. These were variously defined as "very in flu en tia l
circles, mainly (composed of) landowners and the aristocracy", and as
the "outspoken m ilita r is t elements and., certain powerful families of
the aristocracy, who have regarded the Var Office, the Admiralty and
the India Office for years past as the ir special preserve", together
6lwith "powerful interests in the Cityt,r . Curzon, in  particular, for a l l  
his o ff ic ia l l i f e ,  llewbold commented, had been "representative of those 
interests which looked away from the Dominions and the Democracy of the
62U.S. to the autocratic Empire in  India" •
These "reactionaries of an older period, guarding the 
property of the landed proprietors and the credit manipulators -  
expressing the point of view of the Court and the Services", were held 
to be the "strongest section of the cap ita lis t class" early in 1922 •
Such "Conservative, mainly agrarian circles", in the view of the deputy 
Soviet trade representative in London, had played the leading part in  
the threatened rupture of relations in May 1923* Their action had, 
however, compelled " lib era l circles of the industrial bourgeoisie" to 
defend commercial relations with Soviet Russia, from which they stood 
(often considerably) to gainf^
Early in 1923, in Kenworthy's estimate, the former group
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had exercised the dominant influence within the Cabinet. Bonar Law,
however, he believed to favour the diplomatic recognition of Soviet
Russia, since he was 11 too practical a man, and understood the advantages
65for England of such recognition” • Tha secession of Baldwin to the 
Premiership, and la te r of Austen Chamberlain to the Foreign Secretary­
ship, reversed the ea rlie r position. The Cabinet was not prepared -  
any more than its  Labour predecessor had been -  to overlook a vigorous 
propaganda offensive under Soviet auspices in the colonies or, for 
that matter, within B rita in  i ts e lf .  Unless such a campaign supervened, 
however, the increasing and by no means negligible benefits of commer­
c ia l relations with Soviet Russia were lik e ly  to outweigh the party's 
trad itional distaste for that country's (or any other8s) socialist 
form of government. However temporary i t  might prove to be, the complex 
dialectic of class, party and foreign policy had reached a new 
equilibrium.
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A Note on Sources
The sources consulted in the preparation of this study are set out 
below. A number of standard works and works which proved to be of 
no relevance are omitted from the list of secondary authorities, 
but the bibliography is otherwise complete. Not all sources have 
been of equal value. A number of collections of private papers are 
disappointingly meagre (Lansbury’s, admittedly, were raided by the 
police) and other archives which promised much, that of the Fabian 
Society for example, provided little of value. A particular effort, 
however, has been made to locate and examine local labour records, 
in the belief that a more accurate and revealing picture of labour 
politics in the period might be obtained from them than from national 
and Parliament-centred sources. These records are often incomplete, 
and sometimes virtually illegible when handwritten, but they provided 
a valuable perspective, many useful facts, and much entertainment. 
The study of the contemporary pamphlet and ephemeral literature had 
a similar value. Soviet monographs proved uneven in quality, and 
(until recently) almost invariably schematic; more recent studies, 
howevef, refer more frequently to otherwise inaccessible archive 
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Sheffield Trades and Labour Council, Sheffield:
Executive Committee minutes (1917-21)
Delegate meeting minutes (1916-20)
Sheffield Public Library:
I.L.P.: Attercliffe branch: executive committee minutes
Trades Union Congress Library, ^ondon:
Parliamentary Committee minutes (1917-22; on microfilm) 
Governmental records:
Public Record Office:
Home Office: class H.O. *f5 
Metropolitan Police: class MEPO 2
Foreign Office: General Political Correspondence: F.O. 371
^ , minutes (1917-192*0 n 
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Sheffield Federal Council minutes (1917-2*0
: Confidential Prints 
: 'Green* (Secret) Papers
Cabinet Office: Cabinet Minutes (CAB 23)
: Cabinet Papers (CAB 2*f)
: Genoa (International Economic) 
Conference (CAB 31)
: Committees: General Series (CAB 27): 
Eastern, Industrial Unrest,Indian Reforms,Strike, 
and Supply and Transport Committees
: Imperial Conferences (CAB 32)
India Office:Political and Secret Department 
Prime Minister*s Office: Papers (PREM 1)
Published sources:
km Collections of documents (official and other):
Documents on British Foreign Policy: First Series:
Volumes 1,2,3,8,11,12,15 (London 19^7-)
Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR (Moscow 1957-) Vols 1-7 
Dokumenty i Materialy po Istorii Sovetsko-Pol’skykh 
Otnoshenii Vols i-iv (Moscow 1963-66)
Sovetsko-Afganskye Otnosheniya 1919-69 (Moscow 1970) 
Sovetsko-Germansk^tnosheniya, Vols i-ii (Moscow 1968-) 
Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti Vol i-v (Moscow 1957-)
KPSS ▼ rezolyutsiakh i resheniyakh S**ezdov, Konferentsii 
i Plenumov TsK Vol ii (8th ed., Moscow 1970)
Degras,Jane (ed.): Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 
Vol i (London 1951)
: The Communist International: Documents 
Vols i-ii (London 1956)
Eudin,X.X. and North R.C.: Soviet Russia and the East 
1920-7 (Stanford Calif. 1957)
Eudin X.I. and Fisher H.H.: Soviet Russia and the West:
1920-7 (Stanford Calif. 1957)
Bunyan,J. and Fisher H.H.: The Bolshevik Revolution 
1917-18 (Stanford Calif. 193*^
: Intervention, Civil War and 
Communism in Russia (Baltimore 1996)
Gankin, O.H. and Fisher,H.H.: The Bolsheviks and the 
World War (Stanford Calif. 19*K»
Keith, A.B. (ed).: Speeches and Documents on British 
Colonial Policy 1763-1917 (London 1918; 1953 ed.)
: Speeches and Documents on the 
British Dominions 1918-1931 (London 1932)
Kun, Bela (ed.): Kommunistichesky Internatsional v 
dokumentakh (Moscow 1933)
Markin,N. (ed.): Sbornik Sekretnykh Dokumentov iz 
Arkhiva Byshego Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del 
5 volumes (NKID, Petrograd 1917-18)
Klyuchnikov,Tu.V. and Sabanin,A. (ed.): Mezhdunarodnaya 
Politika noveishego vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh i 
deklaratsiakh (3 volumes, Moscow 1925-8)
Philips,C.H. (ed.): The Evolution of India and Pakistan
1858 to 1947: select documents (London 1962) ;
Tivel*, A. and Kheimo,M. (ed.): Desiat* Let Kominterna v
resheniyakh i tsifrakh (Moscow-Leningrad 1929) *
Reports and documents of organizations:
Anti-Socialist Union of Great Britain: Do you know your
case? (London 192?) (BLPES) 1
: Pamphlets and Leaflets (London 1921-)(BM) 
Arcos Banking Corporation, Ltd.: Balance Sheet December 
1923-^ (London 192*0 (BLPES)
Association if Chambers of Commerce: Report of the
Executive Council 1919-21, 192*f/5 (London 1920-5) (BLPES) 
Birmingham Chamber of Commerce reports and bulletins 
Birmingham Trades Council Report 1917-1923/**- 
British Empire Union: Labour Series No3: Revolution Indust­
rial and Political Viewed from both sides (L. 1919)(BLPES) 
Becos Traders Ltd.: Report on the Visit to Russia of the 
Becos Mission (London 1923)(BLPES)
Amalgamated Society of Engineers: Annual Report 1917-19 (BLPES) 
Conservative Party: National Union of Conservative and 
Unionist Associations Annual Conference Reports 1917-2** 
(microfilm, Mitchell Library, Blasgow)
National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations: The 
Poison which is being scattered over the Country (L.1921?)(LSE) 
Council of Action: Special Conference on Labour and the Russo- 
Polish War (London 1920)(BLPES)
: Declaration of the Russian Soviet Government 
on Polish Independence (London 1920)(BLPES: includes agenda 
of Special Conference and draft resolutions)
: Russia and Poland (10 August 1920)(T.U.C.)
: Peace with Soviet Russia (17 August 1920)(T.U.C.)
: Form Your Councils of Action I (n.d.)(Labour Pty)
: Report to the Local Councils of Action, Execut­
ives oi Trade Unions etc. No 1 (26 August 1920); No 2 (10 
September 1920); No 3 (1 October 1920)
Communist International: Pervy Kongress (2 ed. Moscow 1933)
Vtoroi Kongress (2 ed. Moscow 193**-)
Trety Kongress (Petrograd 1922)
Fourth Congress of the Communist 
International: Abridged Report (London CPGB 1923)
: Izbrannye Doklady,Rechi i Rezolyutsii
(Moscow 1923)
Pyaty Kongress (2 parts, Moscow 1925)
Veme Congresse de l 1Internationale 
Communists: compte rendu analytique (Paris 192*0 (ISEES)
: Executive Committee: Russia's Appeal to 
British Workers (foreword John Maclean, Mo scow 1920)
: Capitalist England - 
Socialist Russia: to British Soldiers (Mos.?1919)(BM)
: Say, What are You?
(Moscow 1919)(BM)
(other appeals to British and Allied forces in Russia are: )
Workers, Peasants and Soldiers of Soviet Russia: (Appeal 
to) British and American Working Men (Moscow 19l8)(F037l)
A Communist: The Work of the Soviets and the Unconfess- 
-able War (Petrograd July 1918) (BLPES)
Why have you come to Murmansk? (n.d.)(BLPES)
: Pervy S'*ezd Narodov Vostoka (Petrograd 1920)
Economic Leagues Notes for Speakers (London 192*t-) (BLPES)
Federation of British Industries: Annual Report (1918/9*121/2,»22/3)
: Report of the Committee on Cmmraercial Efficiency (19&8)
: What it is, and What it Does (London 1922)
: The Control of Industry: Nationalisation and
Kindred Problems (London July 1919)(all BLPES)
Glasgow Trades Council: Annual Report (1916/7-19 2*f/5)
Handbook for Anti-Socialists (London 1921?)(BLPES)
Indepdndtnt Labour Party: Annual Conference Report (1917-192*0
: The ILP and the Third International (London 1920)(Mitchell)
: The Russian Loan means British Work (L* 192*0
: Support the Russian Treaties (London 192*0
: Information Department: Six Months of Labour Government
(L * 2*f): Labour Governments Loans to Russia (London 192*f?)
: Left Wing Group: Moscow's Reply to the ILP (Glasgow 1920)
: Policy Committee: Report on the Party's Programme (L.1920)
: International £nd Peace: Call for Action (London 1918)
: Note by the ILP on the Labour Party War Aims Manifesto(L'17 
: Pamphlets: Communist International (London 1920)(BLPES) j
. : Glasgow Federation: Annual Report (1917-8 - 1923-**-)
(bound in Minutes of bimonthly meetings above)
: National Administrative Council: Britain and Russia: )
Give Work to our People and Peace to the World (L.1923) 
International Conference on Labour and Religion (London 1919)(LSE)
: Labour and Industrial Peace (intr. ShawT)
: The Religion in the Labour Movement L*'19) 
Industrial League: Pamphlets (1917-)((BM)
: Facts for Workers (London 1921-)(BM)
: The Industrial League (L.1918)
: Objects (speeches; London 1917)
: The Industrial League and Council (L.1919?)
: Address on 'A National Scheme of Profit 
Sharing' by H*W. Jordan (London 1920)
: Whitley Councils: What they are and What they 
sure Doing: by J*H* Whitley (psimphlet No 6, L. April 1920)(allLSE) 
Industrial Peace Union of the British Empire: J.Havelock Wilson's 
Appeal on behalf of** (London 192?)(BLPES)
India, Government of: Indian Politics 1921-2 (Calcutta 1922)
: India in 1923-*!-* statement prepared by 
L.F. Rushbrook Williams (Calcutta 192*1-) (both BLPES)
Labour Party: Annual Conference Report (191**—1925)
: Report of the British Labour Delegation to Russia,
1920 (London 1920);
: Report of the British Labour Delegation to Russia,
192*f (London 1925)
: Labour and the National 'Economy1 (London 1922)(BM)
: Labour and the European Situation (London 1923)
: Labour and the New Social Order (London 1918)
: Memorandum on War Aims (London 1917)
: Notes on the Parliamentary Session 1921(London 1921)
: Results of the Lausanne Conference (L.,TS, 1923)
1> Labour Problems after the War (London 1917)
: Labour and the Nation (London 1917)(Mitchell)
: Appeal to the British Nation (London 1920) I
: Labour and the Unemployment Crisis (London 1921)
: The Coalition on Trial (London ?1922)
: Labour's Russian Policy: Peace with Soviet Russia(L'20) 
: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Present 
Conditions in Ireland (London 1920)
: Report of the Labour Commission to Ireland (L.'21)
: Control of Foreign Policy (London 1921)
: Memorandum on themployment and the international 
situation, reparations and Russia (London 1921)(TUC)
: Unemployment: a Labour Policy (London 1921)
: Unemployment, Peace and the Indemnity (London 1921) 
Labour Research Department: Annual Report 1917- (BLPES file)
: Federation of British Industries (London 1923)
: Labour and Capital in Parliament (London 1923)
Liberal Party: A Sham Treaty (London 192*0
Liberty League: The Liberty Crusade (London 1920) Nos 1,2 (BM) 
Liberty and Property Defence League: Annual Report 1917-20 (BLPES) 
Liverpool Trades Council and Labour Party: 1st Annual Report
1921-2 (contained in minutes, Liberpool P.L. TRA 11/1)
London Chamber of Commerce: Annual Report 1917-2** (BLPES)
London Trades Council: Annual Report 1918,1919*1923 (BLPES) 
Manchester and Salford Trades Council: Annual Report 1917-22(MPL) 
Narodny Komissariat po Inostrannym Delam (NKID):
Godovoi Otchet k VIII S''ezdu Sovetov 1919-20 gg (uoscow 1921) 
Godovoi Otchet k IX S''ezdji Sovetov 1920-21 gg (Moscow 1922) 
Godovoi Otchet za 1923 g. k II S''ezdu Sovetov (Moscow 192**) 
Godovoi Otchet NKID Sed'momy S''ezdy Sovetov (Nov 18-Becl9)(M'19!
Mezhdunarodnaya Politika v 1922 g*: Otchet NKID (Moscow 1923) 
Sinyaya Kniga, ed K.M. Troyanovsky (Moscow 1918)
Sovetskaya Rossiya inPol'sha (Moscow 1921)
Livre Rouge: receuil de documents diplomatiques relatifs
aux relations entre la Russia et la Pologne 1918-20 (M*1920) 
Krasnaya Knkga: (as above) (Moscow 1920) (both BLPES)
: Genuezskaya Konferentsiya: Materialy (Moscow 1922)
: Genuezskaya Konferentsiya: Materialy i Dokumenty: Steno- 
grafichesky Otchet Vypusk i (Moscow 1922)
: Gaagskaya Konferentsiya: Polny Stenografichesky Otchet (M.1922) 
Narodny Komissariat Vneshnei Torgovli (NKVT):
Vneshnyaya Torgovlya Rossii za pervuyu tret' 1922 g. (M*1922) 
Vneshnyaya Torgovlya RSFSR Dec 1920-Dec 1921: Otchet k 
IX S''ezdu Sovetov (Moscow 1921)
Narodny Komissariat po Delam Natsional'nostei (Narkomnat):
Politika Sovetskoi Vlasti po Natsional'nomy Voprosu aa 
Tri Goda 1917-1920 (MoscoR 1920) (BLPES)
National 'Hands off Russia' Committee:
Peace with Russia: Organized Labour's Demand (London 1920) 
Trade with Russia: the Facts (London 1921)
Russia's Protest against the British Government's unwarranted
interference in the Republic's internal affairs (TS,Ap '
The Arrest of British Trawlers (mineo 1923)(TUC)
Manifesto of the Wollwich 'Hands off Russia' Committee
(n.d. ?1923 London)(TUC)
Attacks on Russia during 1921 (London 1922)(TUC)
The British Ultimatum to Russia (May 1923* London)(BLPES)
The Hague Conference: interview with the Russian delegation
(london 1922)(LSE)
Industrial Reconstruction Council: Trade Parliaments (n.d*
1917?, London)(BLPES)
National Party: Industrial Committee: Industrial Unrest and 
Labour Policy (London 1920)(BLPES)
Miners* Federation of Great Britain: Annual Report etc
1917-192** (Mitchell Library)
National Council of British Socialist Sunday Schools: A 
Manual (Gateshead n*d* (1923))(Glasgow U*L.)
National Industrial Alliance (National Alliance of Employers 
and Employed): Programme (n.d. 2 parts, London)(BLPES)
: Report 1916/18,1920,1922 (BLPES)
RSFSR: All-Russian Congresses:
Fifth, July 1918 (Moscow 1918)
Sixth, November 1918 (Moscow 1919)
Seventh (December 19190 (Moscow 1920)
Eighhh, December 1920 (Moscow 1921)
Tenth, December 1922 (Moscow 1923)(All BLPES) 
Russian Trade Delegation: Information Department: Famine in 
Russia: documents and statistics presented to the Brussels 
Conference (London 1921)(BLPES)
: Restoration of
Agriculture in the Famine Areas of Russia (London 1922)(NLS)
: Nailed to the
Counter (Anti-Soviet lies)(London 1923)(preface Brailsford)
Reconstruction Society: No 62 new series: International
Revolutionary Propaganda: the Situation in Ireland (speech
by the Duke of Northumberland 7 July 1920)(BLPES)
Scottish T.U.C*: Annual Report 1917-192** (Mitchell,STUC)
Sheffield Chamber of Commerce: Annual Report 1920,1923 (S.P.L.!
Sheffield Trades and Labour Council: Annual Report 1916/7-23/**
Tsentralarkhiv: Dopros Kolchaka (ed* K*A* Popov,Leningrad 1925.
Trade Union Labour Party: Report of the First Meeting to
secure support for a Trade Union Labour Party (L*1918)(BLPES)
Trades Union Congress: Annual Congress Report 1915-192**
: General Cpuncil: The 1Zinoviev' letter: Report of the
Investigation of the British Labour delegation to Russia
(London 1925)(BLPES)
: General Council: Deputations to the Prime Minister 
September 1922 (BLPES)
: Reports of Deputations to Ministers 
February 1923 (BLPES)
: Parliamentary Committee: Joint Committee on the Cost 
of Living: Final Report (London 1921)(Mitchell) 
Vserossiiskaya (later: Vsesoyuzskaya*.) Sel*skokhozyaistvennaya \ 
i kustarno-prolyshlennaya Vystavka: Byullfcten' (Moscow 1923-**)
: Materialy i Dokumenty (Moscow 1922)
: Materialy i Dokumenty Vypusk 2 (Moscow 1923)
: Obshchy Katalog (Moscow 1923)
: Sputnik po Vystavke Kn* i-ii (Moscow 1923)
What Happened at Leeds (London 2 ed* 1917)(TUC) (reprinted with 
an introduction by Ken Coates, Nottingham: Institute for 
Workers* Control 1966: copy in BLPES)
Workers' Travel Association: Annual Report for 192**- (BM)
Petrograd Trade Union Council: British Labour Delegation 
(Petrograd 1920)(BM)
Workers' and Soldiers' Council: Miscellaneous Publications (1917)
1* Manifesto to District Conferences (1917) (both in NLS) 
(Workmen's and Soldiers' Council: Resolutions (London 1917 
**pp) is in the catalogue of BLPES but presently missing.
A printed list of the resolutions is in Glasgow Trades 
Council minutes above)
Govermment (Parliamentary) Publications:
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard): House of Commons 1917-192** 
Parliamentary Papers (These have been extensively utilised, 
and are not individually listed here; subject indices are 
in Vogel, Ron: Breviate of British Diplomatic Blue Books 
(McGill 1963), and General Index to Parliamentary Papers 
1900-19**9 (HMSO I960) • The more important headings for 
the purposes of this study have included: Russia, Statist­
ical Abstracts, Persia, Ireland, Army, Police, Genoa 
Conference, Hague Conference, Trade, Imperial Conferences, 
(East) India, Employers and Employed, Labour Statistics, 
Afghanistan and Egypt)*
Interviews:
Rajani Palme Butt (prominent Communist, editor Labour 
Monthly 1921-) (18 July 1972)
Morgan Philips Price (Manchester Guardian correspondent 
in Russia during the Revolution and after, leftwing 
Labour MP for Forest of Dean 1922-) (3 August 1972) 
Andrew Rothstein (Information Department of the Russian 
Trade Delegation from 1920) (letter of 14 July 1972)
Theses (unpublished)
Ritter, G.A.: The British Labour movement and Russia 
from the Revolution to Locarno (Oxford B.Litt 1959) 
Daniel, C.G.: British Intervention in Russia 1917-18 
(Birmingham B.A. thesis 1956)
Aziz, K.K.: Britain and Muslim India (Manchester 
Ph.D 1959-60)
Meynell, Hildemarie: The Second International 191^- 
1923 (Oxford B.Litt 1958)
Bather,L.: A History of Manchester and Salford Trades 
Council (Manchester Ph.D 1956)
Kent,M.R.: The British Government interest in Middle 
Eastern Oil Conseccions (London Ph.D 1968)
Hassaan, M.R.: Indian Politics and the British Right 
191^-1922 (London Ph.D 1963-1*)
(I have not made use of a thesis when the author's 
findings have subsequently been published in book 
form, e.g. Imam, Sinha, Mehrotra. It has not always 
been possible to locate earlier theses, presented 
before their deposition was required. General and 
subject listings of particular value are:
Index to Theses accepted for Higher Degrees (Aslib) 
Oxford Slavonic Papers xiii (1967)* Theses in 
Slavonic Studies in British Universities 1907-66 
Dissertation Abstracts
Lists of theses completed and in progress in Soviet 
Studies information supplement and ABSEES , Slavic
Review and the Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 
Dossicg, Jesse: list of American theses on Slavonic subjects to *60 
Bloomfield,B.C.: Theses on Asia (Cass, London 1967))
Contemporary Reference Works, Yearbooks and Encyclopedias 
Dod'sParliamentary Companion 
Annual Register
Indian Year Book (ed. Sir S. Reed) (1921-)
Labour Research Department: Labour International Year Book 1923 
ed. R.P. Dutt: Labour International Handbook (London 1921)
Employer’s Year Book 1920
Industrial Year Book 1922 (both ed. by P. Gee)
Labour Party: Labour Speakers’ Handbook (preface Henderson, ?1922)
Sir. /**() . "Iki Bv&K of ft
ed. F. Thornsby: Who’s Who in the Labour ana Co-operative Movement
Labour Year Book 1916, 1919, 1924
ed. A. Toynbee: Survey of International Affairs: 1920-3 (Londo n 1923
Ir&ceu W . : 7/x &00W. ef tc P e wtty (3\M> .L ftzr) : 1924 {London 1926)
- 7U Mzxk Ulwr lowh? \l*t> U >M) 
ed. Santalov, Segal.: Commercial Yearbook or the
Soviet Union (London 1925; 2 ed. 1926)
F.B.I. Yearbook and Export Register 1922, 1924
Foreign Office List
Ezhegodnik NKID 1925
V.I. Frolova: Statistika Vneshnego Tovaroobmena Rossii 1921-3 (M.’23) 
A.P. Vinokura, S.N. Bakulin ed: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR 
za period 1918-1927/8 (Moscow 1931)
A.I. Kutuzov ed.: Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za X Let (Moscow 1928) 1
Angle-Soviet Trade 1920-7 (London 1927)(BLPES)
Santalov A. ed.: SSSR na Angliiskom Rynke, Vypusk i (Moscow 1926)$M 
Entsiklopedia Russkogo Eksporta (3 vols, Berlin 1924-5)(ISEES) 
Peacock, N (ed.): Russian Almanac 1919
Lees-Smith H.B. ed.: Encyclopedia of the Labour Movement 
(3 vols. London 1928)
Labour Who’s Who (London 1924; 2 ed. 1927)
Directory of Directors 1922
Business Prospects Yearbook 1923
Stock Exchange Year Book 1923
Financial Times Investor's Guide (London 1923)
Chamber of Commerc^o^ Jgj^-gegt^gggia: fB&ftgjftan
Modern bibliography and reference works:
International Bibliography of Political Science (Paris 1954-,annual) 
International Political Science Abstracts (quarterly, Oxford) 
American Economic Association: Index of Economic Journals i (1961) 
American Bibliography of Slavonic and East European Studies 
Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History 
British Humanities Index (published for 1917/9, 1920, 1921 and 
1922 as Subject Index to Periodicals)
Social Sciences and Humanities Index (formerly International Index 
to Periodicals, published from 1907)
Labour Party Bibliography (London 1967)
Block, G.: A Source Book of Conservatism (London 1964)
Grierson,P; Books on Soviet Russia (^ondon 1942)
Gulick, C.A. et al: History and Theories of Working-Class Movements 
Vigor, PH.: Books on Communism (3 ed. London 1972) (Calif1964$
Gorodetsky, E.N.: Velikaya Oktyabbskaya Sotsialisticheskaya 
Revolyutsiya: Bibliografichesky Ukazatel1 Dokumental'nykh 
Publikatsii (Moscow 1961)
: Sovetskaya Strana v Periods Grazhdanskoi Voiny 
Baikova, A.N. : Istoriya Anglii i Irlandii: bibliografi-**osoow ^96l) 
chesky Ukazatel' Literatury.. 1918-62 gg (Moscow 1963)
Bibliografiya Afganistana (Moscow 1965)
Bibliografiya Indii (Moscow 1965)
Hammond, T.T.: Soviet Foreign Relations and World Communism (Prince- 
Volgyes,! ed.: Hungarian Soviet Republic 1919 (Stanford *70)to11 ^ 65)1 
Sworakowski, W. ed.: The Communist International and its Front 
Organizations (Stanford 1965)
Wilson, P.: Checklist of the Writings of M.N. Roy (Berkeley 1957) 
Woods, F. ed.: Bibliography of Winston Churchill 
Flint, J.E.: Books on the British Empire a d Commonwealth (1968$ 
McDougall, Ian ed.: Interim Bibliography of the Scottish 
Working-class movement (Edinburgh 1965)
Allen, V.L.:.Internetional Bibliography of Trade Unionism (London *69
E. Collotti Pischel, C. Robertazzi: L'Internationale Communists 
et les Problemes Coloniaux (Paris 1968)
(The standard Slavonic bibliographies of Maichel and Horecky have 
not been separately noted). ( Bibliographies of Nehru, Gandhi and 
the Indian National Congress by J.S. Sharma are in the India 0.Library)
British Museum : Catalogue of Brinted Books 
: Subject Index 
London Bibliography of the Social Sciences
Widener Library Shelflist No 4: Russian History since 1917 (1966) 
(The catalogues of the Hoover Institution and the Internationaal 
Instituut voor Sociale Gescheidenis have been reprinted, and 
have been consulted in BLPES as appropriate)
Public Record Office; Guide to the Contents of the P.R.O.
: Records of the Foreign Office 1782-1939 (HMSO 1969)
: Records of the Cabinet Office to 1922 (HMSO 1966)
: Records of Interest to Social Scientists (by Swann,B.,
and M. Turnbull, HMSO 1971)
Ford, P. and G. : Guide to Parliamentary Papers (Oxford 1956)
: Breviate of Parliamentary Papers 1917-39 
Ditmas, EMR ed: Consolidated Index to the Survey of
International Affairs and Documents on International 
Affairs 1920-1938 (London 1967)
Degras, J. : Calendar of Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (1948) 
Walker,G. ed: Directory of Libraries and Special Collections 
on Eastern Europe and the USSR (London 1971)
Slusser and Triska,J.: Calendar of Soviet Treaties 1917-57 (Stanf'59) 
Egorov,V.N. ed.: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya (tyoscow 1961)
: Vneshnyaya Politika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya 
(Moscow 1965) (lists of Soviet publications for 1945-60 and 
1961-4 respectively)
Dictionary of National Biography
Trukhanovsky V.G. ed.: Letopis* Sovetskoi Vneshnei Politiki (M. 1968) 
Who was Who
Diplomatiehesky Slovar' (3 vols Moscow 1960-4)
Saville, J. ed.: Dictionary of Labour Biography Vol i- (London 1972-)
Craig,F.W.S. ed.: British General Election Manifestoes 1918-66
('7$): British Parliamentary Election Results
1918-1949 (Glasgow 1969)
: General Election Statistics (2 ed. Chichester'71- 
Butler, D.E. and Freeman: British Political Facts 1900-66 
Mitchell,B.R. and Denae,P.: Abstract of British Historical 
Statistics (Cambridge 1962)
British Labour Statistics 1888-1968 (London HMSO 1971)
Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 1918-40 gg.; Statistichesky 
Obzor (Moscow i960)
Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR: Statistichesky Sbornik 1918-66 (M.'6$)
Contemporary Newspapers and Journals 
Arkos Kommerchesky Byulleten'




Board of Trade Journal (1922-4)
Bulletin of the Federation of British Industries (1923-4)
Bankers' Magazine (1922-3)
British Trades Union Review 
British Empire Union Record (1919)
Bradford Pioneer (1917, 1919, 1920)
British Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook (1923-4)
The (Birmingham) Town Crier (191?, 1919, 1920)




The Call (Moscow, 1918-19? nos 1,4 and 9 located)
Contemporary Review 
Curfent Opinion










Foreign Affairs (to June 1921)
Forward
Financial Times (May-December 1923)




Financial Review of Reviews 
Glasgow Herald (indexed)
Glasgow Chamber of Commerce Monthly Journal
Gleanings and Memoranda (Conservative Party; 1919,1921,1923)
Herald; and from April 1919:
Daily Herald
Inostrannoe Torgovoe Obozrenie 
Industrial Peace 
Izvestiya (from 1920)
International Press Correspondence (Inprecorr)
Industrial League Journal (1919)
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 






Liverpool Pioneer (November 1919: Liverpool P.L.)
Leeds Weekly Citizen (1917, 1919, 1920)
Labour Leader 
Labour Magazine
Leicester Pioneer (1917, 1919, 1920)
Labour Organiser
Labour Party Local Government, Pariisunentary and 
International Bulletin 
Manchester Chsimber of Commerce Monthly Record 
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn1 
Manchester Guardian (references only)
Manchester Guardian Commercial (1923)




New Voice (Middle Classes Union; for 1920)
New Leader
Narody Dal'nego Vostoka 
Novy Vostok
Narodnov Khozyaistvo (from 1920)
Nineteenth Century and After 
New Russia 





Pod Snamenem Marksisma 
Pravda (1920 -4)
Quarterly Review 
Russian Information and Review 






Russo-British Chambe* of Commerce Journal
Sheffield Forward (Nos 1,4,14-5,19, 1921-2, in Sheffield PL)













Vestnik Sotsialistickeskoi Akademii 
Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi Akademii 
Vestnik Statistiki
Westminster Gazette (references only)
Worker
Workers' Weekly
Woman's Dreadnought; which became:
Workers' Dreadnought
Woolwich Pioneer and Labour Journal
Zhizn' Natsional'nostei
Yorkshire Factory Times and Workers' Weekly Record (1917*1919-
1920)
Memoirs and Biographies:
Addison, C.M.: Politics from Within (2 vols London 1924) 
Amery,L.S.: My Political Life ii (London 1953)
Anderson,Mosa: Noel Buxton (London 1952)
Angell,N.: After All (London 1951)
Aralov,S.: Vospominaniya Sovetskogo Diplomata (Moscow I960) 
Asquith,H.H.: Memories and Reflections (2 vols London 1928) 
Attlee, C*: As it Happened (London 1954)
Bailey,F.M.: Mission to Tashkent (London 1946)
Barnes,G.N.: From Workshop to War Cabinet (London 1924)
Beer, Max: Fifty Years of International Socialism (L.'35) 
Beli, Tom: Pioneering Days (London 1941)
Birse,A.: Memoirs of.an Interpreter (London 1967)
Blake,R.: The Unknown Prime Minister (London 1955) 
Blaxland,G.: J.H. Thomas: A life for Unity (London 1964) 
Brittain,V.: Pethick-Lawrence: a Portrait (London 1963) 
Brockway,A.F.: Socialism over Sixty Years (London 1946)
: Indide the Left (london 1942)
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